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

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
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CONCEPTUAL MODELS AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS*

GRAHAM T. ALLISON
Harvard University

The Cuban missile crisis is a seminal event. For thirteen days of October 1962, there was a higher probability that more human lives would end suddenly than ever before in history. Had the worst occurred, the death of 100 million Americans, over 100 million Russians, and millions of Europeans as well would make previous natural calamities and inhumanities appear insignificant. Given the probability of disaster—which President Kennedy estimated as "between 1 out of 3 and even"—our escape seems awesome.[1] This event symbolizes a central, if only partially thinkable, fact about our existence. That such consequences could follow from the choices and actions of national governments obliges students of government as well as participants in governance to think hard about these problems.

Improved understanding of this crisis depends in part on more information and more probing analyses of available evidence. To contribute to these efforts is part of the purpose of this study. But here the missile crisis serves primarily as grist for a more general investigation. This study proceeds from the premise that marked improvement in our understanding of such events depends critically on more self-consciousness about what observers bring to the analysis. What each analyst sees and judges to be important is a function not only of the evidence about what happened but also of the "conceptual lenses" through which he looks at the evidence. The principal purpose of this essay is to explore some of the fundamental assumptions and categories employed by analysts in thinking about problems of governmental behavior, especially in foreign and military affairs.

The general argument can be summarized in three propositions:

1. *Analysts think about problems of foreign and* military policy in terms of largely implicit conceptual models that have significant consequences for the content of their thought.[2]

Though the present product of foreign policy analysis is neither systematic nor powerful, if one carefully examines explanations produced by analysts, a number of fundamental similarities emerge. Explanations produced by particular analysts display quite regular, predictable features. This predictability suggests a substructure. These regularities reflect an analyst's assumptions about the character of puzzles, the categories in which problems should be considered, the types of evidence that are relevant, and the determinants of occurrences. The first proposition is that clusters of such related assumptions constitute basic frames of reference or conceptual models in terms of which analysts both ask and answer the questions: What happened? Why did the event happen? What will happen?[3] Such assumptions are central to the activities of explanation and prediction, for in attempting to explain a particular event, the analyst cannot simply describe the full state of the world leading up to that event. The logic of explanation requires that he single out the relevant, important determinants of the occurrence.[4] Moreover, as the logic of prediction underscores, the analyst must summarize the various determinants as they bear on the event in question. Conceptual models both fix the mesh of the nets that the analyst drags through the material in order to explain a particular action or decision and direct him to cast his net in select ponds, at certain depths, in order to catch the fish he is after.

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* A longer version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September, 1968 (reproduced by the Rand Corporation, P-3919). The paper is part of a larger study, scheduled for publication in 1969 under the title *Bureaucracy and Policy: Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis*. For support in various stages of this work I am indebted to the Institute of Politics in the John F. Kennedy School of Government and the Center for International Affairs, both at Harvard University, the Rand Corporation, and the Council on Foreign Relations. For critical stimulation and advice I am especially grateful to Richard E. Neustadt, Thomas C. Schelling, Andrew W. Marshall, and Elisabeth K. Allison.

[1] Theodore Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York, 1965), p. 705.

[2] In attempting to understand problems of foreign affairs, analysts engage in a number of related, but logically separable enterprises: (a) description, (b) explanation, (c) prediction, (d) evaluation, and (e) recommendation. This essay focuses primarily on explanation (and by implication, prediction).

2. Most analysts explain (and predict) the behavior of national governments in terms of various forms of one basic conceptual model, here entitled the Rational Policy Model (Model I).[5]

In terms of this conceptual model, analysts attempt to understand happenings as the more or less purposive acts of unified national governments. For these analysts, the point of an explanation is to show how the nation or government could have chosen the action in question, given the strategic problem that it faced. For example, in confronting the problem posed by the Soviet installation of missiles in Cuba, rational policy model analysts attempt to show how this was a reasonable act from the point of view of the Soviet Union, given Soviet strategic objectives.

3. Two "alternative" conceptual models, here labeled an Organizational Process Model (Model II) and a Bureaucratic Politics Model (Model III) provide a base for improved explanation and prediction.

Although the standard frame of reference has proved useful for many purposes, there is powerful evidence that it must be supplemented, if not supplanted, by frames of reference which focus upon the large organizations and political actors involved in the policy process. Model I's implication that important events have important causes, i.e., that monoliths perform large actions for big reasons, must be balanced by an appreciation of the facts (a) that monoliths are black boxes covering various gears and levers in a highly differentiated decision-making structure, and (b) that large acts are the consequences of innumerable and often conflicting smaller actions by individuals at various levels of bureaucratic organizations in the service of a variety of only partially compatible conceptions of national goals, organizational goals, and political objectives. Recent developments in the field of organization theory provide the foundation for the second model. According to this organizational process model, what Model I categorizes as "acts" and "choices" are instead *outputs* of large organizations functioning according to certain regular patterns of behavior. Faced with the problem of Soviet missiles in Cuba, a Model II analyst identifies the relevant organizations and displays the patterns of organizational behavior from which this action emerged. The third model focuses on the internal politics of a government. Happenings in foreign affairs are understood, according to the bureaucratic politics model, neither as choices nor as outputs. Instead, what happens is categorized as *outcomes* of various overlapping bargaining games among players arranged hierarchically in the national government. In confronting the problem posed by Soviet missiles in Cuba, a Model III analyst displays the perceptions, motivations, positions, power, and maneuvers of principal players from which the outcome emerged.[6]

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[3] In arguing that explanations proceed in terms of implicit conceptual models, this essay makes no claim that foreign policy analysts have developed any satisfactory, empirically tested theory. In this essay, the use of the term "model" without qualifiers should be read "conceptual scheme."

[4] For the purpose of this argument we shall accept Carl G. Hempel's characterization of the logic of explanation: an explanation "answers the question, '*Why* did the explanadum-phenomenon occur?' by showing that the phenomenon resulted from particular circumstances, specified in C_1, C_2, . . . C_k, in accordance with laws L_1, L_2, . . . L_r. By pointing this out, the argument shows that, given the particular circumstances and the laws in question, the occurrence of the phenomenon was to be *expected;* and it is in this sense that the explanation enables us to understand why the phenomenon occurred." *Aspects of Scientific Explanation* (New York, 1965), p. 337. While various patterns of explanation can be distinguished, *viz.,* Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation,* New York, 1961), satisfactory scientific explanations exhibit this basic logic. Consequently prediction is the converse of explanation.

[5] Earlier drafts of this argument have aroused heated arguments concerning proper names for these models. To choose names from ordinary language is to court confusion, as well as familiarity. Perhaps it is best to think of these models as I, II, and III.

[6] In strict terms, the "outcomes" which these three models attempt to explain are essentially actions of national governments, i.e., the sum of activities of all individuals employed by a government relevant to an issue. These models focus not on a state of affairs, i.e., a full description of the

A central metaphor illuminates differences among these models. Foreign policy has often been compared to moves, sequences of moves, and games of chess. If one were limited to observations on a screen upon which moves in the chess game were projected without information as to how the pieces came to be moved, he would assume—as Model I does—that an individual chess player was moving the pieces with reference to plans and maneuvers toward the goal of winning the game. But a pattern of moves can be imagined that would lead the serious observer, after watching several games, to consider the hypothesis that the chess player was not a single individual but rather a loose alliance of semi-independent organizations, each of which moved its set of pieces according to standard operating procedures. For example, movement of separate sets of pieces might proceed in turn, each according to a routine, the king's rook, bishop, and their pawns repeatedly attacking the opponent according to a fixed plan. Furthermore, it is conceivable that the pattern of play would suggest to an observer that a number of distinct players, with distinct objectives but shared power over the pieces, were determining the moves as the resultant of collegial bargaining. For example, the black rook's move might contribute to the loss of a black knight with no comparable gain for the black team, but with the black rook becoming the principal guardian of the "palace" on that side of the board.

The space available does not permit full development and support of such a general argument.[7] Rather, the sections that follow simply sketch each conceptual model, articulate it as an analytic paradigm, and apply it to produce an explanation. But each model is applied to the same event: the U.S. blockade of Cuba during the missile crisis. These "alternative explanations" of the same happening illustrate differences among the models—*at work*.[8] A crisis decision, by a small group of men in the context of ultimate threat, this is a case of the rational policy model *par excellence*. The dimensions and factors that Models II and III uncover in this case are therefore particularly suggestive. The concluding section of this paper suggests how the three models may be related and how they can be extended to generate predictions.

MODEL I: RATIONAL POLICY

RATIONAL POLICY MODEL ILLUSTRATED

Where is the pinch of the puzzle raised by the *New York Times* over Soviet deployment of an antiballistic missile system?[9] The question, as the *Times* states it, concerns the Soviet Union's objective in allocating such large sums of money for this weapon system while at the same time seeming to pursue a policy of increasing détente. In former President Johnson's words, "the paradox is that this [Soviet deployment of an antiballistic missile system] should be happening at a time when there is abundant evidence that our mutual antagonism is beginning to ease."[10] This question troubles people primarily because Soviet antiballistic missile deployment, and evidence of Soviet actions towards détente, when juxtaposed in our implicit model, produce a question. With reference to what objective could the Soviet government have rationally chosen the simultaneous pursuit of these two courses of actions? This question arises only when the analyst attempts to structure events as purposive choices of consistent actors.

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world, but upon national decision and implementation. This distinction is stated clearly by Harold and Margaret Sprout, "Environmental Factors on the Study of International Politics," in James Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1961), p. 116. This restriction excludes explanations offered principally in terms of international systems theories. Nevertheless, this restriction is not severe, since few interesting explanations of occurrences in foreign policy have been produced at that level of analysis. According to David Singer, "The nation state —our primary actor in international relations . . . is clearly the traditional focus among Western students and is the one which dominates all of the texts employed in English-speaking colleges and universities." David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (eds.), *The International System* (Princeton, 1961). Similarly, Richard Brody's review of contemporary trends in the study of international relations finds that "scholars have come increasingly to focus on acts of nations. That is, they all focus on the behavior of nations in some respect. Having an interest in accounting for the behavior of nations in common, the prospects for a common frame of reference are enhanced."

[7] For further development and support of these arguments see the author's larger study, *Bureaucracy and Policy: Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (forthcoming). In its abbreviated form, the argument must, at some points, appear overly stark. The limits of space have forced the omission of many reservations and refinements.

[8] Each of the three "case snapshots" displays the work of a conceptual model as it is applied to explain the U.S. blockade of Cuba. But these three cuts are primarily exercises in hypothesis generation rather than hypothesis testing. Especially when separated from the larger study, these accounts may be misleading. The sources for these accounts include the full public record plus a large number of interviews with participants in the crisis.

[9] *New York Times*, February 18, 1967.

[10] *Ibid.*

How do analysts attempt to explain the Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba? The most widely cited explanation of this occurrence has been produced by two RAND Sovietologists, Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush.[11] They conclude that "the introduction of strategic missiles into Cuba was motivated chiefly by the Soviet leaders' desire to overcome . . . the existing large margin of U.S. strategic superiority."[12] How do they reach this conclusion? In Sherlock Holmes style, they seize several salient characteristics of this action and use these features as criteria against which to test alternative hypotheses about Soviet objectives. For example, the size of the Soviet deployment, and the simultaneous emplacement of more expensive, more visible intermediate range missiles as well as medium range missiles, it is argued, exclude an explanation of the action in terms of Cuban defense—since that objective could have been secured with a much smaller number of medium range missiles alone. Their explanation presents an argument for one objective that permits interpretation of the details of Soviet behavior as a value-maximizing choice.

How do analysts account for the coming of the First World War? According to Hans Morgenthau, "the first World War had its origin exclusively in the fear of a disturbance of the European balance of power.[13] In the period preceding World War I, the Triple Alliance precariously balanced the Triple Entente. If either power combination could gain a decisive advantage in the Balkans, it would achieve a decisive advantage in the balance of power. "It was this fear," Morgenthau asserts, "that motivated Austria in July 1914 to settle its accounts with Serbia once and for all, and that induced Germany to support Austria unconditionally. It was the same fear that brought Russia to the support of Serbia, and France to the support of Russia."[14] How is Morgenthau able to resolve this problem so confidently? By imposing on the data a "rational outline."[15] The value of this method, according to Morgenthau, is that "it provides for rational discipline in action and creates astounding continuity in foreign policy which makes American, British, or Russian foreign policy appear as an intelligent, rational continuum . . . regardless of the different motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of successive statesmen."[16]

Stanley Hoffmann's essay, "Restraints and Choices in American Foreign Policy" concentrates, characteristically, on "deep forces": the international system, ideology, and national character—which constitute restraints, limits, and blinders.[17] Only secondarily does he consider decisions. But when explaining particular occurrences, though emphasizing relevant constraints, he focuses on the choices of nations. American behavior in Southeast Asia is explained as a reasonable choice of "downgrading this particular alliance (SEATO) in favor of direct U.S. involvement," given the constraint: "one is bound by one's commitments; one is committed by one's mistakes."[18] More frequently, Hoffmann uncovers confusion or contradiction in the nation's choice. For example, U.S. policy towards underdeveloped countries is explained as "schizophrenic."[19] The method employed by Hoffmann in producing these explanations as rational (or irrational) decisions, he terms "imaginative reconstruction."[20]

Deterrence is the cardinal problem of the contemporary strategic literature. Thomas Schelling's *Strategy of Conflict* formulates a number of propositions focused upon the dynamics of deterrence in the nuclear age. One of the major propositions concerns the stability of the balance of terror: in a situation of mutual deterrence, the probability of nuclear war is reduced not by the "balance" (the sheer equality of the situation) but rather by the *stability* of the balance, i.e., the fact that neither opponent in striking first can destroy the other's ability to strike back.[21] How does Schelling support this proposition? Confidence in the contention stems not from an inductive canvass of a large number of previous cases, but rather from two calculations. In a situation of "balance" but vulnerability, there are values for which a rational opponent could choose to strike first, e.g., to destroy enemy capabilities to retaliate. In a

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[11] Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago, 1965). Based on A. Horelick, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Behavior," *World Politics* (April, 1964).

[12] Horelick and Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy*, p. 154.

[13] Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (3rd ed.; New York, 1960), p. 191.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 192.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 5–6.

[17] Stanley Hoffmann, *Daedalus* (Fall, 1962); reprinted in *The State of War* (New York, 1965).

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 171.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 189.

[20] Following Robert MacIver; see Stanley Hoffmann, *Contemporary Theory in International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, 1960), pp. 178–179.

[21] Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, (New York, 1960), p. 232. This proposition was formulated earlier by A. Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," *Foreign Affairs* (January, 1959).

"stable balance" where no matter who strikes first, each has an assured capability to retaliate with unacceptable damage, no rational agent could choose such a course of action (since that choice is effectively equivalent to choosing mutual homicide). Whereas most contemporary strategic thinking is driven *implicitly* by the motor upon which this calculation depends, Schelling explicitly recognizes that strategic theory does assume a model. The foundation of a theory of strategy is, he asserts: "the assumption of rational behavior—not just of intelligent behavior, but of behavior motivated by conscious calculation of advantages, calculation that in turn is based on an explicit and internally consistent value system."[22]

What is striking about these examples from the literature of foreign policy and international relations are the similarities among analysts of various styles when they are called upon to produce explanations. Each assumes that what must be explained is an action, i.e., the realization of some purpose or intention. Each assumes that the actor is the national government. Each assumes that the action is chosen as a calculated response to a strategic problem. For each, explanation consists of showing what goal the government was pursuing in committing the act and how this action was a reasonable choice, given the nation's objectives. This set of assumptions characterizes the rational policy model. The assertion that Model I is the standard frame of reference implies no denial of highly visible differences among the interests of Sovietologists, diplomatic historians, international relations theorists, and strategists. Indeed, in most respects, differences among the work of Hans Morgenthau, Stanley Hoffmann, and Thomas Schelling could not be more pointed. Appreciation of the extent to which each relies predominantly on Model I, however, reveals basic similarities among Morgenthau's method of "rational reenactment," Hoffmann's "imaginative reconstruction," and Schelling's "vicarious problem solving;" family resemblances among Morgenthau's "rational statesman," Hoffmann's "roulette player," and Schelling's "game theorist."[23]

Most contemporary analysts (as well as laymen) proceed predominantly—albeit most often implicitly—in terms of this model when attempting to explain happenings in foreign affairs. Indeed, that occurrences in foreign affairs are the *acts* of *nations* seems so fundamental to thinking about such problems that this underlying model has rarely been recognized: to explain an occurrence in foreign policy simply means to show how the government could have rationally chosen that action.[24] These brief examples illustrate five uses of the model. To prove that most analysts think largely in terms of the rational policy model is not possible. In this limited space it is not even possible to illustrate the range of employment of the framework. Rather, my purpose is to convey to the reader a grasp of the model and a challenge: let the reader examine the literature with which he is most familiar and make his judgment.

The general characterization can be sharpened by articulating the rational policy model as an "analytic paradigm" in the technical sense developed by Robert K. Merton for sociological analyses.[25] Systematic statement of basic assumptions, concepts, and propositions employed by Model I analysts highlights the distinctive thrust of this style of analysis. To articulate a largely implicit framework is of necessity to caricature. But caricature can be instructive.

RATIONAL POLICY PARADIGM

I. Basic Unit of Analysis: Policy as National Choice

Happenings in foreign affairs are conceived as actions chosen by the nation or national government.[26] Governments select the action that will maximize strategic goals and objectives. These "solutions" to strategic problems are the fundamental categories in terms of which the analyst perceives what is to be explained.

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[22] Schelling, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

[23] See Morgenthau, *op. cit.*, p. 5; Hoffmann, *Contemporary Theory*, pp. 178–179; Hoffmann, "Roulette in the Cellar," *The State of War;* Schelling, *op. cit.*

[24] The larger study examines several exceptions to this generalization. Sidney Verba's excellent essay "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System" is less an exception than it is an approach to a somewhat different problem. Verba focuses upon models of rationality and irrationality of *individual* statesmen: in Knorr and Verba, *The International System.*

[25] Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structures* (Revised and Enlarged Edition; New York, 1957), pp. 12–16. Considerably weaker than a satisfactory theoretical model, paradigms nevertheless represent a short step in that direction from looser, implicit conceptual models. Neither the concepts nor the relations among the variables are sufficiently specified to yield propositions deductively. "Paradigmatic Analysis" nevertheless has considerable promise for clarifying and codifying styles of analysis in political science. Each of the paradigms stated here can be represented rigorously in mathematical terms. For example, Model I lends itself to mathematical formulation along the lines of Herbert Simon's "Behavioral Theory of Rationality," *Models of Man* (New York, 1957). But this does not solve the most difficult problem of "measurement and estimation."

II. Organizing Concepts

A. *National Actor.* The nation or government, conceived as a rational, unitary decisionmaker, is the agent. This actor has one set of specified goals (the equivalent of a consistent utility function), one set of perceived options, and a single estimate of the consequences that follow from each alternative.

B. *The Problem.* Action is chosen in response to the strategic problem which the nation faces. Threats and opportunities arising in the "international strategic market place" move the nation to act.

C. *Static Selection.* The sum of activity of representatives of the government relevant to a problem constitutes what the nation has chosen as its "solution." Thus the action is conceived as a steady-state choice among alternative outcomes (rather than, for example, a large number of partial choices in a dynamic stream).

D. *Action as Rational Choice.* The components include:

1. *Goals and Objectives.* National security and national interests are the principal categories in which strategic goals are conceived. Nations seek security and a range of further objectives. (Analysts rarely translate strategic goals and objectives into an explicit utility function; nevertheless, analysts do focus on major goals and objectives and trade off side effects in an intuitive fashion.)

2. *Options.* Various courses of action relevant to a strategic problem provide the spectrum of options.

3. *Consequences.* Enactment of each alternative course of action will produce a series of consequences. The relevant consequences constitute benefits and costs in terms of strategic goals and objectives.

4. *Choice.* Rational choice is value-maximizing. The rational agent selects the alternative whose consequences rank highest in terms of his goals and objectives.

III. Dominant Inference Pattern

This paradigm leads analysts to rely on the following pattern of inference: if a nation performed a particular action, that nation must have had ends towards which the action constituted an optimal means. The rational policy model's explanatory power stems from this inference pattern. Puzzlement is relieved by revealing the purposive pattern within which the occurrence can be located as a value-maximizing means.

IV. General Propositions

The disgrace of political science is the infrequency with which propositions of any generality are formulated and tested. "Paradigmatic analysis" argues for explicitness about the terms in which analysis proceeds, and seriousness about the logic of explanation. Simply to illustrate the kind of propositions on which analysts who employ this model rely, the formulation includes several.

The basic assumption of value-maximizing behavior produces propositions central to most explanations. The general principle can be formulated as follows: the likelihood of any particular action results from a combination of the nation's (1) relevant values and objectives, (2) perceived alternative courses of action, (3) estimates of various sets of consequences (which will follow from each alternative), and (4) net valuation of each set of consequences. This yields two propositions.

A. An increase in the cost of an alternative, i.e., a reduction in the value of the set of consequences which will follow from that action, or a reduction in the probability of attaining fixed consequences, reduces the likelihood of that alternative being chosen.

B. A decrease in the costs of an alternative, i.e., an increase in the value of the set of consequences which will follow from that alternative, or an increase in the probability of attaining fixed consequences, increases the likelihood of that action being chosen.[27]

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[26] Though a variant of this model could easily be stochastic, this paradigm is stated in non-probabilistic terms. In contemporary strategy, a stochastic version of this model is sometimes used for predictions; but it is almost impossible to find an explanation of an occurrence in foreign affairs that is consistently probabilistic.

Analogies between Model I and the concept of explanation developed by R. G. Collingwood, William Dray, and other "revisionists" among philosophers concerned with the critical philosophy of history are not accidental. For a summary of the "revisionist position" see Maurice Mandelbaum, "Historical Explanation: The Problem of Covering Laws," *History and Theory* (1960).

[27] This model is an analogue of the theory of the rational entrepreneur which has been developed extensively in economic theories of the firm and the consumer. These two propositions specify the "substitution effect." Refinement of this model and

V. Specific Propositions

A. *Deterrence.* The likelihood of any particular attack results from the factors specified in the general proposition. Combined with factual assertions, this general proposition yields the propositions of the sub-theory of deterrence.

(1) A stable nuclear balance reduces the likelihood of nuclear attack. This proposition is derived from the general proposition plus the asserted fact that a second-strike capability affects the potential attacker's calculations by increasing the likelihood and the costs of one particular set of consequences which might follow from attack—namely, retaliation.

(2) A stable nuclear balance increases the probability of limited war. This proposition is derived from the general proposition plus the asserted fact that though increasing the costs of a nuclear exchange, a stable nuclear balance nevertheless produces a more significant reduction in the probability that such consequences would be chosen in response to a limited war. Thus this set of consequences weighs less heavily in the calculus.

B. *Soviet Force Posture.* The Soviet Union chooses its force posture (i.e., its weapons and their deployment) as a value-maximizing means of implementing Soviet strategic objectives and military doctrine. A proposition of this sort underlies Secretary of Defense Laird's inference from the fact of 200 SS-9s (large intercontinental missiles) to the assertion that, "the Soviets are going for a first-strike capability, and there's no question about it."[28]

VARIANTS OF THE RATIONAL POLICY MODEL

This paradigm exhibits the characteristics of the most refined version of the rational model. The modern literature of strategy employs a model of this sort. Problems and pressures in the "international strategic marketplace" yield probabilities of occurrence. The international actor, which could be any national actor, is simply a value-maximizing mechanism for getting from the strategic problem to the logical solution. But the explanations and predictions produced by most analysts of foreign affairs depend primarily on variants of this "pure" model. The point of each is the same: to place the action within a value-maximizing framework, given certain constraints. Nevertheless, it may be helpful to identify several variants, each of which might be exhibited similarly as a paradigm. The first focuses upon the national actor and his choice in a particular situation, leading analysts to further constrain the goals, alternatives, and consequences considered. Thus, (1) national propensities or personality traits reflected in an "operational code," (2) concern with certain objectives, or (3) special principles of action, narrow the "goals" or "alternatives" or "consequences" of the paradigm. For example, the Soviet deployment of ABMs is sometimes explained by reference to the Soviet's "defense-mindedness." Or a particular Soviet action is explained as an instance of a special rule of action in the Bolshevik operational code.[29] A second, related, cluster of variants focuses on the individual leader or leadership group as the actor whose preference function is maximized and whose personal (or group) characteristics are allowed to modify the alternatives, consequences, and rules of choice. Explanations of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam as a natural consequence of the Kennedy-Johnson Administration's axioms of foreign policy rely on this variant. A third, more complex variant of the basic model recognizes the existence of several actors within a government, for example, Hawks and Doves or military and civilians, but attempts to explain (or predict) an occurrence by reference to the objectives of the victorious actor. Thus, for example, some revisionist histories of the Cold War recognize the forces of light and the forces of darkness within the U.S. government, but explain American actions as a result of goals and perceptions of the victorious forces of darkness.

Each of these forms of the basic paradigm constitutes a formalization of what analysts typically rely upon implicitly. In the transition from implicit conceptual model to explicit paradigm much of the richness of the best employments of this model has been lost. But the purpose in raising loose, implicit conceptual models to an explicit level is to reveal the basic logic of analysts' activity. Perhaps some of the remaining artificiality that surrounds the statement of the paradigm can be erased by noting a number of the standard additions and modifications employed by analysts who proceed *predominantly* within the rational policy model. First, in the course of a document, analysts shift from one variant of the basic model to another, occasionally appropriating in an *ad hoc* fashion aspects of a situation which are logically incompatible with the basic model. Second, in the course of explaining a number of occurrences, analysts sometimes pause over a particular event about which they have a great deal of information and unfold it in such detail that an impression of

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specification of additional general propositions by translating from the economic theory is straightforward.

[28] *New York Times,* March 22, 1969.

[29] See Nathan Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1953).

randomness is created. Third, having employed other assumptions and categories in deriving an explanation or prediction, analysts will present their product in a neat, convincing rational policy model package. (This accommodation is a favorite of members of the intelligence community whose association with the details of a process is considerable, but who feel that by putting an occurrence in a larger rational framework, it will be more comprehensible to their audience.) Fourth, in attempting to offer an explanation—particularly in cases where a prediction derived from the basic model has failed—the notion of a "mistake" is invoked. Thus, the failure in the prediction of a "missile gap" is written off as a Soviet mistake in not taking advantage of their opportunity. Both these and other modifications permit Model I analysts considerably more variety than the paradigm might suggest. But such accommodations are essentially appendages to the basic logic of these analyses.

THE U.S. BLOCKADE OF CUBA: A FIRST CUT[30]

The U.S. response to the Soviet Union's emplacement of missiles in Cuba must be understood in strategic terms as simple value-maximizing escalation. American nuclear superiority could be counted on to paralyze Soviet nuclear power; Soviet transgression of the nuclear threshold in response to an American use of lower levels of violence would be wildly irrational since it would mean virtual destruction of the Soviet Communist system and Russian nation. American local superiority was overwhelming: it could be initiated at a low level while threatening with high credibility an ascending sequence of steps short of the nuclear threshold. All that was required was for the United States to bring to bear its strategic and local superiority in such a way that American determination to see the missiles removed would be demonstrated, while at the same time allowing Moscow time and room to retreat without humiliation. The naval blackade—euphemistically named a "quarantine" in order to circumvent the niceties of international law—did just that.

The U.S. government's selection of the blockade followed this logic. Apprised of the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba, the President assembled an Executive Committee (ExCom) of the National Security Council and directed them to "set aside all other tasks to make a prompt and intense survey of the dangers and all possible courses of action."[31] This group functioned as "fifteen individuals on our own, representing the President and not different departments."[32] As one of the participants recalls, "The remarkable aspect of those meetings was a sense of complete equality."[33] Most of the time during the week that followed was spent canvassing all the possible tracks and weighing the arguments for and against each. Six major categories of action were considered.

1. Do nothing. U.S. vulnerability to Soviet missiles was no new thing. Since the U.S. already lived under the gun of missiles based in Russia, a Soviet capability to strike from Cuba too made little real difference. The real danger stemmed from the possibility of U.S. over-reaction. The U.S. should announce the Soviet action in a calm, casual manner thereby deflating whatever political capital Khrushchev hoped to make of the missiles.

This argument fails on two counts. First, it grossly underestimates the military importance of the Soviet move. Not only would the Soviet Union's missile capability be doubled and the U.S. early warning system outflanked. The Soviet Union would have an opportunity to reverse the strategic balance by further installations, and indeed, in the longer run, to invest in cheaper, shorter-range rather than more expensive longer-range missiles. Second, the political importance of this move was undeniable. The Soviet Union's act challenged the American President's most solemn warning. If the U.S. failed to respond, no American commitment would be credible.

2. Diplomatic pressures. Several forms were considered: an appeal to the U.N. or O.A.S. for an inspection team, a secret approach to Khrushchev, and a direct approach to Khrushchev, perhaps at a summit meeting. The United States would demand that the missiles be removed, but the final settlement might include neutralization of Cuba, U.S. withdrawal from the Guantanamo base, and withdrawal of U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey or Italy.

Each form of the diplomatic approach had its own drawbacks. To arraign the Soviet Union before the U.N. Security Council held little promise since the Russians could veto any proposed action. While the diplomats argued, the missiles would become operational. To send a secret emissary to Khrushchev demanding that the missiles be withdrawn would be to pose untenable alternatives. On the one hand, this would invite Khrushchev to seize the diplomatic initiative, perhaps committing himself to strategic retaliation in response to an attack on Cuba. On the other hand, this would tender an ultimatum that no great power could accept. To confront Khrushchev at a summit would guarantee demands for U.S. concessions, and the analogy between U.S. missiles in Turkey and Russian missiles in Cuba could not be erased.

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[30] As stated in the introduction, this "case snapshot" presents, without editorial commentary, a Model I analyst's explanation of the U.S. blockade. The purpose is to illustrate a strong, characteristic rational policy model account. This account is (roughly) consistent with prevailing explanations of these events.

[31] Theodore Sorensen, *op. cit.*, p. 675.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 679.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 679.

But why not trade U.S. Jupiters in Turkey and Italy, which the President had previously ordered withdrawn, for the missiles in Cuba? The U.S. had chosen to withdraw these missiles in order to replace them with superior, less vulnerable Mediterranean Polaris submarines. But the middle of the crisis was no time for concessions. The offer of such a deal might suggest to the Soviets that the West would yield and thus tempt them to demand more. It would certainly confirm European suspicions about American willingness to sacrifice European interests when the chips were down. Finally, the basic issue should be kept clear. As the President stated in reply to Bertrand Russell, "I think your attention might well be directed to the burglars rather than to those who have caught the burglars."[34]

3. A secret approach to Castro. The crisis provided an opportunity to separate Cuba and Soviet Communism by offering Castro the alternatives, "split or fall." But Soviet troops transported, constructed, guarded, and controlled the missiles. Their removal would thus depend on a Soviet decision.

4. Invasion. The United States could take this occasion not only to remove the missiles but also to rid itself of Castro. A Navy exercise had long been scheduled in which Marines, ferried from Florida in naval vessels, would liberate the imaginary island of Vieques.[35] Why not simply shift the point of disembarkment? (The Pentagon's foresight in planning this operation would be an appropriate antidote to the CIA's Bay of Pigs!)

Preparations were made for an invasion, but as a last resort. American troops would be forced to confront 20,000 Soviets in the first Cold War case of direct contact between the troops of the super powers. Such brinksmanship courted nuclear disaster, practically guaranteeing an equivalent Soviet move against Berlin.

5. Surgical air strike. The missile sites should be removed by a clean, swift conventional attack. This was the effective counter-action which the attempted deception deserved. A surgical strike would remove the missiles and thus eliminate both the danger that the missiles might become operational and the fear that the Soviets would discover the American discovery and act first.

The initial attractiveness of this alternative was dulled by several difficulties. First, could the strike really be "surgical"? The Air Force could not guarantee destruction of all the missiles.[36] Some might be fired during the attack; some might not have been identified. In order to assure destruction of Soviet and Cuban means of retaliating, what was required was not a surgical but rather a massive attack—of at least 500 sorties. Second, a surprise air attack would of course kill Russians at the missile sites. Pressures on the Soviet Union to retaliate would be so strong that an attack on Berlin or Turkey was highly probable. Third, the key problem with this program was that of advance warning. Could the President of the United States, with his memory of Pearl Harbor and his vision of future U.S. responsibility, order a "Pearl Harbor in reverse"? For 175 years, unannounced Sunday morning attacks had been an anathema to our tradition.[37]

6. Blockade. Indirect military action in the form of a blockade became more attractive as the ExCom dissected the other alternatives. An embargo on military shipments to Cuba enforced by a naval blockade was not without flaws, however. Could the U.S. blockade Cuba without inviting Soviet reprisal in Berlin? The likely solution to joint blockades would be the lifting of both blockades, restoring the new *status quo,* and allowing the Soviets additional time to complete the missiles. Second, the possible consequences of the blockade resembled the drawbacks which disqualified the air strike. If Soviet ships did not stop, the United States would be forced to fire the first shot, inviting retaliation. Third, a blockade would deny the traditional freedom of the seas demanded by several of our close allies and might be held illegal, in violation of the U.N. Charter and international law, unless the United States could obtain a two-thirds vote in the O.A.S. Finally, how

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[34] Elie Abel, *The Missile Crisis* (New York, 1966), p. 144.

[35] *Ibid.,* p. 102.

[36] Sorensen, *op. cit.,* p. 684.

[37] *Ibid.,* p. 685. Though this was the formulation of the argument, the facts are not strictly accurate. Our tradition against surprise attack was rather younger than 175 years. For example President Theodore Roosevelt applauded Japan's attack on Russia in 1904.

could a blockade be related to the problem, namely, some 75 missiles on the island of Cuba, approaching operational readiness daily? A blockade offered the Soviets a spectrum of delaying tactics with which to buy time to complete the missile installations. Was a *fait accompli* not required?

In spite of these enormous difficulties the blockade had comparative advantages: (1) It was a middle course between inaction and attack, aggressive enough to communicate firmness of intention, but nevertheless not so precipitous as a strike. (2) It placed on Khrushchev the burden of choice concerning the next step. He could avoid a direct military clash by keeping his ships away. His was the last clear chance. (3) No possible military confrontation could be more acceptable to the U.S. than a naval engagement in the Caribbean. (4) This move permitted the U.S., by flexing its conventional muscle, to exploit the threat of subsequent non-nuclear steps in each of which the U.S. would have significant superiority.

Particular arguments about advantages and disadvantages were powerful. The explanation of the American choice of the blockade lies in a more general principle, however. As President Kennedy stated in drawing the moral of the crisis:

> Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy—of a collective death wish for the world.[38]

The blockade was the United States' only real option.

MODEL II: ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS

For some purposes, governmental behavior can be usefully summarized as action chosen by a unitary, rational decisionmaker: centrally controlled, completely informed, and value maximizing. But this simplification must not be allowed to conceal the fact that a "government" consists of a conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations, each with a substantial life of its own. Government leaders do sit formally, and to some extent in fact, on top of this conglomerate. But governments perceive problems through organizational sensors. Governments define alternatives and estimate consequences as organizations process information. Governments act as these organizations enact routines. Government behavior can therefore be understood according to a second conceptual model, less as deliberate choices of leaders and more as *outputs* of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior.

To be responsive to a broad spectrum of problems, governments consist of large organizations among which primary responsibility for particular areas is divided. Each organization attends to a special set of problems and acts in quasi-independence on these problems. But few important problems fall exclusively within the domain of a single organization. Thus government behavior relevant to any important problem reflects the independent output of several organizations, partially coordinated by government leaders. Government leaders can substantially disturb, but not substantially control, the behavior of these organizations.

To perform complex routines, the behavior of large numbers of individuals must be coordinated. Coordination requires standard operating procedures: rules according to which things are done. Assured capability for reliable performance of action that depends upon the behavior of hundreds of persons requires established "programs." Indeed, if the eleven members of a football team are to perform adequately on any particular down, each player must not "do what he thinks needs to be done" or "do what the quarterback tells him to do." Rather, each player must perform the maneuvers specified by a previously established play which the quarterback has simply called in this situation.

At any given time, a government consists of *existing* organizations, each with a *fixed* set of standard operating procedures and programs. The behavior of these organizations—and consequently of the government—relevant to an issue in any particular instance is, therefore, determined primarily by routines established in these organizations prior to that instance. But organizations do change. Learning occurs gradually, over time. Dramatic organizational change occurs in response to major crises. Both learning and change are influenced by existing organizational capabilities.

Borrowed from studies of organizations, these loosely formulated propositions amount simply to *tendencies*. Each must be hedged by modifiers like "other things being equal" and "under certain conditions." In particular instances, tendencies hold—more or less. In specific situations, the relevant question is: more or less? But this is as it should be. For, on the one hand, "organizations" are no more homogeneous a class than "solids." When scientists tried to generalize about "solids," they achieved similar results. Solids tend to expand when heated, but some do and some don't. More adequate categorization of the various elements now lumped under the rubric "organizations" is thus required. On the other hand, the behavior of particular organizations seems considerably more complex than the behavior of solids. Additional information about a particular organization is required for further specification of the tendency statements. In spite of these two caveats, the characterization of government action as organizational output differs distinctly from Model I. Attempts to understand problems of foreign affairs in terms of this frame of reference should produce quite different explanations.[39]

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[38] *New York Times*, June, 1963.

ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS PARADIGM[40]

I. Basic Unit of Analysis: Policy as Organizational Output

The happenings of international politics are, in three critical senses, outputs of organizational processes. First, the actual occurrences are organizational outputs. For example, Chinese entry into the Korean War—that is, the fact that Chinese soldiers were firing at U.N. soldiers south of the Yalu in 1950—is an organizational action: the action of men who are soldiers in platoons which are in companies, which in turn are in armies, responding as privates to lieutenants who are responsible to captains and so on to the commander, moving into Korea, advancing against enemy troops, and firing according to fixed routines of the Chinese Army. Government leaders' decisions trigger organizational routines. Government leaders can trim the edges of this output and exercise some choice in combining outputs. But the mass of behavior is determined by previously established procedures. Second, existing organizational routines for employing present physical capabilities constitute the effective options open to government leaders confronted with any problem. Only the existence of men, equipped and trained as armies and capable of being transported to North Korea, made entry into the Korean War a live option for the Chinese leaders. The fact that fixed programs (equipment, men, and routines which exist at the particular time) exhaust the range of buttons that leaders can push is not always perceived by these leaders. But in every case it is critical for an understanding of what is actually done. Third, organizational outputs structure the situation within the narrow constraints of which leaders must contribute their "decision" concerning an issue. Outputs raise the problem, provide the information, and make the initial moves that color the face of the issue that is turned to the leaders. As Theodore Sorensen has observed: "Presidents rarely, if ever, make decisions—particularly in foreign affairs—in the sense of writing their conclusions on a clean slate . . . The basic decisions, which confine their choices, have all too often been previously made."[41] If one understands the structure of the situation and the face of the issue—which are determined by the organizational outputs—the formal choice of the leaders is frequently anti-climactic.

II. Organizing Concepts

A. *Organizational Actors.* The actor is not a monolithic "nation" or "government" but rather a constellation of loosely allied organizations on top of which government leaders sit. This constellation acts only as component organizations perform routines.[42]

B. *Factored Problems and Fractionated Power.* Surveillance of the multiple facets of foreign affairs requires that problems be cut up and parcelled out to various organizations. To avoid paralysis, primary power must accompany primary responsibility. But if organizations are permitted to do anything, a large part of what they do will be determined within the organization. Thus each organization perceives problems, processes information, and performs a range of actions in quasi-independence (within broad guidelines of national policy). Factored problems and fractionated power are two edges of the same sword. Factoring permits more specialized attention to particular facets of problems than would be possible if government leaders tried to cope with these problems by themselves. But this additional attention must be paid for in the coin of discretion for *what* an organization attends to, and *how* organizational responses are programmed.

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[39] The influence of organizational studies upon the present literature of foreign affairs is minimal. Specialists in international politics are not students of organization theory. Organization theory has only recently begun to study organizations as decisionmakers and has not yet produced behavioral studies of national security organizations from a decision-making perspective. It seems unlikely, however, that these gaps will remain unfilled much longer. Considerable progress has been made in the study of the business firm as an organization. Scholars have begun applying these insights to government organizations, and interest in an organizational perspective is spreading among institutions and individuals concerned with actual government operations. The "decisionmaking" approach represented by Richard Snyder, R. Bruck, and B. Sapin, *Foreign Policy Decision-Making* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1962), incorporates a number of insights from organization theory.

[40] The formulation of this paradigm is indebted both to the orientation and insights of Herbert Simon and to the behavioral model of the firm stated by Richard Cyert and James March, *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm* (Englewood Cliffs, 1963). Here, however, one is forced to grapple with the less routine, less quantified functions of the less differentiated elements in government organizations.

[41] Theodore Sorensen, "You Get to Walk to Work," *New York Times Magazine*, March 19, 1967.

[42] Organizations are not monolithic. The proper level of disaggregation depends upon the objectives of a piece of analysis. This paradigm is formulated with reference to the major organizations that constitute the U.S. government. Generalization to the major components of each department and agency should be relatively straightforward.

C. *Parochial Priorities, Perceptions, and Issues.* Primary responsibility for a narrow set of problems encourages organizational parochialism. These tendencies are enhanced by a number of additional factors: (1) selective information available to the organization, (2) recruitment of personnel into the organization, (3) tenure of individuals in the organization, (4) small group pressures within the organization, and (5) distribution of rewards by the organization. Clients (e.g., interest groups), government allies (e.g., Congressional committees), and extra-national counterparts (e.g., the British Ministry of Defense for the Department of Defense, ISA, or the British Foreign Office for the Department of State, EUR) galvanize this parochialism. Thus organizations develop relatively stable propensities concerning operational priorities, perceptions, and issues.

D. *Action as Organizational Output.* The preeminent feature of organizational activity is its programmed character: the extent to which behavior in any particular case is an enactment of preestablished routines. In producing outputs, the activity of each organization is characterized by:

1. *Goals: Constraints Defining Acceptable Performance.* The operational goals of an organization are seldom revealed by formal mandates. Rather, each organization's operational goals emerge as a set of constraints defining acceptable performance. Central among these constraints is organizational health, defined usually in terms of bodies assigned and dollars appropriated. The set of constraints emerges from a mix of expectations and demands of other organizations in the government, statutory authority, demands from citizens and special interest groups, and bargaining within the organization. These constraints represent a quasi-resolution of conflict—the constraints are relatively stable, so there is some resolution. But conflict among alternative goals is always latent; hence, it is a quasi-resolution. Typically, the constraints are formulated as imperatives to avoid roughly specified discomforts and disasters.[43]

2. *Sequential Attention to Goals.* The existence of conflict among operational constraints is resolved by the device of sequential attention. As a problem arises, the subunits of the organization most concerned with that problem deal with it in terms of the constraints they take to be most important. When the next problem arises, another cluster of subunits deals with it, focusing on a different set of constraints.

3. *Standard Operating Procedures.* Organizations perform their "higher" functions, such as attending to problem areas, monitoring information, and preparing relevant responses for likely contingencies, by doing "lower" tasks, for example, preparing budgets, producing reports, and developing hardware. Reliable performance of these tasks requires standard operating procedures (hereafter SOPs). Since procedures are "standard" they do not change quickly or easily. Without these standard procedures, it would not be possible to perform certain concerted tasks. But because of standard procedures, organizational behavior in particular instances often appears unduly formalized, sluggish, or inappropriate.

4. *Programs and Repertoires.* Organizations must be capable of performing actions in which the behavior of large numbers of individuals is carefully coordinated. Assured performance requires clusters of rehearsed SOPs for producing specific actions, e.g., fighting enemy units or answering an embassy's cable. Each cluster comprises a "program" (in the terms both of drama and computers) which the organization has available for dealing with a situation. The list of programs relevant to a type of activity, e.g., fighting, constitutes an organizational repertoire. The number of programs in a repertoire is always quite limited. When properly triggered, organizations execute programs; programs cannot be substantially changed in a particular situation. The more complex the action and the greater the number of individuals involved, the more important are programs and repertoires as determinants of organizational behavior.

5. *Uncertainty Avoidance.* Organizations do not attempt to estimate the probability distribution of future occurrences. Rather, organizations

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[43] The stability of these constraints is dependent on such factors as rules for promotion and reward, budgeting and accounting procedures, and mundane operating procedures.

avoid uncertainty. By arranging a *negotiated environment,* organizations regularize the reactions of other actors with whom they have to deal. The primary environment, relations with other organizations that comprise the government, is stabilized by such arrangements as agreed budgetary splits, accepted areas of responsibility, and established conventional practices. The secondary environment, relations with the international world, is stabilized between allies by the establishment of contracts (alliances) and "club relations" (U.S. State and U.K. Foreign Office or U.S. Treasury and U.K. Treasury). Between enemies, contracts and accepted conventional practices perform a similar function, for example, the rules of the "precarious status quo" which President Kennedy referred to in the missile crisis. Where the international environment cannot be negotiated, organizations deal with remaining uncertainties by establishing a set of *standard scenarios* that constitute the contingencies for which they prepare. For example, the standard scenario for Tactical Air Command of the U.S. Air Force involves combat with enemy aircraft. Planes are designed and pilots trained to meet this problem. That these preparations are less relevant to more probable contingencies, e.g., provision of close-in ground support in limited wars like Vietnam, has had little impact on the scenario.

6. *Problem-directed Search.* Where situations cannot be construed as standard, organizations engage in search. The style of search and the solution are largely determined by existing routines. Organizational search for alternative courses of action is problem-oriented: it focuses on the atypical discomfort that must be avoided. It is simple-minded: the neighborhood of the symptom is searched first; then, the neighborhood of the current alternative. Patterns of search reveal biases which in turn reflect such factors as specialized training or experience and patterns of communication.

7. *Organizational Learning and Change.* The parameters of organizational behavior mostly persist. In response to non-standard problems, organizations search and routines evolve, assimilating new situations. Thus learning and change follow in large part from existing procedures. But marked changes in organizations do sometimes occur. Conditions in which dramatic changes are more likely include: (1) Periods of budgetary feast. Typically, organizations devour budgetary feasts by purchasing additional items on the existing shopping list. Nevertheless, if committed to change, leaders who control the budget can use extra funds to effect changes. (2) Periods of prolonged budgetary famine. Though a single year's famine typically results in few changes in organizational structure but a loss of effectiveness in performing some programs, prolonged famine forces major retrenchment. (3) Dramatic performance failures. Dramatic change occurs (mostly) in response to major disasters. Confronted with an undeniable failure of procedures and repertoires, authorities outside the organization demand change, existing personnel are less resistant to change, and critical members of the organization are replaced by individuals committed to change.

E. *Central Coordination and Control.* Action requires decentralization of responsibility and power. But problems lap over the jurisdictions of several organizations. Thus the necessity for decentralization runs headlong into the requirement for coordination. (Advocates of one horn or the other of this dilemma—responsive action entails decentralized power vs. coordinated action requires central control—account for a considerable part of the persistent demand for government reorganization.) Both the necessity for coordination and the centrality of foreign policy to national welfare guarantee the involvement of government leaders in the procedures of the organizations among which problems are divided and power shared. Each organization's propensities and routines can be disturbed by government leaders' intervention. Central direction and persistent control of organizational activity, however, is not possible. The relation among organizations, and between organizations and the government leaders depends critically on a number of structural variables including: (1) the nature of the job, (2) the measures and information available to government leaders, (3) the system of rewards and punishments for organizational members, and (4) the procedures by which human and material resources get committed. For example, to the extent that rewards and punishments for the members of an organization are distributed by higher authorities, these authorities can exercise some control by specifying criteria in terms of which organizational output is to be evaluated. These criteria become constraints within which organizational activity proceeds. But constraint is a crude instrument of control.

Intervention by government leaders does sometimes change the activity of an organization in an intended direction. But instances are fewer than might be expected. As Franklin Roosevelt, the master manipulator of government organizations, remarked:

> The Treasury is so large and far-flung and ingrained in its practices that I find it is almost impossible to get the action and results I want. . . .

> But the Treasury is not to be compared with the State Department. You should go through the experience of trying to get any changes in the thinking, policy, and action of the career diplomats and then you'd know what a real problem was. But the Treasury and the State Department put together are nothing compared with the Na-a-vy . . . To change anything in the Na-a-vy is like punching a feather bed. You punch it with your right and you punch it with your left until you are finally exhausted, and then you find the damn bed just as it was before you started punching.[44]

John Kennedy's experience seems to have been similar: "The State Department," he asserted, "is a bowl full of jelly."[45] And lest the McNamara revolution in the Defense Department seem too striking a counter-example, the Navy's recent rejection of McNamara's major intervention in Naval weapons procurement, the F-111B, should be studied as an antidote.

F. *Decisions of Government Leaders.* Organizational persistence does not exclude shifts in governmental behavior. For government leaders sit atop the conglomerate of organizations. Many important issues of governmental action require that these leaders decide what organizations will play out which programs where. Thus stability in the parochialisms and SOPs of individual organizations is consistent with some important shifts in the behavior of governments. The range of these shifts is defined by existing organizational programs.

III. Dominant Inference Pattern

If a nation performs an action of this type today, its organizational components must yesterday have been performing (or have had established routines for performing) an action only marginally different from this action. At any specific point in time, a government consists of an established conglomerate of organizations, each with existing goals, programs, and repertoires. The characteristics of a government's action in any instance follows from those established routines, and from the choice of government leaders—on the basis of information and estimates provided by existing routines—among existing programs. The best explanation of an organization's behavior at t is $t - 1$; the prediction of $t + 1$ is t. Model II's explanatory power is achieved by uncovering the organizational routines and repertoires that produced the outputs that comprise the puzzling occurrence.

IV. General Propositions

A number of general propositions have been stated above. In order to illustrate clearly the type of proposition employed by Model II analysts, this section formulates several more precisely.

A. *Organizational Action.* Activity according to SOPs and programs does not constitute far-sighted, flexible adaptation to "the issue" (as it is conceived by the analyst). Detail and nuance of actions by organizations are determined predominantly by organizational routines, not government leaders' directions.

1. SOPs constitute routines for dealing with *standard* situations. Routines allow large numbers of ordinary individuals to deal with numerous instances, day after day, without considerable thought, by responding to basic stimuli. But this regularized capability for adequate performance is purchased at the price of standardization. If the SOPs are appropriate, average performance, i.e., performance averaged over the range of cases, is better than it would be if each instance were approached individually (given fixed talent, timing, and resource constraints). But specific instances, particularly critical instances that typically do not have "standard" characteristics, are often handled sluggishly or inappropriately.

2. A program, i.e., a complex action chosen from a short list of programs in a repertoire, is rarely tailored to the specific situation in which it is executed. Rather, the program is (at best) the most appropriate of the programs in a previously developed repertoire.

3. Since repertoires are developed by parochial organizations for standard scenarios defined by that organization, programs available for dealing with a particular situation are often ill-suited.

B. *Limited Flexibility and Incremental Change.* Major lines of organizational action are straight, i.e., behavior at one time is marginally different from that behavior at $t - 1$. Simple-minded predictions work best: Behavior at $t + 1$ will be marginally different from behavior at the present time.

1. Organizational budgets change incrementally—both with respect to totals and with respect to intra-organizational splits. Though organizations could divide the money available each year by carving up the pie anew (in the light of changes in objectives or environment), in practice, organizations take last year's budget as a base and adjust incrementally. Predictions that require large budgetary shifts in a single year between organizations or between units within an organization should be hedged.

2. Once undertaken, an organizational in-

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[44] Marriner Eccles, *Beckoning Frontiers* (New York, 1951), p. 336.

[45] Arthur Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days* (Boston, 1965), p. 406.

vestment is not dropped at the point where "objective" costs outweigh benefits. Organizational stakes in adopted projects carry them quite beyond the loss point.

C. *Administrative Feasibility*. Adequate explanation, analysis, and prediction must include administrative feasibility as a major dimension. A considerable gap separates what leaders choose (or might rationally have chosen) and what organizations implement.

1. Organizations are blunt instruments. Projects that require several organizations to act with high degrees of precision and coordination are not likely to succeed.
2. Projects that demand that existing organizational units depart from their accustomed functions and perform previously unprogrammed tasks are rarely accomplished in their designed form.
3. Government leaders can expect that each organization will do its "part" in terms of what the organization knows how to do.
4. Government leaders can expect incomplete and distorted information from each organization concerning its part of the problem.
5. Where an assigned piece of a problem is contrary to the existing goals of an organization, resistance to implementation of that piece will be encountered.

V. *Specific Propositions*.

1. *Deterrence*. The probability of nuclear attack is less sensitive to balance and imbalance, or stability and instability (as these concepts are employed by Model I strategists) than it is to a number of organizational factors. Except for the special case in which the Soviet Union acquires a credible capability to destroy the U.S. with a disarming blow, U.S. superiority or inferiority affects the probability of a nuclear attack less than do a number of organizational factors.

First, if a nuclear attack occurs, it will result from organizational activity: the firing of rockets by members of a missile group. The enemy's *control system*, i.e., physical mechanisms and standard procedures which determine who can launch rockets when, is critical. Second, the enemy's programs for bringing his strategic forces to *alert status* determine probabilities of accidental firing and momentum. At the outbreak of World War I, if the Russian Tsar had understood the organizational processes which his order of full mobilization triggered, he would have realized that he had chosen war. Third, organizational repertoires fix the range of effective choice open to enemy leaders. The menu available to Tsar Nicholas in 1914 has two entrees: full mobilization and no mobilization. Partial mobilization was not an organizational option. Fourth, since organizational routines set the chessboard, the training and deployment of troops and nuclear weapons is crucial. Given that the outbreak of hostilities in Berlin is more probable than most scenarios for nuclear war, facts about deployment, training, and tactical nuclear equipment of Soviet troops stationed in East Germany—which will influence the face of the issue seen by Soviet leaders at the outbreak of hostilities and the manner in which choice is implemented—are as critical as the question of "balance."

2. *Soviet Force Posture*. Soviet force posture, i.e., the fact that certain weapons rather than others are procured and deployed, is determined by organizational factors such as the goals and procedures of existing military services and the goals and processes of research and design labs, within budgetary constraints that emerge from the government leader's choices. The frailty of the Soviet Air Force within the Soviet military establishment seems to have been a crucial element in the Soviet failure to acquire a large bomber force in the 1950s (thereby faulting American intelligence predictions of a "bomber gap"). The fact that missiles were controlled until 1960 in the Soviet Union by the Soviet Ground Forces, whose goals and procedures reflected no interest in an intercontinental mission, was not irrelevant to the slow Soviet buildup of ICBMs (thereby faulting U.S. intelligence predictions of a "missile gap"). These organizational factors (Soviet Ground Forces' control of missiles and that service's fixation with European scenarios) make the Soviet deployment of so many MRBMs that European targets could be destroyed three times over, more understandable. Recent weapon developments, e.g., the testing of a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) and multiple warheads for the SS-9, very likely reflect the activity and interests of a cluster of Soviet research and development organizations, rather than a decision by Soviet leaders to acquire a first strike weapon system. Careful attention to the organizational components of the Soviet military establishment (Strategic Rocket Forces, Navy, Air Force, Ground Forces, and National Air Defense), the missions and weapons systems to which each component is wedded (an independent weapon system assists survival as an independent service), and existing budgetary splits (which probably are relatively stable in the Soviet Union as they tend to be everywhere) offer potential improvements in medium and longer term predictions.

THE U.S. BLOCKADE OF CUBA: A SECOND CUT

Organizational Intelligence. At 7:00 P.M. on

October 22, 1962, President Kennedy disclosed the American discovery of the presence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba, declared a "strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba," and demanded that "Chairman Khrushchev halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace."[46] This decision was reached at the pinnacle of the U.S. Government after a critical week of deliberation. What initiated that precious week were photographs of Soviet missile sites in Cuba taken on October 14. These pictures might not have been taken until a week later. In that case, the President speculated, "I don't think probably we would have chosen as prudently as we finally did."[47] U.S. leaders might have received this information three weeks earlier—if a U-2 had flown over San Cristobal in the last week of September.[48] What determined the context in which American leaders came to choose the blockade was the discovery of missiles on October 14.

There has been considerable debate over alleged American "intelligence failures" in the Cuban missile crisis.[49] But what both critics and defenders have neglected is the fact that the discovery took place on October 14, rather than three weeks earlier or a week later, as a consequence of the established routines and procedures of the organizations which constitute the U.S. intelligence community. These organizations were neither more nor less successful than they had been the previous month or were to be in the months to follow.[50]

The notorious "September estimate," approved by the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) on September 19, concluded that the Soviet Union would not introduce offensive missiles into Cuba.[51] No U-2 flight was directed over the western end of Cuba (after September 5) before October 4.[52] No U-2 flew over the western end of Cuba until the flight that discovered the Soviet missiles on October 14.[53] Can these "failures" be accounted for in organizational terms?

On September 19 when USIB met to consider the question of Cuba, the "system" contained the following information: (1) shipping intelligence had noted the arrival in Cuba of two large-hatch Soviet lumber ships, which were riding high in the water; (2) refugee reports of countless sightings of missiles, but also a report that Castro's private pilot, after a night of drinking in Havana, had boasted: "We will fight to the death and perhaps we can win because we have everything, including atomic weapons"; (3) a sighting by a CIA agent of the rear profile of a strategic missile; (4) U-2 photos produced by flights of August 29, September 5 and 17 showing the construction of a number of SAM sites and other defensive missiles.[54] Not all of this information was on the desk of the estimators, however. Shipping intelligence experts noted the fact that large-hatch ships were riding high in the water and spelled out the inference: the ships must be carrying "space consuming" cargo.[55] These facts were carefully included in the catalogue of intelligence concerning shipping. For experts sensitive to the Soviets' shortage of ships, however, these facts carried no special signal. The refugee report of Castro's private pilot's remark had been received at Opa Locka, Florida, along with vast reams of inaccurate reports generated by the refugee community. This report and a thousand others had to be checked and compared before being sent to Washington. The two weeks required for initial processing could have been shortened by a large increase in resources, but the yield of this source was already quite marginal. The CIA agent's sighting of the rear profile of a strategic missile had occurred on September 12; transmission time from agent sighting to arrival in Washington typically took 9 to 12 days. Shortening this transmission time would impose severe cost in terms of danger to sub-agents, agents, and communication networks.

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[46] U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin*, XLVII, pp. 715–720.

[47] Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, p. 803.

[48] Theodore Sorensen, *Kennedy*, p. 675.

[49] See U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Preparedness Investigation Subcommittee, *Interim Report on Cuban Military Build-up*, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963, p. 2; Hanson Baldwin, "Growing Risks of Bureaucratic Intelligence," *The Reporter* (August 15, 1963), 48–50; Roberta Wohlstetter, "Cuba and Pearl Harbor," *Foreign Affairs* (July, 1965), 706.

[50] U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations, *Hearings*, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963, 25 ff.

[51] R. Hilsman, *To Move a Nation* (New York, 1967), pp. 172–173.

[52] Department of Defense Appropriations, *Hearings*, p. 67.

[53] *Ibid.*, pp. 66–67.

[54] For (1) Hilsman, *op. cit.*, p. 186; (2) Abel, *op. cit.*, p. 24; (3) Department of Defense Appropriations, *Hearings*, p. 64; Abel, *op. cit.*, p. 24; (4) Department of Defense Appropriations, *Hearings*, pp. 1–30.

[55] The facts here are not entirely clear. This assertion is based on information from (1) "Department of Defense Briefing by the Honorable R. S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, State Department Auditorium, 5:00 p.m., February 6, 1963." A verbatim transcript of a presentation actually made by General Carroll's assistant, John Hughes; and (2) Hilsman's statement, *op. cit.*, p. 186. But see R. Wohlstetter's interpretation, "Cuba and Pearl Harbor," 700.

On the information available, the intelligence chiefs who predicted that the Soviet Union would not introduce offensive missiles into Cuba made a reasonable and defensible judgment.[56] Moreover, in the light of the fact that these organizations were gathering intelligence not only about Cuba but about potential occurrences in all parts of the world, the informational base available to the estimators involved nothing out of the ordinary. Nor, from an organizational perspective, is there anything startling about the gradual accumulation of evidence that led to the formulation of the hypothesis that the Soviets were installing missiles in Cuba and the decision on October 4 to direct a special flight over western Cuba.

The ten-day delay between that decision and the flight is another organizational story.[57] At the October 4 meeting, the Defense Department took the opportunity to raise an issue important to its concerns. Given the increased danger that a U-2 would be downed, it would be better if the pilot were an officer in uniform rather than a CIA agent. Thus the Air Force should assume responsibility for U-2 flights over Cuba. To the contrary, the CIA argued that this was an intelligence operation and thus within the CIA's jurisdiction. Moreover, CIA U-2's had been modified in certain ways which gave them advantages over Air Force U-2's in averting Soviet SAM's. Five days passed while the Stâte Department pressed for less risky alternatives such as drones and the Air Force (in Department of Defense guise) and CIA engaged in territorial disputes. On October 9 a flight plan over San Cristobal was approved by COMOR, but to the CIA's dismay, Air Force pilots rather than CIA agents would take charge of the mission. At this point details become sketchy, but several members of the intelligence community have speculated that an Air Force pilot in an Air Force U-2 attempted a high altitude overflight on October 9 that "flamed out", i.e., lost power, and thus had to descend in order to restart its engine. A second round between Air Force and CIA followed, as a result of which Air Force pilots were trained to fly CIA U-2's. A successful overflight took place on October 14.

This ten-day delay constitutes some form of "failure." In the face of well-founded suspicions concerning offensive Soviet missiles in Cuba that posed a critical threat to the United States' most vital interest, squabbling between organizations whose job it is to produce this information seems entirely inappropriate. But for each of these organizations, the question involved the issue: "*Whose* job was it to be?" Moreover, the issue was not simply, which organization would control U-2 flights over Cuba, but rather the broader issue of ownership of U-2 intelligence activities—a very long standing territorial dispute. Thus though this delay was in one sense a "failure," it was also a nearly inevitable consequence of two facts: many jobs do not fall neatly into precisely defined organizational jurisdictions; and vigorous organizations are imperialistic.

Organizational Options. Deliberations of leaders in ExCom meetings produced broad outlines of alternatives. Details of these alternatives and blueprints for their implementation had to be specified by the organizations that would perform these tasks. These organizational outputs answered the question: What, specifically, *could* be done?

Discussion in the ExCom quickly narrowed the live options to two: an air strike and a blockade. The choice of the blockade instead of the air strike turned on two points: (1) the argument from morality and tradition that the United States could not perpetrate a "Pearl Harbor in reverse"; (2) the belief that a "surgical" air strike was impossible.[58] Whether the United States *might* strike first was a question not of capability but of morality. Whether the United States *could* perform the surgical strike was a factual question concerning capabilities. The majority of the members of the ExCom, including the President, initially preferred the air strike.[59] What effectively foreclosed this option, however, was the fact that the air strike they wanted could not be chosen with high confidence of success.[60] After having tentatively chosen the course of prudence—given that the surgical air strike was not an option—Kennedy reconsidered. On Sunday morning, October 21, he called the Air Force experts to a special meeting in his living quarters where he probed once more for the option of a "*surgical*" air strike.[61] General

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[56] See Hilsman, *op. cit.*, pp. 172–174.

[57] Abel, *op. cit.*, pp. 26 ff; Weintal and Bartlett, *Facing the Brink* (New York, 1967), pp. 62 ff; *Cuban Military Build-up;* J. Daniel and J. Hubbell, *Strike in the West* (New York, 1963), pp. 15 ff.

[58] Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, p. 804.

[59] Sorensen, *Kennedy*, p. 684.

[60] *Ibid.*, pp. 684 ff.

[61] *Ibid.*, pp. 694–697.

Walter C. Sweeny, Commander of Tactical Air Forces, asserted again that the Air Force could guarantee no higher than ninety percent effectiveness in a surgical air strike.[62] That "fact" was false.

The air strike alternative provides a classic case of military estimates. One of the alternatives outlined by the ExCom was named "air strike." Specification of the details of this alternative was delegated to the Air Force. Starting from an existing plan for massive U.S. military action against Cuba (prepared for contingencies like a response to a Soviet Berlin grab), Air Force estimators produced an attack to guarantee success.[63] This plan called for extensive bombardment of all missile sites, storage depots, airports, and, in deference to the Navy, the artillery batteries opposite the naval base at Guantanamo.[64] Members of the ExCom repeatedly expressed bewilderment at military estimates of the number of sorties required, likely casualties, and collateral damage. But the "surgical" air strike that the political leaders had in mind was never carefully examined during the first week of the crisis. Rather, this option was simply excluded on the grounds that since the Soviet MRBM's in Cuba were classified "mobile" in U.S. manuals, extensive bombing was required. During the second week of the crisis, careful examination revealed that the missiles were mobile, in the sense that small houses are mobile: that is, they could be moved and reassembled in 6 days. After the missiles were reclassified "movable" and detailed plans for surgical air strikes specified, this action was added to the list of live options for the end of the second week.

Organizational Implementation. Ex-Com members separated several types of blockade: offensive weapons only, all armaments, and all strategic goods including POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants). But the *"details"* of the operation were left to the Navy. Before the President announced the blockade on Monday evening, the first stage of the Navy's blueprint was in motion, and a problem loomed on the horizon.[65] The Navy had a detailed plan for the blockade. The President had several less precise but equally determined notions concerning what should be done, when, and how. For the Navy the issue was one of effective implementation of the Navy's blockade—without the meddling and interference of political leaders. For the President, the problem was to pace and manage events in such a way that the Soviet leaders would have time to see, think, and blink.

A careful reading of available sources uncovers an instructive incident. On Tuesday the British Ambassador, Ormsby-Gore, after having attended a briefing on the details of the blockade, suggested to the President that the plan for intercepting Soviet ships far out of reach of Cuban jets did not facilitate Khrushchev's hard decision.[66] Why not make the interception much closer to Cuba and thus give the Russian leader more time? According to the public account and the recollection of a number of individuals involved, Kennedy "agreed immediately, called McNamara, and over emotional Navy protest, issued the appropriate instructions."[67] As Sorensen records, "in a sharp clash with the Navy, he made certain his will prevailed."[68] The Navy's plan for the blockade was thus changed by drawing the blockade much closer to Cuba.

A serious organizational orientation makes one suspicious of this account. More careful examination of the available evidence confirms these suspicions, though alternative accounts must be somewhat speculative. According to the public chronology, a quarantine drawn close to Cuba became effective on Wednesday morning, the first Soviet ship was contacted on Thursday morning, and the first boarding of a ship occurred on Friday. According to the statement by the Department of Defense, boarding of the *Marcula* by a party from the *John R. Pierce* "took place at 7:50 A.M., E.D.T., 180 miles northeast of Nassau."[69] The *Marcula* had been trailed since about 10:30 the previous evening.[70] Simple calculations suggest that the *Pierce* must have been stationed along the Navy's original arc which extended 500 miles out to sea from Cape Magsi, Cuba's eastern most tip.[71] The blockade line was *not* moved as the President ordered, and the accounts report.

What happened is not entirely clear. One can be certain, however, that Soviet ships passed through the line along which American destroyers had posted themselves before the official "first contact" with the Soviet ship. On October 26 a Soviet tanker arrived in Havana and was honored by a dockside rally for "running the blockade." Photographs of this vessel show the name *Vinnitsa* on the side of the vessel in

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[62] *Ibid.*, p. 697; Abel. *op. cit.*, pp. 100–101.

[63] Sorensen, *Kennedy*, p. 669.

[64] Hilsman, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

[65] See Abel, *op. cit.*, pp. 97 ff.

[66] Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, p. 818.

[67] *Ibid.*

[68] Sorensen, *Kennedy*, p. 710.

[69] *New York Times*, October 27, 1962.

[70] Abel, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

[71] For the location of the original arc see Abel, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

Cyrillic letters.[72] But according to the official U.S. position, the first tanker to pass through the blockade was the *Bucharest,* which was hailed by the Navy on the morning of October 25. Again simple mathematical calculation excludes the possibility that the *Bucharest* and the *Vinnitsa* were the same ship. It seems probable that the Navy's resistance to the President's order that the blockade be drawn in closer to Cuba forced him to allow one or several Soviet ships to pass through the blockade after it was officially operative.[73]

This attempt to leash the Navy's blockade had a price. On Wednesday morning, October 24, what the President had been awaiting occurred. The 18 dry cargo ships heading towards the quarantine stopped dead in the water. This was the occasion of Dean Rusk's remark, "We are eyeball to eyeball and I think the other fellow just blinked."[74] But the Navy had another interpretation. The ships had simply stopped to pick up Soviet submarine escorts. The President became quite concerned lest the Navy—already riled because of Presidential meddling in its affairs—blunder into an incident. Sensing the President's fears, McNamara became suspicious of the Navy's procedures and routines for making the first interception. Calling on the Chief of Naval Operations in the Navy's inner sanctum, the Navy Flag Plot, McNamara put his questions harshly.[75] Who would make the first interception? Were Russian-speaking officers on board? How would submarines be dealt with? At one point McNamara asked Anderson what he would do if a Soviet ship's captain refused to answer questions about his cargo. Picking up the Manual of Navy Regulations the Navy man waved it in McNamara's face and shouted, "It's all in there." To which McNamara replied, "I don't give a damn what John Paul Jones would have done; I want to know what you are going to do, now."[76] The encounter ended on Anderson's remark: "Now, Mr. Secretary, if you and your Deputy will go back to your office the Navy will run the blockade."[77]

MODEL III: BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS

The leaders who sit on top of organizations are not a monolithic group. Rather, each is, in his own right, a player in a central, competitive game. The name of the game is bureaucratic politics: bargaining along regularized channels among players positioned hierarchically within the government. Government behavior can thus be understood according to a third conceptual model not as organizational outputs, but as outcomes of bargaining games. In contrast with Model I, the bureaucratic politics model sees no unitary actor but rather many actors as players, who focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse intra-national problems as well, in terms of no consistent set of strategic objectives but rather according to various conceptions of national, organizational, and personal goals, making government decisions not by rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics.

The apparatus of each national government constitutes a complex arena for the intra-national game. Political leaders at the top of this apparatus plus the men who occupy positions on top of the critical organizations form the circle of central players. Ascendancy to this circle assures some independent standing. The necessary decentralization of decisions required for action on the broad range of foreign policy problems guarantees that each player has considerable discretion. Thus power is shared.

The nature of problems of foreign policy permits fundamental disagreement among reasonable men concerning what ought to be done. Analyses yield conflicting recommendations. Separate responsibilities laid on the shoulders of individual personalities encourage differences in perceptions and priorities. But the issues are of first order importance. What the nation does really matters. A wrong choice could mean irreparable damage. Thus responsible men are obliged to fight for what they are convinced is right.

Men share power. Men differ concerning what must be done. The differences matter. This milieu necessitates that policy be resolved by politics. What the nation does is sometimes the result of the triumph of one group over others. More often, however, different groups pulling in different directions yield a resultant distinct from what anyone intended. What moves the chess pieces is not simply the reasons which support a course of action, nor the routines of organizations which enact an alternative, but the power and skill of proponents and opponents of the action in question.

This characterization captures the thrust of the bureaucratic politics orientation. If problems of foreign policy arose as discreet issues, and decisions were determined one game at a time, this account would suffice. But most "issues," e.g., Vietnam or the proliferation of nuclear weapons, emerge piecemeal, over time, one lump in one context, a second in another. Hundreds of issues compete for players' attention every day. Each player is forced to fix upon his issues for that day, fight them on their own terms, and rush on to the next. Thus the character of emerging issues and the pace at which the game is played converge to yield government "decisions" and "actions" as collages. Choices by one player, outcomes of minor games, outcomes of central games, and "foul-ups"—these pieces, when stuck to the same canvas, constitute government behavior relevant to an issue.

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[72] *Facts on File,* Vol. XXII, 1962, p. 376, published by Facts on File, Inc., New York, yearly.

[73] This hypothesis would account for the mystery surrounding Kennedy's explosion at the leak of the stopping of the *Bucharest*. See Hilsman, *op. cit.,* p. 45.

[74] Abel, *op. cit.,* p. 153.

[75] See *ibid.,* pp. 154 ff.

[76] *Ibid.,* p. 156.

[77] *Ibid.*

The concept of national security policy as political outcome contradicts both public imagery and academic orthodoxy. Issues vital to national security, it is said, are too important to be settled by political games. They must be "above" politics. To accuse someone of "playing politics with national security" is a most serious charge. What public conviction demands, the academic penchant for intellectual elegance reinforces. Internal politics is messy; moreover, according to prevailing doctrine, politicking lacks intellectual content. As such, it constitutes gossip for journalists rather than a subject for serious investigation. Occasional memoirs, anecdotes in historical accounts, and several detailed case studies to the contrary, most of the literature of foreign policy avoids bureaucratic politics. The gap between academic literature and the experience of participants in government is nowhere wider than at this point.

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS PARADIGM[78]

I. Basic Unit of Analysis: Policy as Political Outcome

The decisions and actions of governments are essentially intra-national political outcomes: outcomes in the sense that what happens is not chosen as a solution to a problem but rather results from compromise, coalition, competition, and confusion among government officials who see different faces of an issue; political in the sense that the activity from which the outcomes emerge is best characterized as bargaining. Following Wittgenstein's use of the concept of a "game," national behavior in international affairs can be conceived as outcomes of intricate and subtle, simultaneous, overlapping games among players located in positions, the hierarchical arrangement of which constitutes the government.[79] These games proceed neither at random nor at leisure. Regular channels structure the game. Deadlines force issues to the attention of busy players. The moves in the chess game are thus to be explained in terms of the bargaining among players with separate and unequal power over particular pieces and with separable objectives in distinguishable subgames.

II. Organizing Concepts

A. *Players in Positions.* The actor is neither a unitary nation, nor a conglomerate of organizations, but rather a number of individual players. Groups of these players constitute the agent for particular government decisions and actions. Players are men in jobs.

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[78] This paradigm relies upon the small group of analysts who have begun to fill the gap. My primary source is the model implicit in the work of Richard E. Neustadt, though his concentration on presidential action has been generalized to a concern with policy as the outcome of political bargaining among a number of independent players, the President amounting to no more than a "superpower" among many lesser but considerable powers. As Warner Schilling argues, the substantive problems are of such inordinate difficulty that uncertainties and differences with regard to goals, alternatives, and consequences are inevitable. This necessitates what Roger Hilsman describes as the process of conflict and consensus building. The techniques employed in this process often resemble those used in legislative assemblies, though Samuel Huntington's characterization of the process as "legislative" overemphasizes the equality of participants as opposed to the hierarchy which structures the game. Moreover, whereas for Huntington, foreign policy (in contrast to military policy) is set by the executive, this paradigm maintains that the activities which he describes as legislative are characteristic of the process by which foreign policy is made.

[79] The theatrical metaphor of stage, roles, and actors is more common than this metaphor of games, positions, and players. Nevertheless, the rigidity connotated by the concept of "role" both in the theatrical sense of actors reciting fixed lines and in the sociological sense of fixed responses to specified social situations makes the concept of games, positions, and players more useful for this analysis of active participants in the determination of national policy. Objections to the terminology on the grounds that "game" connotes non-serious play overlook the concept's application to most serious problems both in Wittgenstein's philosophy and in contemporary game theory. Game theory typically treats more precisely structured games, but Wittgenstein's examination of the "language game" wherein men use words to communicate is quite analogous to this analysis of the less specified game of bureaucratic politics. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* and Thomas Schelling, "What is Game Theory?" in James Charlesworth, *Contemporary Political Analysis.*

Individuals become players in the national security policy game by occupying a critical position in an administration. For example, in the U.S. government the players include "Chiefs": the President, Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, Director of the CIA, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, since 1961, the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs;[80] "Staffers": the immediate staff of each Chief; "Indians": the political appointees and permanent government officials within each of the departments and agencies; and *"Ad Hoc* Players": actors in the wider government game (especially "Congressional Influentials"), members of the press, spokesmen for important interest groups (especially the "bipartisan foreign policy establishment" in and out of Congress), and surrogates for each of these groups. Other members of the Congress, press, interest groups, and public form concentric circles around the central arena —circles which demarcate the permissive limits within which the game is played.

Positions define what players both may and must do. The advantages and handicaps with which each player can enter and play in various games stems from his position. So does a cluster of obligations for the performance of certain tasks. The two sides of this coin are illustrated by the position of the modern Secretary of State. First, in form and usually in fact, he is the primary repository of political judgment on the political-military issues that are the stuff of contemporary foreign policy; consequently, he is a senior personal advisor to the President. Second, he is the colleague of the President's other senior advisers on the problems of foreign policy, the Secretaries of Defense and Treasury, and the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Third, he is the ranking U.S. diplomat for serious negotiation. Fourth, he serves as an Administration voice to Congress, the country, and the world. Finally, he is "Mr. State Department" or "Mr. Foreign Office," "leader of officials, spokesman for their causes, guardian of their interests, judge of their disputes, superintendent of their work, master of their careers."[81] But he is not first one, and then the other. All of these obligations are his simultaneously. His performance in one affects his credit and power in the others. The perspective stemming from the daily work which he must oversee—the cable traffic by which his department maintains relations with other foreign offices—conflicts with the President's requirement that he serve as a generalist and coordinator of contrasting perspectives. The necessity that he be close to the President restricts the extent to which, and the force with which, he can front for his department. When he defers to the Secretary of Defense rather than fighting for his department's position—as he often must—he strains the loyalty of his officialdom. The Secretary's resolution of these conflicts depends not only upon the position, but also upon the player who occupies the position.

For players are also people. Men's metabolisms differ. The core of the bureaucratic politics mix is personality. How each man manages to stand the heat in his kitchen, each player's basic operating style, and the complementarity or contradiction among personalities and styles in the inner circles are irreducible pieces of the policy blend. Moreover, each person comes to his position with baggage in tow, including sensitivities to certain issues, commitments to various programs, and personal standing and debts with groups in the society.

B. *Parochial Priorities, Perceptions and Issues.* Answers to the questions: "What is the issue?" and "What must be done?" are colored by the position from which the questions are considered. For the factors which encourage organizational parochialism also influence the players who occupy positions on top of (or within) these organizations. To motivate members of his organization, a player must be sensitive to the organization's orientation. The games into which the player can enter and the advantages with which he plays enhance these pressures. Thus propensities of perception stemming from position permit reliable prediction about a player's stances in many cases. But these propensities are filtered through the baggage which players bring to positions. Sensitivity to both the pressures and the baggage is thus required for many predictions.

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[80] Inclusion of the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs in the tier of "Chiefs" rather than among the "Staffers" involves a debatable choice. In fact he is both super-staffer and near-chief. His position has no statutory authority. He is especially dependent upon good relations with the President and the Secretaries of Defense and State. Nevertheless, he stands astride a genuine action-channel. The decision to include this position among the Chiefs reflects my judgment that the Bundy function is becoming institutionalized.

[81] Richard E. Neustadt, Testimony, United States Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Security Staffing, *Administration of National Security,* March 26, 1963, pp. 82–83.

C. *Interests, Stakes, and Power*. Games are played to determine outcomes. But outcomes advance and impede each player's conception of the national interest, specific programs to which he is committed, the welfare of his friends, and his personal interests. These overlapping interests constitute the stakes for which games are played. Each player's ability to play successfully depends upon his power. Power, i.e., effective influence on policy outcomes, is an elusive blend of at least three elements: bargaining advantages (drawn from formal authority and obligations, institutional backing, constituents, expertise, and status), skill and will in using bargaining advantages, and other players' perceptions of the first two ingredients. Power wisely invested yields an enhanced reputation for effectiveness. Unsuccessful investment depletes both the stock of capital and the reputation. Thus each player must pick the issues on which he can play with a reasonable probability of success. But no player's power is sufficient to guarantee satisfactory outcomes. Each player's needs and fears run to many other players. What ensues is the most intricate and subtle of games known to man.

D. *The Problem and the Problems*. "Solutions" to strategic problems are not derived by detached analysts focusing coolly on *the* problem. Instead, deadlines and events raise issues in games, and demand decisions of busy players in contexts that influence the face the issue wears. The problems for the players are both narrower and broader than *the* strategic problem. For each player focuses not on the total strategic problem but rather on the decision that must be made now. But each decision has critical consequences not only for the strategic problem but for each player's organizational, reputational, and personal stakes. Thus the gap between the problems the player was solving and the problem upon which the analyst focuses is often very wide.

E. *Action-Channels*. Bargaining games do not proceed randomly. Action-channels, i.e., regularized ways of producing action concerning types of issues, structure the game by pre-selecting the major players, determining their points of entrance into the game, and distributing particular advantages and disadvantages for each game. Most critically, channels determine "who's got the action," that is, which department's Indians actually do whatever is chosen. Weapon procurement decisions are made within the annual budgeting process; embassies' demands for action cables are answered according to routines of consultation and clearance from State to Defense and White House; requests for instructions from military groups (concerning assistance all the time, concerning operations during war) are composed by the military in consultation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, State, and White House; crisis responses are debated among White House, State, Defense, CIA, and Ad Hoc players; major political speeches, especially by the President but also by other Chiefs, are cleared through established channels.

F. *Action as Politics*. Government decisions are made and government actions emerge neither as the calculated choice of a unified group, nor as a formal summary of leaders' preferences. Rather the context of shared power but separate judgments concerning important choices, determines that politics is the mechanism of choice. Note the *environment* in which the game is played: inordinate uncertainty about what must be done, the necessity that something be done, and crucial consequences of whatever is done. These features force responsible men to become active players. The *pace of the game*—hundreds of issues, numerous games, and multiple channels—compels players to fight to "get other's attention," to make them "see the facts," to assure that they "take the time to think seriously about the broader issue." The *structure of the game*—power shared by individuals with separate responsibilities—validates each player's feeling that "others don't see my problem," and "others must be persuaded to look at the issue from a less parochial perspective." The *rules of the game*—he who hesitates loses his chance to play at that point, and he who is uncertain about his recommendation is overpowered by others who are sure—pressures players to come down on one side of a 51–49 issue and play. The *rewards of the game*—effectiveness, i.e., impact on outcomes, as the immediate measure of performance—encourages hard play. Thus, most players come to fight to "make the government do what is right." The strategies and tactics employed are quite similar to those formalized by theorists of international relations.

G. *Streams of Outcomes*. Important government decisions or actions emerge as collages composed of individual acts, outcomes of minor and major games, and foul-ups. Outcomes which could never have been chosen by an actor and would never have emerged from bargaining in a single game over the issue are fabricated piece by piece. Understanding of the outcome requires that it be disaggregated.

III. Dominant Inference Pattern

If a nation performed an action, that action was the *outcome* of bargaining among individuals and groups within the government. That outcome included *results* achieved by groups committed to a decision or action, *resultants* which emerged from bargaining among groups with quite different positions and *foul-ups.* Model III's explanatory power is achieved by revealing the pulling and hauling of various players, with different perceptions and priorities, focusing on separate problems, which yielded the outcomes that constitute the action in question.

IV. General Propositions

1. *Action and Intention.* Action does not presuppose intention. The sum of behavior of representatives of a government relevant to an issue was rarely intended by any individual or group. Rather separate individuals with different intentions contributed pieces which compose an outcome distinct from what anyone would have chosen.

2. *Where you stand depends on where you sit.*[82] Horizontally, the diverse demands upon each player shape his priorities, perceptions, and issues. For large classes of issues, e.g., budgets and procurement decisions, the stance of a particular player can be predicted with high reliability from information concerning his seat. In the notorious B-36 controversy, no one was surprised by Admiral Radford's testimony that "the B-36 under any theory of war, is a bad gamble with national security," as opposed to Air Force Secretary Symington's claim that "a B-36 with an A-bomb can destroy distant objectives which might require ground armies years to take."[83]

3. *Chiefs and Indians.* The aphorism "where you stand depends on where you sit" has vertical as well as horizontal application. Vertically, the demands upon the President, Chiefs, Staffers, and Indians are quite distinct.

The foreign policy issues with which the President can deal are limited primarily by his crowded schedule: the necessity of dealing first with what comes next. His problem is to probe the special face worn by issues that come to his attention, to preserve his leeway until time has clarified the uncertainties, and to assess the relevant risks.

Foreign policy Chiefs deal most often with the hottest issue *de jour,* though they can get the attention of the President and other members of the government for other issues which they judge important. What they cannot guarantee is that "the President will pay the price" or that "the others will get on board." They must build a coalition of the relevant powers that be. They must "give the President confidence" in the right course of action.

Most problems are framed, alternatives specified, and proposals pushed, however, by Indians. Indians fight with Indians of other departments; for example, struggles between International Security Affairs of the Department of Defense and Political-Military of the State Department are a microcosm of the action at higher levels. But the Indian's major problem is how to get the *attention* of Chiefs, how to get an issue decided, how to get the government "to do what is right."

In policy making then, the issue looking *down* is options: how to preserve my leeway until time clarifies uncertainties. The issue looking *sideways* is commitment: how to get others committed to my coalition. The issue looking *upwards* is confidence: how to give the boss confidence in doing what must be done. To paraphrase one of Neustadt's assertions which can be applied down the length of the ladder, the essence of a responsible official's task is to induce others to see that what needs to be done is what their own appraisal of their own responsibilities requires them to do in their own interests.

V. Specific Propositions

1. *Deterrence.* The probability of nuclear attack depends primarily on the probability of attack emerging as an outcome of the bureaucratic politics of the attacking government. First, which players can decide to launch an attack? Whether the effective power over action is controlled by an individual, a minor game, or the central game is critical. Second, though Model I's confidence in nuclear deterrence stems from an assertion that, in the end, governments will not commit suicide, Model III recalls historical precedents. Admiral Yamamoto, who designed the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, estimated accurately: "In the first six months to a year of war against the U.S. and England I will run wild, and I will show you an uninterrupted succession of victories; I must also tell you that, should the war be prolonged for two or three years, I have no confidence in our ultimate victory."[84] But Japan attacked. Thus, three questions might be considered. One: could any member of the government solve his problem by attack? What patterns of bargaining could yield attack as an outcome? The major difference between a stable balance of terror and a questionable balance may simply be that in the first case most members of the government

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[82] This aphorism was stated first, I think, by Don K. Price.

[83] Paul Y. Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," in Harold Stein (ed.), *American Civil-Military Decisions* (Birmingham, 1963).

[84] Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor* (Stanford, 1962), p. 350.

appreciate fully the consequences of attack and are thus on guard against the emergence of this outcome. Two: what stream of outcomes might lead to an attack? At what point in that stream is the potential attacker's politics? If members of the U.S. government had been sensitive to the stream of decisions from which the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor emerged, they would have been aware of a considerable probability of that attack. Three: how might miscalculation and confusion generate foul-ups that yield attack as an outcome? For example, in a crisis or after the beginning of conventional war, what happens to the information available to, and the effective power of, members of the central game.

THE U.S. BLOCKADE OF CUBA: A THIRD CUT

The Politics of Discovery. A series of overlapping bargaining games determined both the *date* of the discovery of the Soviet missiles and the *impact* of this discovery on the Administration. An explanation of the politics of the discovery is consequently a considerable piece of the explanation of the U.S. blockade.

Cuba was the Kennedy Administration's "political Achilles' heel."[85] The months preceding the crisis were also months before the Congressional elections, and the Republican Senatorial and Congressional Campaign Committee had announced that Cuba would be "the dominant issue of the 1962 campaign."[86] What the administration billed as a "more positive and indirect approach of isolating Castro from developing, democratic Latin America," Senators Keating, Goldwater, Capehart, Thurmond, and others attacked as a "do-nothing" policy.[87] In statements on the floor of the House and Senate, campaign speeches across the country, and interviews and articles carried by national news media, Cuba—particularly the Soviet program of increased arms aid—served as a stick for stirring the domestic political scene.[88]

These attacks drew blood. Prudence demanded a vigorous reaction. The President decided to meet the issue head-on. The Administration mounted a forceful campaign of denial designed to discredit critics' claims. The President himself manned the front line of this offensive, though almost all Administration officials participated. In his news conference on August 19, President Kennedy attacked as "irresponsible" calls for an invasion of Cuba, stressing rather "the totality of our obligations" and promising to "watch what happens in Cuba with the closest attention."[89] On September 4, he issued a strong statement denying any provocative Soviet action in Cuba.[90] On September 13 he lashed out at "loose talk" calling for an invasion of Cuba.[91] The day before the flight of the U-2 which discovered the missiles, he campaigned in Capehart's Indiana against those "self-appointed generals and admirals who want to send someone else's sons to war."[92]

On Sunday, October 14, just as a U-2 was taking the first pictures of Soviet missiles, McGeorge Bundy was asserting:

> I *know* that there is no present evidence, and I think that there is no present likelihood that the Cuban government and the Soviet government would, in combination, attempt to install a major offensive capability.[93]

In this campaign to puncture the critics' charges, the Administration discovered that the public needed positive slogans. Thus, Kennedy fell into a tenuous semantic distinction between "offensive" and "defensive" weapons. This distinction originated in his September 4 statement that there was no evidence of "offensive ground to ground missiles" and warned "were it to be otherwise, the gravest issues would arise."[94] His September 13 statement turned on this distinction between "defensive" and "offensive" weapons and announced a firm commitment to action if the Soviet Union attempted to introduce the latter into Cuba.[95] Congressional committees elicited from administration officials testimony which read this distinction and the President's commitment into the *Congressional Record*.[96]

What the President least wanted to hear, the CIA was most hesitant to say plainly. On August 22 John McCone met privately with the President and voiced suspicions that the Soviets were preparing to introduce offensive missiles into Cuba.[97] Kennedy heard this as what it was: the suspicion of a hawk. McCone left

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[85] Sorensen, *Kennedy,* p. 670.

[86] *Ibid.*

[87] *Ibid.*, pp. 670ff.

[88] *New York Times,* August, September, 1962.

[89] *New York Times*, August 20, 1962.

[90] *New York Times,* September 5, 1962.

[91] *New York Times,* September 14, 1962.

[92] *New York Times,* October 14, 1962.

[93] Cited by Abel, *op. cit.,* p. 13.

[94] *New York Times,* September 5, 1962.

[95] *New York Times,* September 14, 1962.

[96] Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Senate Armed Services Committee; House Committee on Appropriation; House Select Committee on Export Control.

[97] Abel, *op. cit.,* pp. 17–18. According to McCone, he told Kennedy, "The only construction I can put on the material going into Cuba is that the Russians are preparing to introduce offensive missiles." See also Weintal and Bartlett, *op. cit.,* pp. 60–61.

Washington for a month's honeymoon on the Riviera. Fretting at Cap Ferrat, he bombarded his deputy, General Marshall Carter, with telegrams, but Carter, knowing that McCone had informed the President of his suspicions and received a cold reception, was reluctant to distribute these telegrams outside the CIA.[98] On September 9 a U-2 "on loan" to the Chinese Nationalists was downed over mainland China.[99] The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) convened on September 10 with a sense of urgency.[100] Loss of another U-2 might incite world opinion to demand cancellation of U-2 flights. The President's campaign against those who asserted that the Soviets were acting provocatively in Cuba had begun. To risk downing a U-2 over Cuba was to risk chopping off the limb on which the President was sitting. That meeting decided to shy away from the western end of Cuba (where SAMs were becoming operational) and modify the flight pattern of the U-2s in order to reduce the probability that a U-2 would be lost.[101] USIB's unanimous approval of the September estimate reflects similar sensitivities. On September 13 the President had asserted that there were no Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba and committed his Administration to act if offensive missiles were discovered. Before Congressional committees, Administration officials were denying that there was any evidence whatever of offensive missiles in Cuba. The implications of a National Intelligence estimate which concluded that the Soviets were introducing offensive missiles into Cuba were not lost on the men who constituted America's highest intelligence assembly.

The October 4 COMOR decision to direct a flight over the western end of Cuba in effect "overturned" the September estimate, but without officially raising that issue. The decision represented McCone's victory for which he had lobbied with the President before the September 10 decision, in telegrams before the September 19 estimate, and in person after his return to Washington. Though the politics of the intelligence community is closely guarded, several pieces of the story can be told.[102] By September 27, Colonel Wright and others in DIA believed that the Soviet Union was placing missiles in the San Cristobal area.[103] This area was marked suspicious by the CIA on September 29 and certified top priority on October 3. By October 4 McCone had the evidence required to raise the issue officially. The members of COMOR heard McCone's argument, but were reluctant to make the hard decision he demanded. The significant probability that a U-2 would be downed made overflight of western Cuba a matter of real concern.[104]

The Politics of Issues. The U-2 photographs presented incontrovertible evidence of Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba. This revelation fell upon politicized players in a complex context. As one high official recalled, Khrushchev had caught us "with our pants down." What each of the central participants saw, and what each did to cover both his own and the Administration's nakedness, created the spectrum of issues and answers.

At approximately 9:00 A.M., Tuesday morning, October 16, McGeorge Bundy went to the President's living quarters with the message: "Mr. President, there is now hard photographic evidence that the Russians have offensive missiles in Cuba."[105] Much has been made of Kennedy's "expression of surprise,"[106] but "surprise" fails to capture the character of his initial reaction. Rather, it was one of startled anger, most adequately conveyed by the exclamation: "He can't do that to *me!*"[107] In terms of the President's attention and priorities at that moment, Khrushchev had chosen the most unhelpful act of all. Kennedy had staked his full Presidential authority on the assertion that the Soviets would not place offensive weapons in Cuba. Moreover, Khrushchev had assured the President through the most direct and personal channels that he was aware of the President's domestic political problem and that nothing would be done to exacerbate this problem. The Chairman had *lied* to the President. Kennedy's initial reaction entailed action. The missiles must be removed.[108] The alternatives of "doing nothing" or "taking a diplomatic approach" could not have been less relevant to *his* problem.

These two tracks—doing nothing and taking a diplomatic approach—were the solutions advocated by two of his principal advisors. For Secretary of Defense McNamara, the missiles raised the spectre of nuclear war. He first framed the issue as a straightforward strategic problem. To understand the issue, one had to grasp two obvious but difficult points. First, the missiles represented an inevitable occurrence: narrowing of the missile gap. It simply happened sooner rather than later. Second, the United States could accept this occurrence since its consequences were minor: "seven-to-one missile 'superiority,' one-to-one missile 'equality,' one-to-seven missile 'inferiority'—the three postures are identical." McNamara's statement of this argument at the first meeting of the ExCom was summed up in the phrase, "a missile is a missile."[109] "It makes no great difference," he maintained, "whether you are killed by a missile from the Soviet Union or Cuba."[110] The implication was clear. The United States should not initiate a crisis with the Soviet Union, risking a significant probability of nuclear war over an occurrence which had such small strategic implications.

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[98] Abel, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

[99] *New York Times,* September 10, 1962.

[100] See Abel, *op. cit.*, pp. 25–26; and Hilsman, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

[101] Department of Defense Appropriation, *Hearings,* 69.

[102] A basic, but somewhat contradictory, account of parts of this story emerges in the Department of Defense Appropriations, *Hearings,* 1–70.

[103] Department of Defense Appropriations, *Hearings,* 71.

[104] The details of the 10 days between the October 4 decision and the October 14 flight must be held in abeyance.

[105] Abel, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

[106] *Ibid.*, pp. 44ff.

[107] See Richard Neustadt, "Afterword," *Presidential Power* (New York, 1964).

[108] Sorensen, *Kennedy,* p. 676; Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, p. 801.

The perceptions of McGeorge Bundy, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, are the most difficult of all to reconstruct. There is no question that he initially argued for a diplomatic track.[111] But was Bundy laboring under his acknowledged burden of responsibility in Cuba I? Or was he playing the role of devil's advocate in order to make the President probe his own initial reaction and consider other options?

The President's brother, Robert Kennedy, saw most clearly the political wall against which Khrushchev had backed the President. But he, like McNamara, saw the prospect of nuclear doom. Was Khrushchev going to force the President to an insane act? At the first meeting of the ExCom, he scribbled a note, "Now I know how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor."[112] From the outset he searched for an alternative that would prevent the air strike.

The initial reaction of Theodore Sorensen, the President's Special Counsel and "alter ego," fell somewhere between that of the President and his brother. Like the President, Sorensen felt the poignancy of betrayal. If the President had been the architect of the policy which the missiles punctured, Sorensen was the draftsman. Khrushchev's deceitful move demanded a strong counter-move. But like Robert Kennedy, Sorensen feared lest the shock and disgrace lead to disaster.

To the Joint Chiefs of Staff the issue was clear. *Now* was the time to do the job for which they had prepared contingency plans. Cuba I had been badly done; Cuba II would not be. The missiles provided the *occasion* to deal with the issue: cleansing the Western Hemisphere of Castro's Communism. As the President recalled on the day the crisis ended, "An invasion would have been a mistake—a wrong use of our power. But the military are mad. They wanted to do this. It's lucky for us that we have McNamara over there."[113]

McCone's perceptions flowed from his confirmed prediction. As the Cassandra of the incident, he argued forcefully that the Soviets had installed the missiles in a daring political probe which the United States must meet with force. The time for an air strike was now.[114]

The Politics of Choice. The process by which the blockade emerged is a story of the most subtle and intricate probing, pulling, and hauling; leading, guiding, and spurring. Reconstruction of this process can only be tentative. Initially the President and most of his advisers wanted the clean, surgical air strike. On the first day of the crisis, when informing Stevenson of the missiles, the President mentioned only two alternatives: "I suppose the alternatives are to go in by air and wipe them out, or to take other steps to render them inoperable."[115] At the end of the week a sizeable minority still favored an air strike. As Robert Kennedy recalled: "The fourteen people involved were very significant. . . . If six of them had been President of the U.S., I think that the world might have been blown up."[116] What prevented the air strike was a fortuitous coincidence of a number of factors—the absence of any one of which might have permitted that option to prevail.

First, McNamara's vision of holocaust set him firmly against the air strike. His initial attempt to frame the issue in strategic terms struck Kennedy as particularly inappropriate. Once McNamara realized that the name of the game was a strong response, however, he and his deputy Gilpatric chose the blockade as a fallback. When the Secretary of Defense—whose department had the action, whose reputation in the Cabinet was unequaled, in whom the President demonstrated full confidence—marshalled the arguments for the blockade and refused to be moved, the blockade became a formidable alternative.

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[109] Hilsman, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

[110] *Ibid.*

[111] Weintal and Bartlett, *op. cit.*, p. 67; Abel, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

[112] Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, p. 803.

[113] *Ibid.*, p. 831.

[114] Abel, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

[115] *Ibid.*, p. 49.

[116] Interview, quoted by Ronald Steel, *New York Review of Books*, March 13, 1969, p. 22.

Second, Robert Kennedy—the President's closest confidant—was unwilling to see his brother become a "Tojo." His arguments against the air strike on moral grounds struck a chord in the President. Moreover, once his brother had stated these arguments so forcefully, the President could not have chosen his initially preferred course without, in effect, agreeing to become what RFK had condemned.

The President learned of the missiles on Tuesday morning. On Wednesday morning, in order to mask our discovery from the Russians, the President flew to Connecticut to keep a campaign commitment, leaving RFK as the unofficial chairman of the group. By the time the President returned on Wednesday evening, a critical third piece had been added to the picture. McNamara had presented his argument for the blockade. Robert Kennedy and Sorensen had joined McNamara. A powerful coalition of the advisers in whom the President had the greatest confidence, and with whom his style was most compatible, had emerged.

Fourth, the coalition that had formed behind the President's initial preference gave him reason to pause. *Who* supported the air strike—the Chiefs, McCone, Rusk, Nitze, and Acheson—as much as *how* they supported it, counted. Fifth, a piece of inaccurate information, which no one probed, permitted the blockade advocates to fuel (potential) uncertainties in the President's mind. When the President returned to Washington Wednesday evening, RFK and Sorensen met him at the airport. Sorensen gave the President a four-page memorandum outlining the areas of agreement and disagreement. The strongest argument was that the air strike simply could not be surgical.[117] After a day of prodding and questioning, the Air Force had asserted that it could not guarantee the success of a surgical air strike limited to the missiles alone.

Thursday evening, the President convened the ExCom at the White House. He declared his tentative choice of the blockade and directed that preparations be made to put it into effect by Monday morning.[118] Though he raised a question about the possibility of a surgical air strike subsequently, he seems to have accepted the experts' opinion that this was no live option.[119] (Acceptance of this estimate suggests that he may have learned the lesson of the Bay of Pigs—"Never rely on experts"—less well than he supposed.)[120] But this information was incorrect. That no one probed this estimate during the first week of the crisis poses an interesting question for further investigation.

A coalition, including the President, thus emerged from the President's initial decision that something had to be done; McNamara, Robert Kennedy, and Sorensen's resistance to the air strike; incompatibility between the President and the air strike advocates; and an inaccurate piece of information.[121]

CONCLUSION

This essay has obviously bitten off more than it has chewed. For further developments and synthesis of these arguments the reader is referred to the larger study.[122] In spite of the limits of space, however, it would be inappropriate to stop without spelling out several implications of the argument and addressing the question of relations among the models and extensions of them to activity beyond explanation.

At a minimum, the intended implications of the argument presented here are four. First, formulation of alternative frames of reference and demonstration that different analysts, relying predominantly on different models, produce quite different explanations should encourage the analyst's self-consciousness about the nets he employs. The effect of these "spectacles" in sensitizing him to particular aspects of what is going on—framing the puzzle in one way rather than another, encouraging him to examine the problem in terms of certain categories rather than others, directing him to particular kinds of evidence, and relieving puzzlement by one procedure rather than another—must be recognized and explored.

Second, the argument implies a position on the problem of "the state of the art." While accepting the commonplace characterization of the present condition of foreign policy analysis—personalistic, non-cumulative, and sometimes insightful—this essay rejects both the counsel of despair's justification of this condition as a consequence of the character of the enterprise, and the "new frontiersmen's" demand for *a priori* theorizing on the frontiers and *ad hoc* appropriation of "new techniques."[123] What is required as a first step is non-casual examination of the present product: inspection of existing explanations, articulation of the conceptual models employed in producing them, formulation of the propositions relied upon, specification of the logic of the various intellectual enterprises, and reflection on the questions being asked. Though it is difficult to overemphasize the need for more systematic processing of more data, these preliminary matters of formulating questions with clarity and sensitivity to categories and assumptions so that fruitful acquisition of large quantities of data is possible are still a major hurdle in considering most important problems.

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[117] Sorensen, *Kennedy*, p. 686.

[118] *Ibid.*, p. 691.

[119] *Ibid.*, pp. 691–692.

[120] Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, p. 296.

[121] Space will not permit an account of the path from this coalition to the formal government decision on Saturday and action on Monday.

[122] *Bureaucracy and Policy* (forthcoming, 1969).

[123] Thus my position is quite distinct from both poles in the recent "great debate" about international relations. While many "traditionalists" of the sort Kaplan attacks adopt the first posture and

Third, the preliminary, partial paradigms presented here provide a basis for serious reexamination of many problems of foreign and military policy. Model II and Model III cuts at problems typically treated in Model I terms can permit significant improvements in explanation and prediction.[124] Full Model II and III analyses require large amounts of information. But even in cases where the information base is severely limited, improvements are possible. Consider the problem of predicting Soviet strategic forces. In the mid-1950s, Model I style calculations led to predictions that the Soviets would rapidly deploy large numbers of long-range bombers. From a Model II perspective, both the frailty of the Air Force within the Soviet military establishment and the budgetary implications of such a buildup, would have led analysts to hedge this prediction. Moreover, Model II would have pointed to a sure, visible indicator of such a buildup: noisy struggles among the Services over major budgetary shifts. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Model I calculations led to the prediction of immediate, massive Soviet deployment of ICBMs. Again, a Model II cut would have reduced this number because, in the earlier period, strategic rockets were controlled by the Soviet Ground Forces rather than an independent Service, and in the later period, this would have necessitated massive shifts in budgetary splits. Today, Model I considerations lead many analysts both to recommend that an agreement not to deploy ABMs be a major American objective in upcoming strategic negotiations with the USSR, and to predict success. From a Model II vantage point, the existence of an ongoing Soviet ABM program, the strength of the organization (National Air Defense) that controls ABMs, and the fact that an agreement to stop ABM deployment would force the virtual dismantling of this organization, make a viable agreement of this sort much less likely. A Model III cut suggests that (a) there must be significant differences among perceptions and priorities of Soviet leaders over strategic negotiations, (b) any agreement will affect some players' power bases, and (c) agreements that do not require extensive cuts in the sources of some major players' power will prove easier to negotiate and more viable.

Fourth, the present formulation of paradigms is simply an initial step. As such it leaves a long list of critical questions unanswered. Given any action, an imaginative analyst should always be able to construct some rationale for the government's choice. By imposing, and relaxing, constraints on the parameters of rational choice (as in variants of Model I) analysts can construct a large number of accounts of any act as a rational choice. But does a statement of reasons why a rational actor would choose an action constitute an explanation of the *occurrence* of that action? How can Model I analysis be forced to make more systematic contributions to the question of the determinants of occurrences? Model II's explanation of t in terms of $t - 1$ is explanation. The world is contiguous. But governments sometimes make sharp departures. Can an organizational process model be modified to suggest where change is likely? Attention to organizational change should afford greater understanding of why particular programs and SOPs are maintained by identifiable types of organizations and also how a manager can improve organizational performance. Model III tells a fascinating "story." But its complexity is enormous, the information requirements are often overwhelming, and many of the details of the bargaining may be superfluous. How can such a model be made parsimonious? The three models are obviously not exclusive alternatives. Indeed, the paradigms highlight the partial emphasis of the framework—what each emphasizes and what it leaves out. Each concentrates on one class of variables, in effect, relegating other important factors to a *ceteris parabus* clause. Model I concentrates on "market factors:" pressures and incentives created by the "international strategic marketplace." Mod-

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many "scientists" of the sort attacked by Bull adopt the second, this third posture is relatively neutral with respect to whatever is in substantive dispute. See Hedly Bull, "International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach," *World Politics* (April, 1966); and Morton Kaplan, "The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations," *World Politics* (October, 1966).

[124] A number of problems are now being examined in these terms both in the Bureaucracy Study Group on Bureaucracy and Policy of the Institute of Politics at Harvard University and at the Rand Corporation.

els II and III focus on the internal mechanism of the government that chooses in this environment. But can these relations be more fully specified? Adequate synthesis would require a typology of decisions and actions, some of which are more amenable to treatment in terms of one model and some to another. Government behavior is but one cluster of factors relevant to occurrences in foreign affairs. Most students of foreign policy adopt this focus (at least when explaining and predicting). Nevertheless, the dimensions of the chess board, the character of the pieces, and the rules of the game—factors considered by international systems theorists—constitute the context in which the pieces are moved. Can the major variables in the full function of determinants of foreign policy outcomes be identified?

Both the outline of a partial, *ad hoc* working synthesis of the models, and a sketch of their uses in activities other than explanation can be suggested by generating predictions in terms of each. Strategic surrender is an important problem of international relations and diplomatic history. War termination is a new, developing area of the strategic literature. Both of these interests lead scholars to address a central question: *Why* do nations surrender *when?* Whether implicit in explanations or more explicit in analysis, diplomatic historians and strategists rely upon propositions which can be turned forward to produce predictions. Thus at the risk of being timely—and in error—the present situation (August, 1968) offers an interesting test case: Why will North Vietnam surrender when?[125]

In a nutshell, analysis according to Model I asserts: nations quit when costs outweigh the benefits. North Vietnam will surrender when she realizes "that continued fighting can only generate additional costs without hope of compensating gains, this expectation being largely the consequence of the previous application of force by the dominant side."[126] U.S. actions can increase or decrease Hanoi's strategic costs. Bombing North Vietnam increases the pain and thus increases the probability of surrender. This proposition and prediction are not without meaning. That—"other things being equal"—nations are more likely to surrender when the strategic cost-benefit balance is negative, is true. Nations rarely surrender when they are winning. The proposition specifies a range within which nations surrender. But over this broad range, the relevant question is: why do nations surrender?

Models II and III focus upon the government machine through which this fact about the international strategic marketplace must be filtered to produce a surrender. These analysts are considerably less sanguine about the possibility of surrender *at the point* that the cost-benefit calculus turns negative. Never in history (i.e., in none of the five cases I have examined) have nations surrendered at that point. Surrender occurs sometime thereafter. *When* depends on process of organizations and politics of players within these governments—as they are affected by the opposing government. Moreover, the effects of the victorious power's action upon the surrendering nation cannot be adequately summarized as increasing or decreasing strategic costs. Imposing additional costs by bombing a nation may increase the probability of surrender. But it also may reduce it. An appreciation of the impact of the acts of one nation upon another thus requires some understanding of the machine which is being influenced. For more precise prediction, Models II and III require considerably more information about the organizations and politics of North Vietnam than is publicly available. On the basis of the limited public information, however, these models can be suggestive.

Model II examines two sub-problems. First, to have lost is not sufficient. The government must know that the strategic cost-benefit calculus is negative. But neither the categories, nor the indicators, of strategic costs and benefits are clear. And the sources of information about both are organizations whose parochial priorities and perceptions do not facilitate accurate information or estimation. Military evaluation of military performance, military estimates of factors like "enemy morale," and military predictions concerning when "the tide will turn" or "the corner will have been turned" are typically distorted. In cases of highly decentralized guerrilla operations, like Vietnam, these problems are exacerbated. Thus strategic costs will be underestimated. Only highly *visible* costs can have direct impact on leaders without being filtered through organizational channels. Second, since organizations define the details of options and execute actions, surrender (and negotiation) is likely to entail considerable bungling in the early stages. No organization can define options or prepare programs for this treasonous act. Thus, early overtures will be uncoordinated with the acts of other organizations, e.g., the fighting forces, creating contradictory "signals" to the victor.

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[125] In response to several readers' recommendations, what follows is reproduced *verbatim* from the paper delivered at the September, 1968 Association meetings (Rand P-3919). The discussion is heavily indebted to Ernest R. May.

[126] Richard Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense* (Princeton, 1961), p. 11. For a more general presentation of this position see Paul Kecskemeti, *Strategic Surrender* (New York, 1964).

Model III suggests that surrender will not come at the point that strategic costs outweigh benefits, but that it will not wait until the leadership group concludes that the war is lost. Rather the problem is better understood in terms of four additional propositions. First, strong advocates of the war effort, whose careers are closely identified with the war, rarely come to the conclusion that costs outweigh benefits. Second, quite often from the outset of a war, a number of members of the government (particularly those whose responsibilities sensitize them to problems other than war, e.g., economic planners or intelligence experts) are convinced that the war effort is futile. Third, surrender is likely to come as the result of a political shift that enhances the effective power of the latter group (and adds swing members to it). Fourth, the course of the war, particularly actions of the victor, can influence the advantages and disadvantages of players in the loser's government. Thus, North Vietnam will surrender not when its leaders have a change of heart, but when Hanoi has a change of leaders (or a change of effective power within the central circle). How U.S. bombing (or pause), threats, promises, or action in the South affect the game in Hanoi is subtle but nonetheless crucial.

That these three models could be applied to the surrender of governments other than North Vietnam should be obvious. But that exercise is left for the reader.

A TRANSACTIONAL THEORY OF POLITICAL INTEGRATION AND ARMS CONTROL*

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Nominally, the English became a nation in the eighth century but did not achieve political integration until the seventeenth century, a thousand years later. During the millennium, the English "nation" was the scene of recurring internal wars, the last ending with the acceptance of the Bill of Rights by William III and Mary in 1688. What was the process leading to cessation in the use of armed conflict as a technique of domestic politics in England?

Nominally, Mexico was an independent nation in 1821 but did not see the end of its internal wars until the 1940's. What political process led to domestic "arms control" in Mexico?

Although taking place in different centuries and in nations with distinct political cultures, were there common elements in the two transitions to internal arms control? What were critical factors in the integrative process? May the same factors, or analogous ones, be identified and controlled in contemporary efforts related to regional and international arms control? What may be learned from the English, the Mexican, and other national cases that is generalizable to the problem of international political integration and arms control?

The present theory sketch views arms control as an aspect of the integration of political organizations. Political integration, in turn, is the consequence of a process of political transactions among principal political actors over time. In keeping with numerous contemporary conceptions of social transaction, political "things" of one kind or another are exchanged between actors when *both* (or more) parties perceive or anticipate a "profit," that is, applying their own individual criteria, see a net gain when measuring what is received against what is given up in the transaction. In order to quantify and relate these transactional events to the process leading to political integration, three types of "currency" are postulated: positional, decisional, and materiel currencies. These types are employed in the analysis of the content of each political transaction. The following general hypotheses are then proposed:

1. Successive transactions perceived as profitable by all parties tend to reinforce attitudes of trust among political transactors.
2. Trust among political transactors is positively correlated with sharp increases in the inclusion of decisional currencies among the content of transactions.
3. Increased trust is positively associated with the decline in political exchanges involving armaments (a sub-type of materiel currency), that is, increasing trust and decreasing violent warfare are positively correlated.
4. Transactional sequences that follow a trust-inducing pattern tend to be associated with successful transition from unintegrated to integrated states of political organization.[1]

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[1] The distinction between "disarmament" and "arms control" is significant. Neither England nor Mexico, for example, is a domestically disarmed nation. Rather, as a consequence of the processes to be examined with this theory, each nation—as others that are politically integrated—has established a monopoly of its major means of internal violence. Domestic peace, that is, the cessation of internal wars, seems to be associated with conditions of arms *control* (involving decisional currency exchanges) rather than disarmament.

"Political development" and "political integration" are also troublesome terms that should not delay us long. Since World War II, the rubric "political development" has tended to be employed mainly to describe comparative studies of national modernization, particularly with respect to the growth of economic organization and governmental bureaucracies. Overviews of current usage are reported in Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics,* 17 (April, 1965), 386–430; Fred W. Riggs, "The Theory of Political Development," in J. C. Charlesworth (ed.), *Contemporary Political Analysis* (New York: The Free Press 1967), pp. 317–349; Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, *The Political Basis of Economic Development* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1966). The approach described in this report is "developmental" simply in its search for recurring tendencies.

I. TRANSACTIONS, TRUST, AND ORGANIZATIONAL INTEGRATION

Warfare—whether international or domestic—is a "costly" activity. It is costly to be armed. It is costly to expend armaments in military conflicts. The cost may be measured in the usual economic sense; thus, the annual defense budget of the United States during the Korean War rose from $12 billions to $41 billions. The cost may be measured in lives; e.g., President Lyndon B. Johnson's comment, as he signed orders raising the troop commitments to Vietnam: ". . . If I retreated from Vietnam, I believe it would cost us more boys than it would to stay."[2] But history is replete with references to non-pecuniary, non-personnel costs of warfare. Reputedly, Joan of Arc feared bringing her military campaigns to an end lest it cost her the grace of God. Patrick Henry and other libertarians invariably perceive the loss of liberty as costlier than death during resistance; the contemporary version of "give me liberty or give me death" is presumably "better dead than Red."

Evidently cost units other than dollars and lives are critically relevant to political judgments about engaging in or avoiding warfare. One question may be put as follows: Under what conditions do political decision-makers consider the expenditure of military resources, in arms races or actual warfare, to be *too costly* for the political objectives they seek? Deterrence theorists will recognize the variation on a familiar problem: "How much power—military, economic, etc.—do *we* need to make an adversary see the risks and probable costs of *his* war-like acts?" The focus in deterrence theory is on the other decision-maker as *he* perceives and as *he* measures costs.

If cost judgments are at the heart of the choice between warfare and non-warfare, then the problem may be a political-economic one.[3] This is the view taken here. Political integration, and its concomitant arms control and cessation of violence, are viewed hypothetically as consequences of historic series of "political deals," or transactions, wherein adversary political decision-makers pass through a transitional stage beyond which they believe they may regularly get what they want from their dealings with each other by trading "political currencies" less costly than military resources and less risky than warfare. Certain characteristics of these series of political deals, it appears, are importantly related to attitudes of trust, another condition antecedent to the transition to arms control.

Specifically, a theory sketch about political transaction is set forth, in which a typology of political currencies is offered for *ex post facto* analysis of historic exchanges associated with processes of national political integration. Preliminary findings in English and Mexican case studies suggest that internal wars recur until a particular pattern of political transactions, to be described as "Pattern T" below, takes place.[4]

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[2] Interview in *Newsweek,* August 2, 1965, p. 21.

[3] Current interest in political economy is surveyed by William C. Mitchell in "The Shape of Political Theory to Come; From Political Sociology to Political Economy," *American Behavioral Scientist,* 11 (November, 1967), 8–37, and in "The New Political Economy," *Social Research,* 35 (Spring, 1968), 76–110. See also, R. L. Curry, Jr., *A Theory of Political Exchange* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1969). Particular impetus has been provided by such works as Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics and Welfare* (New York: Harper, 1953), Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1957), and James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962).

[4] Some theoretical difficulties of the case study method of political inquiry are described in Harold Stein (ed.), *Public Administration and Policy Development; A Case Book* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1952), pp. xx-xxx; also, Bernard Berelson and G. A. Steiner, *Human Behavior* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964), p. 27. The logical and empirical pitfalls of *ex post facto* research are succinctly stated in Fred N. Kerlinger, *Foundations of Behavioral Research* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), pp. 360 ff., whereas the more general requirements of scientific historiography are discussed in Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961), Chap. 15; Carl G. Hempel, "The Functions of General Laws in History," in Herbert Feigl and Wilfred Sellars (eds.), *Readings in Philosophical Analysis* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949), pp. 459–471; and Patrick Gardiner, *The Nature of Historical Explanation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952). To cope with some of the limitations of *ex post facto* tests of hypotheses, this project anticipates developing a simulation experiment which will presumably permit measurement of player behavior as related to currency transactions, attitudes of trust and suspicion, and other variables of the present theory. For an important attempt to replicate historical events through an experimental simulation, see Charles F. Hermann and Margaret G. Hermann,

The "political currencies" exchanged in the course of this transactional pattern tend to promote attitudes of trust among political transactors. These attitudes in turn facilitate a "critical transitional phase" in national evolution toward domestic arms control, disappearance of internal wars, and political integration.

Transaction Theory

Exchange, or transactional, explanations of political events and behavior have great antiquity. Plato, in discussing the essential activities of inhabitants of a state, observed that "they exchange with one another, and one gives and another receives, each under the idea that the exchange will be for his own good." Aristotle spoke of a conception of "distributive justice" according to which the offices of the state and the rights adhering to these offices are distributed to each citizen in proportion to his contribution to the ends of the state, that is, to a good quality of life. As persons A and B give to the state, in personal merit and personal contribution to its well-being, so A and B receive from the state, in office and honor. After describing this political exchange between citizen and state, Aristotle acknowledged the difficulties arising from different criteria for judging what constitutes a meritorious contribution. Each social class, he observed, tries to have its particular criterion, whether wealth, noble birth, personal goodness, greater numbers, or some other, prevail, thus leading to different forms of state and to the revolutions that change states from one form to another.[5]

A transaction between the citizen and his government is implied in Locke's "social contract." Adam Smith, David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, Thomas Malthus, and the later Utilitarians emphasized the place of each citizen's personal valuational yardstick in the political economy created by the state. James Madison applied a market-place perspective to his analysis of group and governmental relations. Edmund Burke declared:

> . . . All government, indeed every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue, and every prudent act, is founded on compromise and barter. We balance inconveniences; we give and take; we remit some rights, that we may enjoy others. . . . In every arduous enterprise we consider what we are to lose, as well as what we are to gain. . . . Man acts from adequate motives relative to his interest and not on metaphysical speculation.[6]

The "broker" aspect of the politician's role was alluded to by Sir Henry Maine in his critique of democracy:

> . . . There is no doubt then, in popular government resting on a wide suffrage . . . the leader . . . will be the Wire-puller. The process of cutting up political power into petty fragments has in him its most remarkable product. The morsels of power are so small that men, if left to themselves, would not care to employ them . . . But the political chiffonnier who collects and utilizes the fragments is the Wire-puller.[7]

Lowell carried forward the notion that the politician is primarily a "broker" among group interests; democracy "requires a species of brokerage and one of the functions of politicians is that of brokers." Bentley, Lasswell, Dahl and Lindblom, Downs, and Buchanan and Tullock follow this tradition.[8]

For economists, the exchange concept is fairly well-defined. Together with production and consumption, exchange of goods is a core concern of economics. "Exchange" has been defined in economic theory as "a situation in which each of two parties provides some good(s) to the other." In the more traditional usage, the giving up of goods by one party is contingent upon receipt of goods from the other. A "transaction," then, is an exchange, along with the attendant bargaining or negotiations. There may be two or more parties involved in a transaction, and the parties may be either individuals or organizations.[9]

George C. Homans incorporated elements of classical economics and behavioral psychology

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"An Attempt to Simulate the Outbreak of World War I," this REVIEW, 61 (June, 1967), 400–416.

[5] Plato's *Republic,* Book Two; Ernest Barker, *The Politics of Aristotle* (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 116–137.

[6] John Locke, *Second Treatise on Civil Government* (1689); James Madison's *Federalist Papers,* Number 10; Edmund Burke, *Speech on the Conciliation of the Colonies* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1896), pp. 67–68.

[7] *Popular Government* (New York: Holt, 1886), p. 30.

[8] A. Lawrence Lowell, *Public Opinion and Popular Government* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1913), pp. 61–62; Arthur F. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Evanston, Illinois: Principia Press, 1949 re-issue); Harold D. Lasswell, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936); Dahl and Lindblom, *op. cit.,* Downs, *op. cit.,* and Buchanan and Tullock, *op. cit.*

[9] One of the best behavioral formulations is found in Alfred Kuhn, *The Study of Society* (Homewood, Illinois: Irwin-Dorsey Press, 1963).

into his theory of social behavior as a form of exchange or transaction. Homans examines face-to-face contacts between individuals, viewing them as "an exchange of activity, tangible or intangible, and more or less rewarding or costly" to each individual.[10]

"Activity," according to Homans, is a comprehensively descriptive term referring not only to the transfer of objects and materials from one individual to another but also the emission of "sentiments" by one to the other. One person gives advice in exchange for "sentiments" of deference or affection from the other. Neighbors exchange attentions and favors. Members of a seminar exchange ideas. An activity emitted by one is rewarded or punished by an activity emitted by the other, regardless of the kinds of activity each emits.

Consistent with economic theory, Homans views a "cost" as a value foregone. The person who emits an activity must, by doing so, have foregone a *potentially* rewarding alternative activity; the activity foregone is a "cost." A friend who takes time to give advice instead of pursuing some other potential use of his time is incurring a "cost," that is, the foregone time. In exchange, he may, for example, expect affection or deference. If he receives derision or abuse instead, he is likely to consider further transactions with the other person "unprofitable." Further exchanges are likely to decline in frequency or cease.

In Homans' terms, the more costly an activity is to a person, the less often will he emit it. Psychic profit, therefore, is reward less cost. Again, as in traditional economic theory, no exchange of activity continues unless *both* parties believe they are profiting.

Homans illustrates his theory by drawing upon the findings of Blau's study of interpersonal behavior in a bureaucracy. Sixteen agents of a Federal law-enforcement agency were the subjects observed. These men held the same job title, but they varied in competence. The more skilled received more requests for advice and assistance from their co-workers. The recipients of the advice and assistance benefited, but nonetheless at a cost. The agent requesting help usually was rewarded by being enabled to do a better job. He paid the price of implicitly admitting his inferiority to a colleague who, by title, was supposedly his equal. On the other hand, the consultant gained prestige, at the same time incurring the cost of time taken from his own work.[11]

Each agent—advisee and adviser—netted "social profit" if his perceived reward from the interaction exceeded the personal costs. In other words, "social justice" was realized in this transaction if the rewards of both participants were proportional to their respective costs. The criterion of proportionality rests upon each participant's *own* normative expectation, derived though it may be from what he had learned about the nature of "fairness" and "justice" from his social environment.

Kuhn adds the concept "effective preference." The behavior of *each* party to a transaction must be analyzed in order to understand the combined behaviors of *both*. For this purpose, "effective preference" (EP) is "the degree of capacity to get some desired thing plus the will to get it rather than to satisfy conflicting desires." The EP of an individual is determined not only by his subjective desires, but also by his objective opportunities (availability of the goods, his resources for exchange, his capacity for deciding, etc.)[12]

Assume that person A desires good Y and has the resources to enable him to acquire Y, that is, Y lies with A's opportunity system. Whatever A must give up or forego in order to get Y will be called X; that is, X is the objective cost of good Y as far as A is concerned. The objective cost, however, is a poor basis for predicting whether A will incur X in order to obtain Y. His decision depends on the *relative valuation* that A places on X and Y. Let us, then, label his valuation of X as AX and of Y as AY. If, in A's value or preference system, AY is greater than AX, he will incur the cost X to get Good Y. If AY equals AX, he will be indifferent to the transaction, that is, he is equally likely to exchange as not to exchange. If AY is less than AX, person A will keep X and forget about obtaining good Y. In general, A's effective preference (EP) for Y is AY-AX.

Each transactor has his own subjective yardstick for measuring "profit" or "loss," although his membership in various groups may have some cultural influence upon the "units" he employs. Conceivably, it is possible to design an "Equity Scale" to help measure a decision-maker's own valuation of a transaction. An Equity Scale may be based upon an evaluative scale with polar values such as "very profitable for me" and "very costly to me" and a middle interval for "even exchange" or "fair deal." If what he receives (R) in a transaction is worth exactly as much to him as what he gives (G), the ratio between the two (R/G) equals one, or unity. An Equity Scale score of one could be said to describe "a sense of equity." If R is worth more to him than G, then R/G is greater than one, and he presumably experiences a psychic "sense of profit." On the other hand, if R is worth less to him than G, then R/G is less than one, producing "a sense of loss." Such an Equity Scale as suggested here would be a simple ordinal scale that, in some respects, operationalizes Homan's notion of "distributive justice" and Kuhn's "effective preference." As far as the transactor is concerned, he will probably consummate an exchange if he has a sense of profit but refuse to exchange if he experiences a sense of loss. A sense of equity is likely to produce a 50–50 prospect of transaction, the kind of "satisfaction" that adversaries experience when they are about to compromise on each other's minimum terms. "Half a loaf is better than none" perhaps best describes "sense of equity."

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[10] *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms* (Boston: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961).

[11] Peter M. Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955.)

[12] Kuhn, *op. cit.*, pp. 319–20, Chap. 17 ff.

However, a transaction is a decision process involving more than one person. Person B must therefore be added to the basic model. Assume that B possesses good Y and desires X for it. The general statement of B's EP is BX-BY. A transaction requires two decisions: A's decision to give up X for Y, and B's decision to give up Y for X.

The preference orderings of two persons must now be examined simultaneously. It will of course be necessary for both X and Y to be valued *somewhat* by A and B, otherwise neither transactor would be interested in keeping the good presently in his possession nor would he seek the good of the other.[13] On the other hand, for a transaction to ensue, some degree of opposite or divergent preference ordering must exist between A and B. Each must want the other's good at least a little more than his own. The possibilities are as follows:

(1) If A and B both prefer Y to X, then A will be willing to offer X for Y, but B will refuse. No transaction. (2) If both prefer X to Y, B will be willing to give Y for X, but A will refuse. No transaction. (3) If A prefers Y to X, and B prefers X to Y, then an exchange is possible. (4) Both A and B prefer Y over X, that is, have the same preference *ordering,* but A places a greater value, that is, would give up more, on Y than does B. Such a difference in relative valuation, even with the same preference orderings, may be sufficient to permit a transaction to take place.

In a bargainable transaction, each person's power to acquire what he desires depends, therefore, not only on his own but also on the other's EP. Only if there is *some minimal overlap* of transactor EPs can a transaction take place. This means that the parties must know about each other, want each other's goods, have information about the respective EPs. With all this having to transpire, very few social interactions would seem likely to end up as successful transactions. On the other hand, the notion of overlap of EPs helps make explicit the important function of marketplaces in bringing potential transactors together in some convenient and rational manner. If a prospective transactor wants to trade in wheat or bonds, for example, he knows exactly where to find persons with prospectively overlapping EPs, that is, in some appropriate marketplace in the United States.

Trust and Suspicion

Time is an important aspect of transactions.[14] The simplest transactions are those in which two parties transfer goods between themselves simultaneously. When the transfers take place at different times, anticipation and trust become significant elements in the situation. The local grocer will extend non-interest credit to a customer until pay-day, that is, he will exhibit an attitude of trust toward the customer in anticipation of a completion of the transaction at some fixed future time. A more complicated economic transaction occurs with the purchase of a house in which the buyer signs a mortgage contract to pay a price, say, $30,000, plus interest, in specific installments over a period of years. In this case, the mortgage company extends trust at an economically acceptable price (the going interest rate) if its investigations establish the trustworthiness (credit standing) of the buyer.

Social and political exchanges, as Blau points out, have somewhat different trust conditions in that they usually entail unspecified obligations. Business transactors can bargain over price and interest rate, but friends can hardly bargain over the expectation that an invitation to dinner will be reciprocated at some future time.[15] Another difference relates to the ambiguity or the unquantified character of currency units usually involved in social and political exchanges. In Blau's study of Federal investigators, for example, what "units" can measure (1) the advice given by the more competent investigators and (2) the deference returned by the less competent?

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[13] A may of course be willing to exchange X for B's Y in order to facilitate getting C's Z later, but this is an elaboration of the basic model rather than a new model.

[14] ". . . Evolution of trust goes through phases brought on by a time-dependent cognitive reappraisal of the relationship," in the words of Marc Pilisuk, Paul Skolnick, Kenneth Thomas, and Reuben Chapman, "Boredom vs. Cognitive Reappraisal in the Development of Cooperative Strategy," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 9 (March, 1967), p. 116. Cf. processes taking place during "critical transition" in the present theory.

[15] Peter M. Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (New York: Wiley, 1964).

Social and political exchanges, therefore, involve transfers that create diffuse rather than precisely specified future obligations and a return that cannot readily be bargained about but must be left to the discretion of the one who makes it. Since there is no way to assure an appropriate return for a social favor, social exchange particularly requires trusting others to discharge their obligations. Typically, according to Blau, exchange relations evolve as a slow process, usually starting with minor transactions requiring little trust as well as little risk. By discharging such obligations for goods or services received, individuals demonstrate their trustworthiness, leading to gradual expansion of mutually equitable exchanges, in turn leading to further growth of mutual trust. Examples readily come to mind; e.g., the borrower who repays a small loan promptly in order to establish his credit standing for a larger loan.

What if a transactor receiving goods fails to keep his promise to pay or leaves unfulfilled the arranged return of goods? In the usual economic transaction, "foreclosure" is a familiar response by the giving transactor. Non-payment of a mortgage at the scheduled rate leads to a forfeiture of "the stake," namely the house and all previous payments on it. Termination of a credit standing is a kind of foreclosure, that is, loss of the opportunity to possess goods in advance of cash payment. In social and political exchanges, unkept promises and unreturned obligations lead to the loss of such "stakes" as friendship, reputation, peace, honor, credibility, opportunities for affiliation, etc. Transaction relationships may become less trusting, transactors less attractive to each other, and grounds for cooperation or coalition less tenable. If enough suspicion is created, one of the transactors may, usually at some risk, try to take back the goods transferred in the first phase of the exchange. Thus, for political transactions in which transfers of currencies are spread over time rather than completed simultaneously, attitudes of trust or suspicion by the transactors toward each other become operative and influential.

A familiar example from American history may be drawn from the events following the Compromise of 1850. In the Congressional actions based upon the Compromise, the North succeeded in having California admitted as a non-slave state and having slave trade abolished in the District of Columbia. The South won a promise of enactment of stricter Federal statutes dealing with the return of runaway slave property. Although the promise was technically implemented by passage of a Fugitive Slave Act, the spirit of the Act, from the Southern point of view, was undermined by the Northern "underground railroad" for helping slaves escape and by other local interferences with Federal enforcement. The South perceived the latter activities as breach-of-promise and grounds for distrust of Northern intentions. All through the 1850's, of course, event after event broadened the distrust between the two sections.[16]

Organizational Integration

A nation, like any other group or organization, may become politically "integrated," a state of affairs whose parameters at best continue to be difficult to operationalize. Ake, for example, suggests several possible empirical indicators of political integration: (1) the extent to which the citizens of a state identify with the state as an embodiment of their interest and therefore concede that it deserves their loyalty and the authority to exercise certain powers over them; (2) the degree of preference political actors have for extraconstitutional rather than constitutional actions; (3) political violence as a special type of extraconstitutional behavior which, if frequent, suggests that the normative political culture is still in an embryonic stage; (4) the number of groups wishing to secede from the political system; (5) the extent to which major political groups, such as political parties, competing for control of the government draw their support from a diversity of regions and groups within the country; (6) the extent to which loyalty of members of the political system is focused on office rather than on charismatic appeal of the holder of an office; and (7) the availability of the state's coercive resources.[17]

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[16] Political scientists are becoming increasingly aware of the central importance of trust attitudes in political and social relations. Most of the work, however, continues to be done by sociologists and psychologists. The trust-suspicion factor is expounded and experimented with by the following: William A. Gamson, *Power and Discontent* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1968), Chap. 3; M. Deutsch, "Trust and Suspicion," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 2 (December, 1958), 265–279, and "Some Considerations Relevant to National Policy," *Journal of Social Issues,* 17 (1961), 57–68; M. Deutsch and R. M. Krauss, "Studies in Interpersonal Bargaining," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 6 (March, 1962), 52–76; Harold Garfinkel, "A conception of, and Experiments with, 'Trust' as a Condition of Stable Concerted Actions," in O. J. Harvey (ed.), *Motivation and Social Interaction* (New York: Ronald Press, 1963), pp. 187–238; E. D. Hoedemaker, "Distrust and Aggression: An Interpersonal-International Analogy," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 12 (March, 1968), 69–81; B. Lieberman, "i-Trust: A Notion of Trust in Three-Person Games and International Affairs," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 8 (September, 1964), 271–280; Marc Pilisuk *et al.,* "Honesty, Deceit, and Timing in the Display of Intentions," *Behavioral Science,* 12 (May, 1967), 205–215; G. H. Shure and R. J. Meeker, "A Personality/Attitude Schedule for Use in Experimental Studies," *Journal of Psychology,* 65 (1967), 233–252.

Others write of "political integration" as a process involving such factors as: shifting loyalties and expectations; jurisdiction; a participant community; progressive reduction of cultural and regional tensions and discontinuities; and value consensus.[18]

Another conception of political integration could undoubtedly be derived from group and organization theory. According to most students of the subject, a human "group" comes into being when two or more persons engage in a minimum frequency of interaction in response to some shared attitude (or shared characteristic about which they have a common attitude) which produces among them specific uniformities of behavior. An "organization" has been defined as a system of consciously coordinated personal activities or forces that comes into being when (1) there are two or more persons able to communicate with each other (2) who are willing to contribute action (3) to accomplish a common purpose.[19]

All social transactions are a concomitant of group or organizational life. By definition, an exchange must be engaged in by two or more persons or groups. For each person to perceive a prospective exchange as profitable (a necessary condition for consummating the transaction), he, along with the other transactor, must attach some value to the thing or currency being negotiated. Each person's valuation of the currency may be different in degree, but each must to some degree value it. The more valuable a goal to the individual, the more effort he will put into group activities designed to achieve the goal. In transactional terms, a group is "integrated" when most of its members think it more costly to contribute effort and resources elsewhere than to the group. Affiliation and effort by a member continue so long as he thinks it is "worth doing business" with the particular group, according to whatever subjective valuational yardstick he may apply. When the members of a group prefer its goals, remain in communication with other members, contribute effort to implement these goals, and participate in group decision-making, the group may be described as "integrated." Conversely, "disintegration" is characterized by manifestations of goal-dissatisfaction, low morale, membership inertia, non-communication, or disaffiliation of members.

The durability of "group integration" is invariably a probabilistic condition; in the life of human groups, disintegration and demise are always a possibility. However, if most group members experience (a) a sense of profit during most transactions with the group, (b) reinforced attitudes of trust toward group leaders and fellow-members, and (c) increased transactional opportunity at declining subjective cost, then intra-group transactions may become "irrevocable."

The department store "clearance sale" is a familiar commercial example of an "irrevocable" transaction. The merchant interested in disposing of an inventory of goods, at the same time covering all costs, will announce a "clearance sale" in which prices are irreducibly low and all sales are declared "final." The latter requirement reflects the fact that the reduced prices leave him no margin for either risks or clerical overhead associated with returns of goods. On the other hand, buyers, just as interested in minimizing expenditures, will take special pains to examine goods prior to purchases, unless, of course, the merchant is a trusted seller in the community. Any attempt to reverse the transaction, that is, take back or return goods, would involve unwanted costs to both transactors. The transaction, in this cost-analysis sense, is then "irrevocable." The greater the number and significance of irrevocable transactions among members of a group, the more integrated the group presumably is.

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[17] Claude Ake, *A Theory of Political Integration* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1967), pp. 8–11.

[18] An excellent empirical study of political integration, employing a content analysis of the American colonial press, is Richard L. Merritt's *Symbols of American Community, 1735–1775* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). For an outstanding attempt to cope with the logical and empirical issues of defining "integration," see Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Integration," *Journal of Peace Research* (1968), No. 4, pp. 375–95. According to Galtung, integration is "the process whereby two or more actors form a new actor."

[19] For development of these definitions, David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Knopf, 1951); Chester Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938); James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: Wiley, 1958); and Bertram M. Gross, *The Managing of Organizations* (New York: Free Press, 1964).

"Irrevocable transaction," then, is another feature of organizational integration, including the integration of a nation or a world organization. In view of the constant search for "irrevocable" arms control arrangements in international politics, data about irrevocable transactions would undoubtedly be an important part of an *ex post facto* search into the transactional histories of nations.

II. BEHAVIORAL AND POLITICAL CURRENCIES: A TYPOLOGY

What is exchanged in a transaction? The economists, who have made the most extensive use of the "transaction" concept, have had perhaps the easiest task of identifying the objects exchanged, for they have been relatively material, observable, and quantifiable. Human commerce over the centuries has led to a specific identification of things transacted: goods, services, currencies, etc. For social exchanges, Homans added "sentiments" and "activities." For the purposes of the present theory, "transactable things" are called "currencies." A "currency" is any empirically observable object, action, or condition perceived as valuable by a particular set of interacting persons (or groups) and capable of being transferred or transmitted by one to the other in a transaction.

As suggested earlier, all social transactions are a concomitant of group and organizational life. Shared values are an essential element in the formation of human cooperative systems. Groups come into being when two or more persons hold in common at least one attitude about some goal. Each member of the group contributes effort toward the implementation of the goal in direct ratio to the worth he attaches to the goal. Among the principal behaviors generated in groups and organizations are those relating to (1) the performance of tasks intended to implement either the group goal or the group's response to a shared attitude; (2) the accomplishment of collective decisions, and (3) the utilization of material resources. These principal types of behavior, respectively, are theoretically exchangeable as *positional, decisional,* and *materiel* currencies. Thus, the present theory offers a general typology of behavioral and political "currencies" derived from theoretical characteristics of all groups and organizations.

Positional Currencies

To help in their immediate decisions and actions, the members of a group, or their leaders, will analyze the goal into specific tasks whose accomplishment is then delegated to particular individuals. These are "task expectations."[20] Sets of task-expectations comprise the "positions" in an organized group. The more a group believes that a particular set of tasks or skills will be instrumental in moving it to its goal, the more will that group esteem the position and reward its incumbents. A group position or incumbency therein, therefore, may be a valuable good or currency amenable to exchange in social transactions. The job patronage given by party leaders in exchange for party service is a well known example.

When organizations, including governments, are created, positions are also brought into being. Such positions are usually given (a) a name, (b) a set of tasks to perform, (c) conditions of investiture, according to which the group places into incumbency in the position some particular person, and (d) conditions of divestiture, according to which the group may remove an incumbent from a position. Each of these four aspects of *incumbency* may become negotiable and exchangeable sub-types, or "denominations," of currency in political transactions.

(a) *Position name.* If a position is created and named by a group, the naming may be part of a significant transaction. Should the executive head of the new Federal Union (in 1787) be called "king" or "president"? Should the chief executive office of the United Nations be called "president" or "secretary-general"? These naming questions may carry a number of implications for valued political symbolisms. "President" implies a republican government; "king" implies a monarchy; "chairman" suggests a committee form of executive leadership; etc.

(b) *Task specification.* The creation, assignment, and withdrawal of duties or task-expectations associated with an office may be another sub-type of incumbency currency. Task specification requires information and judgments about the following kinds of issues: What are the odds that particular tasks will produce particular events leading to the goal? What member talent is available that is most relevant to an adequate performance of the tasks expected? How are conflicting estimates of the success of particular instrumental activities—the fight over "means"—to be reconciled with job descriptions? How may the group compensate for inadequate performance by an irremovable incumbent? On each issue, the specification and allocation of tasks may become negotiable currency. For example: "If you let my group (because it knows so much about farming) influence the policies that tell the Secretary of Agriculture what he should be doing, we'll agree that your group (because it knows so much about business) influence what the Secretary of Commerce should be doing."

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[20] Defined in this author's "A Theory of Conflict Processes and Organizational Offices," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 10 (September, 1966), 331–334.

(c) *Legitimizing conditions*. The relationship between a person and a position when the former "fills" the latter is an "incumbency." When an organization prescribes the legitimizing conditions that signal a conclusive choice of incumbent for a position, the elements of that prescription become negotiable currency. The design of the Electoral College method for electing a president, for example, was the result of transactions in legitimizing conditions.

(d) *Divesting conditions*. To create a vacancy in a position is, in effect, to increase the number of incumbencies available for political transaction. For example, in the heyday of Federal post office patronage (1850–1890), tens of thousands of postmasters customarily resigned or failed to have their appointments renewed each time a different political party captured the Presidency. This made way for appointment of the loyal rank-and-file of the winning party. Sometimes, if divesting conditions are not specified or operable, the creation of a vacancy may become quite costly—as in the case of wars, revolutions, assassinations, or *coups d'état* aimed at removing incumbents from office.

Decisional Currencies

Groups, like individuals, must make choices. A group may delegate, by fiat or silent acquiescence, all of its decisional activity to a single individual, a familiar arrangement in dictatorships. At the opposite pole, a group may require the explicit and unanimous consent of all its members before adopting an alternative. Between these extremes are the countless other collective decision-making procedures invented by mankind, including such familiar types as the Quaker "sense of the meeting" and the "majority rule" voting arrangements of democratic representative assemblies.

Whether the group consists of only two persons, e.g., husband and wife, or millions of persons, e.g., the American presidential electorate, its decision-making is normally a matter of selecting one of two or more perceived and available alternatives of action. What is presumably decided is the action alternative most likely, in the minds of group members, to be instrumental in moving the group toward its goal. The greater a member's weight or *share* in the collective decision process, the more likely will *his* valuation of group goals and *his* interpretation of the best means for achieving those goals prevail. "Power" is generally viewed as a matter of sharing in or influencing collective decisions. It follows, then, that decisional units (*shares* in collective decision) may be a valuable currency.

Invariably, decision-making is an individual act or event. Group or collective decision-making, therefore, requires some "method" for summarizing relevant individual decisions in order to discover and act upon the group's choice of alternatives.[21] As a consequence, any arrangement for distributing or sharing collective decision-making prerogative requires a system of participation that may be analyzed into the following components: *Who* takes *what part* in deciding *what kinds of matters* and on *what occasions*? Each of the underscored components may be considered a sub-type, or denomination, of decisional or *shares* currency.

Politicians are conspicuously concerned about trading with shares of prerogative in the collective decisions of the community. To distribute shares of participation in collective decision-making is to establish an organized structure of power dispersion. This leads politicians to analyze and transact solutions to the question above. Political inventors over the centuries have produced a variety of arrangements dealing with each of the components of this question: (a) the attributes that identify "who"; (b) the units of participation that prescribe "what party"; and (d) the situational conditions that identify "occasions." *Prima facie* evidence of a formally arranged system of participation may usually be found in constitutions, statutes, treaties, and similar documents.

(a) *Personal attributes*. The identification of those who shall participate is a major negotiable shares currency. Historically, participation in collective decision-making was first extended to groups rather than to individuals. For example, the House of Lords and House of Commons, as organized groups in the early English Parliament, negotiated with the king for prerogatives in certain public decisions.

In designating different classes of participants, many political communities often indicate who shall be *excluded* from participation as well as who shall be *included*. A partial list of the criteria of eligibility for candidacies or for suffrage privileges shows the range of categories that has developed: citizen status; a minimum age; residence or other geographical restrictions; registered party membership; nomination by a party; educational achievements and literacy skills; real or personal property ownership; membership in one or the other sex; payments of taxes or special fees; religious qualifications; mental or penal disqualifications; race, nationality, or belief requirements; oaths of loyalty; etc.

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[21] Buchanan and Tullock, *op. cit.*

(b) *Units of participation*. What part a participant shall have in choice-making usually refers to his "weight" in voting units. Shall the vote of each participant weight equally with that of every other? Shall the "say" of certain participants weigh more heavily than others in the distribution of votes? These questions run through the history of voting and apportionment systems. Every plan of apportionment is controversial because some group inescapably gets more currency than others. One standard of equality among voting units may create a bias under some other standard, e.g., the equal representation of small and large states in the U. S. Senate.

(c) *Substantive topics*. Types of issues are another basis for parceling out participation. Usually, certain topics or issues may be included within the scope of decision of certain types of participants acting on behalf of the entire community. The Constitution, for example, has many such specifications: only Congress may declare war; only the House of Representatives may initiate tax measures; only the President may grant pardons.

Sometimes certain issues are *excluded* entirely from the decision prerogative of the collectivity, to be left entirely to the choice of individuals. Bills of rights are the most common place for such constraining specifications. Religious affiliation, for example, is subject only to individual, never collective, decision in the United States.

(d) *Situational conditions*. Kinds of occasions are a fourth denomination in the shares currency. These are certain types of situations, frequently identified in law or procedure, whose existence may trigger the exercise of shares. Specification of such situations may place important limits upon power dispersion. For example, in a parliamentary system, a legislative vote of "no confidence" in the incumbent ministry may trigger a general election, whereupon voter participation becomes operative. In war or national emergency situations, usually carefully described in law, the President is allowed to become a "constitutional dictator," with unusual prerogatives for deciding certain matters.

Materiel Currencies

This is perhaps the most familiar of the types of currencies. In economics it is usually referred to as "merchandise," wares," "commodities," "services," etc. The term "materiel," as employed here, pertains to things of physical matter: iron ore, houses, foodstuff, bombs, clothing, typewriters, etc. In ordinary commercial practice, most materiel currencies are assigned a price in monetary units, so that an automobile may be worth $2,000, a typewriter $200, or a loaf of bread 20 cents. Money has itself become a materiel commodity with fluctuating value; as every loan company knows, money is worth much more just before pay-day than just after.

A substantial portion of human activity is devoted to the acquisition, conversion, and utilization of the resources found in the environment, for example, into food to satisfy hunger, clothes to provide warmth, housing to give protection from the elements, vehicles to help move people and goods about, and so on. Civilization has, of course, elaborated these basic activities with advanced technologies.

Materiel currencies, like other currencies, are valued to the extent that they are perceived as instruments for the achievement of desired goals. Cultural influences are often crucial in establishing the valuableness of materiel; the aborigine is hardly a "ready" audience for televised toothpaste commercials.

An overwhelming proportion of what may be called governmental business is usually conducted with materiel, or *commodity*, currencies; so much so that Karl Marx and other political economists came to believe that economic considerations determine all operations of government. Even less ideological documents, such as party platforms, textbooks on public policy-making, etc., are largely discussions of demands for and allocations of government funds, services, goods, credit, and armaments.

(a) *Government funds*. Government funds are those monies collected into the public treasury through tax receipts and other revenue sources, to be re-allocated by public officials. A legislature may appropriate public funds for highway construction, but a public official must let the contract. For this reason, a political party may expend great resources to put its candidates into public office, for this office may determine which "friendly" contractors shall receive the construction work.

(b) *Government services*. Government services rendered by personnel under the direction of public officers and supported by government funds are frequently used as a barter type of substitute for materiel or money e.g., the use of the services of military personnel in a disaster area to help rebuild a community. A Federal agency, the Coast Guard, for example, may render valuable service to port communities by providing emergency aid to private craft sailing in these areas for pleasure or business; for port communities this service is as good as money. Some government services are difficult to classify or measure as materiel currency. What, in dollar or materiel units, is an efficient traffic control service worth to the members of a community in "units" of physical safety, hours saved in transit, and orderly flow of daily business?

(c) *Government goods.* Many public agencies are producers of economic goods. There are "government goods" because of some special circumstance under which they are produced, processed, or sold. Government operated or controlled dams produce electricity. Government agencies purchase surplus agricultural products for resale or gift to foreign nations. Prisons are public agencies whose inmates may produce saleable goods.

(d) *Government credit.* A fourth denomination of materiel currencies is government credit. This has become increasingly prominent in American political transactions during recent decades. Low-interest loans to farmers or homeowners are now a well-established form of aid to these important contributers to the Nation's prosperity. Government credit is also extended in the granting of veteran loans and small business loans.

(e) *Armaments.* A somewhat special sub-type of material currency are weapons, or armaments. The dictionary definition of "armament" is a convenient point of departure: "equipment for hostile action." A hammer is a piece of materiel used as equipment in construction, that is, until it happens to be used as a piece of equipment for committing murder. In the latter situation, a "construction tool" is identified as a "murder weapon." Obviously, classification as "weapon" is contingent upon *purposive* and *situational* factors: the intention of the user; the weapon; the moral category into which the purpose is placed by society; perhaps the name assigned in conversation, e.g., "This hammer would make quite a *murder weapon,*" or "This hunting rifle can be used as a *revolutionary weapon.*"

A weapon, therefore, is a physical device intended to destroy, damage, or otherwise disrupt life and property. Such devices become weapons only among persons who (a) recognize the destructive potentiality of the device under circumstances of conflict and (b) place value upon particular lives and property. The aborigine who has never seen a gun can hardly be threatened with it until its effects are demonstrated and become important to him.

One distinctive characteristic of armaments is the significance of their *anticipated* use; that is, a gun may be as important as an unfired threat as it is when fired even though never used in violent exchanges. Also, armaments may *deny* rather than *give* the transactor things of value (life, property), in effect, reduce the negotiable and bargainable currencies available to the other transactor. To "trade shots" is the essence of a transaction involving armament currency.

Some may prefer to call armaments a "negative commodity," that is, materiel manufactured to destroy and be destroyed, in effect, wasted. But this is not entirely an accurate characterization. A tax dollar spent on guns is a tax dollar less for schools, but a railroad built for military transport may also serve as civilian transport. A pilot trained to fly bombers may also be employed by civilian airlines. In this sense, armaments are government commodities, sometimes totally expendable, sometimes convertible to non-destructive uses. It is the latter convertibility that produces the surprising affluence often associated with war-time economies; not all armament spending need be an economic "waste."

III. POLITICAL TRANSACTIONS RELEVANT TO ARMS CONTROL

The typology of general "behavioral currencies" proposed in this paradigm or sketch of a transactional theory, then, consists of three classes: *positional, decisional,* and *materiel.* The "political currencies" identified as counterparts or derivatives of these more comprehensive behavioral currencies consist of *incumbencies* (positional), *shares* (decisional), and *commodities* (materiel). While the definitions of the political currencies fall short of being well-operationalized at this time, the requirement is made that their referents be valuable, observable, and transferable in political transactions.

In an investigation reported elsewhere[22] this typology of political currencies was employed to code the content of political transactions occurring in seventeenth century England and twentieth century Mexico, more specifically, the period 1603–1708 in England and the period 1910–1940 in Mexico. In each case, long periods of recurrent internal war were followed by a cessation of internal wars, national political integration, and domestic arms control. In the two cases, a common pattern of transacted political currencies was identified.

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[22] See cited Final Technical Report entitled "A Transactional Theory of Political Integration and Arms Control" (November 1968), Office of Naval Research Project NR 177258, Contral Nonr-4722 (00).

This pattern suggests the existence of three distinct stages in the development of integrated political communities: (1) an Unintegrated Stage, (2) a Critical Transition, and (3) an Integrated Stage, the latter including arms control arrangements. It was also found important to separate out the armament from the other denominations (sub-types) of commodities currency in order to reveal more clearly the trend concluding in arms control. Thus, the frequencies of four, rather than three, currency types were observed. The four included incumbencies, shares, non-armament commodities, and armament commodities.

In the two cases, the Unintegrated Stage saw a high frequency of *armament* exchanges and very few transacted *incumbencies*. This seemed to reflect the recurrence of internal wars, usually wars about who should sit on the throne or in the presidency; that is, incumbencies as such were not traded, but instead captured by force of arms. In contrast, the Integrated Stage was marked by highly frequent transactions in *incumbencies* and eventually none in *armaments,* the consequence, undoubtedly, of arrangements making *incumbencies* more available for political "deals" in the national marketplace.

The pattern through the three stages shows an over-all rise in transactions involving *shares* currencies. This rise goes up sharply during the Critical Transition, suggesting that *transactions in shares (decisional) currencies are the most important taking place during the Critical Transition.* This would seem to reflect intensive efforts to disperse, share, or otherwise re-arrange the collective decision prerogatives within the national organization. The pattern also suggests that, if shares transacted during the Critical Transition prove to be unprofitable to the major transactors, transactional activity reverts or "loops back" to the frequencies typifying the Unintegrated Stage. In the English and Mexican cases, the deals turned out to be "profitable," and the Critical Transition was successfully navigated into the Integrated Stage. Thus, in passing through the Critical Transition to national integration, *a rising frequency in shares transactions is associated with a sharp decline in violent exchanges of armament commodities.*

Finally, the Integrated Stage experiences a rising rate of incumbency and non-armament commodity transactions. This seems to reflect a regularization of non-violent means for gaining office, the practice of only temporarily controlling the government, as well as growth in relative numbers of governmental positions available for trading. The rising non-armament commodity transactions are, of course, a familiar indicator of peace. Prosperity tends to be growth of economic activity and resources under conditions of peace. This aspect of the transactional pattern may be seen as further confirmation of the proposition that, contrary to Marxist assumptions, peace, not war, is "good for business."

Impressionistic evidence derived from the two case studies indicates another factor appearing to correlate with the integrating pattern, namely, a trust-suspicion factor. Even though transactors reach a level of frequent transaction of shares currencies, previous violent armament exchanges between them are not likely to be conducive to attitudes of trust toward each other. In fact, the contrary has the greater probability; suspicion is the more probable attitude under the usual historical circumstances. *Creation of an environment of transactor trust appears to be the most important consequence of shares exchanges during the Critical Transition period.* Once trust is engendered, transactional activity involving non-armament currencies seems also to be facilitated.

Put another way, observation of transactional histories seems to isolate specific exchange conditions under which attitudes of trust or suspicion may be generated. Conditions leading to trust between transactors may facilitate the surmounting of bargaining hurdles during a Critical Transition period in national political integration. Conditions leading to suspicion, on the other hand, may heighten the negotiating and transactional hurdles to an insurmountable degree, returning the transactors to disintegrative patterns, particularly to armaments exchanges.

These findings may also be interpreted as describing part of the dynamics of evolving representative institutions, suggesting a theory of the development of systems of representation. Representation presumably disperses power (decisional currency) so as to assure comprehensive participation in collective decisions, which in turn promotes trust among transactors, commitment to the political organization, and reduction in the perceived need for armament expenditures. As Charles A. Beard and John D. Lewis note in their survey of "Representative Government in Evolution":

> . . . During the thousands of years which we call antiquity, monarchies, despotisms, dictatorships, tyrannies, democracies, and aristocracies, with numerous variants, rose, flourished, and fell; but nowhere, at no time, did representative institutions appear, at least on any impressive scale. . . .



Figure 1. Political Currencies Transacted Over Time, Showing Hypothesized Suspicion-inducing Pattern (Pattern S).

> The starting point of representative government on a national scale, then, is the Middle Ages in time, and the place is Europe. . . . The monarchs who first called representatives of communities or estates [shares] to grant money [commodities] were not thinking of democracy; they were concerned primarily with the conservation of the peace, the administration of lucrative justice, and the replenishment of their royal treasuries. . . .[23]

Insights provided by the English and Mexican case studies, therefore, suggest testing a relatively ancient political proposition: Dispersed and shared power (decisional currency) is a major contingent factor in promoting attitudes of trust associated with cessations in the use of means of violence (armament commodities) in political transactions. In such a test, the consummated political transactions would be observed, the content of these transactions would be classified as political currencies, that is, as incumbencies, shares, or commodities. The specific major hypotheses would probably be:

a. Rises in frequency of transacted shares (decisional) currencies are positively correlated with attitudinal shifts from suspicion to trust among political transactors.

b. Transactional sequences that follow the

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[23] This Review, 26 (April, 1932), 223–240.



FIGURE 2. Political Currencies Transacted Over Time, Showing Hypothesized Trust-inducing Pattern (Pattern T)

trust-inducing Pattern T (see Figure 2) tend to be associated with successful transitions from unintegrated to integrated stages of political organization.

The transactional time-series that would test the hypothesis are set forth, hypothetically, in Figures 1 and 2.[24]

Briefly, the political currencies transacted during Phase A (Unintegrated Stage) are for the most part armaments. Phase B (Critical Transition) witnesses a rise in armaments transactions, a drop in non-armament commodity transactions (e.g., due to blockades, boycotts, etc.), some increase in incumbency transactions, and *either* Pattern T (sharp rise) *or* Pattern S (decline) in shares transactions. If there is a significant rise in the relative frequency of transactions involving shares currencies (Pattern T), this, hypothetically, will be accompanied by a rise in trusting attitudes and a successful transition to Phase C (Integrated Stage). However, if there is either no rise or a decline in shares transactions (Pattern S), then attitudes of suspicion remain, as in Phase A (as the leftward arrow at the end of Pattern S in Figure 1 suggests), and transactional activity returns to the Phase A state.

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[24] The mathematical and logical problems of measurement in such a time-series may be considered in the light of the excellent discussion by James S. Coleman, "The Mathematical Study of Change," in Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., and Ann B. Blalock (eds.), *Methodology in Social Research* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), Chap. 11.

The theory sketch proposed here requires further formalization, particularly with respect to the operational definition of its principal variables. The predictive statements offered need to be submitted to more rigorous empirical tests than provided in the two cases studies employed for exploratory purposes thus far. Further *ex post facto* historical investigation and simulation experiments seem to hold greatest promise in the design of such tests, and are discussed elsewhere.[25] Either approach has important empirical limitations, yet both types afford challenging opportunities for political scientists wishing to test theoretical generalizations in "the laboratory of history."[26]

If the major hypotheses of this transactional approach are experimentally confirmed, the practical implications may be substantial in a variety of political circumstances, including those involving the design of strategies for advancing international arms control, advancing the political integration of new nations, and even settling violent outbreaks in contemporary urban communities. The strategies would presumably endeavor to promote trust-inducing Pattern T political transactions.

The military capacity to wage war successfully has traditionally been considered an instrument of foreign policy. This view is reflected in Clausewitz's classic definition of war as the continuation of diplomacy by other means. The same view also may be found in most contemporary approaches to "deterrence" of armed aggression through superiority of military forces. Yet, knowledge about the conditions and dynamics of *effective* deterrence continues to be more a matter of conventional wisdom than of validated theory.[27] How "hard" is the political knowledge, after all, that would provide answers to such transactionally stated questions as the following: What are the valuational yardsticks by which particular political transactors judge armament exchanges as "too costly" and transactions in other negotiable political currencies "profitable"? By what series of transactions may adversary decision-makers acquire attitudes of trust sufficient to facilitate arrangements for arms control and political integration? How may changes in valuation yardsticks, political "market-place" arrangements, and political currency denominations raise the probability that world integrating transactions may remain "irrevocable"?

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[25] Final Technical Report, ONR Project NR 177258, *op. cit.*

[26] For further pertinent comment, Ole R. Holsti and Robert C. North, "History as a 'Laboratory of Conflict'," in Elton B. McNeil (ed.), *Social Science and Human Conflict* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965).

[27] Milton J. Rosenberg, in James N. Rosenau (ed.), *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1967), for example, attempts to build new ways to reduce distrust between the United States and the Soviet Union from approaches suggested by validated psychological theories. One suggestion is to rely upon systematic "cross-trading," wherein the advantage in one interest conflict is given to one side, while the advantage in another conflict is given to the other side. Thus, adversary leaders may be conditioned away from the view that their relationship is an extended zero-sum game, and attitudes of distrust toward one another may be modified by overt transactional successes.

TOWARD A RATIONAL THEORY OF DECENTRALIZATION: SOME IMPLICATIONS OF A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH

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This paper seeks to open for exploration the field of decentralization in politics and organizational design. As a first approach, it examines conditions under which decentralization is preferable from the viewpoint of rationality or cost-effectiveness. Our normative statements as to what would be best, or what should be done, are formulated first from the viewpoint of the subjects or clients, but they are expected to include the interest of the community in ensuring adequate service at low cost, and they also include the interest of the rulers, insofar as their power in the long run depends on their capacity to respond to the demands made upon them quickly enough and adequately enough to retain their political support.

The political theory underlying our study assumes that modern governments retain "their just powers by the consent of the governed," and hence that both their legitimacy and their power will depend at least in significant part on their ability to respond adequately to the popular demands made upon them. We do not deal in this study with other important criteria of preference, such as the psychological value which some of those who take the role of powerholders may put upon centralized control, or the contrary value which some of those who identify with their subjects may put upon power sharing and decentralization. We do hope to suggest, however, which side to the centralization-decentralization controversy is likely to be favored by the pressure of cost-effectiveness considerations, and under what conditions.

At this stage, we also assume ethnic, linguistic, cultural and social uniformity, as the conditions most likely to favor centralization. According to traditional theory, at least, strong centralization under non-uniform conditions usually would be more difficult.

We consider a situation where several identical and equally spaced facilities for decision making, information processing, or other operations perform services in response to requests from sources that are uniformly distributed in time and across varying distances. Such distances could be measured in terms of intervening decision points, switching points, waiting lines, or simple geographic space. As the simplest first approximation, we have analyzed this last type—service through communication and/or transport along a long thin spatial strip.

In the simplest models, the focus is on *costs*: the number of duplicated facilities is determined by setting the marginal increase in fixed costs equal to the marginal decrease in the costs of communication and transportation due to decentralization. In later models, the utility of *time* gained by more rapid service in response to requests is taken into account, and attention is given to the more dependable availability of service that comes with decentralization involving duplication of facilities. Throughout all these models the total *volume* of requests, and its ratio to the speed of communication and transport, turn out to be crucial.

As far as they go, the results of the present analysis suggest that the social, political and economic changes, which influence the rising volume of requests, may outweigh in many cases the effects of the technological changes that have speeded up communication and transport, and that societies which adopt the technological changes are likely to be societies that increase also—or even more—the volume of requests for service or responses. Where these conditions apply, current and future social, political and technical developments may increase, rather than decrease, conditions favoring decentralization.

More extended mathematical derivations and discussions are presented elsewhere.[1] The present paper is the first of a projected series which is to investigate problems of centralization and decentralization by means of a series of models intended to be increasingly close to the actual variables and problems encountered in the practice of governments and other organizations. Problems of uneven distributions of messages or service requests, in space and time, questions of hierarchies among service or decision centers, and questions of lateral communications or interference among multiple facilities among several centers at the same level, will have to be investigated in such later papers.

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[1] M. Kochen and K. W. Deutsch, "A Mathematical Model for a Study of Political Decentralization," submitted to *Operations Research*, September 1968.

I. DECENTRALIZATION AS A GENERAL PROBLEM

When the director of a research institute in which there are several independent investigators plans to provide computer-based information services, a choice presents itself. Should he provide each independent investigator with his own small computer? Should he install a large computer system everyone must share? Should he provide some mix of these two extremes?

When an architect plans a low-income housing project on a fixed budget, he faces a somewhat analogous choice. Should he provide one bathroom for each family but no swimming pool plus bathhouse for the project (assuming that the budget does not stretch to cover both) or should he provide 50% fewer bathrooms than families, thus making every two families share one, but providing a swimming pool plus bathhouse for use by all as well?

A university library system may comprise over a dozen branches plus departmental and special libraries. In planning the construction of new buildings and ordering library materials, should the university librarian favor the creation of branches and special libraries wherever they are wanted, supplying each with duplicate copies and each with a separate bibliographic control system? Or should he favor the creation of a central custodial unit where responsibility for bibliographic control is concentrated?

A school system may concentrate most of the effective control in the hands of a single board of education for an entire metropolitan area with several million inhabitants, or it may decentralize much or most of this control down to about three dozen neighborhood school boards, each serving a community of between 100,000 and 200,000 people. Apart from group demands and local power contests, which arrangement would be more rational? In what respects and on what grounds?

To what extent should the commander-in-chief delegate various battlefield responsibilities to local commanders and platoon sergeants? What are the consequences of too much or too little autonomy for the junior managers and foremen of a 100,000-employee industrial organization, as distinct from rigid control by a strong chief executive?

Are the customers of an industry better served by a single firm, or a single decision-making unit within a firm, or by several firms or several decision-making units?

Is the population of a territory best served by a single nation-state or government or a single administrative center within a nation, or by several states, governments, or administrative centers?

All these questions have a common core. It is the concept of the "degree of decentralization" of an organization or institution and its relation to the "performance" of the latter. The performance of every human organization includes crucially its *responses* to information received from its environment. Service organization, such as governmental housing or other public or private service agencies, health services, libraries, or computing centers, often appear passive in that they wait for requests from their potential clients or users, to which they then respond. Other public or private agencies appear more active in that they often initiate a sequence or transaction between themselves and some members of the public. Thus tax collection agencies, draft boards, truant officers, public health departments, and private sales organizations often take some initiative in this sense; and some organizations, such as legislatures, general administrative agencies, and police departments play a mixed role, initiating some transactions and also responding to messages from the outside.

Human organizations of all kinds, however, depend critically on the *feedback* of information from their environment in order to discover the results of their actions and to correct their errors.[2] It is in regard to this exchange of information, and often also of things and persons, with their environment, that the performance of more or less centralized or decentralized organizations is to be compared here, in a series of preliminary steps toward a theory of decentralization.

The approach proposed here would go somewhat deeper, therefore, than the familiar view that centralization is a matter of power—that the strong tend to centralize in their own hands as much power as they can, and concede to the weak only as much decentralization as they must. It is quite true that a powerful person, group or office often can concentrate a great many flows of information and of decision making responsibilities in their own hands, but it does not necessarily follow that they will be able to use this information effectively to produce timely and adequate responses.

The relation between power and communication is thus not a one-way process. Power can command communication, but communication and information-processing capacity may increase power or reduce it to the point of paralysis. Where power originally produced centralization, delays or failures in information-processing or responsiveness may then tend to shift both loyalties and power away from the centralized but unresponsive offices or places of command. The operational effectiveness of centralized or decentralized information-processing or decision-making centers, governmental agencies, business organizations and service facilities, is thus in each case a question intellectually distinct from the question of power, and worth considering in its own right.

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[2] On the concept of feedback, see Norbert Wiener, *The Human Use of Human Beings*, (New York: Avon Books, 1967), ch. 1; K. W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government*, (2nd ed.; New York: Free Press, 1966), with references; and Robert A. Rosenthal and Robert S. Weiss, "Problems of Organizational Feedback Processes," in *Social Indicators*, Raymond A. Bauer (ed.), (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966), pp. 302–340.

Much of the well-known political and social theory on centralization and decentralization implies that centralization is preferable on the grounds of efficiency, and that modern technology, with its jet aircraft and electronic communication, has increased the pressures toward centralization.[3] Some theories also assert, however, that decentralization is better suited to protect the values of democracy, liberty, and popular participation in decision-making.[4] Some theorists point our that these different views balance to some extent, and that the optimal point on some more or less continuous centralization-decentralization scale must be discovered in each case; but they give little further indication as to how these discoveries are to be made.

For a start, we shall try to make explicit a few of the basic notions involved, leaving other aspects of the problem for later work. Thus we shall start from the feedbacks and transactions with the outside world, postponing for later analysis elsewhere the internal decision processes of organizations and their possible overloads which play such a large role in much of current organization theory.[5]

We stress in this paper the concern of the person with primary responsibility for the institutional organization rather than the concerns of the members of that organization. Further, we stress what he *should* be concerned with in terms of purposive rationality, rather than what may actually concern him most for personal, psychological, or sociological reasons. By "what he should be concerned with" we mean norms, related to the basic functions and the survival of the institution for which he is responsible; these norms are determined environmentally in terms of feedback processes that are decisive about the survival of the institution. Not that these neglected subjective aspects are unimportant. Far from it. They may well be the salient features of a viable theory of decentralization. So much more reason to treat them thoroughly, but separately, at a later stage.

There is surprisingly little published literature on which to base a formal explication of the decentralization concept.[6] Some of the operations research literature dealing with warehouse allocation problems[7] is relevant, as is some of the applied mathematical statistics literature on problems for determining the optimum number of machines or service facilities.[8] Generally, however, customers are assumed to arrive at the service facility, and the time for requests to pass from the customer's site to the facility and for responses to pass back to the customer is not taken into account. The conventional "warehouse-location" problem is to locate a specified number of warehouses and assign customers to each warehouse so that the sum of the squared distances between each customer and the warehouse closest to him is minimized. Actually, distance may not be best represented by its second power;[9] and the present paper will treat the best number of warehouses not as given but as to be computed. It is primarily in the analysis of information systems that such problems are encountered, and relatively little analytical study has been devoted to these.

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[3] See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, Donald W. Smithburg, and Victor A. Thompson, *Public Administration* (New York: Knopf, 1956), pp. 272–279. For a related argument in international relations, see Albert Wohlstetter, "Illusions of Distance," *Foreign Affairs*, 46 (January 1968), p. 250.

[4] A qualified emphasis on decentralization is found in Joseph A. Litterer, *The Analysis of Organizations* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965), pp. 378–393; and John M. Pfiffner and Frank P. Sherwood, *Administrative Organizations*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960), pp. 440–462.

[5] For some important general approaches, see Herbert Kaufman, "Organization Theory and Political Theory," this REVIEW, 58 (1964), 5–14, esp. 7–8, 13–14; Mason Haire, *Organization Theory in Industrial Practice* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962), pp. 6–7; Albert H. Rubenstein and Chadwick J. Haberstroh, *Some Theories of Organization* (Homewood, Illinois: Irwin and Dorsey, 1966).

[6] For examples of discussions of the political and social aspects of decentralization and the size of political units or areas, see Bernard H. Baum, *Decentralization in a Democracy*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1961); Robert A. Dahl, "The City in the Future of Democracy," this REVIEW, 61 (1967), 953–970; James W. Fesler, *Area and Administration* (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1942); S. W. Hess, *et. al.*, "Non-Partisan Political Redistricting by Computer," *Operations Research*, 13 (1965); 998–1006; Philip Jacob and James V. Toscano (eds.), *The Integration of Political Communities*, (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964); Arthur W. Macmahon, *Delegation and Autonomy* (New York: Asia Publications and Taplinger, 1967); E.A.G. Robinson (ed.), *Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1963). General studies of decentralization are relatively rare in political science. *The Cumulative Index to the American Political Science Review* (1906–1963) (ed.), (Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press, 1964) lists only one article for the 57 years covered, S. G. Lowrie's "Centralization versus Decentralization (Federalism)", which appeared in the REVIEW in 1922. During the same 57 years, three articles referring in their titles to the delegation of legislative powers appeared in 1908, 1926, and 1947, respectively.

In this paper we analyze the simplest of these mathematical problems which are, nonetheless, quite generic to a large class of situations in which centralization vs. decentralization is an issue.

II. MOVING PEOPLE, THINGS AND INFORMATION: THE LOGISTICS OF ORGANIZATION

Decentralization depends in large part on logistics, and all social organizations have problems of logistics. All of them must move messages from one place to another; many of them also must move people, such as field representatives, investigators, fire truck crews, riot squads, case workers or other agents of various kinds; and many must also move material objects, ranging from small samples or mail order items to bulky goods in mass production. Yet some organizations mostly depend in their functioning on the inflow and outflow of messages, as do telephone exchanges, while others depend most critically on the movement of material goods, as do factories. Still other organizations depend primarily on receiving information, such as orders or requests, and on responding to these by moving material objects or people, as do mail order houses and at higher rates of speed also fire departments and ambulance services.

The agencies of government and politics overlap these various types. Public school systems depend upon the movement both of people and of information. The long-run recruitment and maintenance of an army depends upon the movement of persons and supplies, but the short-run intervention of some of its forces may occur in response to an order or message. A law court requires the physical presence of the parties or their representatives, and a prison insists on the physical presence of its inmates. Administrative decisions, on the other hand, often are sent out as control signals or messages in response to information that was received at some earlier stage. Legislation consists from this point of view in a special class of messages issued in response not only to earlier messages but also in response to the physical movement of various spokesmen for interest groups at formal hearings, or more informally of lobbyists, and to the bodily movement of legislators and constituents between their respective constituencies and the capital.

A simple overview of such organizations classified into basic logistic types is shown in Table 1.

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[7] See Hess, *et. al.*, *op. cit.*; W. J. Baumol and P. Wolfe, "A Warehouse Location Problem," *Operations Research*, 6 (1958), 252–263; L. Hurwicz, *Decentralized Resource Allocation*, Cowles Commission Discussion Paper No. 2112, 1955; T. C. Koopmans and M. J. Beckmann, "Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities," *Econometrica*, 25 (1957), 53–76; A. A. Kuehn and M. J. Hamburger, "A Heuristic Program for Locating Warehouses," *Management Science*, 9 (1963), 643–666; Alan S. Manne, "Plant Location under Economies-of-Scale—Decentralization and Computation," *Management Science*, 11 (1964), 213–235.

[8] J. P. Anderson, *et. al.*, "D825—A Multiple Computer System for Command and Control," in *AFIPS Conference Proceedings*, Volume 22, (Washington, DC: Spartan Books, 1962), pp. 86–96; K. J. Arrow and L. Hurwicz, "Decentralization and Computation in Resource Allocation," in R. W. Pfouts (ed.), *Essays in Economics and Econometrics* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), pp. 34–104; Information Dynamics Corporation, *A Methodology for the Analysis of Information Systems*, Final Report to the National Science Foundation, NSF-C-370, (1965); J. R. Jackson, "Networks of Waiting Lines," *Management Sciences Research Project Research Report No. 53* (Los Angeles: University of California, mimeographed, 1957); Z. S. Wurtele, "A Criterion for Determining the Number of Identical Machines to be Installed at a Machine Center," *Management Sciences Research Project Discussion Paper No. 78* (Los Angeles: University of California, mimeographed, 1961); Edgar M. Hoover, *The Location of Economic Activity*, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1948).

[9] K. W. Deutsch and W. Isard, "A Note on a Generalized Concept of Distance," *Behavioral Science*, 6 (1961), 308–311.

TABLE 1. SOME EXAMPLES OF LOGISTIC TYPES OF ORGANIZATION

		OUTGOING	
		Matter	Information
INCOMING	Matter*	Army Law Court Prison Repair Shop Hospital Medical Examination Factory or Plant Legitimate Theater	Quality Control Stations Analytical Laboratory Movie Studio Live Television Museum, Gallery, Archives
	Information	Military Task Force Police Fire Department Ambulance Relief Supplies Mail Order House	Decision-making and Control Centers (governmental and private) Telephone Switching Nets Data Centers Reference Services Computer Facilities

* Material objects and/or human bodies

Each entry in any cell in Table 1 refers to either a task to be performed ("medical examination and treatment") or to an institution which performs some task or tasks (e.g., "army," "hospital"). In some cases, such a task is performed only by relatively large institutions, while other tasks can be decentralized in their performance to the level of individual clients. Government and defense usually are concentrated in such larger institutions, but some physicians still visit patients in their homes. Even governments and armies, however, can decentralize their functions to a greater or lesser degree.

For a functional theory of decentralization, toward which the present paper is directed, the social tasks to be performed are more important than the historical institutions which currently happen to perform them. Though institutions have a great deal of persistence and tend to protect their own survival, they nonetheless do change. Some of these changes tend toward greater or lesser decentralization, and a functional analysis of the level of decentralization most appropriate to their chief task is essential in order to evaluate rationally the actual changes which occur in response to technological or political pressures.

We emphasize the distinction between the movement and storage of persons and materials on the one hand, and the transmission and storage of information on the other hand as most important from the viewpoint of logistics. Messages move more quickly by several orders of magnitude than do persons and materials, and unlike persons and materials they can be duplicated at low cost. All information, of course, depends on some material carrier or marker which bears it, much as a book depends on printer's ink and paper, but the ratio of amount of information to mass of carrier, say in bits per pound per hour, is very high and on a computer display terminal (e.g., teletypewriter or display screen), it is still higher. Our analysis will show that transmission speed is often critical for determining the optimum level of decentralization of a network of facilities and we may expect, therefore, to get different answers for systems depending primarily upon transport as against those depending primarily upon communication.

A simple exercise may illustrate these points. Here we idealize a special but prototypical problem to such an extent that we can analyze it mathematically. Our prototype model will deal with the supply of services from one or several storage facilities. This is not irrelevant. For politics and administration, government, administrative agencies, and law courts all can be thought of as storage places for memories, recorded in their files or carried in the minds of their specialized personnel, and as suppliers of decisions to their clients or constituents. The mathematical analysis of this simplified model may give us insights that a purely verbal analysis does not provide. Building on such a more precise and explicit foundation, we hope then to make some progress toward an edifice of theory that explicates the core problems and proves helpful in explaining the success of various organizations and possibly also in advising decision-makers.

III. A PROTOTYPE MODEL

Imagine an institution existing to supply objects of value, e.g., books or mail-order items, to customers located in an elongated region from Boston to San Francisco in which the north-south dimension is treated as negligible.

Let D be the east-west distance of this region in miles or in terms of relay stations, traffic intersections, intervening opportunities or other conditions affecting the probability and costs of transmission or transport (Definition 1). Let us make the further assumption that the demand for these valuable objects is spread uniformly over the length of this strip. For example, suppose that ten requests per month originate from each mile along the strip.

Let L denote the total load, in requests per month (Definition 2). The total load, L, resulting from this demand requiring service, then would be $L = 10D$ requests per month. Assume that we can control the way the institution is organized, and we wish to explore the consequences of various degrees of decentralization.

By the most centralized organization we mean a single service facility, say a warehouse, which maintains a large enough stock of the valuable objects to clear the demand at all times. (At this first stage of the analysis we assume that the time to forward and process requests is negligible.) It is obvious that the best location for this warehouse is in the middle of our stretched-out region, as shown in Figure 1.



FIG. 1. A Centralized Organization

The manager of the organization is uncertain about the exact distance x between the service facility and the site from which a request (for an object) originates at any moment. When such a request is made, the manager must find the wanted object in the warehouse and transport it to that location.

We assume having a transportation medium which transports at a uniform speed of v miles per hour (Definition 3).

Then the delivery time to a point at a distance of x from the warehouse is x/v. Because the sites of requests are assumed to be uniformly distributed over the length D, the average distance between the site of a randomly selected request and the warehouse at the midpoint is D/4. Hence, the average delivery time for a request is D/4v.

By a slightly less centralized organization we mean two warehouses, with identical inventories (each containing a copy of each valuable object), located at the quarter points of our elongated region (see Figure 2).



FIG. 2. A Two-Facility Organization

A request originating at any point is serviced by the warehouse nearest to it; requests from points equidistant from two facilities are serviced at random by either.

While for the single facility shown in Figure 1, the delivery time, averaged over many randomly originating requests, was D/4v, it is half of that, or D/8v, for the two facilities shown in Figure 2.

Let the dollar costs of operating a warehouse be $C per month (Definition 4).

Then the fixed cost of operating the single repository organization of Figure 1 is C (including interest and amortization on its cost of installation) while that of the duplicated service in Figure 1 is 2C.

Let the dollar cost of delivering objects be c dollars per hour (Definition 5).

Then the total demand is L requests per month (with L/2 for each of the two warehouses in the organization of Figure 2), and the average delivery cost is cDL/4v dollars per month for Figure 1 and cDL/8v for Figure 2.

If we used three warehouses, we would arrange them as shown in Figure 3.



Fig. 3

The most primitive index of decentralization is n, the number of duplicate warehouses (Definition 6).

We would, in the general case, place the left-most warehouse at distance $D/2n$ miles from the left, and space $n-1$ warehouses D/n miles apart, the right-most warehouse being $D/2n$ miles from the right end. Each warehouse meets requests issuing from a distance of D/n or fewer miles to its right or left. Since a request, on the average, should originate $\frac{1}{2}$ $(D/2n)$ miles to the right or left of the warehouse, the average transport distance is $D/4n$. The average delivery time (in hours) is the average distance divided by transport speed (miles per hour) or $D/4vn$.

This first approximation neglects the internal cost of processing and servicing each request within each facility. It also neglects congestion effects and instead assumes *unobstructed* channels of transport and communication. That is, it assumes that the input load L, in requests per unit of time, has no effect on the transmission speed v, and that it has no effect on the throughput rate of the system.

The maximum throughput rate of the system is defined as its capacity, called here M for objects and B for information, respectively (Definition 7).

If the system were partially obstructed, the speed v of transport or transmission would decline with rising input loads; if the system were *overloaded*, its throughput rate would decline with increasing inputs, and it would fall increasingly below the system's capacities M or B. In reality, there often is an extended range of traffic loads L over which the speed v remains substantially unchanged. In the present prototype example, however, we are assuming that this range extends all the way to the maximum capacity point and beyond it, so that v is treated as independent from L at all times. More realistic congestion effects and other complicating possibilities must be left for later treatment.

Suppose time were of no value to users, and only costs mattered to them. Then it would pay to increase the number, n, of facilities until the marginal increase in fixed costs is equal to the marginal decrease in delivery costs.

Let C_n be the cost of operating an organization with n warehouses. Let us assume that $C_n = nC$, namely that it costs simply n times as much to operate an n-warehouse organization as it does to operate a single repository. That is, the marginal increase in fixed costs is $C_n + 1 - C_n$ or just $(n+1-n).C$; that is, it is simply equal to C and remains therefore constant.

We have shown earlier that the average delivery cost per month for a system of n facilities is $cDL/4vn$. An increase by 1 in the number of facilities reduces this cost to $cDL/4v(n+1)$, by a difference of

$$\frac{cDL}{4v}\left(\frac{1}{n} - \frac{1}{n+1}\right)$$

which is

$$\frac{cDL}{4v} \frac{1}{n(+1)}.$$

There is a point, therefore, where the savings from lower delivery costs will be just equal to or less than C, the increase in capital costs, and where it will no longer pay to increase n, the number of facilities, any further. We set C equal to

$$\frac{cDL}{4v}\,\frac{1}{n(n+1)}$$

and solve for n. The best number n of decentralized facilities thus would be the integer just larger than:

$$1/2\left(\sqrt{1+\frac{cDL}{Cv}}-1\right) \qquad (1)$$

The average service cost per request, S, of this optimal service is given by:

$$s=\frac{nC}{L}+\frac{cD}{4nv} \qquad (2)$$

Even these simple formulas have some interesting implications. Let us suppose the following possibilities, as in Table 2:

TABLE 2. SOME EXAMPLES OF OPTIMAL DECENTRALIZATION LEVELS

	Low Load, Low Delivery Cost		High Load, High Delivery Cost	
	low capital cost, low speed	high capital cost, medium speed	high capital cost, high speed	very high capital cost, very high speed
	A	B	C	D
1. Distance D (miles)	3,000	3,000	3×10^3	3×10^3
2. Load (requests per month) L	3×10^4	3×10^4	3×10^6	3×10^6
3. Costs of delivery c ($ per hour)	0.10	0.10	10.-	10.-
4. Capital cost C ($ per month)	10^2	10^4	10^4	10^5
5. Velocity of transport v (miles per hour)	10	10^2	10^3	10^4
cDL	9×10^6	9×10^6	9×10^{10}	9×10^{10}
Hence Cv	10^3	10^6	10^7	10^9
Then optimum number of facilities N	47	1	47	5
Distance among facilities	64	—	64	600
Cost of service, S, in dollars per request	.32	1.08	.32	.32

This simple exercise demonstrates—as does, of course, the formula

$$\frac{1}{2}\left(\sqrt{1+\frac{cDL}{Cv}}-1\right)$$

given earlier—that this simple model is equally sensitive over a wide range to proportionate changes in c, D, L, C and v, but is more sensitive to changes in C and v where these values are very small. The table also shows that decentralization may decline as capital costs and/or delivery speeds increase, but that it may increase again at high levels of capital cost and delivery speeds, if the load of service requests and the costs of delivery have risen faster.

This result tends to modify the suggestion of Herbert Simon and his associates, that the introduction of long-distance or intercontinental telephones makes it "unnecessary" for governments "to allow (their) representatives much discretion in the choice of decisional premises." Generally, they stress that "improved methods of communication have made a much greater degree of centralization possible."[10] If we are to judge what is probable or rational, in addition to what is merely possible, we now may consider that a society which produces telephones also produces higher request rates, service demands, and decision loads for public and private agencies, and that they may become more affluent in regard to capital costs, so that the optimum degree of decentralized facilities may increase.

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[10] Simon, Smithburg, & Thompson, *op. cit.*, pp. 275, 279. Simon's thoughtful comments on the various tendencies making for actual, rather than merely possible, centralization are wholly compatible with our analysis. The latter merely adds some emphasis on several no less real tendencies which may work in the opposite direction.

The optimum level of decentralization emerges as a systems property in response to changes, not in one parameter, but in the configuration of several critical parameters. Such a configuration may favor the excellent telephone service and considerable political decentralization of present-day Switzerland rather than the slow messenger service and the much greater political centralization of ancient Egypt or Tokugawa Japan.[11] Even under the simplified assumptions of our prototype model, growth of the capitalization and performance of service organizations of all kinds, including governments, may rationally lead to decentralization or to centralization, depending on which of the relevant parameters grow at a greater rate.

IV. TRANSPORTATION VS. TRANSMISSION: THE BULK OF OBJECTS AND THE LENGTH OF MESSAGES

Whether or not to service requests with a centralized or decentralized deployment of facilities depends to some extent on what is being requested: materials or information. Both are transmitted through channels in which they would move at characteristic primary speeds if the channels were unobstructed. In each case, however, these channels have limited capacities. They can, and usually do, become overloaded and obstructed with a resulting decline in the effective rate of flow. Thus, congested roads may cut the effective speed of traffic flow from 60 to 15 miles per hour; congested airports may cut the effective speed of downtown-to-downtown jet air travel from 600 miles per hour to 300 miles per hour for airport-to-airport speed and 100 m.p.h. for downtown-to-downtown speeds. Similarly, overloaded switchboards and relays reduce the effective speed of electronic transmission from the theoretical limit of the speed of light (186,000 miles per second, or over .67 billion miles per hour, making light from the sun take about nine minutes to reach the earth) to an average effective speed varying from 1,000 to 10,000 miles per hour. Even when delayed in this manner, however, electronically-optically transmitted information will tend to move on the average about 100 times as fast as would bulky material objects. Communication thus differs from transport by several orders of magnitude in regard to the degree of centralization or decentralization which it makes relatively optimal.

At this point it becomes desirable to consider the bulk or weight of objects, measured in pounds or tons, and the length of messages, measured in bits of information. (Actually, we shall be more concerned here with orders of magnitude than with precise measurements.) The cost variable previously introduced measured the cost of "delivering an object" in response to a request, in dollars per hour. But c depends not only on the speed but on the nature of the object as well. It costs more to deliver a massive object than a light one. It costs more to deliver a voluminous message that requires wider and costlier communication channels than to deliver a brief message.

As to the average volume of transmission per request, we shall call it m for material objects and measure it in pounds or tons; and we shall call it b when referring to the transmission of information, which is measured conventionally in "bits." (A bit is a single yes-or-no decision, such as the on-or-off position of a switch, or a dot or dash in the Morse code, or a black or white point on a television screen. A single digit number corresponds to about four bits, a teletype letter six bits, an average English word about thirty bits, a printed page in a book about 10,000 bits, a 300-page book three megabits, i.e., three million bits, and over twenty megabits for one second's picture on a normal television screen.) The capacity of a transportation channel then is the amount of mass M it can move times the velocity v (i.e., distance/time) at which it can do so under the best traffic conditions. The formula for this is Mv for the overall capacity of the channel and mv for its effective capacity in regard to the size and speed of transmitting and/or servicing the average request. Both Mv and mv are formally analogous to the concept of momentum in mechanics. As it takes force to change momentum in mechanics, so it takes innovation—in the form of visible investment in capital equipment and/or invisible investment in new technology—to change capacity in a transport channel (e.g., to a supersonic transport aircraft). The change in capacity Mv is then a possible measure of the effect (or "force") of innovation in respect to the overall capacity of a channel, and the change in mv similarly would measure its effect in regard to the servicing of average sized requests.

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[11] On centralization and communication at earlier levels of technology, Lewis Mumford comments: "Action at a distance, through scribes and swift messengers, was one of the identifying marks of the new megamachine (the centralized state) . . . 'The scribe, he directeth every work that is in this land,' an Egyptian New Kingdom composition tells us . . . They made possible the constant 'report to political headquarters' essential for a centralized organization": *The Myth of the Machine* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1967), p. 192. Cf. also Harold A. Innis, *Empire and Communication*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1950).

Decentralization often depends critically on the effective service capacities of the available transport and communication channels, and changes in the optimum level of decentralization for a given organization, government or service.

The following table may clarify some of the relations between capacities, rates and the different conditions examined so far.

TABLE 3. SUMMARY OF KEY VARIABLES

3a. Basic Variables

D = length of strip, in miles, typically 3,000 for a big country, 300 for little one

L = total load, in requests per month, about 30,000 for heavy demand, 3,000 for low demand

C = fixed cost for one facility, in dollars per month, about 10,000 for an expensive facility and 100 for a cheap one

v = average transport speed under actual traffic conditions, in miles per hour, about 1,000 for jet speeds and 10 to 100 for ground passenger speeds

m = mass or bulk of items to be transported in response to requests, in pounds, about 100 for massive objects to 1 for light ones

b = amount of information in an average message delivered in response to a request, in bits, from 10 megabits for a second's worth of TV to 10,000 for a printed page's worth

B' = rates of information transmission under channel conditions, in bits/second, from 10^7 for video to 2,000 for digital telephone

3b. Parameters	*Unit Transport Cost*	*Average Cost To Service Request*	*Assumption*
Simplest Model ($m=0$)	c_v, dollars per hour, for transport at a speed-capacity of v miles per hour	$c_v \cdot \frac{D}{4nv}$	$v=V$
Bulk Taken Into Account	c_{MV}', dollars per pound per hour, for transport characterized by speed-bulk capacity of MV pound-miles per hour	$c_{MV}' \cdot m \frac{D}{4nv}$	$mv=MV$
Digital	c_B'', dollars per mile per hour, for communication characterized by a capacity of B bits per second	$c_B'' \frac{D}{4n} \frac{1}{3600} \cdot \frac{b}{B'}$	$B'=B$

Actual rather than maximum transmission speeds, however, are very nearly the same for a person-to-person call over a distance of thirty miles than over a distance of 3,000 miles and what really counts is not the velocity in miles per hour but the capacity in bits per second. The value of v for telephone, telegraph, wireless via radio or television, etc., is substantially the same for local as for long-distance communication, though, of course, the cost differs. These channels differ mainly in their capacity, in how many bits, or bv, similar to v per second of information, mv for materials. In the communication processes, therefore, the number of duplicated facilities does not depend very much on geography with respect to saving message delivery time. The distribution of overall channel capacities, B (bits per second), and data transmission rates B', in place of bv (i.e., message speed times message length), plays a much more central role in this regard. A low value of B is about 2,000 bits per second for voice-grade telephone lines, and a high value about 200,000 bits per second for wireless transmission, such as radio telephony or telegraphy, and at least one hundred times this amount for television.

These considerations permit us to make our notion of current transport costs somewhat more realistic. Let us begin with the case of bulk movements, such as mail, freight, or personnel. We have previously considered c, or more precisely, c_V, as the transport cost in dollars per hour depending only on speed capacity, but regardless of the bulk to be moved. Now let us consider, instead, $c'MV$ as the transport cost in dollars per pound transported per hour for a carrier with capacity MV. Here it costs more to move the same bulk of freight more quickly, as airmail and airfreight cost more than do slower services, but it also still costs more to move a larger number of pounds at unchanged speeds. The average transport cost per request is simply $c'MV$ times m times D/v. The optimal number of facilities can therefore be calculated with these refined assumptions by the formula:

$$\frac{1}{2}\left(\sqrt{1+\frac{c'_{MV}DLm}{Cv}}-1\right) \qquad (3)$$

The average cost of service S' per request of average shipment weight m then becomes:

$$S'=\frac{nC}{L}+\frac{c'Dm}{4nv} \qquad (4)$$

and the total cost of service $S''=S'L$ (Formula 4a).

In order to take into account in these formulas the weight of the average shipment, we had to replace c/C by c'/C and D/v by mD/v, while the total load of requests, L, has remained unchanged. If $c'_{MV}=m$, the cost of transporting the shipments of average weight m, equals c_V, the average transport cost of filling a request, then the weight of the average shipment would make no difference for the optimum level of decentralization, and the results of Table 2 would remain unchanged. If, however, an increase in the average weight of shipment would bring about an increase in the transport cost, then the optimum number of facilities would increase, in proportion to the square root of the change: a 100-fold increase in average shipment weight (and cost) would then require approximately a 10-fold increase in the most efficient number of facilities.

Let us assume that an administrative agency has to consult a file on each case on which it has to make a decision. Servicing a case would then require either transporting, on the average, one pound of documents from the repository to the site of the request, or else transmitting the information in those documents over a long distance computer channel. The file to be transmitted is assumed to contain the equivalent of a 200-page book, that is, about 4 million bits, or 4 megabits.[12] According to formula (3), the optimal number of facilities for electronic transmission under the above assumptions is now sixteen. This is more than three times as many as in the earlier case presented in column D of Table 2, where the transmission costs depended only on speeds and not on the amount of information being transmitted to service the average request.

Had we sent our four megabits by express messenger service at the rate of $c'=\$.04$ per pound-hour, then the optimal number of facilities, according to formula (2), would be three. In other words, *under the assumptions of our example, a slower service based on messengers or mail delivery could be much more highly centralized than a fast service based on a computer-based or satellite-based communication net.*

It might be interesting to compare the total costs for these two kinds of service. Let us recall that each of them would have to cope with 3 million requests per month, each request requiring transmission of four megabits. The cost of servicing requests by digital telephone—called "dataphone"—transmission would be $1.05 per request, compared with $.20 per request for service by mail or express messenger. *The five-fold increase in cost,* however, *here would buy a sixty-fold increase in speed.* The dataphone replies would be available within little more than half an hour, in contrast to the thirty hours response time required for the more highly centralized service based on messengers or mail.

The situation is similar in some respects to the transmission of messages through communication channels. Here c_B'' is the cost of transmission for a channel with a capacity (maximum rate) of B bits per second, in dollars per hour per mile. The average cost of servicing a request would then be $c_B''/3600 \cdot b/B \cdot D/4n$, because $D/4n$ is the average distance from a request to its nearest service facility when there are n such facilities. The actual cost of telephone transmission does not increase in *direct* proportion to distance; it increases by less for large distances than it does for small distances, but this will be neglected for the purpose of this paper. The cost c_B'' for long distance telephone is about $.02 per mile per hour for ordinary long-distance transmission. (This would amount to $3.00 for a three-minute business-hour call from Boston to San Francisco and $1.00 for a similar Boston-

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[12] This calculation assumes roughly the usual average of 6 bits per character, 80 characters per line, and 42 lines per page. For further discussion, see Manfred Kochen (ed.), *The Growth of Knowledge* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967); also Manfred Kochen, "Newer Techniques for Processing Bibliographic Information," in F. Kilgour (ed.), *Proceedings of the Symposium on Data Processing in University Libraries* (Philadelphia: Drexel Institute of Technology, 1968).

Chicago call.) Such a channel is characterized by a capacity of $B=2000$ bits per second.

The formula for computing the optimal number of facilities in this case is therefore

$$\frac{1}{2}\left(\sqrt{1+\frac{c_B''}{C}\cdot\frac{1}{3600}\cdot\frac{b}{B}\cdot D\cdot L}-1\right). \qquad (5)$$

Note that we have replaced c/C and D/v in formula (1), or c'/C and Dm/v in formula (2) by c_B''/C and $1/3600\cdot b/B$ respectively.

V. THE VALUE OF TIME: A FIRST APPROACH THROUGH OPTIMIZATION

In the primitive model treated so far, no value was assigned to time. Users were assumed not to care how long they had to wait for service. In fact, however, users find service with smaller delivery time more valuable than service with high delivery time. Similarly, clients or constituents of a governmental agency often request decisions which are to be acceptable to them in substance but which are valued more highly if they are prompt in time. In some other studies, the probability that a government, or a governmental agency, will produce within an acceptable time an acceptable response to the average demand upon it has been called the *responsiveness* of that agency.[13] Responsiveness and mean response time thus may be included among the highly relevant performance indicators of governments and their agencies. This section of our inquiry will attempt to make explicit some possible relationships between response time, the utility of time to the average user, and the degree of decentralization.

As a first step, let us assume a single "representative user" with the properties of both the average and the median users of the service, who are assumed to be identical. (We assume at this point uniform distribution of locations and utilities for all users.)

The net worth, W, of the institution is its utility to the user minus the cost to operate it. Figure 4 shows a possible relation between utility and communication speed, compared with approximate current rates for sending a brief message across 1000 miles in the United States.

It is difficult to infer even very roughly the shape of the demand curve of the American people for speed of transmission of their messages. It is illuminating, however, to plot the rates for the transmission of messages by telephone, telegraph, and mail (air and regular). All these rates have been set by complex processes. These are at least partially responsive to the political demand generated by the population in their roles as interest groups and citizens. Since these rates have remained relatively stable and have not aroused intense opposition, they can serve as indicators of acceptability. Fitting a curve to these data suggests a monotonically decreasing function of rate versus delivery time such as shown in this figure.

Let us first consider the case of a society which can afford to back up its utilities completely with actual purchasing power representing all the required resources. Such a society might then consider increasing the number of decentralized facilities n so long as this increases the net worth to the society. It would stop increasing only when the marginal increase in net worth with n duplicated centers is zero. This enables us to derive a formula for n, which depends on the utility of time. The higher the utility of time, the more we shall be willing to pay for higher speeds of response or of service.

The utility of time will be large in a society that has urgent needs to save time or that puts great cultural value on speed (which some critics of contemporary Western culture might call impatience), or whose members have many attractive alternative opportunities for occupying, so that the opportunity cost of time to them is raised sometimes to an oppressive degree.[14] Our R may reflect a combination of all these pressures. The same cultural factors of urgency and impatience would be reflected to an even greater extent in the shape of a curve describing the variation of utility with response time. The greater the society's concern with speed, the steeper the curve will be.

In the case just presented, the optimal degree of decentralization would be to make n as large as possible if the value of time is larger than the increase in total cost. If the opposite condition

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[13] On the concept of responsiveness, see K. W. Deutsch, S. A. Burrell, *et. al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, 1968), pp. 40–41, 199–200; Bruce M. Russett, *Community and Contention: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century*, (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963), pp. 29–30; Dean Y. Pruitt, "Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of International Action," in Herbert C. Kelman (ed.), *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 397–399.

[14] On the general problem of the "quality of life," which is connected with our growing lack of and need for time, compare John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Affluent Society* (New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1958) and *The New Industrial State* (New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1967).



FIGURE 4

holds and increases in the speed of response on service are valued less highly than the increases in cost resulting from increases in decentralization, then the optimum number for n is 1; that is, complete centralization. A society as rich and as pressed for time, therefore, as we assumed it to be in this example would tend to go to one extreme or the other: complete centralization or decentralization. The tendencies toward substituting in many parts of the United States individual transportation by personal automobile instead of public transportation may resemble in some ways the second of these trends—up to the point, at least, where mutual interference among automobiles on congested streets and highways becomes critical.

MORE REFINED MODELS: REDUNDANCY AND FLUCTUATIONS IN DEMAND

Using multiple facilities for more dependable service. In the models analyzed so far, we assumed that if there are n duplicated facilities any one of which could have serviced all the L requests per month, then each facility is used only $1/n$th of the time. Each is to some degree redundant, therefore, for each now services only L/n requests per month. For a decentralized organization, with large n, the utilization percentage is quite low and redundancy is high. If low response time has very high utility —i.e., the value of R is high—and transmission costs are high but fixed costs are not too high, then such low utilization is tolerable. The unused portion of the time, however, has considerable potential value in:

(a) insurance against the effects of breakdown;
(b) smoothing losses due to fluctuating demands and busy local facilities;
(c) control of errors.

Clearly this average delivery time increases with the probability of breakdown in one particular facility, but in proportion to n. As we decentralize, we gain more side benefits in reduced mean time loss due to failure. The greater the transmission speed v, the greater the effect of this time saving. Technical progress may confront designers with a choice between increasing the speed or the reliability of their equipment. Decentralization and redundancy, at higher cost but at the same level of technology, may permit them to have both.

Total response time and fluctuations in demand. Instead of mean delivery time $\overline{T}_n$, it would be more realistic to consider the total response time Q_n. This is the total time lapse between the epoch the request originates and the epoch the information or item requested is received by the requestor at the site where it originated. It is this turn-around time which matters to the originator of a request. This is the sum of three terms:

$$Q_n = F_n + S_n + T_n \qquad (6)$$

Here F_n is the time to transmit and forward the request from its source to the nearest station able to service it.

It is the run-around time, which the customer does not notice, apart from the turn-around time.

Next, we let Sn be the time it takes to service the request at that station, including the time at the other stations which had to decide whether to pass it on and to do so.

Finally, T_n is the time to transmit or transport the results back to the source, as defined before.

Since we can calculate $\overline{T}_n$, we can do likewise for $\overline{F}_n$ and $\overline{S}_n$. The latter term, the internal service time S_n, includes the time needed for decision-making and the possible delays resulting from the overloading of the decision-making and the possible delays resulting from the overloading of the decision-making capabilities of the service organization or bureaucratic agency. This aspect of the problem has received a good deal of attention in the literature of organization theory and management science.[15]

If the total demand is L' requests per hour, then each of n stations has to service L'/n requests per hour under the assumption of uniformity over length D of the strip. If we assume 10×30 or 300 hours per month, then $L = 300\ L'$ where L is the load in requests per month, as previously defined. If one service could handle the total demand, its service time must be $S=1/L'$ hours per request. Thus n replicated facilities offering this service could handle n times this total demand or each be utilized only a fraction $1/n$ of the time. On the other hand, slower services, with service time $S_n=n/L'$, could be used to handle the same demand, and these would be utilized one-hundred-per-cent.

Of course, the cost of such a slower service with service time n/L' hours per request should not be C, the cost of a service with $S=1/L'$ hours per request; it should be lower. Since many identical such services are required, their fixed cost C_n might be lowered still further, at least in regard to those components that could be produced in quantity.

If the demand is not constant in time, but fluctuates randomly, and if the capacity of each facility is only equal to the average demand, then there will be times when a request cannot be serviced by the nearest server because it is busy. In that event, the request is forwarded according to the same pattern used for routing when the nearest server was down. If the request has to be rerouted several times, $\overline{F}_n$ becomes a "run-around time," comparable to the possibly longer or shorter waiting time in a queue or single centralized facility. In either case, the effective waiting time may exceed the waiting capacity or tolerance of the client, as in the case of emergency patients for hospitals, or of emergency responses in military or police systems, or in urgent local or national political decisions.

The formulas and calculations involved even in this simplified model would permit us to derive conditions on R and optimal n in many additional pages of more complex mathematics. For this reason, as well as for reason of the greater flexibility in modeling more realistic systems, it seems desirable for future work to obtain these quantities by computer, either by evaluating complex formulas or by Monte-Carlo simulation.

In this more realistic and complex analysis, we suppose that the service time, s, per server varies with the percentage u "he" is utilized. That is, u is the percentage of time a facility is utilized.

If u is small, $s(u)$ is high. He is slow because he is out of practice, because start-up time causes delays, etc. If u is close to 100%, $s(u)$ is also high. He is slow again, this time because he is overloaded. Some services don't get done at all if the server is too overloaded, and this may be far more costly than under-utilizing him; this is especially true when the value of the service is high, as in cases where the server is a highly paid executive. For intermediate values of u, $s(u)$ is moderate. A curve like $s(u)=s_0$

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[15] See references in notes 2–6, above.

$(u-u_0)^2+s_{00}$ might represent the general shape of the curve.

VII. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR ORGANIZATION THEORY AND POLITICS: SOME SECULAR CHANGES IN KEY VARIABLES

Our crude models suggested that a greater number of multiple service facilities, n, and hence a higher degree of decentralization, becomes rational with an increase in the load or volume of services demanded. Also, a higher degree of decentralization becomes desirable with an increase in the value of time, and in those portions of service costs which are related to time and/or distance.

Our models further suggested that this optimal degree of decentralization increases with a decrease in the proportion of the fixed capital costs of the service among its total costs; and they suggest that the optimum degree of decentralization also increases with any decrease in the margins of error and of breakdown that are considered acceptable in the performance of the service.

All these decentralization-promoting conditions will tend to increase with economic growth and technological development. Let us first consider changes in direct costs. If other things remain equal, then the optimal number of decentralized facilities for a service increases in proportion to the square root of the ratio of its time-distance costs c to its capital costs C. Secular trends toward highly advanced levels of economic and technological development make human labor more expensive, and they make capital goods relatively cheaper. Thus they may tend to increase this ratio, and hence the desirable degree of decentralization. Some economic data suggest that this may have happened, both in Communist and non-Communist countries. An increase in real wages normally represents an increase in the price of labor relative to the price of goods, including capital goods, and hence also an increase in the c/C ratio. In many advanced countries of the world during recent decades, real wages have tended to grow on the average at about three per cent per year, thus doubling every twenty-three years. If real wages should grow fourfold in the course of a half-century, while capital costs would not, then at the end of such a period the optimal number of decentralized facilities for a wide variety of services may well have as much as doubled during the same time. If capital costs should grow somewhat but less than real wages, there would still be a net tendency toward some decentralization, albeit to a lesser extent.

Demographic, economic and technological growth in many countries in recent decades, very roughly speaking, has proceeded at annual rates of about 2 per cent and 3 per cent, respectively, adding up to about annual 5 per cent increase in the demands for many services, and doubling about every 14 years the load upon many of the public or private centers that have to supply them. Such increases in loads include the volume of demands for many political, administrative, judicial and quasi-judicial decisions and responses, as well as for many services and for the communication and transportation they imply.[16] Moreover, as technological progress speeds up transport and communication, it increases the opportunity cost of time, since more things now could be done or experienced in each unit of time than had been the case earlier. Finally, highly modernized and automated technologies may require higher levels of accuracy and reliability of service. Thus they may need more redundancy of facilities as an insurance against error and breakdown.

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[16] In the 1950s, the average rate of per capita income growth in 68 countries, comprising 86 per cent of the world's population, was about 3 per cent, while the average rate of population growth in 111 countries, with 97 per cent of mankind was 2.3 per cent. (B. M. Russett, *et. al.*, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964, pp. 46–48, 160–161.) More recently, in 1960–66, world population increased at an annual rate of 1.9 per cent. During the last two decades, total GNP in many countries may have been rising, therefore, at about 5 per cent per year, and thus doubling every 14 years. Request loads and service loads in many fields, including governments may have grown at about the same rate as GNP. *United Nations Demographic Yearbook*, 1966 (New York: 1967), p. 95. During the same years, 1960–66, the population of the United States increased at the rate of 1.4 per cent, while its gross national product in constant 1958 prices grew at 4.8 per cent. Murders and non-negligent homicides grew at 2.3 per cent, all accidents at 2.8 per cent, domestic mail at 3.5 per cent, and daily telephone conversations at 5.0 per cent, and automobile thefts at about 7 per cent. In contrast to this, the average speed of motor vehicles increased only at 1.4 per cent a year, and about the same low rate held for the 1945–66 period. The average speed of aircraft on scheduled domestic air carrier routes increased at about 3.5 per cent for 1950–67 period, but rose more quickly, at 5.0 per cent, during the years 1960–67, and the speed of aircraft on international flights in 1960–67 increased at about 7 per cent per year. (Approximate rates, computed from data in the *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1967*, pp. 58, 86, 505, 508–509, 561 and 586; and *ibid.*, 1968, pp. 6, 550 and 573; and *Uniform Crime Reports for the United States*, 1960, p. 2, and *ibid.*, 1965, p. 3.) These figures exclude, however, the delays caused by getting to and from the airports, and the delays by traffic congestion on the ground, and in the air above many airports. If these delays are taken into account, it seems plausible that many activities,

Perhaps most importantly, the growing need for greater precision and adaptability of responses to the increasingly complex, diverse and changing needs of people will require in many cases more frequent dialogs and feedback cycles of back-and-forth communication between service centers and customers, agencies and clients, administrators and constituents, the rulers and the ruled. This will multiply the effective distance D (regardless of whether it is measured in rules, switching points, or intervening obstacles or opportunities); it will multiply it by the average number of feedback cycles of communication, travel or transport required to ensure an acceptable fit between each specific demand and the particular response to it. The current demands for more popular participation, initiative and communication "from below," if heeded, would have similar effects: it would increase the average number of feedback cycles needed, and hence often the importance of distance and proximity. Each of these changes makes for an increase in the degree of desirable decentralization.

Under the assumptions of our models it seems quite possible, therefore, that many of the highly modernized and automated societies and nations which we may find by the end of this century will by then require a much greater degree of decentralization in public and private services than the one to which we are accustomed now. Doubtless some of these assumptions will have to be replaced by more realistic ones. In particular, refining our simple concept of decentralization, introducing the notion of hierarchies of facilities, and revising the assumption of uniform distribution of demand in space and time, all may well modify some of our findings. The present paper already may suggest, however, that the naive images of a future of ever increasing centralization in business organizations, public services, national governments, and the international political systems may have to be revised.

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calling for public service, now may be growing faster than does our effective speed in moving persons and goods in daily practice. Something similar may apply to telephone communications: a telephone call from Washington to San Francisco during business hours does not get through much more quickly to the individual we want to reach in a busy office than it did in 1945.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION*

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"Myself, I get confused. The President tells ya that he don't want no war, it's peace. You pick up a paper, they're bombing children. And television, the guys being interviewed, talking about peace, and the picture shows where the women and children are being bombed and slaughtered and murdered. How long if I think that way and I have had a bad feeling, how long will other people that their mentality's not strong enough, to separate the cause of it? Fear. What's gonna happen to our kids, our grandchildren?

"Lotta them are afraid of their jobs, losing their jobs. Because the government's maybe got some contract with some company. For example, we got one fellow here works with the government, with this here carbonic gas or whatever it is. If he opens his mouth up too much, he can lose his job. And the senators or congressmen, they personally don't take interest in their own country, right here, what's going on.

"The colored. We had a tavern on 61st and State, three and a half years, Negro neighborhood. I tell you I never was insulted no place by not a Negro person over there. They respected me highly. It took a white fella to come in and insult me because I wouldn't serve him beer, he was too drunk. And if it wasn't for these poor Negro fellas, I'd a probably killed this man. (Laughs) Because he called me a dirty name."

Eva Barnes, 56, citizen of Chicago.[1]

I. FOUR THEORIES ABOUT THE SOURCES OF IDEOLOGY

Mrs. Barnes is trying to understand the political world, but she suffers from a common problem. She has no intellectual handle on it. She blames the government for acting inconsistently, but she herself is inconsistent. She deplores war and its slaughter; yet she can imagine herself killing a man who has merely called her "a dirty name." She rambles from war to governmental control of employment to the problem of race. There are no explicit intellectual links in this chain. Rather, her choice of topics seems almost randomly martialed. For example, "them" in the first sentence of the second paragraph has no clear referent; therefore, we have no way of knowing the logic that led her from war to the involvement of government in employment. And, of course, she speaks primarily from and about personal experiences, which she uses to illustrate her generalizations. There is the "fellow . . . (who) works with the government," and the incident in the barroom. Each single case must support by itself the general principle. Finally, her remarks include no familiar political concepts by which we can connect one observation to the next. We can understand why Mrs. Barnes yearns for "the cause of it."

Is Mrs. Barnes atypical? Yes, but in an unexpected way. She has been a political activist. She helped unionize the Chicago stockyards under conditions which might well have made her reflective about her political world.[2] The vast majority of her fellow citizens have never done anything as political as union organizing. Consequently, their conversations about politics might be even more fragmented than hers.

Although Mrs. Barnes' discussion of politics evidences a desire to understand, it is uninformed by any basic ideational framework which would permit comprehension. This framework may be called ideology. It is by now a commonplace that the mass of Americans do not have a sophisticated conceptual organization by which politics may be understood. Perhaps the aptest description of this situation is contained in Philip E. Converse's "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics."[3] Converse defines political ideologies as belief systems characterized by high constraint, great range, and a centrality of political items.[4] These belief systems provide conceptual and terminological canals into which the flood of political events which overwhelms Mrs. Barnes can be diverted and managed.

Political scientists have emphasized different components of ideology. The concept of con-

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* I wish to thank Fred Greenstein for his comments on an earlier version of this piece. He is absolved of any responsibility for what follows.

[1] Studs Terkel, *Division Street: America* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1967), p. 65.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 61–62.

[3] In *Ideology and Discontent*, ed., David E. Apter (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 206–262. For an interesting attempt to rebut Converse, see Norman R. Luttberg, "The Structure of Beliefs among Leaders and the Public," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 32 (Fall, 1968), 398–410.

[4] Converse, *loc. cit.*, pp. 207–213.

straint is vital to Converse's analysis. Constraint "may be taken to mean the success we would have in predicting, given initial knowledge that an individual holds a specified attitude, that he holds certain further ideas and attitudes."[5] But ideologies also provide standards by which political events may be evaluated, allowing a person to approve some and deplore others. While Converse's discussion of ideology stresses cognition, Lane's definition of ideology emphasizes evaluation. To Lane, ideologies "are normative, ethical, moral in tone and content."[6]

My understanding of ideology encompasses both panels of this picture. Let us think of ideology as involving: 1) a considerable number of constrained political ideas. By "constraint" let us mean, with Converse, that if one idea changes, those others related to it in the ideology will change as well. 2) An evaluational and prescriptive system. The ideology sets forth a statement of political preferences. 3) Persistence. An ideology must have some arbitrary, but considerable, duration in order for us to distinguish its components from passing whims. 4) Global standards. The judgments applied to any sub-category of political events within the ideology are exhaustive and consistent. 5) Boundaries. Political events which fall into different sub-categories within the ideology are sharply distinguished from each other and are, therefore, judged differently by and within the ideology. 6) Deductive consistency. Given inherently non-logical premises, deductions must occur in accordance with the rules of logic. For example, if a person, because of some views of individual morality, favors a balanced budget, he cannot, at the same time, believe in extra-budgetary social welfare payments to his own group. In short, ideological prescriptions must not produce logical absurdities. 7) Activist directives. Political ideologies do not produce apathy.

According to Converse, no more than 2½% of Americans meet our qualifications as ideologues.[7] There is no clear understanding among political scientists as to why so few Americans think ideologically. After all, our society is characterized by the largest percentages of college students and graduates in the world, great affluence, and instant contact with political events through the mass media. Shouldn't these things help to produce more ideologues? Four attempted explanations of this paradox exist, but, as we shall see, none is successful.

A favorite hypothesis notes a relationship between political activity and the development of political ideologies. More generally, the argument may be formulated as follows: The greater his proximity to politics at any time, the greater is the likelihood that a person will become an ideologue. Few people participate; therefore, few are ideologues.[8] According to this hypothesis, the more active a person is in politics, the more familiar with political life he becomes. His familiarity leads him to forge the informational links between political events which encourage and sustain the growth of a political ideology. Furthermore, the more active he becomes, the more he associates with others who speak in terms of and group themselves around political ideologies, such as liberalism or conservatism. These are only a sample of the supporting arguments for the hypothesis, but they suffice for our purposes.

No one doubts the high correlation between sustained political activity and the existence of political ideologies.[9] But even if all the ideologues so defined by Converse were political "gladiators,"[10] many other political participants would not be included. Nor in reality should we expect that all ideologues engage in sustained political activity. In short, many political gladiators are no doubt able to function without the benefit of tightly knit political ideologies; and some ideologues do not become regular political participants.

The hypothesis may also be attacked even when we take the case most favorable to it. We would certainly expect, under the terms of the argument, that the sons and daughters of the politically active would be themselves especially likely to become both politically active and ideological. Politics becomes proximate to them at particularly early ages, and they, surrounded as they are by political influences and having a set of ready-made contacts, should naturally fall into a political life. However, the process is neither so simple nor so encompassing as it seems, for we can observe many sons and daughters of politicians who resist the political siren. No compelling political ideology pushes them into politics. On the other hand, there are many people from backgrounds of political apathy who, moved by motives divorced from the proximity of political decisions, enter into political careers. Indeed, it is often those from the most unpromising backgrounds who become the most ideologically deviant and politically militant in their society. For all these reasons, it would appear that the proximal politics hypothesis is insufficient. It can not tell us why the proximity of politics is not sufficient for ideological development among all the politically active. It can not tell us why some children of politicians become active themselves and others do not. It can not tell us why some people from backgrounds in which politics is only dimly perceived become political ideologues. Nor can it tell us why some ideologues do not engage in sustained political activity.

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[5] *Ibid.*, p. 207.

[6] Robert E. Lane, *Political Ideology* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 15. The uses of the term "ideology" are legion. Therefore, we have defined the term in our own way. For further elucidation, see *Ibid.*, pp. 13–17.

[7] Converse, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

[8] For a thoroughly tangled statement of the interrelationships of participation and cognition, see Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1965), pp. 62–66ff.

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

A second, weaker hypothesis concentrates on sociological factors. This argument asserts that the development of political ideologies is associated with particular positions in the social structure. For example, as Converse and others stress, ideology is closely related to educational level.[11] It also appears that extremist ideologies often originate in social positions which are exposed to sociological discontinuities, such as, for example, status inconsistency.[12] People experiencing status inconsistency are accepted by society in some respects and rejected in others. A case in point, in terms of European society, involves the early marginal status of the Nazi ideologues, numbers of whom felt themselves worthy of respect as ex-soldiers and German patriots, but could find no place in the Weimar Republic. In addition, many of the early Nazi leaders came from geographically marginal areas of the Reich.[13] Another European case involves the many middle class Jewish ideologues, such as Karl Marx, whose financial standing was more than respectable, but whose religion set them apart.

Unfortunately, these sociological hypotheses suffer from the same difficulties encountered in our earlier discussion of the proximal politics argument. For example, there are many more people in positions of status inconsistency, particularly in an upwardly mobile, highly fluid society such as ours, than there are ideologues. Furthermore, a respectable body of sociological theory suggests that the modal response to status inconsistency and cross-pressures is withdrawal rather than activism.[14] There are, of course, many more educated men than there are political ideologues. We are forced to conclude that while this theory may provide clues to help us discover those positions in society where ideologues are most likely to cluster, it can do little more. It does not explain the existence of ideology any more than the arrival of clouds explains the consequent rain.

A third suggested explanation is also heavily sociological, though it is not so well defined as the previous two arguments examined. It may, therefore, be dealt with more rapidly. Some observers feel that while ideology in the United States and Western Europe once flourished, fed by the class antagonisms of stratified industrial societies, the age of ideology has come to a close.[15] The social basis of ideological thought has simply disintegrated under the impact of widespread affluence and the lowering of class barriers. This position may be faulted on two counts. It assumes that ideological thought was more characteristic of nineteenth century than twentieth century America, an assumption for which it is impossible to gain reliable evidence. But, in addition, it implies that contemporary American politics is not marked by ideological divisions. Yet we are living in a comparatively rich time for the generation of ideology. Black Power, Student Power, New Left Radicalism, and their conservative counterparts fill the news and shape the nation's politics. Furthermore, the segment of our population most indulged by our affluence—college students—has been disproportionately responsible for the development of these new ideologies. For these reasons, the end of ideology hypothesis is unpersuasive.

Finally, we may take brief note of an hypothesis which attributes the absence of large numbers of American ideologues to the American "national character."[16] Americans are alleged to be "pragmatic" people whose instincts do not lead them into the airy realms of ideology. We can see immediately that this position is no explanation; it is, rather, another way of saying the same thing. Even if true, it does not tell us *why* Americans are the way they are. Therefore, the national character hypothesis is of no use for our discussion.

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[11] Converse, *op. cit.*, p. 213. See also Angus Campbell *et al., The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960), p. 476.

[12] See, for example, the pieces by Seymour Lipset and Richard Hofstader in *The Radical Right,* ed., Daniel Bell (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1964); and Joseph R. Gusfield, *Symbolic Crusade* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963). For an early statement of the theory underlying these formulations, see Gerhard Lenski, "Status Crystallization: A Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status," *American Sociological Review,* 19 (August, 1954), 405–413.

[13] Daniel Lerner, *The Nazi Elite* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951), p. 85.

[14] For a review and empirical test of the two theories, see Richard M. Merelman, "Intimate Environments and Political Behavior," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* 12 (August, 1968), 382–400. A case study of the same phenomenon is E. Franklin Frazier, *Black Bourgeoisie* (New York: Collier Books, 1962).

[15] The fullest statement of this position may be found in Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology* (New York: Collier Books, 1961), pp. 393–407.

[16] For one of the best national character treatments of Americans, see Max Lerner, *America as a*

If none of these attempted explanations is sufficient, where can we turn? The answer is simple. The four arguments fail primarily because they are unable to account for the development of an ideology in some people and not in others. The key word, in this formulation, is *development*. A person must be psychologically capable of ideological thought. We must uncover and describe both those developmental patterns which produce ideologues and those which hinder the growth of ideology. Our definition of ideology tells us where to begin the search for these patterns. To become an ideologue, a person must: 1) have cognitive skills which allow him to see linkages between ideas and events. Such linkages determine the amount of constraint in his belief system. 2) Have a developed morality which allows him to evaluate consistently the ethical meanings of political events. In order, therefore, to explain the development of political ideologies, we must explore the course of cognitive and moral development. So far, this developmental process and the literature which studies it is largely uncodified and unintegrated into the study of both political science as a whole and of political socialization in particular. This omission is particularly important for the latter area, because political socialization is the branch of our discipline most concerned with human development. Indeed, as we shall see, knowledge about the development of moral and cognitive skills not only enlightens us about the question of ideology but also has broader import for the entire study of poliitcal socialization. Therefore, let us see if we can understand and describe the growth of those cognitive and moral skills which are prerequisites for ideological thought.

II. A MODEL OF IDEOLOGY FORMATION

We will begin by sketching an ideal-typical psychological development culminating in the ability to think ideologically. The pattern is characterized by a passage through a series of psychological stages. It is true that psychological theories relying upon developmental stages are subject to Bandura and Walter's criticism that "Stage theories have at best specified only vaguely the conditions that lead to changes in behavior from one level to another."[17] However deficient though such theories are, their division of a complex process of growth into distinct phases does provide an unusually clear model against which real-world development may be compared.

Let us first turn to the cognitive side of ideological development. As Adelson and O'Neil put it, ". . . the growth of cognitive capacity allows *the birth of ideology* [italics theirs]. . . . What passes for ideology in . . . younger respondents is a raggle-taggle array of sentiments. . . . When younger subjects are cross-questioned, however gently, they are ready to reverse themselves even on issues they seem to feel strongly about."[18] But what are the specific components of "cognitive capacity" which become the building blocks of ideology?

One of the cognitive skills indispensable for ideological thought is the ability to think causally. In order for a political ideology to grow, the individual must be able not only to see the interrelations of social events and personalities, but also to arrange such events and personalities in meaningful causal sequences. Otherwise, few ideas in his repertory will exhibit constraint. Secondly, the individual must believe that the political world is malleable, for otherwise there is no motivational basis for an activating political ideology. Finally, the person's understanding of events, his scheme of political causation, must be at least partially capable of communication to others. Developed political ideologies, such as liberalism and conservatism, are *shared*. They are based upon principles of causation which have been communicated and understood consensually. To sum up, the individual must be able to reason from cause to effect. The causes of effects in the political world must seem partially and/or potentially under human control, and the principles by which causes and effects are linked must be transmissible.

An examination of the reasoning processes of young children indicates clearly how much learning and maturation must transpire before these requirements can be met. According to Piaget and his followers, the young child is incapable of causal thought as we have described it.[19]

Civilization (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957).

[17] Albert Bandura and Richard H. Walters, *Social Learning and Personality Development* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1963), p. 25.

[18] Joseph Adelson and Robert P. O'Neil, "The Growth of Political Ideas in Adolescence: The Sense of Community," unpublished, n. d., 29.

[19] The most important sources for this aspect of Piaget's thought are Barbel Inhelder and Jean Piaget, *The Growth of Logical Thinking*, trans. Anne Parsons and Stanley Milgram (New York: Basic Books, 1958); and Jean Piaget, *The Language and*

Instead, the child reasons precausally until the ages of 10–13. What are the characteristics of precausal thought? Laurendeau and Pinard have isolated and examined four major forms of this childish reasoning: realism, artificialism, dynamism, and animism.[20]

According to Kohlberg, realism is "the confusion of subjective phenomena with objective things."[21] For example, young children who are asked the origins and spatial placement of such subjective phenomena as dreams report that "the events that occur in the dream have an origin external to the dreamer and also take place in front of him. . . ."[22] The child does not understand that he has created the objects he sees in the dream. The implications of this thought process are important. Because every child has a somewhat idiosyncratic subjective world, each child also has a different "real" world. Therefore, children are unable to communicate consensually enough to develop shared ideologies. Furthermore, because all phenomena are viewed as objective, the child finds it difficult to realize that some events need not be imposed upon him. He has no sense of the effects his own efforts or his own ideas might have on the world. Because it is unalterable by human effort, the world has no place for the judgments that human beings might make to change it.

In addition, the child attributes much natural and social phenomena to artifical and supernatural, hence unalterable, forces. For example, the child explains that the coming of night is not a natural, but a supernatural process.[23] The child also states that the clouds are pushed by God.[24] Unseen supernatural forces with human-like personalities manipulate the world. This childish attribution of causation to supernatural forces functions to remove many matters of choice from human control and to render the construction of a political ideology virtually impossible. Furthermore, inevitably, complex interactions of events are reduced to short and distorted sequences. The many subtleties of the transition from day to night are eliminated by invoking a personalized supernatural actor.

But the child is inconsistent. Laurendeau and Pinard also report that children often consider the movement of inorganic objects to be self-generating.[25] Why? Because movement or dynamism is taken as a sign of life. Therefore, when objects change their state, they are either directly propelled by God or by their own unregulated desires. Causation is either wholly supernatural or wholly personal. It is never natural or social. Even some college students mistake the movement of an object for a sign of life. Dennis found that many college students in his sample believed that the sea is a living organism because it moves.[26] A belief in the personal autonomy of objects and individuals except when they are subject to God's will is incompatible with the knowledge that political processes can alter events.

The unifying and summarizing principle of these precausal tendencies may be called *animism,* the tendency for the child to explain all things anthropomorphically. As Laurendeau and Pinard explain, the child attributes some form of life to virtually all phenomena.[27] Even inanimate objects have unique personalities which are peculiarly free of physical limitations or laws. Furthermore, his beliefs about the behavior of individuals become the child's tools for explaining the actions of social institutions. Adelson and O'Neil note that young children, unable to conceptualize such impersonal terms as "government" and "society," reduce such abstractions to imaginary persons able to determine their own destinies.[28] In a world in which people and things are either entirely free or entirely subjected to divine control, no intervention based on personal conviction or understanding is possible. There are no natural or social cause-effect linkages. Consequently, there exists no cognitive base on which political ideologies can be constructed.

Precausal thought in the child is accompanied by what Piaget calls egocentrism. As Piaget describes it, childish egocentrism takes two interrelated forms, personal and logical. Personal egocentrism is well illustrated by Piaget's description of childhood argumentation. The youn-

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Thought of the Child (Cleveland and New York: Meridian Books, 1955). For an extensive review of the pertinent literature and a helpful bibliography, see Monique Laurendeau and Adrien Pinard, *Causal Thinking in the Child* (New York: International Universities Press, 1962), chaps. 1–4.

[20] *op. cit.*

[21] Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Development of Children's Orientations Toward a Moral Order: I. Sequence in the Development of Moral Thought," *Vita Humana,* 6 (1963), 11–33, 18.

[22] Laurendeau and Pinard, *op. cit.,* 107.

[23] *Ibid.,* 161.

[24] *Ibid.,* 188–192.

[25] *Ibid.,* 192–196.

[26] Wayne Dennis, "Animistic Thinking Among College and University Students," *Scientific Monthly,* 76 (April, 1953), 247–249. Other sources cited therein and in Laurendeau and Pinard are particularly useful on this topic.

[27] Laurendeau and Pinard, *op. cit.,* chap. 9.

[28] Adelson and O'Neil, *loc. cit.,* 8–9.

ger the child involved in debate, the more likely he is merely to assert and reassert his own position. Rarely does he confront and deal with the views of his opponent. Nor does he attempt to prove his own contentions or to probe his opponent's logic. The child is encased in his own world[29] Such egocentrism in discussion may be traced to an even earlier tendency. Piaget observes that very young children go through a prolonged period of egocentric play and speech before any habits of cooperation arise. Although several children may be playing in the same area with the same toys, they generally remain relatively unconscious of each other. Nor are they able or disposed to adopt a common play pattern.[30] The expectation of cooperation, of abiding by rules of conduct, and of observing rules of thought is slow in arriving. Childhood play, talk, and debate are variants of a single monologue.

Egocentric logic is defined by Piaget in the following way:

> "Egocentric logic is more intuitive, more 'syncretistic' than deductive, i.e., its reasoning is not made explicit. The mind leaps from premise to conclusion at a single bound, without stopping on the way. . . . Little value is attached to proving, or even checking propositions. The vision of the whole brings about a state of belief and a feeling of security far more rapidly than if each step in the argument were made explicit. . . . Personal schemas of analogy are made use of. . . . Visual schemas also play an important part. . . ."[31]

In short, the child intuits the meaning of things without ever laying bare to others or to himself the principles by which his meanings are derived. It is, therefore, not surprising that he should make the sorts of logical and causal errors which hinder the development of political ideologies. Furthermore, his personal egocentrism prevents him from gaining consensual validation for his logic, faulty though it be. His thought, consequently, remains unexamined, defective, and idiosyncratic.

To be capable of ideological thought the child must surmount egocentrism and precausality. He must develop a consensually validated sense of logic and an ability to reason from social cause to social effect. Furthermore, growing ideologically necessitates his recognition that the world of human events is contingent on the behavior of men and social forces, neither of which is entirely beyond human control. Because the earliest stages of human thought are not conducive to such ideological development, it seems fair to speculate, accepting the Freudian position on the psychological dominance of earliest modes of thought, that adult political ideologies always rest on an unstable base. We shall explore the implications of this conclusion shortly.

Many of the principles of cognitive development which we have described apply, with some modifications, to the course of moral development. While in the area of cognition the child views the world as given and unalterable by human intervention, in the moral realm he finds it impossible to account for the origins of rules, regulations, or moral standards except by reference to history. When, for example, Piaget asked his youthful subjects to explain the origins of the rules which govern the game of marbles, the children replied that the rules had existed from time immemorial and were simply passed on unchanged from one generation to the next. The children could not imagine the possibility of their or anyone else's changing the rules.[32] It is easy to see what function is performed by attributing all rules and judgments to historical figures or processes. The rules, having weathered the test of time and having been sanctified by parental transmission, need not be questioned. Therefore, there exists no impulse to the formulation of political ideologies.

Because the moral standards which govern the world are given, he who violates them, regardless of motivation, is guilty. Young children evaluate rule breaking primarily in terms of the objective material effects of violation, rather than in terms of the motivation of the lawbreaker or his relation to the law. It is the degree of injury done, not the motivation of the lawbreaker or the facts of the case, which determines the extent of punishment. The world is viewed as a sort of moral machine in delicate equilibrium which, if disturbed, must be set right by the proper amount of retribution and expiation. "An eye for an eye" is the principle which insures the moral order of the world.[33]

But how is this tribute to be exacted? Again, we find in the child's answer to this question a method of removing from human agencies the necessity to make a choice and justify the choice one made. Human beings do not exercise retribution; rather, the rules themselves and the objects which they protect become the agents of punishment. The child's credo is "immanent justice," which may be defined as a belief in "the existence of automatic punishments which emanate from things themselves."[34] Piaget, for example, discovered that children explained accidents to people who had earlier violated a rule by attributing the accident to the violation.[35] All disruptions of the law produce their own remedies, much as in classical Greek tragedy the Furies seek out and punish any man who presumes to challenge the natural order. The child is a great *aficionado* of the "deus ex machina."

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[29] Piaget, *op. cit.*, pp. 45–46.

[30] Jean Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1965), p. 45.

[31] Piaget, *The Language and Thought. . .*, p. 66.

[32] Piaget, *The Moral Judgment. . .*, pp. 50–65.

[33] It is this tendency on the part of the child which Piaget has labeled "moral realism." *Ibid.*, pp. 109–197.

This view of the moral world, which lifts the burden of choice from the child, is based upon a belief that laws and moral codes are objective.[36] The child conceives that moral regulations are set down clearly and unalterably within the world itself and, further, are understood consensually by all. There can be no conflict of interpretation nor failure of understanding. Therefore, if an individual violates the law he cannot defend himself by citing mitigating or idiosyncratic circumstances. The child has no sense of the relationship between his own mind and the law, nor does he see that rules are the creation of individuals and, therefore, can be modified by individuals.

It may be conjectured that the child's belief in the invariance and immanent justice of the moral order is caused by his total dependence on his parents. The human child is much more dependent on parents for a longer time than are the offspring of other species. In some primitive way, the child may compensate for this vulnerability by proclaiming the ultimate rectitude of those who control him and who are, at the same time, the symbols of history and rules—his parents. This universal tendency may become exaggerated, however. Piaget postulates that the child's natural glorification of history may be reenforced by parental resort to arbitrary commands.[37] I shall have more to say about this problem momentarily.

As maturation proceeds, the child emerges from his early conception of morality. He acquires a more subjective, more contingent view of rules, morality and transgression. This new position requires him both to investigate the motives of those who do not conform to the law and to vary his judgments accordingly. His early emphasis on punishment is replaced by a consideration of equity. Retribution and expiation give way to distributive justice. By adolescence rules are accepted only in relation to the purposes for which they are intended. For example, the adolescent understands that the rules which govern the game of marbles can be manipulated for the transitory enjoyment of the players.[38] Curiously enough, this transition may be illustrated especially well by the deviant case of psychopaths. Stephenson discovered that adolescent psychopaths, who had obviously been retarded in development, were actually *more* punitive in their judgments of other people's transgressions than were normal adolescents.[39]

Not only does the child develop a relativistic sense of morality, but he also gradually internalizes his own moral norms. The apparent inconsistency between these two processes can be dispelled quickly. The child's reliance upon sacred authority or history as the source of morality and rules, coupled with his belief that moral standards are automatically enforced, relieves him of any need to develop a conscience of his own. Conscience, on the other hand, grows only when the child desires an internal compass for the evaluation of a newly complex, contingent world. Indeed, the child's early belief in the external regulation of the moral order actually frees him to indulge in erratic behavior and inconsistent judgment. As Piaget reports, echoing Converse's observations about the political statements of non-ideologues, "It may even happen that one and the same child judges sometimes one way, sometimes the other."[40] Because the world is itself reliable and can substitute its own controls, the child does not need the judgmental consistency which conscience provides him. But once the world is seen as morally contigent and risky, the child must formulate his own rules and be able to defend them against other people's standards. The child thus moves from a "punishment and obedience orientation" to a "morality of individual principles of conscience."[41]

Cognitive and moral development are closely linked. Cognitive growth produces the realization that there are controllable human and social forces which have effects. Neither willful inanimate objects nor an invariant divine order determines the character of events. These discoveries enable the child to recognize the existence of moral variety and situational contingency. In turn, these latter realizations provide the impulse for the development of his own moral standards. On the other hand, the child's newfound desire to internalize his own sense of morality motivates him to inquire into the actual causal structure of events. Before he can make his own judgments about human behavior, he must understand the motivations and social forces which underlie that behavior. Therefore, the development of cognitive skills and the construction of a conscience are reenforcing processes. Laying the groundwork for ideology is all of a piece.[42]

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[34] *Ibid.*, p. 251.

[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 251–263.

[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 121–163.

[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 101–197. For a recent attempt to test this hypothesis in the area of childhood attitudes about political authorities, see Dean Jaros, "Children's Orientations Toward the President: Some Additional Theoretical Considerations and Data," *Journal of Politics*, 29 (May, 1967), 368–388.

[38] Piaget, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

[39] Geoffrey M. Stephenson, *The Development of Conscience* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 43.

[40] Piaget, *The Language and Thought . . .*, p. 91.

[41] Kohlberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 13–14.

As the citations in this section indicate, much of the theory upon which we have based our description of cognitive and moral development is traceable to Jean Piaget.[43] Before leaving this discussion, therefore, it is important to point out briefly some of the shortcomings of the Piagetian stage-developmental approach. A number of criticisms have been leveled at Piaget's theories and, as a result, some important modifications have already been or are in the process of being made.

Students of child development since Piaget have become well aware of his methodological errors. His theories, which he describes as being universally applicable, are now known to suffer from cultural bias.[44] In addition, not only are his samples all Swiss, but they overrepresent the working class.[45] Nor are their sizes sufficient to generate much confidence.

There is also uncertainty about the fate of those stages through which the child has passed. Some authors hold that new stages replace and erase old, while other authors, such as Sullivan,[46] contend that new stages are terraced on old. If this latter conception is true, no stage would ever be entirely surmounted. Earlier stages would simply remain in a latent form, capable of reinstated impact under special conditions. Piaget was himself inconsistent in his formulations on the subject. At some points he implies that early stages crumble entirely under advanced phases of development, while at other times he argues that stages are only statistical tendencies and never disappear entirely.[47] The implications of this ambiguity will concern us shortly.

There is, finally, much uncertainty about the relative importance of genetic and environmental factors in Piaget's developmental scheme. Piaget attempts to recognize the importance of environment. He argues that aging forces the child into increasingly demanding social relationships, and it is these relationships which are the major intervening variables in the developmental process.[48] But he assumes that the social relationships themselves are constant at every level for every child. Such an argument implies that *all* children, excluding those who have physical and mental defects, should, as adults, manifest similar levels of cognitive and moral development. To accept such a contention would be to undercut the major theoretical problem of this article, the widespread absence of ideology. In fact, of course, adults have widely different patterns of cognition and morality. Therefore, they evidence disparate capacities for ideological thought. Piaget's theory is probably understood best as an ideal type. People must pass through the stages he describes if they are to think ideologically, but most people do not succeed in making the passage. What are the factors which determine whether the process will be completed or not? It is these intervening factors, responsible for inhibiting the maturation process and producing different levels of ideological development, to which we now turn.

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[42] Parenthetically, it is striking the extent to which the development of the child, as outlined in this theory, resembles historical developments over whole eras. For example, we have talked much about the child's shift from an external, but wholly dictatorial form of morality to an internalized conscience. This shift seems to parallel what many scholars believe to be the difference between late Old Testament Judaism and early Christianity. Many scholars have commented upon the emphasis on legalism and expiation in Old Testament Judaism, and the disintegration of codification thereafter. We have no wish to argue seriously that ontogeny does recapitulate phylogeny. We only wish to indicate the parallelism. The young child's belief in ritualism, supernaturalism, the deus ex machina, etc., remind one, however, of the thought processes of "primitive" people. To develop this argument so as to make it more palatable to the reader would require knowledge and space not available to the author. The general idea seems worth pursuing, however.

[43] Piaget's immense corpus of work is only now having a major impact in the United States. For an enjoyable introduction to his thought, see David Elkind, "Giant in the Nursery—Jean Piaget," *New York Times Magazine*, May 26, 1968.

[44] See Urie Bronfenbrenner, "The Role of Age, Sex, Class, and Culture in Studies of Moral Development," *Religious Education* (Research Supplement), 62 (July-August, 1962), S-3, S-5, S-18. For contrasts between American and English children, see E. M. and M. Eppel, *Adolescents and Morality* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), pp. 157–170. For interesting comparative studies on Senegalese children, see Jerome S. Brunner *et al., Studies in Cognitive Growth* (New York: Wiley, 1966), chaps. 11–13. A well known study which also indicates Piaget's cultural bias is Gustav Jahoda, "Children's Concepts of Nationality: A Critical Study of Piaget's Stages," *Child Development*, 35 (December, 1964), 1081–1092.

[45] Bronfenbrenner, *loc. cit.* For the first empirical study to touch this deficiency, see M. R. Harrower, "Social Status and Moral Development," *British Journal of Educational Psychology*, 5 (1935), 75–95.

[46] For an overview of Sullivan's work, see Patrick Mullahy (ed.), *The Contributions of Harry Stack Sullivan* (New York: Hermitage House, 1952), chaps. 1–2.

[47] For example, Piaget sets only a percentage boundary on thought categories; he also admits that a particular child may evidence thought characteristic of a variety of levels at once. Piaget, *The Moral Judgment . . ., passim.*

[48] *Ibid.*, chap. 3.

III. FACTORS PRODUCING DIFFERENT LEVELS OF IDEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

The major factors which affect the course of ideological development are of two sorts: those relevant to identification and child rearing practices, and those involving the many and complex components of morality and cognition. We will investigate each sort in turn.

Of course, both psychological and psychoanalytic theory have long focused on the character of a child's identification with his parents. Theories about the identification process would not be germane to this paper, however, were it not for evidence indicating a link between positive identification and the development of moral and cognitive skills.[49] It now appears that a positive form of identification encourages the growth of political ideology.[50]

Suggestive recent evidence indicating the interrelationships of identification and ideological development may be found by turning to Keniston's studies of college students. Keniston reports that his alienated and politically apathetic Harvard students felt themselves to be rebelling against their parents and, particularly, struggling to surmount the demands placed on them by their mothers.[51] Elsewhere, Keniston discovers that the majority of campus activists identify strongly with parental authority.[52] He finds that activists are not only more likely than the other students to respect their parents, but also generally enjoy the support of their parents in their political activities. Lipset and Altbach claim that most campus activists are actually following a line of political activity gratefully in imitation of their parents.[53] Clearly, therefore, close identification with parents, at least for these primarily middle class students, forges an important link in the chain of ideological development.

We know that the structure of the family affects the likelihood of successful identification. There is considerable evidence which indicates, for example, that the children of husbands and wives who value the same things are more likely than are other children to identify with their parents.[54] This finding is easily interpretable. It is unlikely that there will be much tension in homes where the parents approve of each other. Furthermore, parents who profess the same values will present a fairly consistent picture of themselves to their children, and will also display a single set of ideals for emulation. In short, parents who approve of each other minimize cognitive and moral confusion in their children.

Unfortunately, however, the effects of most family structure characteristics on identification remain obscure. This is true particularly of such factors as father absence.[55] Consensus comes nearest to existing only on the matter of child rearing patterns as they affect identification.

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[49] See the review and codification of the relevant literature in Robert F. Winch, *Identification and Its Familial Determinants* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962).

[50] This formulation should not be taken to imply that identification has an unambiguous meaning. Lazowick, for example, has specified at least three major definitions which seem currently in use: 1) acting as if the subject were the same person as his model; 2) imitating the model; 3) introjecting the model's norms and values. Lionel M. Lazowick, "On the Nature of Identification," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,* 51 (September, 1955), 175–184, 175–176. Bronfenbrenner specifies yet a fourth meaning, i.e., acting in terms of an ideal image of the model rather than on the basis of his actual behavior. Urie Bronfenbrenner, "The Study of Identification through Interpersonal Perception," in *Person Perception and Interpersonal Behavior,* eds., Renato Tagiuri and Luigi Petrullo (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 110–131, 123. Despite their importance for psychology, these definitional ambiguities do not affect the basic argument of this paper.

[51] Kenneth Keniston, *The Uncommitted: Alienated Youth in American Society* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965), chap. 6.

[52] Kenneth Keniston, *Young Radicals* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968), chap. 2.

[53] Seymour Martin Lipset and Philip G. Altbach, "Student Politics and Higher Education in the United States," in *Student Politics,* ed., Seymour Martin Lipset (New York: Basic Books, 1967), pp. 199–252, 216.

[54] John A. Clausen, "Family Structure, Socialization, and Personality," in *Review of Child Development Research,* v. 2, eds., Lois W. and Martin L. Hoffman (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1966), pp. 1–55, 42.

Within the bounds of psychological theory there have been two major schools of thought about patterns of child rearing in the identification process. One school, populated largely by Freudians, has postulated that identification is the result of a childhood defensive reaction against a highly punitive and physical parental environment. The child, supposedly fearing his severe parents, fantasizes himself retaliating against them. But his retaliation fantasies, because they would bring abnormally severe retribution if acted out, are even more disturbing than the parental environment itself. Therefore, the child tries to repress his rebellion. But his repression can succeed only if he internalizes the values of his parents. The process ends with the child identifying with the agressors, his parents.[56]

Anaclitic theories of identification, which comprise the second school, dispute the truth of these assertions. According to the anaclitic theorists, successful identification is most likely to occur in a warm, tightly knit, relatively permissive family atmosphere. Discipline in such a family proceeds primarily through threats to withdraw love rather than through the imposition of physical sanctions. Anaclitic theorists claim that love and succor encourage the child to reflect on his own behavior and internalize those standards which will prevent withdrawal. Also, according to Hoffman, parents who do not punish their child physically provide him with a model of restraint that he is motivated to emulate.[57] The behavior of parents who discipline by physical aggression, however, encourages the child to believe that internal controls are unnecessary. Therefore, physical sanctions actually encourage rebellion. Anaclitic theorists also claim that physical punishment breeds the primitive, expiatory form of morality which we have described, rather than an internalized set of values.

Students of identification also differ over the autonomy-supervision dimension in child rearing. Theorists of defensive identification argue that the imposition of close parental supervision is necessary for the growth of identification. The anaclitic theorist Robert Sears claims, however, that identification is dependent upon parental willingness to grant the child a measure of autonomy to develop his own personality.[58] The child must be expected to adhere to certain standards, but the parent should not remain hovering over him monitoring his behavior and correcting minor faults.

As the debate indicates, interpreting the effects of varying child rearing patterns on identification has not been easy. Nor has the dialogue been as clear on terms and hypotheses as one might desire. For example, the control relationship between parent and child—as most parents and virtually all children realize—is both multidimensional and subtle. A parent who is demanding in one phase of his child's life may be permissive or uninterested entirely in another. Measures of identification and control capable of dealing with these subtleties have been noticeable mainly by their absence. Not surprisingly, therefore, research linking child rearing practices to identification is not entirely consistent or reliable. However, there seems to be a growing consensus along three dimensions. These dimensions are the mode of punishing children, the warmth of the relationship between parent and child, and the age at which responsible behavior on the part of the child is first expected. Let us investigate these three dimensions as they affect identification, cognitive development, and moral development.

As Hoffman puts it, summarizing the research on punishment and moral development, "The relatively frequent use of discipline that makes some sort of appeal to the child's inner need seems to foster the development of an internalized moral orientation, especially as reflected in the child's reactions to his own transgressions. The use of coercive measures that openly confront the child with the parent's power, on the other hand, apparently contributes to a moral orientation based on the fear of authority."[59] According to available evidence, the parent who resorts to physical punishment not only provides an aggressive model for his child, but also demonstrates vividly to him the unbridgeable gulf between his own standards and those of the child. Such a parent makes no appeal to the child's own latent moral sense. The use of psychological punishment, such as threatened love-withdrawal, assumes a standard shared equally by the child and his parents. Such a technique accustoms the child to think through and judge the behavior which has disappointed his parents. Physical sanctions also appear to suggest to the child that merely his willingness to absorb pain provides an expiation for wrongdoing. Moral rectitude does not require his own set of values. The child who is, implicitly, treated as an adult temporarily unable to meet shared standards learns to evaluate himself; but the child who is not taken into his parents' confidence and who is punished physically begins to expect society to judge him. An internalized conscience, obviously, is the moral base from which ideological preferences grow. Reliance on external authorities to define what is proper builds no stable moral framework within which political events can be arrayed.

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[55] For concise statements of opposing positions, see Winch, *op. cit.*, p. 35, and Joan McCord, William McCord, and Emily Thurber, "Some Effects of Paternal Absence on Male Children," in *Studies in Adolescence*, ed., Robert E. Grinder (New York: Macmillan, 1963), 118–133. For studies indicating the possible importance of father absence to both identification and political ideology, see Keniston, *The Uncommitted . . .*, esp. 113–118; and Dean Jaros, Herbert Hirsch, and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., "The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Sub-Culture," this REVIEW, 62 (June, 1968), 564–578, 573.

[56] Morton Deutsch and Robert M. Krauss, *Theories in Social Psychology* (New York: Basic Books, 1965), p. 158.

[57] For a review of these theories, see Martin L. Hoffman, "The Role of the Parent in the Child's Moral Growth," *Religious Education* (Research Supplement), 57 (July-August, 1962), S-18 through S-33, S-22.

[58] Robert R. Sears, "Identification as a Form of Behavioral Development," *The Concept of Development*, ed., Dale B. Harris (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957), pp. 149–162, 160.

There is also evidence that parental warmth toward children stimulates the growth of a consistent, internalized moral orientation.[60] Of course, an affectionate environment may be viewed partly as an off-shoot of certain discipline techniques, but the warmth of family relationships seems to have its own independent effect. The same principles operating in the punishment dimension seem to obtain here. In addition, however, unlike the children of punitive and distant parents, the children of affectionate parents have good reason to feel conflicted about violating parental standards. The kindness of parents may well seem to demand better repayment. Tensions of this kind may force children to evaluate their own behavior carefully. The habit of self-evaluation is certainly a major requirement for the growth of a stable, internalized moral orientation.

Finally, the time at which responsibility is first expected of the child seems related to the growth of a moral sense. Studies by Grinder[61] and by Whiting and Child[62] show that the child's early assumption of responsibility results in a propensity to feel guilt and to experience remorse after transgression. The principle may be illustrated simply. When, for example, the child is given early responsibility for his own toilet and cleanliness, he is, in effect, on notice that he is to be held responsible for an important part of his behavior. This sense of responsibility encourages him to make autonomous decisions and to think for himself.

To sum up, the optimal child rearing pattern for the growth of conscience appears to combine rapid shouldering of responsibility, the use of psychological discipline, and continuing parental warmth. This pattern is found rarely, with two factors primarily responsible. First, many parents believe that warmth, affection, and "permissiveness" are incompatible with the child's early assumption of responsibilities. They construe permissiveness broadly so as to make it require late and relatively lax training in fundamental areas. Second, many parents who do attempt early toilet training find it difficult to remain affectionate toward their children when errors occur. Their punitive response often sets a continuing pattern. Hence, early training may well become associated with physical punishment, relatively cold parent-child relations, and considerable anxiety on all sides.

We have less evidence about the effects of differing child rearing styles on the growth of cognitive capabilities than we have of their influence on moral development. However, some experimental findings permit speculation. Solley and Murphy report that punishment by the use of electric shock disrupts the ability of experimental subjects to distinguish between figure and ground.[63] Such findings suggest that large doses of physical punishment may disorient the conceptual apparatus which permits the individual to make the elementary perceptual distinctions necessary for ideological thought. Physical punishment concentrates the subject's mind on only those of his acts which have painful consequences, thereby depriving him of varied sensory stimulation. The subject focuses primarily on his suffering, rather than on the world around him. This sensory deprivation effect may be thought of as a kind of psychological "tunnel vision." As Solley and Murphy indicate, sensory deprivation may become associated with autism, the pathological rejection of environmental stimuli.[64] The autistic person finds the world dull, undifferentiated and, ultimately, unworthy of attention. In short, the excessive use of physical punishment may reduce both the desire and the ability to view the outer world in all its richness. In non-experimental contexts, such as concentration camps, observers have noted similar effects.[65] The relevance of this discussion both to child rearing and to the growth of ideological thought needs no elaboration.

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[59] Hoffman, *op. cit.*, S-24.

[60] *Ibid.*, S-25.

[61] Robert E. Grinder, "Parental Child-rearing Practices, Conscience, and Resistance to Temptation of Sixth-Grade Children," *Child Development*, 33 (December, 1962), 803–820.

[62] John W. M. Whiting and Irvin L. Child, *Child Training and Personality* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), pp. 254–258.

[63] Charles M. Solley and Gardner Murphy, *Development of the Perceptual World* (New York: Basic Books, 1960), p. 274.

We referred earlier to the debate over whether child development proceeds via a substitution of entirely new phases for old or by a terracing of new stages over latently powerful older, more "primitive" stages. If we assume that the former process operates, non-adoption of the optimum child rearing process which we have described may fixate the child at a particular stage of development. But if we assume that development proceeds regardless, imposition of punishment or threat may still cause at least temporary regression to a more primitive behavioral stage. In the latter case, we would also expect that an adult whose early development had been disrupted by faulty child rearing would be especially prone to regress under imposition of punishments identical or symbolically equivalent to those he experienced as a child. Experiments on both humans and lower animals provide some interesting illustrations.[66]

Let us examine the fixation effect first. Kleemier reports that rats who have been frustrated by the use of electric shock develop severe response rigidity. Not only do they find it difficult to respond to new demands, but even after shock is removed so as to open up new options, the rats cleave to old behavioral patterns which will not reward them.[67] Frustration induced by severe punishment glues them to a particular developmental level. Comparable behavioral and perceptual rigidity in humans would cut down the range of attention necessary to interpret the political world ideologically.

Frustration, no matter what its source, has its own fixation properties. Maier reports on a variety of experiments which indicate that frustrated rats and humans settle on a few patterns of behavior, often the ones least functional, and remain with them. Rats, for example, resort to "symbol stereotypy," an invariant but unrewarded response to a specific sign.[68] Their behavior becomes almost purely ritualistic. Lawson and Marx show that frustration retards perceptual acuity, problem solving abilities, and learning.[69] In short, both excessive physical punishment and frustration rigidify behavior and retard cognitive development. These effects persist even after the cessation of frustration and physical punishment. They inhibit the growth of an ideological framework responsive and alert to new pieces of information.[70]

The psychodynamic process by which fixation occurs may have as its core the experience of anxiety. Sullivan, for one, believes that the onset of anxiety can be traced either to psychological distance from the mother or to excessive punishment. He also claims that anxiety inhibits moral and cognitive development.[71] Odier describes the close relationship between the experience of anxiety and consequent primitive, magical, and animistic interpretations of events.[72] The obsessive, repetitive, ritualistic thought patterns of anxious people are similar to, though more elaborate than, the early forms of thought in the child as Piaget and his followers have described them.

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[64] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

[65] Bruno Bettleheim, "Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 38 (1943), 417–452.

[66] Some may question this introduction of data drawn from studies conducted on lower animals. I have used this material not because I think it definitive (I would not even argue the point), but precisely because it is illustrative. Were I to attempt a definitive argument on this point, I would naturally rely wholly on studies of humans. It is, however, possible that the same reactions which exhibit themselves in purity with lower animals also occur in humans, but are masked or distorted. We ought not to assume that the responses of lower animals and humans are incomparable. They may be different in expression, but not in substance.

[67] Robert Kleemier, "Fixation and Regression in the Rat," *Psychological Monographs*, v. 54, #4, Whole No. 246 (1942), 13.

[68] Norman R. F. Maier, *Frustration: The Study of Behavior Without a Goal* (Ann Arbor: Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1961), p. 28.

[69] Reed Lawson and Melvin H. Marx, "Frustration: Theory and Experiment," *Genetic Psychology Monographs*, 57 (March, 1958), 393–464, 437.

[70] I do not contend that psychological modes of punishment may not be frustrating. But physical intervention to block desired behavior probably is more frustrating than psychological intervention.

[71] Mullahy, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

[72] Charles Odier, *Anxiety and Magic Thinking*, trans., Marie-Louise Schoelly and Mary Jane Sherfey (New York: International Universities Press, 1956), pp. 52–53. Odier's work is one of the few attempts to bring together Piaget's and Freud's perspectives on human development.

If we prefer the terracing rather than the substitution theory of development, we can also marshal illustrative evidence showing that frustration, physical punishment, and anxiety may cause behavior to regress, at least temporarily, to a primitive stage. In a famous experiment, Barker, Dembo, and Lewis found that children who were permitted to see but were forcibly prevented from playing a second time with some desirable toys regressed. Specifically, their behavior became disorganized and their physical movements undifferentiated.[73] Barthol and Ku demonstrated that college students reacted to task-induced frustration by returning to their first learned successful task behavior, even when such behavior was no longer appropriate.[74] Adelson and O'Neil discovered that when children became angry or anxious, there was a "momentary cognitive regression, expressing itself in a loss of abstractness, and a reversion to personalized modes of discourse."[75] The terracing theory would predict that even persons normally capable of expressing a political ideology would, under stress, regress cognitively and morally, becoming at least temporarily unable to think ideologically. Any such reversion, as Odier points out, is likely to be characterized by special attention to the symbolic aspects of experience rather than to the factual, by a disposition to make absolute, rather than contingent, judgments about events, and by a willingness to rely heavily upon supernatural "signs."[76]

To sum up, the frustrations and anxieties which inadequate child rearing methods produce may inhibit the identification process and prevent the growth of cognitive and evaluational skills sufficient for the development of political ideology. Furthermore, the imposition of excessive physical punishment and frustration on normally ideological people may induce a regression to less ideological conceptual frameworks. These remarks have obvious implications for understanding the paranoic and disorganized behavior of individuals during political crises.[77]

The second class of variables which influences ideological development includes the components of the moral and cognitive dimensions themselves. Two such components are the sense of time and the ability to handle language. To think ideologically requires the capacity to link present trends to preferred future states or past experiences. Therefore, the character of political cognition is partly determined by the experience of time. Although little is known about the development and stability of the consciousness of time, Ames discovered that the younger the child the less likely he is to have a conception either of past or future.[78] The very young child lives in an eternal present, attaining a sense of future by age three and a sense of past only by age three and a half.[79] The most natural and earliest mode of viewing the world is in the present. Child rearing patterns which fixate or cause regression might restrict the child to the incomplete experience of time evident in the early months of life. The effects of traumatic events may alter even the adult's consciousness of time.

Nor is the sense of time important only for cognition. Mischel discovered that children who prefer immediate small reinforcements to delayed larger reinforcements, when compared to children with an expanded time orientation, scored extremely low on a scale of social responsibility.[80] Grim, Kohlberg and White claim that ". . . there is substantial evidence relating indexes of moral character to ego-strength factors such as . . . anticipation of future events. . . ."[81]

We would also expect to find in language a second cognitive component relevant to ideological thought. Traditionally, and Ames seconds this conclusion,[82] we have assumed that children first use language concretely and then abstractly. If this were true, we might postulate that the abstract language ability necessary for ideological thought rests on as unstable a developmental base as does the sense of time. However, Roger Brown disputes Ames' position by arguing that, "The child's vocabulary is more immediately determined by the naming practices of adults."[83] In some cases, as Brown shows, language development may proceed from abstract conceptions to more precise differentiations within such conceptions. At present it only seems safe to conclude, with Brown, that "The vocabulary of a child is not a very direct index of his cognitive preferences."[84] Language development may be sufficiently idiosyncratic to defy generalizations about its relation to ideological thought.

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[73] R. F. Barker, T. Dembo, and K. Lewin, "Frustration and Regression: An Experiment with Young Children," *University of Iowa Studies in Child Welfare,* 18 (1941). For a reanalysis of this experiment, see John M. Davis, "A Reinterpretation of the Barker, Dembo, and Lewin Study of Frustration and Regression," *Child Development,* 29 (December, 1958), 503–506.

[74] Richard P. Barthol and Nani D. Ku, "Regression Under Stress to First Learned Behavior," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,* 59 (July, 1959), 134–136.

[75] Adelson and O'Neil, *op. cit.,* p. 10.

[76] Odier, *op. cit.,* pp. 48–49.

[77] The most spectacular tendency involved is, of course, scapegoating.

[78] Louise Bates Ames, "The Development of the Sense of Time in the Young Child," *Journal of Genetic Psychology,* 68, First Half (March, 1946), 97–125, 110.

[79] *Ibid.*

[80] Walter Mischel, "Preference for Delayed Reinforcement and Social Responsibility," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,* 62 (January, 1961), 1–8.

[81] Paul F. Grim, Lawrence Kohlberg, and Sheldon H. White, "Some Relationships between Conscience and Attentional Processes," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 8 (1968), 239–252, 239.

[82] Ames, *op. cit.,* 115.

While cognitive and moral development depend on a complete sense of time and an ability to abstract, the actual character of cognitive and moral judgments presents its own problems. Let us use as an example the development of morality, about which we have expended so much effort. Piaget assumed that morality was a unidimensional quality which could be measured accurately by asking children about their likely behavior in situations which presumably tempted them to violate their sense of rightness. However, verbal responses to hypothetical temptations expose only one aspect of the moral sense. Investigators of moral development have utilized at least three other designs. Some researchers have examined the actual behavior of children in situations where they have been tempted to violate moral injunctions. The earliest and most influential studies of this sort were conducted by Hartshorne and his associates.[85] Other researchers have investigated the extent to which children express guilt after transgression. Yet others have asked children to imagine their likely reactions to hypothetical situations in which they are supposed to have transgressed.

Interestingly enough, MacRae shows that intercorrelations along these four dimensions are far from perfect.[86] Consequently, there is reason to believe that conscience is a multidimensional collection of attributes. Complete moral development in a person might be characterized by high correlations between moral dimensions; in fact, high correlations might serve as an operational *definition* of complete moral growth. But such development is hindered by the fact that at least four complex moral dimensions must be mastered and integrated. The child must learn to resist actual temptation, feel remorseful after transgression, resist his own imaginary temptations, and imagine his guilt after fantasized transgressions. Development along these dimensions apparently does not proceed at parallel speeds with identical end-points.

The complexity of cognition and moral judgment raises the chances of cognitive and moral instability. The more capacities to be mastered, the less likely it is that there will be consistency along any single dimension. Evidence confirms the suspicion. The Hartshornes discovered that children who cheated at one time refrained at another, despite the fact that objective circumstances had not changed.[87] More recently, Durkin found that the same child judges instances of a single class of reciprocity problems differently with no apparent rule tying the judgments together.[88] These findings parallel exactly Converse's discovery that as one proceeds from more to less informed publics, persons judge the same political events and objects differently within relatively short periods.[89] Perhaps the explanation of Converse's finding inheres in the complexity and fluidity of those moral and cognitive skills which underlie political judgment. Converse's finding, in other words, becomes less perplexing when we recognize that, for many, political perceptions are underpinned by unstable moral and cognitive senses.

These remarks are not intended to suggest any inadequacy in the picture of development Piaget and his followers have sketched. All we have meant to stress is that both the multidimensionality of moral and cognitive maturation and the rarity of optimal child rearing techniques make development problematic. It is therefore not surprising to discover that so few individuals develop into political ideologues.

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[83] Roger Brown, "How Shall a Thing be Called?" in *The Cognitive Process: Readings,* ed., Robert J. C. Harper *et al.* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), 647–655, 651.

[84] *Ibid.*

[85] H. Hartshorne and M. A. May, *Studies in the Nature of Character,* vol. I (New York: Macmillan, 1928). H. Hartshorne, M. A. May, and J. B. Maller, *Studies in the Nature of Character,* v. II (New York: Macmillan, 1929). H. Hartshorne, M. A. May, and F. K. Shuttleworth, *Studies in the Nature of Character,* v. III (New York: Macmillan, 1930).

[86] Duncan MacRae, Jr., "A Test of Piaget's Theories of Moral Development," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,* 49 (January, 1954), 14–18. Grinder's assertion that by age 11 the various measures of conscience intercorrelate closely seems to represent a minority position. The evidence simply does not support his argument. Grinder, *op. cit.*, 818.

[87] As cited in Hoffman, *op. cit.*, S-29.

[88] Dolores Durkin, "The Specificity of Children's Moral Judgments," *Journal of Genetic Psychology,* 98 (January, 1961), 3–13.

[89] Converse, *op. cit.*, 238–245.

IV. POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF IDEOLOGY

While this paper's focus has been on the developmental roots of political ideology, it should by now be apparent why I feel that the theory it explicates also has applicability to the political socialization literature. Indeed, we have already considered a few findings in the socialization area which are interpretable in terms of the developmental factors we have outlined. More data on political socialization can be integrated into this general framework, thereby providing some conceptual unification for a field which, currently, may well be accused of vulgar empiricism.[90] Let us briefly review some socialization literature which our framework subsumes and illuminates.

Two classes of socialization findings fit into our discussion. One set may be understood primarily by means of the developmental sequence presented in Part II of this paper, the other in terms of the retardation or facilitation factors discussed in Part III.

The developmental sequence helps account not only for the growth of political ideology, but also for the oft-noted "authoritarianism" of the child. We can now see that the child's authoritarian view of politics is only an extension of, first, his natural tendency to idealize history and authority; second, his belief in the inability of humans to alter the world; and third, his conception of justice as a self-regulating, mechanical, expiational process. Similarly, the "benevolent leader" syndrome[91] by which the child links himself to the polity may be explained partly by his inability to reason abstractly, to be self-conscious about his thinking, or to relate concrete judgments to general rules. Because the child reasons intuitively and syncretically, he reaches the personal application side of thought very rapidly. Reliance on a benevolent leader is both the outcome and the symbolic representation of a syncretic rather than analytic thought process. The "benevolent leader" syndrome, in other words, is an elliptical and condensed expression[92] of syncretic, personalized, unself-conscious thought. As Adelson, Siegel, and Piaget agree, not until the crucial 11–14 age range do children gain the capacity to reason abstractly and thereby arrange their relationship with the political system on different terms.

The intervening factors which determine the outcome of the developmental process illuminate a second set of socialization findings. We have argued that failures in cognitive and moral development seem uniquely linked to the psychological process of identification. This contention has already permitted us to interpret the perhaps puzzling discovery that student rebels and ideologues are *not,* by and large, also rebels against their parents. This generalization may be extended now to other kinds of political leadership. For example, Malcolm X in his *Autobiography* speaks in glowing and sympathetic terms of his mother, whose tribulations apparently sparked a latent political interest in him.[93] Nor should it be surprising that the children of clergymen seem to be especially prone to political activism.[94] These children, more than others, must incorporate moral norms in order to identify successfully with their parents.

The modalities of intergenerational transmission of party identification—at the heart of much socialization literature[95]—also become more understandable by use of the framework. We can explain why such transmission is easiest in the child's early years, because it is then that the child views the parent as the embodiment of a stable moral order. But we would also predict that when the conditions for identification between parents and children are weakened, the transmission process will similarly be endangered. Jennings and Niemi find, for example, that transmission of party identification from parent to child is considerably less successful today than it appears to have been a generation ago.[96] How can this change be explained? It is no secret that the present generation of American families is more plagued by divorce than were its predecessors. In most cases, divorce results in family disintegration, bitterness, and a breakdown of communication between the generations. Children viewing the breakup of their parents' marriage can seize on more than enough reasons not to identify with those parents. Obviously, divorce is not the only factor at work in weakening the identification process; I have used it merely as an illustration. Those many aspects of contemporary life which are responsible for the celebrated "generation gap" no doubt contribute as well.

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[90] For a recent article which evidences realization of this problem, see Jack Dennis, "Major Problems of Political Socialization Research," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* 12 (February, 1968), 85–115.

[91] For a discussion, see Fred I. Greenstein, *Children and Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), chap. 3, and the sources cited therein. Also, Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children* (Chicago: Alldine, 1967), chaps. 2–3; Jaros, Hirsch, and Fleron, *op. cit.*; and Jaros, *op. cit.*

[92] These aspects of childish thought seem similar to "dreamwork" in the psychoanalytic theory of dreams.

[93] *The Autobiography of Malcolm X* (New York: Grove Press, 1964), chap. 1.

[94] The names of Woodrow Wilson, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Malcolm X come most readily to mind.

[95] See Herbert Hyman, *Political Socialization* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 69–85; Greenstein, *op. cit.,* chap. 4; Hess and Torney, *op. cit.,* chap. 9; Campbell *et al., op. cit.,* chap. 6; and M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, "The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child," this REVIEW, 52 (March, 1968), 169–185, 172–174.

Of course, a framework's analytic utility should be judged not only by the existing findings it interprets, but also by the originality of the hypotheses it yields. Does our framework pass this test? Let me indicate three kinds of nonobvious questions which our framework leads us to investigate. I shall start with a relatively low-level hypothesis, move through a middle range question, and continue on to what might be called a systemically relevant problem.

First, though I have indicated the importance of identification to the acquisition of a political ideology and have specified some factors which affect the identification process, the specification is incomplete. For example, identification might be related to birth order because, as Stephenson points out, ". . . the higher the birth order of the child, the more time will the parents be able to spend with the child."[97] Assuming Stephenson is correct, we would predict that firstborn children would be especially likely to become political ideologues. But we should also expand and qualify this hypothesis somewhat. It is proverbial that not only first but also last-born children get heavy doses of parental attention. It is true that for a time the oldest child has exclusive claim to parental interest and, often, to parental hopes, but the last child, normally coming relatively late in the reproduction cycle, often receives a tenderness and warmth not afforded his brothers and sisters. To his parents he may seem nature's going-away present. Therefore, intermediate children may be less likely to identify with parents and, consequently, less likely to become political ideologues.

A middle range hypothesis takes up the differing and inconsistent moral standards evidenced by most children. We have already noted the relationship of these findings to the adult ideological inconsistencies uncovered by Converse. This parallelism indicates the need for a searching inquiry into the variety of moral standards people employ in their perceptions of political events. Are different standards applied to different classes of events, institutions, or personalities? Are there ways of predicting or describing the standard in use for any particular perception? Until now, most investigations of public opinion have generally assumed, very superficially, that people employ a single judgmental dimension in evaluating politics. Only Lane's work has described fully the many moral standards applied to politics.[98] Our framework leads us to hypothesize that single moral standards and judgmental consistency will be applied primarily by people whose parents were warm to them, accorded them responsibility early, and disciplined them psychologically. Other child rearing patterns will lead to a fragmented view of the political world.

Finally, at the systemic level, we may investigate the intertwining of moral and cognitive development. I argued that moral and cognitive progress reinforced each other. The need to evaluate the world gives rise to the desire to uncover the causal patterns *in* the world, and vice versa. I also implied that impairment of development affects cognition and evaluation equally. But there are certainly *uneven* rates of moral and cognitive development. What might be the outcome if, for some reason, a person's cognitive development proceeded faster and more smoothly than his moral development? Though there is currently no way by which to explain such aberrant processes, we can at least hypothesize about effects. For example, we might predict differing occupational patterns for people with different balances of moral and cognitive abilities. Children whose moral development exceeds their cognitive development might be attracted to occupations where moral questions are central. Such people might enter religious careers. On the other hand, children whose cognitive capacities outstrip their moral faculties might be attracted to occupations requiring advanced cognitive skills but little moral judgment. Might this be true of mathematicians? Finally, what mix of moral and cognitive development will lead a child to the political life, and might this mix differ from culture to culture?

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[96] Compare *ibid.* with Hyman, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

[97] Stephenson, *op. cit.*, p. 112. For evidence indicating the superiority of first-born children over middle children in two other spheres—occupational and educational achievement, see Peter M. Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan, *The American Occupational Structure* (New York: Wiley, 1968), pp. 307–308.

[98] Lane, *op. cit.* For an excellent empirical description of one kind of ideological structure, with moral standards at the forefront of the discussion, see Leonard Berkowitz and Kenneth G. Lutterman, "The Traditionally Socially Responsible Personality," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 32 (Summer, 1968), 169–186.

So much for the organizing and heuristic values of this framework. The argument developed here has several specific implications for the understanding both of political structures and of ideology—implications which I wish to highlight in conclusion. Assuming, as I have, that early learning and conceptualization processes have lasting impacts, the sequence of development favors some political movements and regimes over others. Specifically, movements of the left rest on a less secure psychological base than do movements of the right. Left movements, in their call for innovation and their emphasis upon the secular over the sacred and equity over expiation, appeal to high levels of moral and cognitive development. Movements of the right stress the need to respect authority, tradition, and punitive law. In so doing, they appeal to the earliest inculcated and most "natural" forms of thought. Therefore, more people are capable of reaction than reform.

For these reasons the revolutionary cycle from reform to reaction, which Brinton describes in structural terms,[99] may also be understood as a psychological problem. It is difficult for the mass of people to sustain commitments to left movements. Therefore, after such movements have succeeded in redistributing wealth or property, the less ideologically sophisticated adherents become apathetic or even antagonistic. As a consequence, leadership passes from agitators to colorless administrators or ruthless pragmatists. The maxim, "The revolution swallows its own children," is not entirely accurate. Rather, the children of the revolution defect, and can be brought back only by coercion. This formulation need not imply, however, that reactionary movements are invariably successful. Movements of the right in democratic regimes are forestalled both by leaders whose psychological capacities allow them to maintain a commitment to gradual reform, and by the apathy, inconsistency, and material self-interest of mass publics.[100]

We can also understand how difficult it is to meet the psychological requirements for a stable democratic regime.[101] Democracy demands much with its emphasis on openness, flexibility, gradual reform, progress through secular endeavor, and tolerance for those on the margins of society. Most people do not reach a high enough level of moral or cognitive development to maintain a long-run commitment to such a system. Either democracy must support itself by assuring material well-being for most of its citizens[102] or it must extract commitment at the cost of developing in its people a sense of nationalism. Both forms of support may eventually come into conflict with the norms of the system itself. We are led to the conclusion that diverse kinds of democratic commitment, resting as they do on different modes of perception and evaluation, provide considerable potential for fission and fragmentation. As Lasswell argued long ago, insufficient cognitive and moral development constitute continuing threats to democracy.[103]

We have also considered evidence and theory suggesting that individuals may slide between levels of political perception depending upon events. The implications of this discovery are far-reaching, and take two forms. First, we need to identify both the characteristic processes by which people shift and the circumstances which contribute to such movement. Edelman explores the mechanisms by which feared or experienced sanctions can cause regression to less advanced modes of political perception.[104] But political crises of a magnitude sufficient to cause widespread severe regression rarely occur. We should concentrate, therefore, on the process by which less traumatic but more frequent political events induce movement between cognitive and evaluative levels. At the very least, as Converse's discussion demonstrates,[105] there is need for periodic replication of all attitude studies.

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[99] Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965).

[100] For evidence on these characteristics of mass publics, see Samuel Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1963); Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," *Political Opinion and Electoral Behavior,* ed., Edward C. Dryer and Walter A. Rosenbaum (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1966), 236–267; James W. Prothro and C. W. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," *Journal of Politics,* 22 (Spring, 1960), 276–294; Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William H. MacPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), chap. 14. For a recent critique, see Peter Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967).

[101] A study which addresses this problem is Harry Eckstein, *A Theory of Stable Democracy* (Princeton: Center of International Studies, 1961).

[102] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1960), chap. 2.

[103] Harold D. Lasswell, "Democratic Character," in *The Political Writings of Harold Lasswell* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951), pp. 465–525. For a recent discussion of these same problems, see Fred I. Greenstein, "Personality and Political Socialization: The Theories of Authoritarian and Democratic Character," *The Annals,* 361 (September, 1965), 81–95.

Second, we should not ignore the effects of our making attitudinal inconsistency and slippage a primary assumption in the study of politics. Accepting such a premise makes our tasks doubly difficult. Many of our most cherished findings, not only from the "behavioral" sides of political science—such as public opinion and electoral behavior—but also from the more institutional areas of the discipline, become problematic. Still, these retrenchments seem required if the foregoing argument is persuasive.

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[104] Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), chap. 9.

[105] Converse, *op. cit.*

EXPANDING THE POLITICAL PRESENT

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"Nothing we have created, in politics or literature, is necessary. . . ."

—RICHARD POIRIER

Theory expressing new dimensions of man's political predicaments has rarely emerged from well-accredited academic quarters. Yet political scientists have come to hope that their own discipline, imaginatively pursued, might nevertheless yield comprehensive theories for coming to terms with man's present and prospective situations. To cope with emergencies—if not those of the year 1984 then those of the now more fashionable year 2000—they have proceeded to delineate possible futures. It is hardly necessary to document how industriously they have been extrapolating from the present, becoming interested in simulating, linear programming, gaming, and projecting into the future. With methodological ingenuity and resourcefulness, practitioners of futuristics have provided a new literature which is unconventional, exciting, and at times intriguingly surrealistic.[1] Like Bentham's and Saint-Simon's more buoyant pieces, it has all the trappings of authentic radical thought: it appears to challenge the prevailing intellectual and institutional boundaries.

Yet in view of the ideological constraints inherent in every professional discipline, it would be surprising if the new blueprints and scenarios were to inspire men to transcend the present political order, if the new utopians (to use Robert Boguslaw's apt label) acknowledged something other than the prevailing system of psychological, economic, and industrial norms as their point of departure. They understandably begin with the present, that which *is*. They perceive what various forms of systems analysis have shown to exist: man as egotistical utility and power maximizer, public policy as interest group inputs, the economic sector as primary generator of community goods, governmental structures as hierarchical organizations, politics as a sacrifice of personal values, psychological and economic resources as scarce, and development as whatever leads toward the fulfillment of this empirically confirmed vision. Notwithstanding the criticisms of Peter Bachrach, Robert Paul Wolff, Murray Edelman, Graeme Duncan, Irving Louis Horowitz, and others,[2] the new utopians begin with observed experience. And as they proceed, they reveal that not even the injection of temporal concepts into systems analysis—careful references to change, development, or dynamic processes—is sufficient to prevent their work from vindicating what is patently present.

Projections being impossible without some sort of baseline, it may be hard to see how it could be otherwise. Still, we know that what has existence for us depends on what we perceive to be there, on conditions we admit (sorrowfully or cheerfully) to be present. Few would disagree with Kant that "the present" is at least partially the result of intention, decision, and action. It is constituted by our power to designate and signify, the power to establish values.

But such power is not claimed by the authors of those exercises in futuristics which are the most frequently cited.[3] The new utopianism professes no value commitments. To be sure, it favors formal coherence, structural tidiness, and the use of denotative terms. Moreover, it reveals a preference for a rationally controlled future over one which might merely happen. But its practitioners refrain from discussing the valuation implicit in their concern for the integrity of one set of contemporary phenomena as opposed to others. The constitution of the present, they assume, is valid, or at least given. For them, "the present" is not so much a concept as a benign state of being. For them, there *is* a present to which their charts and words presumably give full credit. Because they do not see themselves as creatively attaching names to experiences, as accrediting institutions and behavior patterns, they simply treat as present whatever is fortunate enough to have been caught in their net of concepts. The present virtually presents itself, and the new utopians turn out to be no more than attentive, solicitous representatives of established reality. Playing this passive role, they seem to make no decisions. In the name of science, they behave like primitive man for whom, as Wendell Bell and James Mau have noted, "ends were seldom questioned and means were often invested with ritualistic significance."[4] Giving expression to a seemingly autonomous process of history, they do not appear to act either in favor of some aspect of reality or against an infinity of dormant alternatives. They do not appear to discriminate against those parts of the past (and the future) which remain buried in the present moment. The new utopianism, it would seem, is altogether "realistic" and "empirical."

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[1] See especially Robert Boguslaw, *The New Utopians* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965); Bertrand de Jouvenel (ed.), *Futuribles* (Geneva: Droz, 1963), Vols. I and II; Olaf Helmer, *Social Technology* (New York: Basic Books, 1966); Daniel Bell (ed.), *Toward the Year 2000* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968); Andrew Kopkind, "The Future-Planners," *The New Republic* (February 25, 1967), 19–23; William Ewald, Jr. (ed.), *Environment for Man: The Next 50 Years* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967); Office for Industrial Associates, *The Next Ninety Years* (Pasadena: California Institute of Technology, 1967); Robert Prehoda, *Designing the Future* (Philadelphia: Chilton, 1967); Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, *The Year 2000* (New York: Macmillan, 1967); Zbigniew Brzezinski, "America in the Technetronic Age," *Encounter*, 30 (January, 1968), 16–26; Stanford Anderson (ed.), *Planning for Diversity and Choice* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1968).

[2] Critiques of an arrested, excessively narrow empiricism may be found in two collections of readings: Charles A. McCoy and John Playford (eds.), *Apolitical Politics* (New York: Crowell, 1967); and Henry S. Kariel (ed.), *Frontiers of Democratic Theory* (New York: Random House, 1969).

[3] The best example is the work by Kahn and Wiener, *The Year 2000*.

I

Reifications serve to restrict politics to the few. Less epigrammatically, to identify reality exclusively with such abstractions as "balance of interests," "national honor," "private property," or "industrial man" is to acquiesce in the policies of those in society who have the power to create reality, who are free enough to structure man's consciousness of space and time. Moreover, to assume the finality of experiences which might yet change is to betray a commitment to *de facto* conditions—and to those who benefit by them. Such reification—and its consequent acceptance of the exercise of political power by the few—becomes insidious when done in the name of realism and science: it degrades the unperceived part of reality and the whole of science.[5]

Insofar as the new utopianism eliminates alternative realities by embracing as "real" the very institutions which the social sciences properly subject to continuous criticism, it is antiempirical as well as elitist. When it fails to acknowledge the problematic—not to say grotesque—character of the present, it is unable to specify how men are kept underdeveloped by the dominant order of commitments: government by a plurality of elites, a functional division of labor, the distinction between private and public sectors, the system of fixed social and biological roles within hierarchical organizations, the market economy, the identification of security with military power, the achievement orientation, the separation of means from ends, and finally the organized repression of action and pleasure, of life and death, of politics and play.

There is so little doubt that these commitments and the institutions which implement them are functional—signs of good sense and maturity—that their explicit justification would seem to have become dispensable. Action to establish alternative realities is thus discredited without discussion: it is *a priori* "unrealistic"—unhinged from experienced reality. Moreover, authentic utopian speculation comes to be seen as irrelevant for scientific analysis. As frameworks for analysis scrupulously exclude unrealized norms, they are attached to the status quo, treating reactions to suffering or anxiety as malfunctions of existing systems—be they the systems of production, distribution, recreation, education, communication, transportation, law enforcement, riot control, medical service, prison management, welfare, or warfare.

That neither cost-benefit accounts nor systems analysis is inherently conservative would seem to be clear enough.[6] But what would be the practical consequence of attempts to overcome their present conservatism have hardly been acknowledged. True, it is noted that a sociocultural system should not be exhaustively identified with an equilibrium of interests; the equilibrium metaphor, it is recognized, fails to account for man's creative response to tensions. Hence Walter Buckley, for example, has pointed to the need for "a new concept to express not only the *structure-maintaining* feature, but also the *structure-elaborating and changing* feature of the inherently unstable system."[7] He has consequently introduced the concept of "morphogenesis," quoting C. A. Mace's argument for extending the concept of homeostasis so that it might "cover the case in which the goal and/or norm is some state or relation which has never previously been experienced."[8] But this begs the question: how might social scientists remain loyal to their paradigm and express what has "never previously been experienced"? To what reality would their terms refer? How would they have to define reality so that their terms might acquire meaning? Would they not have to *create* experiences so as to come to terms with them, and would this not entail engaging in something more idealistic and hazardous—more active—than systems analysis as currently practiced?

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[4] Wendell Bell and James A. Mau, "Images of the Future and Research Strategies," manuscript prepared for J. McKinney and E. Tiryakian (eds.), *Theoretical Sociology* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, forthcoming), p. 7. The major premise of this essay is that "modern sociologists have so reified [technologies and organizational settings] that they have neglected the study of the processes involved in social development and change resulting from the actions of men themselves" (p. 34).

[5] Indictments of closure are legion. The charge is committing the fallacies of reductionism, misplaced concreteness, hypostatization, historicism, and essentialism. The record shows how readily science is converted into scientism, an analytical construct into an absolute, a useful tool into a fetish, or a contingency into a certainty.

[6] See Oran R. Young, *Systems of Political Science* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968).

The reluctance to face up to these questions is understandable. That social science should be inclined to maintain public morale and embrace established interests within self-maintaining structures should occasion no surprise: documentation of its readiness to serve is itself a minor industry.[9] If there is nonetheless a disciplined concern today with enlarging options by postulating the unity of theory and action—the inextricable linkage between fact and norm—we should not in any case expect to find it at the center of the social sciences. After all, such a concern would have to take the form of an attachment to potential interests which are all but eclipsed, which are present though invisible.[10] Attempts to represent unexpressed interests by bringing them into the light of day are bound to seem suspect to those who have the resources to see clearly and speak properly. The manners and idiom of spokesmen for the polarities of experience are unavoidably perceived as unseemly, if not incomprehensible. The utopias negatively implied or positively projected, for example, by Herbert Marcuse, Paul Goodman, Kenneth Burke, Wilhelm Reich, Francis Golffing, and Erich Fromm are seen to be irresponsibly conceptualized, expressed without regard for professional etiquette and scientific convention. Their metaphors fail to refer to manifest experience. Their works are out of order. Their vision, in Nietzsche's precise term, is untimely. Their prose discredits certified reality not only explicitly but also by its disconcerting ambiguity. Who can tell the genuine from the false prophet?

In view of these criticisms one can hardly blame either Marx or Wittgenstein (almost unthinkable company) for having declined to speak about worlds (and values) which had not been brought into being. And if their restraint is believed to be sensible, on what grounds can one entertain the desperate negations of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Marcel, Laing, or Mailer? Before accepting them, should one not wait until their prose has become more chaste and their posture less ambiguous?

Whether we are justified in rejecting efforts to communicate as unbearably eccentric, as politically irrelevant, must depend, however, on available resources. Can we bear to listen? Do we have the capacity for overcoming the manifest present, sustaining new forms of political consciousness, and surviving within an enlarged order of being? These questions may be seen as empirical ones: to what extent is it possible, in practice, to welcome a mode of action, of doing social science, which detaches men from prevailing social fortifications and empowers them to live life more fully? How far can men afford to dispense with the comfort provided by myth, ritual, religion, ideology, and consensus? Can men manage to act once they learn that nature gives no final answer, once they discover that its pervasive ambiguity frees them to choose the constraints which give significance to their lives?

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[7] Walter Buckley, "Society as a Complex Adaptive System," in *Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist* (Chicago: Aldine, 1968), p. 493.

[8] C. A. Mace, "Homeostasis, Needs and Values," *British Journal of Psychology,* 44 (1953), 204–205, as quoted *ibid.*

[9] See Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Vintage, 1954), Vol. II, pp. 42–49; Thorstein Veblen, *The Higher Learning in America* (New York: Huebsch, 1918); C. Wright Mills, *White Collar* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951), pp. 129–136. See also Loren Baritz, *Servants of Power* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1960); Frederik L. Polak, *The Image of the Future* (New York: Oceana, 1961), Vol. II, pp. 169–200; Sol Stein, "The Defense Intellectuals," *Ramparts* (February, 1967); H. L. Nieburg, *In the Name of Science* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966); Christopher Lasch, "The Cultural Cold War," in Barton J. Bernstein (ed.), *Towards a New Past* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968), pp. 322–359; James Ridgway, *The Closed Corporatoin* (New York: Random House, 1968); and Noam Chomsky, *American Power and the New Mandarins* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969).

[10] See Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955); Paul and Percival Goodman, *Communitas: Means of Livelihood and Ways of Life* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947); Wilhelm Reich, *Selected Writings* (New York: Farrar, Straus, & Cudahey, 1960); Francis and Barbara Golffing, "An Essay on Utopian Possibility," *Centennial Review,* 7 (Fall, 1963), 470–480; Erich Fromm, *The Sane Society* (New York: Rinehart, 1955); R. D. Laing, *The Politics of Experience* (New York: Pantheon, 1967); Kenneth Burke, "Dramatism," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), Vol. VII, pp. 445–452. See also George Kateb, "Utopia and the Good Life," *Daedalus,* 94 (Spring, 1965), 454–473; Denis A. Goulet, "Development for What?" *Comparative Political Studies,* 1 (July, 1968), 295–312; and Henry S. Kariel, *Open Systems: Arenas for Political Action* (Itasca, Ill.: F. E. Peacock, 1969).

It is easiest, of course, for us to support a view of man as capable of disciplining himself and of constructing his own reality when we insist at the same time that such a view is at best not fully implemented. Thus it has seemed advisable to keep protean man—why settle for less?—out of politics. Anyone who strives to negate the manifest present and design a new reality is accordingly confined to private life, the cultural arena, the realm of art. In private life (in life which some insist *is* private, or at least must be *kept* private) we can tolerate man's creative impulses. But out in the open where men do public business, some higher law—patented as a constitution—is alleged to be fixed and binding. Thus we follow Kant: we free the artist but confine the citizen—and along with the citizen the social scientist.

It may be useful to recall how the Kantian argument that we can have full confidence only in laws made by ourselves served to emancipate man as artist.[11] Prior to Kant, the artist had been confined: his role had been to sustain and illuminate the very nature of things. Expressing what he beheld, his works were to reflect the inherent order of the universe. Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason,* however, made it apparent that whatever order might inhere in the universe, it would surely remain mysterious. Man could no longer presume to say anything conclusively true about reality. He could merely make hypothetical statements—*and put them to the test.* Nature—or what those in power claimed to be nature—might now be made to yield. In the natural world, in what now could become *man's* world to the extent that he could impose on it, man could feel free to make the formulas, myths, designs, languages, ideologies, and laws that satisfied *his* needs. As generations of romantics beginning with Rousseau and the Marquis de Sade made plain, man was now authorized to express himself. The artist thus emerged, free to structure his feelings in the way he gave form to both his life and his work. Reality could be appropriated.

In practice, of course, the artist is kept from enlarging the sphere of his operations. His way is blocked by social prejudice, established institutions, political traditions, governing elites, and public opinion. He is confined to respectable enclaves: the gallery, the concert hall, the *salon,* the theater, the audience of well-bred connoisseurs. Plays are confined to stages, paintings are framed, performances have beginnings and endings. The arts are for special places and special hours, and access is restricted. Apparent exceptions—the decreative, boundary-breaking work of Joyce, Nabokov, Fellini, Borges, or Beckett; open-ended happenings; student rebellions and urban riots; strikes and demonstrations; marches of the poor—are simply not perceived as structured drama, as political projects which create meaning. Such performances are not seen as controlled efforts to break with actuality and display a new reality. It therefore simply does not occur to us that those who partake in them might be engaged in rational action. We fail to recognize that some outsiders might have discovered the theater of Antonin Artaud—not stages on which to resolve conflict and offer answers but stages on which to "express concretely certain secret truths, to bring into the light of day by means of active gestures certain aspects of truth that have been buried. . . ."[12] Failing to see this—failing to see that here might be "victims *signalling* through the flames"—we indiscriminately characterize annoying social events as reflexes, as outbreaks of lawlessness, irrationality, inhumanity, barbarism. They are out of bounds —mindless private usurpations of the public realm.[13]

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[11] This paragraph draws on "Society as Crucible," in Helmut Schoeck and James W. Wiggins (eds.), *Psychiatry and Responsibility* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1962), pp. 135–156.

[12] Antonin Artaud, *The Theater and Its Double* (New York: Grove Press, 1958), p. 70. See also James L. Peacock, *Rites of Modernization: Symbolic and Social Aspects of Indonesian Proletarian Drama* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); and Hugh D. Duncan, *Communication and Social Order* (Totawa, N.J.: Bedminster, 1962). Reuel Denney has pointed out to me the relevance of Artaud's conceptions.

[13] For examples of ambivalent concerns about the decline of good form, see Philip Rieff, *The Triumph of the Therapeutic* (New York: Harper

To become anxious about the artist breaking out and engaging in public action it is merely necessary to believe that the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century were governed not by elites imposing their private visions but by the unleashed masses. The spectres of Nazi Germany or American McCarthyism—reinforced by data about working-class authoritarianism—are enough to inspire fear of the masses.[14] And once one confuses elite-governed regimes with mass society and identifies mass society with barbarism it becomes only sensible to deny public outlets for man's creative impulses. Culture then becomes quite literally private business, and pluralism and constitutionalism are celebrated as the last strongholds of civility. Thus the existing constitutional order—and the economy of motion and emotion it implicitly institutionalizes—emerges as the very embodiment of justice, as an unamendable achievement. It ceases to be regarded as relative to changing human needs, as a design for living which men might change when it obstructs their pursuit of happiness.

Policies, it is true, do continue to be made and unmade in the public sector of constitutional regimes: but it is doubtful that they appreciably affect those fundamental economic institutions which effectively govern the rhythm and texture, direction and quality of everyday existence.[15] Nor are the arenas in the private sector significantly open to political action. To be sure, all manner of men who have been blessed by luck and favorable tax laws may act creatively at the top of the hierarchies of private power. Moreover, scientists and scholars who have escaped scarcity and necessity may explore new space and play their serious games. But genuine latitude is granted only to the clearly identified, narrowly defined artist. Only he would seem to have room to maneuver, to express his enterpreneurial and creative impulses. Authorized to change the forms that constrain him, he above all others may approach convention, law, discipline, authority, or myth in a playful spirit, as forever subject to revision. He is permitted to treat the truly basic questions of style and form as hypothetical, as useful to the extent that they intensify and extend experience. Admittedly, his special sensibilities had initially impelled him to be alienated from the dominant culture. But while he had once rebelled against the bourgeoisie, today he has begun to accept its embraces. More than that, he has been returning the favor, utilizing commercial images and electronic products. Thus the private socio-economic order has been linked with that of art. It is only in the political realm—only in the realm in which man acts as citizen—that theory still denies us the power to create the plans, designs, and concepts to expand reality.

II

The case for extending the range of the artist's operations has hardly received a hearing. Theory may have cleared the ground for action. But it still does not allow for democratizing the impulse to manage one's experiences in public—the political impulse that was expressed at its highest pitch by Nietzsche. On the contrary, the political theory dominant today generally treats man as incapable of managing his interests and assumes a just political system to be one which will account for his allegedly inherent limitations.[16] Although political thinkers from Machiavelli to Kant provided foundations for public action, they never invited the masses to participate. Nietzsche, it is true, did take note of the conditions for self-government; yet he never explored how the mass of men might be enabled to meet these conditions. He failed to ask the question which was to be consistently posed by Dewey: what kind of educational system will enable men to detach themselves from the life-destructive structures of their society?[17]

The obvious strategy for moving ahead is to make *practical* inquiries about environments conducive to democratizing creativity, to expanding politics. This entails raising empirical questions which, because they must be answered

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& Row, 1966); Irving Howe, "The Idea of the Modern," in *Literary Modernism* (New York: Fawcet, 1967); and Edward Shils, "Plenitude and Scarcity: The Anatomy of an International Crisis," *Encounter*, 32 (May, 1969), 37-57. For an approach recognizing the form of seemingly formless behavior, see Murray Edelman, "Public Policy and Political Violence," mimeographed discussion paper, Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin, 1968.

[14] See J. L. Talmon, *Origins of Totalitarian Democracy* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1952); José Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1940); and Robert A. Nisbet, *The Quest for Community* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953). The classic statement is Tocqueville's. For an incisive criticism, see Michael Rogin, *The Intellectuals and McCarthy* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967).

[15] See among innumerable others Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1966).

[16] See the selections in Kariel (ed.), *op. cit.*

[17] Marx, of course, posed this question, but his idiom has been more difficult to Americanize.

experimentally, compel social science to emerge as a form of action. It entails a commitment to an active, creative social science—a *political* science—for widening the scope of publicly controlled experience, for increasing the time and enlarging the space for political life. Reducing self-destructive privacy, it would extend man's various deadlines.

The extent to which social science offers practical demonstrations of the feasibility of democratizing creativity is not readily apparent, for the motives of social scientists are mixed and their work is accordingly ambiguous. Admittedly, the point of some scientific projects has not been obscure: behavioralists have been recurrently pleased to instruct men in power how to manipulate consumers, employees, patients, television viewers, prisoners, students, and rebellious populations.[18] Their very prose style has closed alternatives as they unambiguously defined deviants, reified existing systems, or converted their hypotheses into finalities. In their grading system, the most shameful grade is "Incomplete." Yet opportunism, impatience, and the will to settle things have not been the whole of contemporary social science. Social science has also shown itself capable of remaining experimental, of designing prototypes and constructing social laboratories—whether in hospitals, corporations, prisons, schools, or ghettos.[19] In 1955 Harold Lasswell became explicit about the need to build more bridges "between laboratory situations and field situations, . . . to take the laboratory design into the field and apply it to a whole community context." The community—transformed into a laboratory—may

> then be explored more intensively in order to identify the variables that account for the deviation. This can be done by applying more laboratory-type measures at the proper spots and by instituting a program of 'probers,' 'pre-tests,' 'interventions,' and 'appraisals.'[20]

Progressively expanding its laboratories, the social sciences may thus become openly activitistic.

No less radically, they may also consider the value of a phenomenological orientation which seeks to give recognition to repressed parts of the present—to causes which are latent, unpopular, discredited, or lost. Turning to more of the present than is immediately apparent, they can work toward its fullest possible realization. Cutting beneath prevailing simplifications, they can attempt to give creditable accounts of political potentialities, truly simulating by treating nothing as necessary or real.

Given the pressure to reduce intolerable ambiguities and dissonances, we are of course not disposed to add to life's complications. On the contrary, we are moved to seek relationships, solve problems, and explain political acts by functionalizing them. Yet only when we succeed in suspending our causal analyses and explanatory theories can we perceive the unconditional, innovative, and self-determined aspect of human conduct. Only when we decline to judge and draw conclusions can we discern the expressive element of politics, the display of capacities not ordinarily displayed, or not ordinarily displayed with as much grace or intensity.

To perceive this expressive aspect of experience, we need merely follow the clues of Hannah Arendt and conceptualize political action as a form of play, as characteristically a performing art. When politics is conceptualized in these terms—as something more than a struggle for power to allocate values in short supply—it will not be seen as a function of scarcity. From a phenomenological perspective, it emerges as a manifestation of human freedom, of the determination to use abundant resources to create publicly meaningful structures of being—whether these are demonstrations, research designs, urban redevelopment programs, war games, election campaigns, or entire political systems. Should we wish to understand the way action signifies the presence of ordinarily unrealized structures of being, we cannot regard it as conclusively significant in any other sense—in the sense, for example, of "really" signifying some predefined intention or of being "really" functional to some predefined structure. We must see it as a form of play: *complete in itself*.

The obstacles to applying this orientation to the normal subject matter of political science are considerable. Political scientists whose scope-and-methods courses orginally led them to invest in a definition of politics as economizing behavior are bound to become troubled. It is certainly more conventional (and for some purposes more useful) to view so-called voting behavior, for instance, from non-phenomenological perspectives. We may explain it as a function of group membership, as a conditioned response to economic deprivation, or as determined by income level. Or we may interpret it as a gesture intended to influence policy. But to understand it as a form of action, it must be perceived as no more (and no less) than the manifestation of man's desire to appear in public and display his freedom. Such a display, we must acknowledge, proclaims the sheer determination to act, the will of an individual to appear, to *be*. It is hardly surprising, on reflection, that social scientists or men in power should have difficulties seeing this determination in others. The self-assertiveness of outsiders is bound to strike the powerful either as not really intended or as inexplicably arrogant, especially when the resources for effective political action are believed to be scarce. When individuals make their appearance—freeing themselves from necessity—elites readily characterize their emergence as an emergency. But social scientists might be slower to judge, slower to characterize behavior as dysfunctional, recognizing that the behavior of the less privileged, less active orders of society may at least partially be a form of action.

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[18] For early examples, see T. N. Whitehead, *The Industrial Worker* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938); Alexander H. Leighton, *The Governing of Men* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945); and Schuyler Dean Hoslett (ed.), *Human Factors in Management* (New York: Harper, 1946).

[19] Harold D. Lasswell, "Current Studies of the Decision Process: Automation versus Creativity," *Western Political Quarterly*, 8 (September, 1955), 385–386.

[20] See especially Robert Rubenstein and Harold D. Lasswell, *The Sharing of Power in a Psychiatric Hospital* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); and the research strategy advocated by Bell and Mau, *op. cit.*

Although political acts can no more be explained scientifically than the will to survive, they may nevertheless be elucidated. While not regarding them as useful or necessary or instrumental, as intended to make an impression or to teach a lesson, as being *for* anything, the social scientist can yet describe their distinctive modes and structures. He can yet communicate his understanding of them (as Lévi-Strauss did in *The Raw and the Cooked* or Norman Mailer in *Armies of the Night*), translating them so that his exposition will reveal not *what* they signify but the *way* they signify. His model is provided by the German critic Walter Benjamin: "A translation, instead of resembling the meaning of the original, must lovingly and in detail incorporate the original's mode of significance, thus making *both* the original and the translation recognizable as fragments of a greater language. . . ."[21] Making us aware of a "greater language"—of a larger symbolic universe than we conventionally recognize—the writer can convey what a political act *is*. And what it is, he can make clear, is a distinctive way of existing, of resisting necessity, of converting absurdities into meaningful reality. Thus the social scientist as translator can publicly ponder and implicitly exalt the sheer appearance of political life—the inexplicable fact that it is present at all.

If his literary act fails to "explain," it nonetheless establishes reality for others as well as himself. Seeking to come to terms with man as self-directed agent, with expressive aspects of behavior, he assumes that his accounts must be idiographic and ambiguous, that the very concept of explanation, as John Gunnell has said, is "context-bound and field-dependent."[22] One test of his success is his capacity for deepening our understanding of men who make their way outside accredited systems, who act in incongruous situations and unfamiliar environments: marching on the Pentagon, growing up in a kibbutz, serving on workers' councils, participating in utopian communities, playing unorthodox roles, or gaining balance in psychoanalytic encounters. A less orthodox test of such a political science is the extent of its impact on those it presumes to understand. It succeeds to the extent that it enables them to recognize more of themselves than they ordinarily recognize, that it raises their expectations, that it expands their consciousness, freeing them to be more playful and political, more active and alive. Perhaps the ultimate test is its impact on the political scientist himself, even if only he can finally tell whether his symbolic action—his contribution to a journal, his lecture, his public performance—has added, not merely to his *curriculum vitae*, but to his life.

In any case, such a political science serves to amplify and enlarge our existence by illuminating previously invisible, generally discredited dimensions. Bringing apparent exceptions into our symbolic frameworks, it demonstrates how little (or how much) discipline is necessary to satisfy human needs under varying conditions. It makes clear, for instance, that however unavoidable social differentiation may be, a system of social stratification is dispensable, that "there is nothing demonstrably 'natural,' " as Melvin Tumin has shown, "about reacting to differential skills in the ways generally found in modern industrial societies."[23] Though the rhetoric of such a political science is different from that of history, fiction, films, or psychological case studies, it no less reveals man's capacity for role-taking and role-switching, for escaping the assignments hierarchical organizations seem to demand.[24]

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[21] Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations*, Harry Zohn, tr. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968), p. 78; italics supplied.

[22] John G. Gunnell, "Social Science and Political Reality: The Problem of Explanation," *Social Research*, 35 (Spring, 1968), 159–201, 173–174.

[23] Melvin Tumin, "On Inequality," *American Sociological Review*, 28 (February, 1963), 19–26. See also how role differentiation, social stratification, and status inequality are avoided in kibbutzim: Richard D. Schwartz, "Functional Alternatives to Inequality," *American Sociological Review*, 20 (August, 1955), 424–430. Arnold Gehlen's work shows that no specific social order is prescribed by nature: *Der Mensch, seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt* (Bonn: Athenäum Verlag, 1950); *Urmensch und Spätkultur* (Bonn: Athenäum Verlag, 1956).

As they open alternatives, the social sciences necessarily follow Reinhard Bendix's advice to raise questions, as he says,

> contrary to the manifest evidence in order to bring out those capacities of the social structure which any limited body of evidence tends to omit. By exposing observation at any one time to a wider range of comparison with the past (or with other social structures) than is sometimes customary, we may approach an understanding of social structure and change without at the same time moving too far away from the evidence.[25]

By giving credence to past or distant or unfashionable life styles—to modes of conduct which are *possible* though regarded as failures—the social sciences reverse conventional valuations of goals. Valuing the needs of the child over those of the existing school or, as Chris Argyris has done,[26] the needs of the worker over those of the organization, they introduce options. Positing countervailing values, they enlarge understanding. By engendering a growth in empathy toward modes of action intimated but not clearly expressed by extremist movements, they induce a deliberate shifting in point of view—a rejection of the study of outsiders from the established center, an acceptance of men who are active at the margin.[27]

Whether the social scientist is engaged in experimental prototyping or in expressing his understanding of political acts in phenomenological accounts, he remains in touch with his subject matter, treating it not as an object to be acted upon but as phenomena with which to interact. His involvement entails suspension of that subject-object distinction which leads social scientists to disregard unexpressed potentialities and deal with people as if, like objects, they had no political will of their own.[28] It entails approaching society with an attitude of receptivity to the claims of its members, with an artful, simulated readiness to reinforce them, to go along with them, to say forcefully what they say haltingly.[29]

Offering actual demonstrations of the possibility of revolution, this approach leads to a restructured, transformed reality. While it displays options in altogether practical terms, it does not provide inventories of definitive propositions. It therefore should not lead us to expect what students in the social sciences are generally taught to produce—findings, conclusions, information, or general theories. Prepared to be less goal oriented, we can merely expect (it has become hard to say so) a measure of wisdom—an increase in self-conscious empathy, in managed compassion and governed openness.[30] Thus successful social experiments as well as the writings of phenomenologists can scarcely serve to provide knowledge (or even "insight"). They merely draw us into a process of discovery which enables us to grasp what we tacitly know but fail to acknowledge—namely, that more of life might be lived rationally. Rejecting the reified abstractions of Social Science as well as the homilies of Wisdom Literature, they compel us to accept only what cannot be mastered by human action. Ideally, they then leave man to himself, but to more of himself than he knew was his before the social sciences engaged him. "A child may feel hungry and not know that it wants to eat, until it is offered food," Michael Polanyi has noted[31]—implying that the probing of social analysts exposes repressed needs and incites action simply by putting man's immediate responses into question. A science which thus challenges the present by adducing unestablished dimensions of reality assumes not that men are ignorant but that they are burdened by an excess of insinuating knowledge, by elite-serving solutions, by needless words and theories—in short, by ideologies. Consequently writers such as Mead or Sartre or Dewey have always fought the temptation of offering answers. Refusing to simplify our lives, they have deepened our predicaments. But if the studied emptiness of their work is annoying, it does free us to provide answers for ourselves, to construct our own futures now, to revolt and make history.

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[24] See R. W. B. Lewis, *The Picaresque Saint* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1959); Ralph H. Turner, "Role-Taking: Process versus Conformity," in Arnold M. Rose (ed.), *Human Behavior and Social Processes* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), pp. 20–38; and Robert Jay Lifton, "Protean Man," *Partisan Review,* 35 (Winter, 1968), 13–27.

[25] Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship* (New York: Wiley, 1964), pp. 13–14.

[26] Chris Argyris, *Personality and Organization* (New York: Harper, 1957). See also Warren G. Bennis, *Changing Organizations* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966).

[27] See Alvin Gouldner's criticism of sociologists as condescending patrons of outsiders: "The Sociologist as Partisan," *American Sociologist,* 3 (May, 1968), 103–116.

[28] See *ibid.* and works cited in note 18, *supra.*

[29] For a lucid discussion of gaining knowledge through empathic activity, see Edwin A. Burtt, *In Search of Philosophic Understanding* (New York: New American Library, 1965), Ch. 9.

[30] To recognize this may reveal the pathos in efforts to make public administration cases yield general propositions: Frederick C. Mosher (ed.), *Governmental Reorganizations: Cases and Commentaries* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967). Of course, cases may make the student sensitive to the complexity of administrative processes; to claim more, however, is to succumb to scientism.

[31] Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), p. 202.

III

Short of efforts to vacate our practical and theoretical edifices and to invite men to move in and establish themselves—short of efforts to annihilate and reconstruct reality—we cannot possibly perceive the defeats implicit in the various offered projections of our present victories. The most precise cost-benefit accounting or the most elegant exercises in futuristics cannot expand the present as long as their designers simply acquiesce in the Facts of the Situation, the Inner Logic of Industrialism, or the Natural Laws of Organizational Development. Without an idealistic orientation which, by alerting us to deranged and disorderly interests, serves to enlarge the center, we are bound to let our present achievements become permanent fixations. We thereby allow ourselves to be arrested in our development simultaneously as citizens and social scientists. True, while arrested we would, like prisoners, still sense the passage of time. But we would have no future. We would have lost the opportunity for giving time publically significant meaning, for politicalizing it.

When social scientists succeed in being creative in each present moment, destroying meaningless time by acting, they deprive the prevailing concept of "the future" of its current ideological value: they thereby make it serve more than the established present reality. De-emphasizing planning and prediction (both functions of scarcity and insecurity), questioning pre-ordained sequences and breaking continuities, they multiply realities and keep progressively more of them in a state of suspense. As social scientists induce the mass of men to let go, to find release from the merely contemporary objectification of time, they disregard the sense of time within which elites find it profitable to imprison others.

So far, it is true, only elites have been able to live for the moment and to make the most of it.[32] But it is possible to test experimentally whether others, too, might bear the freedom to impose alternative meanings on history. Encouraged to defy the linear predictions of the new utopianism, more men may be able to identify concealed political potentialities; given the power to make more of the present, they may be able to let more of the future take care of itself. As they become aware of the openness of the future—cherishing its emptiness, its mystery—they might learn to dispense with some of their defense mechanisms, to repudiate timeless reifications, and to create unanticipated, still disreputable realms of being.

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[32] Robert Jay Lifton has suggested that the mass of men lack tolerance of a variegated present and consequently crave connections with the future because of a pervasive fear of death, and that this in turn generates an interest in progeny, an obsession with durable achievements, and a devotion to undying causes and death-defying leaders: *Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-Tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1968).

PRISONERS OF WAR: DOES THE FIGHT CONTINUE AFTER THE BATTLE?

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I. REFUGEES AND PRISONERS OF WAR

Just beyond the state there is a kind of limbo, a strange world this side of the hell of war, whose members are deprived of the relative security of political or social membership. Different sorts of people live there, mostly for indefinite periods of time, people who have been expelled from their state or otherwise deprived of legal rights, people whose state has been defeated in war and occupied or who have been separated somehow from its jurisdiction. Among the residents, two groups endure conditions paradigmatic for all the others: refugees, deprived of their rights by persecution; and prisoners of war, separated from their state by captivity. The two are very different, since refugees are stateless persons, radically dependent on their hosts and unable to look backward to any protecting authority, while prisoners remain citizens still and receive such protection as their states can provide. However distant and isolated they may be from their home country, their captivity is (hopefully) temporary; both captives and captors may one day be required to account for their behavior. Nevertheless, prisoners and refugees belong alike to the limbo world. They cannot expect effective help from any organized society; they do not know when, if ever, they will be "at home" again; they are compelled to reconstruct or redefine their obligations without reference, or without clearcut reference, to authoritative laws and commands.

Refugees face their hosts with a special kind of helplessness and pathos, but also with an unaccountable and peculiar freedom. They are men free of all allegiance except to other men, without political obligations, at least without obligations to any state in the world of states. And their condition testifies to the wretchedness of such freedom.[1] Frightening as it may be to the authorities (at least, the authorities generally profess to be frightened), it is far more so to the refugees themselves. Until they are given a home, they have a right to do whatever they can to save themselves, within limits imposed only by their humanity and the relations they form with particular other people. But in fact they can do painfully little, and theirs is a freedom any of us would speedily exchange for membership and protection, despite the restraints these impose. The value of the state as an inclusive community, the importance of even the most minimal kinds of social solidarity and legal definition—these are never more clear than when we regard ourselves as possible participants in the limbo of statelessness.

The prisoner, on the other hand, is doubly unfree, since he is not set loose from his former allegiance, or so he is told, by his captivity. If he is forced to face his captors, bound or at gunpoint, he must also look over his shoulder to the authorities of his own state. He is required continually to balance the obligations he knows he once had, and may still have, as a citizen and soldier, against the more immediate threats and coercions of his captors—and perhaps also against his new obligations to the society of prisoners. What should he do? It is never easy to say. If the statelessness of a refugee is frightening, so is the citizenship of a prisoner of war. To regard ourselves as possible captives is to learn how oppressive political obligations can be. Even limbo, as we shall see, has its temptations.

II. THE CONDITION OF PRISONERS OF WAR

Captivity can be conceived in two different ways: first, as the termination of combat for an individual soldier, the imposition by the captor and the acceptance by the captive, of a total quarantine for the duration of the war; secondly, as the termination of one sort of combat and its replacement by another sort, where the fighting is relatively circumscribed and its conditions radically unequal.[2] Both of these are modern conceptions; both depend on the recognition of the prisoner as a moral and legal person, possessed of certain rights, entitled at the very least to be kept and provided for by what the lawyers call "the detaining power." The prisoner is "detained," and that means that whatever else is done to him or with him during his detention, he cannot be killed or enslaved. Not so very long ago, a prisoner was thought to have forfeited his life by his surrender. Then his slavery was justified as the end result of an exchange made possible solely by the benevolence of his captor, an exchange of life for perpetual service. On that view, captivity was in no sense a status within which a man might be more or less secure even if impotent. Prisoners were rapidly converted into dead men or living slaves, and the choice between these two conditions was only secondarily their own.[3] (In practice, during the early modern period, prisoners were often required simply to join the army of their captors, common soldiers being little more than chattel anyway.) Today, a prisoner can expect to remain a prisoner for as long as the war lasts, and then he can expect to be released. In the interim between capture and release, he is forced into a relation with his captors unlike that of slave and master, though not entirely unlike it, and into a relation with his fellow prisoners unlike that of any normal political (or military) association. The prison or prison camp is the scene of a new society, which exists precariously in the shadow of the detaining power and whose members feel the pull of their previous political commitments, not least because these are likely to be their future commitments as well.

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[1] For a brilliant discussion of the problem of statelessness, see Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1958), Ch. 9.

[2] See G. S. Pugh, "Prisoners at War: The P.O.W. Battleground," 60 *Dickenson Law Review* 123–138 (1956), and "The Code of Conduct," 56 *Columbia Law Review* 678–707 (1956). The best book on the nature and laws of captivity is William E. S. Flory, *Prisoners of War: A Study in the Development of International Law* (Washington, 1942).

This new society of prisoners exists by virtue of, or at least in accordance with, international law. Its members have even been called, by a serene theorist of the nineteenth century, "citizens of the world."[4] The world is, unfortunately, not so organized that citizenship in it is much of a benefit—as stateless persons have learned over and over again in the past 30 years. But the name does serve to suggest something very important, if true: that prisoners are no longer at war. It presses us toward the first of the two conceptions of captivity. For the war is being fought by citizens of this state and of that one, and citizens of the world, even if they hold dual citizenship in one of the belligerent states, are presumably exempt from the compulsions of the struggle. The rules of quarantine replace the code of battle, and this replacement is not merely legal, but moral as well; it frees the prisoner from all obligations to continue the war.

The same replacement would seem to be implied by the conventional practice of "surrendering" or "giving up," though this has sometimes been denied. In the *Code of Conduct* for US soldiers issued by President Eisenhower in 1955, it is said that soldiers must never surrender "of their own free will."[5] If it were possible for soldiers to surrender in any other way, the act might indeed have no moral consequences. But unless the *Code* is intended to bar surrender altogether—and then its subsequent provisions, which deal with the conduct of prisoners, would be superfluous—the phrase "of their own free will" is very odd. The authors presumably want to say that only extreme duress and the threat of imminent death are acceptable reasons for surrender, but that does not mean that the act of surrendering can never be a decision of the men who surrender or an agreement between them and their captors.[6] It most often is a decision, and it is probably always an (implicit) agreement. Even when no decision seems possible, as when the sailors of a sunken ship are simultaneously rescued and captured, it can probably be assumed that the prisoners agree to their captivity, if only for the sake of their rescue, and that they approve of the general practice of taking prisoners. In battle or in the aftermath of battle, surrender usually involves a more explicit judgement and choice on the part of the men surrendering, a judgement of their own continuing effectiveness as soldiers and of the risks they face, a choice to fight on or not. And this is in some sense a free choice, though it is made under varying degrees of duress, since soldiers can and have been known to accept enormous risks and even fight to the death. Surrender is precisely a way of choosing not to take enormous risks and not to fight to the death. It takes the conventional form of an agreement not to fight at all, to "give up" fighting, in return for life itself and then benevolent quarantine.

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[3] Hugo Grotius, writing in the early seventeenth century, still defended the right of enslavement, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis,* Book III, Chapter 14, Section 9. The decisive theoretical critiques of this idea are by Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws,* Book IV, Chapter 2, and Rousseau, *The Social Contract,* Book I, Chapter 4.

[4] James Lorimer, *Institutes of the Law of Nations* (London, 1884), Volume II, p. 72. The whole passage is excellent and should be consulted.

[5] The *Code of Conduct* is the most important official statement on how U.S. soldiers are to behave when overpowered by an enemy, and I will refer to it frequently below. At the time it was issued, its legal status was unclear (see Pugh, "The Code of Conduct"), but it has recently been described, in the aftermath of the *Pueblo* incident, as "only a guideline." Violations of the articles of the *Code* do not constitute a criminal offense: *New York Times,* December 29, 1968. It is presumably still the opinion of the authorities that they constitute a moral offense, and the *Code* continues to play a very important part in the training of US soldiers.

[6] Something must be said here about the difficult problem of coercion, though to deal with it in even a minimally adequate way would require another essay. The common and plausible view is that no man is morally bound to fulfill a contract or commitment he was coerced into making. Since the word "coerced" is usually taken to mean "forced by violence or the threat of violence," surrender would appear to have no moral validity. But it might be argued against this that the definition of coercion depends or ought to depend on the situation of the individual said to be coerced, and that in the context of war, violence exercised in accordance with the laws of war is not coercive. Surrender is a social practice designed to accommodate the human difficulties of war; it can't be judged by conventions appropriate to other, and very different, settings. This calls into question the dictionary definition and ordinary usage of the word "coercion." But there are only two alternatives, neither

This agreement obviously requires a second party; surrender must be accepted as well as offered, and armies can refuse, though no longer lawfully, to take prisoners. Clearly, there would be a positive incentive to refuse if surrender were thought to involve no commitment to cease (and not to resume) fighting, just as there would be a positive incentive to fight to the death if the acceptance of surrender were not viewed as a commitment to one or another form of quarantine. Surrender as a social practice is only possible in the absence of these two incentives, that is, it is only possible when it is conceived as a mutual engagement with moral consequences. This conception is clearly reflected in international law, which requires benevolence of captors and simultaneously deprives a prisoner of all combatant rights.[7] If he kills a prison guard, for example, the act is murder and not war, for he has given up fighting and thereby reassumed some of those civilian obligations which are suspended for soldiers in the face of an enemy.

The essence of surrender is the agreement not to fight, and this agreement may not require quarantine at all. In the days when officers were also gentlemen and aristocrats, it was perfectly normal to release a prisoner on parole, that is, to accept his word that he would not rejoin the fighting and then to permit him personal freedom of movement, even to permit him to go home. This is only possible on a very strict view of surrender, which holds the captives temporarily free of political allegiance and so able to make arrangements on their own behalf: "separated for the time being from any political community, they . . . belong to humanity and to themselves."[8] Eighteenth and nineteenth century lawyers argued—and their arguments were for a time widely accepted—that if a prisoner did return home on parole, his home state could not force him to fight again or in any way require him to violate his faith.[9] This clearly implies that the prisoner did not break faith when he gave parole in the first place; it grants that he belonged at that moment in time "to himself." Perhaps that is a status which aristocrats resume more readily than other men; nevertheless, its recognition is, I think, an extraordinary tribute to the liberality of eighteenth and nineteenth century states, or of some of them, and of their lawyers and philosophers. Modern states, whether liberal or not, are not inclined to grant a similar recognition. Most of them, including the United States, deny prisoners the right to give their parole (except under very restricted circumstances and for short periods of time). International law has been adjusted so as to deny validity to any parole arrangement contrary to the laws or regulations of the prisoner's home state.[10] Very occasionally the old ethic is rediscovered. Thus, a small number of captured American soldiers gave their parole to the Japanese in the Philippines during World War II, and "these paroles were recognized by the US as prohibiting military and other resistance to the Japanese on the part of the individuals concerned."[11] But such agreements are rare in this century and today the *Code of Conduct* explicitly declares that prisoners must not give their parole to their captors. Prisoners, it would appear, never belong, or are never admitted to belong, merely "to humanity and to themselves."

It is perfectly understandable that the state should continue to claim the allegiance and sup-

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of them attractive: either to suggest that no morally binding agreements are possible in wartime, or to accept Hobbes' argument that "Covenants entered into by fear . . . are obligatory" (an argument Hobbes explicitly applied to prisoners of war—see *Leviathan*, Chapter XIV).

[7] See the discussion in Pugh, "The Code of Conduct," pp. 682–683, 690n., and Eric Williams' introduction to *The Escapers* (London, 1953), p. 15.

[8] Lorimer, *op. cit.*, II, 72.

[9] See the British *Manual of Military Law* (1884): "A State has no power to force its subjects to act contrary to their parole." Quoted in Flory, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

[10] Geneva Convention I, Article 21; for a discussion of contemporary law on parole arrangements, see Morris Greenspan, *The Modern Law of Land Warfare* (Berkeley, 1959), pp. 108–110.

[11] Pugh, "The Code of Conduct," p. 683n.

port of prisoners. It is even in the interests of the prisoners that it should do so—up to a point. They have no wish to be abandoned, however uneasy they may be about their "obligations." Nor does the state make its claims very effectively, since it has no immediate control over the persons of the prisoners and is unable to offer any but the most minimal guidance as to their everyday behavior in the radically new society of the prison camp. The claims of the state are still enormously important; they point toward the second and at present (in this country and more clearly in some others) the official view of the status of captives and the moral meaning of captivity. On this view, prisoners of war must regard themselves as combatants even after their capture, full-fledged members of a state at war, a state in trouble, needful of all the men it has, unwilling to yield the services of anyone except to death itself. The prisoner, so the *Code of Conduct* tells him, is an "American fighting man" (Article I). He must refuse any sort of cooperation with his captors and seek continually to escape. By implication, he must also help whenever he can to organize mass escapes, to maintain a resistance network in the camp, to harrass the enemy, spy on him and sabotage his behind-the-lines operations. He must always act so as to require as many guards as possible. It is a little hard to see why any state at war would maintain prisoners who actually did or tried to do all these things, and insofar as the *Code* requires them, it is not entirely consistent with the idea of benevolent quarantine. This is partly because it was designed as a response to North Korean and Chinese captors who paid little regard to that idea, but it also reflects, as did the actions of the North Koreans and Chinese, an extension of state sovereignty and an attempt at ideological control which amount to a denial that individuals can ever move, even partially, out of the range of political action and supervision. There simply is no space, it suggests, that might be called limbo, where quarantine is possible and a certain human passivity morally justified.

Contemporary international law, as codified in the Geneva Conventions (1949), does not require the passivity of prisoners; indeed, it provides carefully and at considerable length for attempted escapes, though not for any other kind of resistance.[12] But it is not unfair to argue that the most humane provisions of the present code —for example, the rule that prisoners captured while trying to escape cannot be punished, but only detained more strictly, and that only for a short time—are rooted in the expectation that the vast majority of prisoners will not resume or make any attempt to resume their combatant roles. And that is an expectation most often realized in practice, despite the wishes of the governments whose citizens are imprisoned. The erosion of the idea of benevolent quarantine has come largely from the other side, from captors and not from captives, as one might expect; for if combat is resumed, it is the captors who have every advantage. Still, prisoners have chosen to fight on, sometimes in response to the coercive acts of the enemy, sometimes on their own initiative, and it is worth asking whether there is any justice at all in the increasingly strong presumption of their home states that they ought to do so.

Article III of the US *Code of Conduct* requires that American soldiers, if captured, must "continue to resist by all means available." This is its most extreme provision, though the ambiguous word "resist" was carefully chosen. Mr. Carter Burgess, Assistant Secretary of Defense, argued at the time the *Code* was adopted that physical resistance (which is barred by Geneva Convention I, article 82) was not required of prisoners, but only mental resistance to political indoctrination.[13] That is hardly made clear by the *Code* itself, and the lack of clarity was presumably intentional, since the wording was long debated. One legal critic of the *Code* has pointed out that unless it is read as a call for resistance "by all *legitimate* means available," prisoners "would be encouraged to commit acts that may be war crimes or at least contrary to the spirit of the Geneva Conventions."[14] Needless to say, their captors would be similarly encouraged.

The *Code* was adopted in the immediate aftermath of the Korean War, a struggle in which the noncombatant status of prisoners was undermined by both sides, though most dangerously and cruelly, judging from the available evidence, by the North Koreans and Chinese.[15] In prison camps north and south of the battleline, a new kind of war went on for the minds, that is, for the loyalty and political commitment, of the prisoners. To some extent, this was a war that could be fought within the limits set by the Geneva Conventions. But one of its most ominous results was that in the American-run camps, where the Conventions were fairly rigorously observed, and in contrast to the Communist camps where they were not, resistance was amazingly successful. At one point, major sections of the camp on Koje Island were entirely controlled by North Korean prisoners, who even captured and for several days held the American commander of the camp. It quickly became clear that "measures permitted under the Geneva Conventions would not completely destroy the Communist organization within the compounds." The North Korean prisoners could no longer be regarded, or treated, "as passive human beings in need of care and protection. . . ."[16]

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[12] Geneva Convention I, Articles 42, 91–93; see Greenspan, *op. cit.*, pp. 135–137.

[13] Carter L. Burgess, "Prisoners of War," 56 *Columbia Law Review* 676–677 (1956).

[14] Pugh, "The Code of Conduct," p. 690.

[15] But see W. Burchett, *Koje Unscreened* (Peking, 1953).

General Mark Clark's comment on the Koje mutiny suggests what American officials learned from this incident: ". . . my experience," he wrote, "had been with *old-fashioned* wars in which prisoners were people to be fed, housed, clothed, and guarded, nothing more. Never had I experienced a situation in which prisoners remained combatants and carried out orders smuggled to them from the enemy high command."[17] Only a few years later President Eisenhower brought American policies up to date by issuing the *Code of Conduct,* recommended to him in a Defense Department report entitled "P.O.W.—The Fight Continues After the Battle."[18] The *Code* was explicitly intended to provide a secure moral basis for resistance to the indoctrination of prisoners as this had been practiced by the North Koreans and Chinese. But its careful ambiguity suggests that it was also intended to encourage action on the scale of the Koje mutiny. What happens then to the "old-fashioned" notion that prisoners must be maintained and guarded and nothing more? Surely there would be some value in reiterating that notion, rather than merely conceding its antiquity.

III. OBLIGATIONS AND FORMS OF RESISTANCE

On the other hand, when serious pressure is put on prisoners to collaborate with the enemy, either by supplying military information or expressions of political support, we do want "our" soldiers (at least) to refuse and resist. It is important to understand just what is involved in such refusals: they don't represent a continuation of the war so much as an unwillingness to enlist or be enlisted on the other side; they are a defense of all that is implied by the idea of quarantine. Prisoners refusing to collaborate are also, of course, refusing to "sell out" their comrades or their recent comrades and to betray their country. But the obligations which they thus acknowledge and sustain are minimal in character. They can most readily be expressed in the negative: not to inform, not to confess, not to collaborate, and so on. I don't mean to suggest that they are for that reason easy to sustain. Whether they are easy or hard (or impossible) to sustain depends on the actions of the enemy. They are significantly different, however, from obligations that lend themselves to positive statement: to try to escape, to harrass, to sabotage, and so on. In practice, most states attempt legal enforcement only of negative obligations. Prisoners who collaborate with the enemy may be charged after the war with misconduct or even with treason, but not prisoners who refuse to join escape organizations.[19] Treason obviously requires some overt act of "aid and comfort," so mere refusals to participate in escape or harrassment attempts don't qualify. But the inability and unwillingness of states to enforce positive obligations has other reasons, which call into question their very status as obligations.

Negative and positive obligations (I mean the two adjectives merely as rough indications of certain sorts of actions and refusals to act) are mediated very differently to the individual soldier. Negative obligations are his as an individual, a member, let us assume a willing member, of a particular state or of its army, and they clearly survive temporary separation from either. In captivity (as out of it) these obligations may be over-ridden, or they may be violated in extenuating circumstances. Refusals to collaborate, for example, may endanger the society of prisoners as a whole or some of its individual members, and then the man who is being pressed to perform this or that service must weigh relative evils and make a difficult and painful decision. It is important to stress the word "must," for whatever decision he comes to, he is faithful only if he takes into account his obligation not to act so as to injure his country or endanger his comrades-in-arms.

Similarly, in those cases where a prisoner collaborates under duress, he is later judged, and rightly so, by the integrity of his resistance as long as it lasts, that is, by his own manifest sense of his obligations. I cannot say, and I am not sure any free man can say, what constitutes an adequate manifestation.[20] Once a prisoner has done what he can on behalf of his home state, by refusal, evasion, or deceit, and can resist no more, his fellow citizens can only mourn with him, and not condemn, the disloyal or degrading acts he is driven to perform. Some manifestation of resistance there must be, however, so long as the prisoner regards himself and hopes to be regarded as a citizen. Negative obligations survive every separation except explicit renunciation, which is only possible under certain conditions and which terminates citizenship. They are paralleled, it should be added, by the obligations of the home state to provide protection whenever it can, to protest every breach of the rules and agreements that make for benevolent quarantine, and to do nothing and demand nothing of its soldiers that might prompt or seem to excuse the coercion of prisoners.

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[16] Pugh, "Prisoners at War," citing UN Command Reports, p. 131. A complete account of the Koje mutiny, from the American point of view, can be found in Hal Vetter, *Mutiny on Koje Island* (Tokyo, 1965).

[17] Quoted in Vetter, *Mutiny,* p. 10 (emphasis added).

[18] Report by the Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, August, 1955.

[19] Rebecca West reports on the trials of several British prisoners of war for treason in *The Meaning of Treason* (London, 1947). For a complete review of judicial treatment of prisoner misconduct, see "Misconduct in the Prison Camp: A Survey of the Law and an Analysis of the Korean Cases," 56 *Columbia Law Review* 709–794 (1956).

Positive obligations belong to the individual as one of a group of citizens or soldiers. This can be a group of conscripts, whose members are designated as falling under one or another law or legitimate command, or a group of volunteers mutually engaged in some enterprise of value to the larger society. It seems most unlikely, in either case, that positive obligations survive clear-cut (even if temporary) separation from the group. The prisoner is alone and on his own, or he is the member of a new society, and while he remains in an important sense a citizen, he can no longer be regarded as a servant of the state. For he is cut off from the group support and organizational structure that once made his service possible. Positive obligations can be reinstated by joining an escape organization or a resistance network in the prison camp. But such reinstatements are actually commitments to a new group, and the precise relation of the new group to the larger society, the state or the army, is radically unclear. It seems unlikely that the state's right to conscript, for example, can ever devolve to an association of prisoners, though such groups have sometimes claimed that right. A kind of rough and ready conscription may, of course, be effective in a camp where an escape organization has widespread support. There are many examples of this sort of thing in prison camp literature: certain kinds of minor helpfulness have often been required of prisoners who have no personal interest in escaping. It is less their patriotism that one appeals to at such moments, however, than their loyalty to fellow prisoners.

This appeal to the others may or may not be successful. That will depend on the nature of the society of prisoners as a whole (which may in turn depend on the nature of the state and army from which the prisoners come) or on the character of the personal relations involved. But it is clear that no prisoner has a positive obligation *to the state or army* to work and take risks for the escape of himself and others or for the harrassment of the enemy. Unless he actually commits himself to such purposes, he has what must be called a perfect right to "enjoy" his quarantine and to sit out the war—so long as doing so involves no conflict with his other obligations.

There are obligations, however, in addition to those positive and negative duties owed or said to be owed to the state, despite the prisoner's separation from the state. Captivity is not only a separation; it also brings men together and does so under conditions that make their cooperation both vitally necessary and extremely difficult. It can't accurately be said that anyone joins the society of prisoners willingly, even though there is a sense, as I've already argued, in which their surrender is a voluntary act. But that society can be organized on a consensual basis, and probably ought to be, either by intelligent officers who recognize that their own authority survives in a tenuous way, if at all, or, in the absence of officers and in accordance with the Geneva Conventions' provisions for enlisted men's camps, by the election of representatives.[21] The political organization of the prison camp, whatever form it takes, considerably simplifies the moral life of the prisoners. It makes possible, for example, the rationing of available food, clothing and medical supplies. It also permits communal decisions on whether or not to support escape attempts, when these involve, as they often do, predictable reprisals against the whole society.[22]

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[20] The courts must say something, however, and what they have said is discussed in "Coercion: A Defense to Misconduct while a Prisoner of War," 29 *Indiana Law Journal* 603–621 (1954). In passing judgment on prisoners who have given military information, it is worth noting the finding of army experts after World War II: "It is virtually impossible for anyone to resist a determined interrogator." Cited in "P.O.W.—The Fight Continues After the Battle," p. 61. For a full discussion of this problem, see Albert D. Biderman's careful study of the behavior of American prisoners in Korea, *March to Calumny* (New York, 1963).

The whole question has recently been reopened because of the *Pueblo* case, and considerably complicated by the fact that the sailors of the *Pueblo* were imprisoned by a state with which the United States was not at war. They were thus formally unprotected by the Geneva Conventions and entirely without any sense of when or whether they might be returned to the United States. Perhaps for this reason, but also because of increased American sensitivity to the plight of prisoners, their "confessions" were not thought by the Secretary of the Navy to warrant court martial proceedings.

Even when the society of prisoners cannot be politically organized, obligatory ties are likely to develop between a particular prisoner and each or any of his fellows. Shared suffering is a powerful bond among men and seems to entail—though I cannot specify the method of the entailment—very strong positive obligations to mutual assistance. These bonds seem to arise among groups of men assembled with or without regard to their previous citizenship, though they may be stronger or given practical effect more quickly among prisoners with common political and social commitments.[23] There may be some sense, that is, in which the new society is parasitic on the old. Nevertheless, these new obligations are owed to other prisoners and not to the state from which they come. When the US *Code of Conduct* requires captured soldiers to "keep faith with their fellow prisoners" (Article IV), it does little more than point to the specific context within which obligations have to be negotiated. It does not strengthen the ties, nor determine their precise character. And insofar as the obligations of prisoners to each other are enforced, later on, in state or army courts, this must be by virtue of a kind of proxy from the (now dissolved) society of prisoners.[24] Such enforcement can be justified, at least in part, by the need to prevent acts of private revenge, but not by the unqualified assertion that the state's writ runs in limbo.

IV. THE OBLIGATION TO TRY TO ESCAPE

We do admire prisoners who actively resist their captors, and such men were thought admirable even before the ideological struggles of the present day provided new motives for continuing the fight after the battle. There is a large literature, dating chiefly from the two World Wars, which documents and celebrates the efforts of prisoners of war to escape and harass the enemy. And this literature suggests that such efforts have been felt as obligations, at least by a minority of the prisoners. Moreover, the detaining powers expect (some) prisoners to try to escape; their military authorities often regard the attempt as honorable and clearly accept the necessity of establishing a secure quarantine. Thus General Clark's statement of the "old-fashioned" view: that prisoners must be maintained "and guarded." The same sense has worked itself into international law, as I have already indicated. But it is worth stressing again that the security of the right to try to escape (which is implied by the rule against punishing escapees and obviously does not include a right to succeed in the attempt) is dependent on the relative infrequency of its exercise. If attempts to escape are common, if whole camps are organized for the sole purpose of facilitating escape, as were many British officers' camps during the two World Wars,[25] then benevolent quarantine will almost certainly break down. Its cost to the captors will simply be too high, and they can argue that they had reckoned on a much lower cost when they accepted the surrender of the men in question. Thus the attempts of states like our own to require soldiers to "make every effort to escape" (Article III of the *Code of Conduct*) might well be disastrous for the soldiers, if they took the requirement more seriously than in fact they do. When we admire the men who

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[21] Geneva Convention I, Article 79. Resistance groups within the camp can also be organized democratically; thus an American group in Korea, one of whose members is quoted in Biderman, *March to Calumny,* p. 171: "We . . . agreed there would be no such thing as a leader. Before we would do anything, it would go before a vote and the majority would rule."

[22] These decisions can be informally made, as in the camp described by A. J. Evans in his memoir of World War I, *The Escaping Club* (London, 1922), pp. 180–181: "Escaping came before everything, and was an excuse for any discomforts which one or two members might bring on the rest of the community. If you wished for help, almost any man in the fort would have helped you blindly, regardless of consequences."

[23] P. R. Reid discusses some of the problems that arose in the multi-national camp that the Germans ran for confirmed escapers at Colditz in World War II, in *Escape from Colditz* (New York, 1956).

[24] Sometimes prisoners set up their own courts in the camp, but these are not encouraged by the authorities on either side. See Pugh, "The Code of Conduct," pp. 683n. and 702.

[25] ". . . nearly everyone was working in some way on the X (escape) organization," Paul Brickhill, *The Great Escape* (New York 1967) p. 42; ". . . we pooled our knowledge. The camp was nothing less than an escaping club," Evans, *op. cit.*, p. 68. (The best books on escape are almost invariably written by British officers.)

"make every effort," we are really admiring heroes. It seems best to say of them, whatever they say of themselves, that their efforts are above and beyond the call of duty.

Escape is heroic only in part because of the physical risks involved, though these can be considerable, as a famous incident from World War II makes clear. In 1944, some 80 British officers escaped through a tunnel from the German camp at Sagan. All but three were eventually recaptured, and 50 were shot, apparently on direct orders from Hitler. Under the international laws of war, these executions constituted murder, and after the war the men who carried them out were tried and, some of them, executed in their turn.[26] That surely was justice done, yet it is hard to imagine a detaining power that would not go to considerable lengths to deter such mass escapes—for they tie down large numbers of troops, demoralize the civilian population, and, if successful, supply valuable information to the enemy. Hopefully, prisoners will not again have to anticipate Nazi brutality. But something less than that (and how much less can never be known) must be regarded as a normal risk. There is more involved, however, in the heroism of escape. Once a prisoner gets out of the camp, he is likely to have to spend weeks behind enemy lines, hiding or in disguise, constantly in danger, expecting discovery and arrest at every moment, able to trust no one, often without adequate food and shelter. For many men the strain must be unbearable, worse than anything that happens in battle. No prisoner can be obligated to undergo such an exacting test of his nerves and his endurance. Escape is precisely the sort of action that a man must choose for himself.

But perhaps this is not always true. In one of the best of the many books on escape, Aidan Crawley, an RAF officer captured during World War II, later a Labor MP and Undersecretary of State for Air, argues "that should a prisoner see a reasonable chance of escape, it [is] his duty to take it. Suppose a prisoner had been abandoned by his guard and deliberately sought captivity again, he would have been the equivalent of a deserter."[27] Perhaps so, but in this example, it should be noted, captivity is ended without any effort by the prisoner himself. Whether he then resumes his former military role is hard to say. It is certainly possible, but if we imagine such a man seeking refuge in the home of a friendly farmer and remaining there for the rest of the war, I doubt that we would have to say, or want to say, that he had deserted. Crawley attempts to argue that there was a duty to attempt escape even when a prisoner was securely held in a camp, but he fails to argue this with much conviction. And in fact, despite the military ethic, the sense of an obligation to escape does not seem to have been widely or deeply felt, though it is almost always acknowledged in the memoir literature. "I am sure," writes one of the bravest of British escapers, "that the majority of the men who sought to escape did it for self-preservation. Instinctively, unconsciously, they felt that resignation [to an indefinite imprisonment] meant not physical, but mental death. . . ."[28] But what of the men who did not feel this way, who decided that they could make a worthwhile life even in the prison camp?

Crawley provides one of the most sympathetic accounts of these men, and he is worth quoting at length:

> From the first moment of captivity . . . there began in every prisoner's mind a conflict which lasted often until the day of liberation. Should he, or should he not try to escape? Ought he to spend his time in what would almost certainly be fruitless endeavor, or should he use it to equip himself to be a better citizen later on? There were many who from the start decided on the course of self-improvement. With great force they argued that, however heroic escape might appear, the odds against success [were] so enormous that the realistic and truly patriotic thing to do was to put the idea out of their minds. . . . To every thinking man, the wisdom of spending years in hopeless effort must at some time have seemed questionable and no one could blame those who decided escape was not worthwhile. Provided they stuck to their guns and held their point of view with tolerance, they were often most valuable members of the community.[29]

To call such refusals "patriotic" is to put a good construction on them, but not necessarily the only good, or the best, construction. Refusal to escape might also express a man's sense of belonging, now, "to humanity and to himself," or his sense of personal obligations to family and friends. It might express his solidarity with his fellow prisoners, or with some of them doomed to remain in the camp for the duration of the war and in need, perhaps, of his help building a decent community.[30] And it might express his human fear or his relief at finding himself relatively safe and far from the battlefield. Surely if a man makes himself "a valuable member of the (prison) community," even these latter reasons need not be judged any more harshly than the others.

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[26] Brickhill, *op. cit.*, pp. 211–223.

[27] *Escape from Germany* (New York, 1956), p. 8.

[28] Reid, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

[29] *Op. cit.*, p. 7.

[30] Exactly what this means and how such a community can be built are the main concerns of J. Davidson Ketchum's fine sociological study, *Ruh-*

Curiously enough, one of the best arguments on behalf of escape, even mass escape, is that the attempt is itself of value to the society of prisoners. Crawley has once again put the argument very well:

> Most important of all, the effort to escape preserved the morale of the prisoners themselves. One of the great difficulties of prison life was that almost all effort, apart from the business of feeding and existing, was directed to goals which could be achieved only in the indefinite future. The mere fact that in preparing for a mass escape hundreds of people were co-operating in an enterprise which held the prospect of an immediate result was the best tonic a prison camp could have. In building a tunnel, making clothes, forging papers, or preparing maps, men took part in a common effort and once again got the feeling of serving a community.[31]

It may be that this new community is parasitic upon the old: that escape can be a common enterprise of the prisoners only because it is an enterprise of value to the state and army from which they commonly come. But this is not necessarily so. In Pierre Boule's novel (and in the better film by David Lean), *The Bridge Over the River Kwai,* the common enterprise of the prisoners is not of value to their state.[32] On the contrary, it poses a serious threat and even requires a military response. Yet it has an effect, and a plausible effect within the novel and the film, identical to that which Crawley describes. In the River Kwai case, the obligations that may arise to work on the bridge, and to work strenuously, are owed to one's fellow prisoners and to no one and nothing else. There is a certain absurdity in the spectacle of hundreds of men working with such zeal on a bridge that they "really" (as members of the conventional world, citizens and soldiers) don't want built. But this is an absurdity always possible in limbo, and it is the achievement of the novel and film to have evoked it. Nor is it clear that enterprises of more conventional value are very much less absurd. The extraordinary discipline and skill, the zeal and the sheer genius, that went into the British escape from Sagan were surely out of all proportion to its salutary effects upon the British war effort. George Harsh nicely summed up "the great escape" when he wrote of the prisoners involved that "they proved for all posterity that men, working together, can dig a damned deep hole in the ground. . . ."[33] Yes, they did prove that, and that hole was their triumph over captivity, their human triumph, as was the bridge for another group of men; and they dug it first of all for each other.

V. CONCLUSION

In limbo obligations are, by and large, not given, not established by any sovereign state, not waiting for discovery; they must be improvised. Attempts to specify them that go beyond those negative obligations which all citizens share are likely to be impositions on the freedom of the men involved and sometimes a cruel threat to their security. That is why they are largely ignored by the prisoners. Citizens and soldiers, safe or relatively safe among their comrades, have every right to hope that prisoners will form some sort of society, find an effective way of making collective decisions, and remain faithful to one another. Armies have every right to train their soldiers to behave in that way. But to insist that this is what prisoners ought to do is to say nothing more than that they owe this much to one another, and finally it is up to the prisoners to say that themselves. Citizens and soldiers, and presidents and generals, may also hope that some of the prisoners will be heroes, that they will discover uncommon resources of courage and endurance, and unilaterally re-establish obligations that in fact have lapsed. But such heroism, it must be recognized, is also a denial of captivity, perhaps even a refusal of benevolent quarantine, and so a potential threat to the status of all those prisoners who don't choose to be heroes. All the more reason, then, that heroism should not be demanded by those of us who cannot expect to feel its consequences.

The fight does not continue after the battle, not for the men who have been captured, unless they choose together to fight on and accept the risks that choice involves. They have every

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leben: A Prison Camp Society (Toronto, 1965). In his postscript to this book, Robert MacLeod argues that the "prevalence of the idea of escape" may be a sign of group disintegration (or, presumably, of social underdevelopment), p. 353. But it is important to note that Ruhleben was a camp for enemy aliens, not soldiers.

[31] *Op. cit.*, pp. 9–10.

[32] They are forced, in violation of the Geneva Conventions, to build a bridge which is of military value to the enemy.

[33] "Introduction" to Brickhill, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

right to choose differently, and this is what most of them do, opting for benevolent quarantine whenever it is offered. It is the responsibility of civilized men to insist that it always be offered and to repudiate decisively and without compromise the very idea of a "total war" to be fought within as without the bounds of the prison camp. The requirements of humanity are clear enough: detaining authorities must assume, and the prisoners' home states must give them reason to assume, that prisoners are not combatants and are no longer required by their citizenship to fight. Then they may safely be treated, and then they ought to be treated, if not like "citizens of the world," at least like men entitled to rest for a while in limbo.

THE GROWTH OF THE SENIORITY SYSTEM IN THE U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES*

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I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SENIORITY

Popular discussions of the internal management of the U.S. House of Representatives in the present era generally give great weight to the ubiquity and arbitrariness of the seniority system as a significant determinant of outcomes there. Careful attention to the scholarly literature, however, should long since have modified this view. For it appears that except for relatively unimportant matters such as the allocation of office space on Capitol Hill,[1] the criterion of seniority is generally intermingled in House decision-making with a great many other crite-

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[1] The Speaker has executive responsibility for the House side of the Capitol, including the three House Office Buildings, which he exercises through his chairmanship of the House Office Building Commission. The rules currently in effect on the allocation of office space are: Each member is entitled to the space he currently occupies. Vacancies as they occur are allocated to claimants in order of their seniority. Entering freshman members are ordered by lot and given their choice of the remaining office space at a predetermined time at the beginning of each Congress. Any extra office space over and above members' suites and rooms set aside for the offices of specific committees are allocated at the discretion of the Speaker. See Donald G. Tacheron and Morris K. Udall, *The Job of the Congressman* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), pp. 41–43, 277–279.

Until the opening of the Rayburn Building, the third House Office Building, in 1965, no clear patterns of preference for office space were discernible. Some members liked to be near the Capitol; others preferred more remote locations, away from the crowds of tourists. Many members had their offices near the rooms of the committees to which they were assigned, which were spotted through both "old" buildings. Some members preferred the more modern facilities of the Longworth Building (opened, 1926). Others agreed with Clem Miller: "I don't care for it. Low ceilings, panelled walls smacking of a 1925 corporation lawyer. . . . I am in the Old Office Building [built 1909], a huge square with a hollow center, wide corridors, high ceilings. Old-fashioned railroad car carpeting. High-backed leather chairs. If you take away the electric typewriters, you move right into the world of William Howard Taft." *Member of the House* (John W. Baker, ed.), (New York: Scribner's, 1962), p. 27.

The Rayburn Building has changed some of this: about half of the House, including most of the senior men, are in it. Rayburn Building offices are larger and more commodious; the much greater inconvenience in getting from the Rayburn Building to the Capitol is somewhat offset by the installation of a Toonerville trolley in the subway that runs between this building and the Capitol building. The two older office buildings are being remodeled to provide more or less equal space for everyone once again.

ria of choice, and the business of choosing is not automatic, but remains in the hands of persons having some considerable discretion. This, apparently, is the case with respect to such decisions as the allocation of Capitol Hill patronage,[2] the initial assignment of Representatives to committees,[3] the distribution of responsibilities within committees,[4] and the choice of party leaders.[5] The one important area in which seniority seems to play a role of overwhelming significance is in the matter of succession to the chairmanship of committees; this is in turn governed by the custom (not a formal rule) of seniority that guarantees members reappointment to committees at the opening of each new Congress, in rank order of committee service. It is the growth of this method of selecting committee chairmen in the House that is the subject of this paper.

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[2] There are a number of kinds of Capitol Hill patronage. Employees of the Capitol fall under the control of the majority party. Major employees at the level of Clerk of the House, Sergeant at Arms, Parliamentarian, Doorkeeper and Postmaster are formally selected by party caucus, in fact are usually appointed by the Speaker, and are elected by vote of the whole House. These are more or less permanent career jobs, and most have minority counterparts built into the organization. When party control of the House shifts, the permanent top bureaucrats of the House exchange jobs with their minority "shadows." When a vacancy occurs, the Speaker appoints what amounts to a permanent member of the Congressional bureaucracy. Jobs at the middle level such as assistant doorkeepers, assistant parliamentarians, folding room superintendent, reading clerks, recorders of debate, and so on are also regarded as career jobs, and require the initial sponsorship of Congressmen of the majority party. These jobs also come under the purview of the Speaker. Low level jobs such as elevator operator, mail room employee, page, are also handled by a system of sponsorship and cleared through a committee of the majority party appointed by the Speaker. An informal quota system based in part upon the seniority of members determines the entitlement of members to sponsor candidates for these jobs.

A second form of patronage is provided by the Congressional campaign committees of each party which allocate funds to House incumbents running for reelection. Seniority as such plays little part in the distribution of these funds. See Michael J. Kirwan as told to Jack Redding, *How To Succeed in Politics* (New York: MacFadden, 1964), pp. 9–11; and Hugh A. Bone, *Party Committees and National Politics* (Seattle: Univ. of Washington, 1958), pp. 120–165, esp. p. 147.

[3] See Nicholas A. Masters, "Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives," this Review, 55 (June, 1961), 345–357. Masters gives the following desiderata for appointments to committees: the candidate must show "legislative responsibility," i.e., personal characteristics of flexibility and willingness to follow norms of predictability, reciprocity and courtesy; his district should allow him flexibility in major matters—which means that norms internal to the House must be allowed to weigh heavily in his committee decision making; the geographical balance of committees must be preserved; and the appointment should bear some relationship to the member's chance of being reelected. In addition to these criteria, Masters says: "When two or more members stake a claim to the same assignment, on the ground that it is essential to their electoral success, both party committees usually, if not invariably, will give preference to the member with longer service." State delegations sometimes but not always use seniority as the criterion determining which among their members will lay claim to a seat on a major committee that the state is thought to be "entitled" to. On the whole, large state delegations are much more successful than small states in getting the committee assignments they want for their members. This is true for both parties, and it operates without regard to the seniority of individual members.

[4] Seniority is generally followed pro forma in the granting of subcommittee chairmanships, but not always. Neither Adam Clayton Powell nor Phil M. Landrum received subcommittee assignments, much less chairmanships, when they were each ranking member of the Education and Labor Committee. This was an unusually frank recognition of estrangement between them and their respective committee chairmen. Ordinarily, senior men out of favor with the chairman receive the recognition of a subcommittee chairmanship, but since the membership and the substantive responsibilities of subcommittees are more or less discretionary with the chairman, it is quite easy for the committee chairman to circumvent a subcommittee chairman he dislikes or mistrusts. Thus the operation of seniority in the organization of subcommittees does not necessarily mean very much. See e.g. Richard F. Fenno, "The House of Representatives and Federal Aid to Education," in Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), *New Perspectives on the House of Representatives* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 195–235.

[5] Seniority in a strict sense does not enter in as a criterion for party leadership. To be eligible for consideration as a party leader, a member must have served long enough to be well known; but Carl Albert was tied with nine others for 30th in seniority on the Democratic side of the aisle when he was elected majority leader in a 1962 Democratic caucus. The Republican caucus has twice, in recent years, removed a senior man from the party leadership and replaced him with a more junior one. Factors of personality, sectionalism and ideology seem to matter most in the choice of party leaders—including chairmen of the caucuses, whips, assistant whips, and Congressional campaign committee chairmen. See Nelson W. Polsby, "Two Strategies of Influence in the U.S.

The importance of a committee chairmanship varies, to be sure, with the importance from session to session of the legislation considered by the committee. It is also significantly modified by committee customs and practices, since formally, committee chairmen are subject to the will of committee majorities. Committees vary in the discretion they leave to their chairmen, and many examples exist of committee chairmen who were bypassed or defeated in specific controversies when they had gone "too far"—or not far enough.[6] Nevertheless, it would be foolish to deny that committee chairmen, on the whole, have enormous power over the activities of their committees, and over the ultimate output of Congress. It is generally the chairman who sets the pace that determines the total workload of the committee, the chairman who hires and fires staff, the chairman who forms subcommittees and assigns them jurisdictions, members and aides. It is generally the chairman who manages the most important bills that are assigned to his committee, and at his own option oversees the endless tinkering with the substance of major bills that goes on in committee, on the floor, and in conference. All this is common knowledge; it provides a backdrop for the continuing interest of scholars and men of affairs in the people who become committee chairmen, and in the process that selects them.

Parliamentary bodies differ in the extent to which they divide labor and decentralize power. The two are, moreover, not precisely synonymous, since an efficient division of labor can be achieved while retaining centralized control. Such is the case, for example, in the Italian Parliament and the Japanese Diet, where strong committee systems are combined with strict party government.[7] Decentralization of power without division of labor leads to parliamentary ineffectiveness, as in Colombia and Ecuador.[8]

A more familiar pattern than either, one congenial to the classic British parliamentary features of ministerial responsibility and strict party regularity, is the centralization of power in the hands of party leaders and a division of labor in the legislature that is rudimentary at the very most. Thus Bagehot's magisterial classification of the 19th century House of Commons as an "electoral chamber" that passes upon the legitimacy of the sitting government but engages not at all in policy-making.[9] At the opposite extreme is a legislature where labor is divided and where power is likewise decentralized, such as in the case of the contemporary U.S. House of Representatives.

Operational indices of these characteristics

House of Representatives: Choosing a Majority Leader, 1962," in Peabody and Polsby, *op. cit.*, pp. 237–270; Robert L. Peabody, "The Ford-Halleck Minority Leadership Contest, 1965" *Eagleton Institute Case in Practical Politics,* No. 40 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966); and Peabody "Party Leadership Change in the United States House of Representatives" this REVIEW, 61 (September, 1967), 675–693.

[6] Examples would include the following: There was a revolt against Chairman Dan Reed, of the Committee on Ways and Means in 1953. See Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis Anthony Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy* (New York: Atherton, 1963), p. 33; a revolt against Chairman Clair Hoffman of Government Operations in the same year; a number of small-scale rebellions against two successive chairmen of the Committee on Education and Labor (see Fenno, *op. cit.*); two major rebellions against Judge Smith of the Rules Committee, one in 1961 that packed the Committee against him, and one in 1965 that established the 21-day rule; in 1965–66 and again in 1967 a revolt against Chairman Wright Patman of the Banking and Currency Committee; and in 1967 a revolt against Chairman William Colmer of the Rules Committee. Both these latter revolts eventuated in important changes in committee rules.

[7] See Giovanni Sartori (ed.) *Il Parlamento Italiano, 1946–1963* (Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1963), esp. pp. 246–248; Robert E. Ward, "Japan" in Ward and Roy Macridis (eds.) *Modern Political Systems: Asia* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 92–94; Hans H. Baerwald "Parliament and Parliamentarians in Japan," *Pacific Affairs* 37 (Fall, 1964), 271–282; Chitoshi Yanaga, *Japanese People and Politics* (New York: Wiley, 1956), p. 255; Nobutaka Ike, *Japanese Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1957), pp. 181–182.

[8] See James L. Payne, *Patterns of Conflict in Columbia* (New Haven: Yale U. Press, 1968), and George Blanksten, *Ecuador: Constitutions and Caudillos* (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1951), pp. 100–119.

[9] Walter Bagehot, *The English Constitution* (London: Collins, 1963. First published 1867), p. 150.

		DIVISION OF LABOR	
		Strong (Strong committees)	*Weak* (Weak committees)
POWER OVER POLICY	*Centralized* (Strong party leadership)	Italian Parliament Japanese Diet	British House of Commons
	Decentralized (Weak party leadership)	U. S. House of Representatives	Columbian and Ecuadorian Legislatures

Figure 1. Relationships Between the Division of Labor and the Centralization of Power over Substantive Policy in Legislatures.

can be suggested, and in so doing, the importance of seniority can be clarified. Briefly, the strength of a division of labor can be defined as the extent to which legislatures rely upon standing committees to conduct their business. When committees are not relied upon, centralization of power can be observed in the extent to which the initiation and modification of policies eventually enacted by the legislature is concentrated in a few hands (normally the hands of party leaders) or dispersed into many. When committees are relied upon, whether they are populated by automatic or discretionary means, and whether discretionary means are at the discretion of few or many members, is an acceptable test of the centralization or decentralization of power.

From these stipulations, we can deduce that an automatic means of assigning members to committees is a sufficient, though not a necessary, condition for decentralization of power, to the extent that committees are heavily relied on in legislatures. A seniority system is automatic. Therefore, in the U.S. House of Representatives, where committees are strong, the seniority system is sufficient to explain the decentralization of congressional power.

The extent of a seniority rule's application may be said to constitute a measure of the allocation of discretion and hence of power as between party leaders and committee chairmen. Previous commentators have agreed upon this even when they agreed on little else.[10] It is of course not the only such measure imaginable, but it is an important one. Committee chairmen subject to the selection of party leaders stand in a different relation to the leadership than chairmen selected by an impersonal process in which the leadership is powerless to interfere. Thus, like pregnancy, seniority is for most purposes a dichotomous variable. When seniority operates as a partial influence upon decision-making rather than as an automatic determinant of committee rank, political influence flows to those empowered to vary the application of the diverse criteria of choice—normally party leaders. When seniority is sovereign and inviolate, power is decentralized to those accordingly protected.

II. WHEN DID SENIORITY BEGIN?

There is disagreement in the literature about how well-entrenched decision making by seniority has been in the House, and for how long. Numerous anecdotes exist, testifying to the violation of seniority in the selection of committee chairmen in former times.[11] Nowadays, the year 1910, which marks the revolt against Speaker

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[10] See, for example, on one hand, James K. Pollock, Jr., "Seniority Rule in Congress," *The North American Review*, 222 (1925), 235–245; and on the other, the testimony of George H. E. Smith in the Hearings, Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, *Evaluation of Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946* (80th Congress, 2nd Session) Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 61, 71–73, 184–185. These are collected in Walter Kravitz, "Seniority in Congress" (mimeo.), Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service, November 7, 1961.

[11] See, for example, Chang-wei Chiu, *The Speaker of the House of Representatives Since 1896* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1928), pp. 64–68; George B. Galloway, *History of the U.S. House of Representatives* (House Document 246, 87th Congress, 1st Session) Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), 62–63; Pollock, *op. cit.*

Cannon, is often mentioned as the effective beginning of the system. George Galloway says: "Seniority in point of service has been the prevailing principle governing both committee assignments and the selection of chairmen since . . . 1910 in the House."[12] However, James K. Pollock maintains, "From early years the rule that has been generally followed in the appointment of committees is the so-called seniority rule. It has made no difference whether Republicans or Democrats controlled Congress; the method of selection has been the same. . . . The practice . . . is a universal one. . . ."[13] Chang-wei Chiu shows that in the four Congresses just prior to 1910 (the 58th to 61st), with respect to ten important committees, many appointments were made at the discretion of the Speaker, but "more than four-fifths of the members . . . were appointed under the seniority rule."[14] Writing in 1884, Woodrow Wilson says: "The Speaker is expected to constitute the committees in accordance with his own political views . . . [and he] generally uses his powers as freely and imperatively as he is expected to use them." But he also writes: ". . . by custom, seniority in Congressional service determines the bestowal of the principal chairmanships."[15]

These writers seem to be reporting upon a situation in which seniority figured as a criterion of choice, but where discretion was left to party leaders. Hence they are describing a period preceding the advent of a seniority *system* such as operates today. Earlier, in 1865, there seems to be no doubt or ambiguity about the locus of power to allocate committee chairmanships. W. R. Brock writes, "The Speaker was a man of considerable influence and much depended upon him. He appointed members of committees, acted in effect as majority leader in the arrangement of business, recognized or failed to recognize would-be participants in debate, interpreted the rules of the House, and dealt with the numerous points of order. . . . A good deal of power rested with the chairmen of committees, though perhaps less than in more recent times. . . ."[16] Likewise, in 1871, the Speaker constituted the committees. A member of Speaker Blaine's household wrote in a family letter, "Your father sits here at the table toiling away over his committees. . . . As fast as he gets them arranged, just so fast some after-consideration comes up which disarranges not one, but many, and over topples the whole row of bricks. It is a matter in which no one can help him . . . [He] had wool and cotton manufacturers to meet in Boston, dinners, breakfasts, and lunches . . . to give and take in New York, and, over and above all, pressures, to resist or permit, of Congressional committees."[17]

There is much other commentary on the wide discretion of the Speaker before 1910. George Rothwell Brown observed, "The right of the Chair to delay making committee assignments for long periods was recognized, Mr. Reed, for example, refraining from appointing the committees in the 55th Congress for 131 days."[18] James Bryce, in the revised edition of *The American Commonwealth* (1905) says: "In America the Speaker has immense political power, and is permitted, nay expected, to use it in the interests of his party . . . His most important privilege is . . . the nomination of the numerous standing committees. . . ."[19] Alexander, writing just after the 1910 revolt against Cannon, says, "The Speaker's greatest power has its source in his authority to appoint committees."[20]

There is, obviously, an important empirical question to be settled which these quotations, taken all together, raise. This has to do with the extent to which seniority was actually followed in the assignment of committee chairmanships before a hard and fast seniority system was established. The answer to this may, in turn, raise questions about the processes by which seniority came to be established as an inflexible norm in the House of Representatives.

The data we shall presently consider consist of a report on the selection of all chairmen of House standing committees, by Congresses, from the 47th to the 88th Congress (1881–1965). This information was gathered from *The Congressional Directory* for each Congress. From the 75th to the 88th Congress, committee memberships are listed and the party affiliations of members designated in the *Directory*. Prior to the 75th Congress, the *Directory* lists committee members without designation as to party. However, from the 74th back through the 55th Congress, the committee lists were, with a few discrepancies, columnized by party affiliation. After an unsystematic but reasonably thorough cross-check in the *Biographical Directory of the American Congress*,[21] these columnizations were followed. From the 54th to the 47th Congress, a systematic and complete checking of names in the *Biographical Directory* enabled us to establish party designations.

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[12] George B. Galloway, *Congress at the Crossroads* (New York: Crowell, 1946), p. 187. See also George Goodwin, "The Seniority System in Congress," this Review, 53 (June, 1959), p. 417.

[13] Pollock, *op. cit.*, pp. 235–236.

[14] Chiu, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

[15] Woodrow Wilson, *Congressional Government* (New York: Meridian, 1956; First published, 1884), pp. 82, 85.

[16] W. R. Brock, *An American Crisis* (New York: St. Martin, 1963), pp. 58–59.

[17] Gail Hamilton, *Biography of James G. Blaine* (Norwich, Connecticut: Henry Bill, 1895), pp. 260, 263. A slightly garbled version is in DeAlva Stanwood Alexander, *History and Procedure of the House of Representatives* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1916), p. 69.

[18] George Rothwell Brown, *The Leadership of Congress* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1922), p. 109.

[19] James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (New York: Macmillan, 1905), Vol. I, pp. 138–139.

[20] Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

The Congressional Directory was published for each Congress we studied; but its publication schedule has been erratic. The most common practice seems to have been for the *Directory* to appear once for each session of every Congress, that is, annually. However, in some years, the first edition of the *Directory* appeared before committee lists were established. Since we proposed to sample committee lists only once per Congress, we adopted the policy of consulting the first edition of the *Directory* available to us for each Congress that contained full listings of committee members. Thus changes in chairmanships within Congresses may have been lost to us.[22]

The *Directory* is neither a wholly uniform, nor a strictly official source; much superior would be the committee lists appearing in the *Journals* or the assignments as they are recorded in the verbatim accounts of debates, currently entitled *The Congressional Record*. However, the former of these sources is not widely available, and the latter is not indexed under the rubric "Committee Assignments." Hence both are exceedingly cumbersome for the purposes of research and, in any event, would in all probability disclose only the most insignificant variations from the *Directory*.

Our most important finding can be summarized in a single table which shows for each Congress the number of times that seniority was and was not followed in the appointment of committee chairmen for each of 40 Congresses from 1881 to 1963. When a committee chairman met the following conditions he was classified as a chairman by virtue of seniority: In the preceding Congress he was the chairman, or if his party was in the minority, the ranking member, or he had been on the committee in the previous Congress and all those listed above him for that Congress were no longer serving in

TABLE 1. THE GROWTH OF SENIORITY 1881–1963

VIOLATION OF THE SENIORITY OF CHAIRMEN, BY COMMITTEE, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BY CONGRESS

Congress	Year	Speaker	Party	Seniority Followed	Seniority not Followed	Total Committees*
47	1881	Keifer	R	2	37	39
48	1883	Carlisle	D	8	30	38
49	1885			21	19	40
50	1887			20	21	41
51	1889	Reed	R	20	27	47
52	1891	Crisp	D	12	35	47
53	1893			25	24	49
54	1895	Reed	R	13	39	52
55	1897			36	16	52
56	1899	Henderson	R	42	15	57
57	1901			49	8	57
58	1903	Cannon	R	43	11	54
59	1905			51	8	59
60	1907			45	13	58
61	1909			42	18	60
62	1911	Clark	D	25	27	52
63	1913			33	20	53
64	1915			50	6	56
65	1917			45	10	55
66	1919	Gillett	R	35	22	57
67	1921			44	15	59
68	1923			40	17	57
69	1925	Longworth	R	37	22	59
70	1927			43	1	44
71	1929			38	7	45
72	1931	Gerner	D	27	18	45
73	1933	Rainey	D	38	7	45
74	1935	Byrns/Bankhead	D	32	13	45
75	1937	Bankhead		42	4	46
76	1939	Rayburn	D	37	9	46
77	1941			39	7	46
78	1943			34	11	45
79	1945			37	9	46
80	1947	Martin	R	9	4	13
81	1949	Rayburn	D	19	0	19
82	1951			18	0	18
83	1953	Martin	R	17	1	18
84	1955	Rayburn	D	19	0	19
85	1957			19	0	19
86	1959			19	0	19
87	1961	Rayburn/McCormack	D	20	0	20
88	1963	McCormack	D	20	0	20

* Total equals the number of committees in the Congress minus the number of new committees and the number of committees in which the three top members in the previous Congress are absent in the present Congress. The latter are excluded because we have no data on men below the number three position in the previous Congress.

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[21] *Biographical Directory of the American Congress*, 1774–1961 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1961).

[22] We doubt that this would make much difference in our findings. Paul DeWitt Hasbrouck says, "Even Speaker Cannon did not go so far as to remove a committeeman in the middle of a Congress." *Party Government in the House of Representatives* (New York: Macmillan, 1927), p. 50.

Congress. If a chairman could meet none of these conditions, he was classified as having been designated by some method other than seniority. These simple rules of classification yielded Table 1.

The general trend, over the 80-year period, is toward the increasing use of seniority as a determinant of committee chairmanships, as Figure 2 shows.

FIGURE 2. The Growth of Seniority: 1881-1963

Percentage of Committees on which Seniority was followed in the Selection of Chairman, by Congress*



* Percentages were calculated as follows: Seniority (from Table 1) divided by Total Committees (from Table 1) for each Congress.

Several different kinds of seniority violation are summarized in Table 1. Some members of Congress who by our criteria should have been committee chairmen were demoted. Others stayed at the same rank but were jumped by members from below them on the list or from elsewhere. Others left their committees. Some of these received new committee assignments, others did not. Of those who received new assignments, some did as well as or better than if they had stayed put.[23]

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[23] In classifying committees by order of importance (and therefore desirability) we relied upon two sources; Chang-wei Chiu's listing of important committees (*op. cit.* pp. 68–69) for the early period, and the sorting of committees into three classes by the Amended Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, which provided that 1) Three committees are *exclusive*—namely Appropriations, Rules, and Ways and Means. A member who serves on any of these can serve on no other committee. 2) Ten committees are *semi-exclusive:* members may serve on any one of them and any one of the seven non-exclusive committees. The ten are: Agriculture, Armed Services, Banking and Currency, Education and Labor, Foreign Affairs,

Finally, some members who otherwise might have become, or remained, chairmen were found to hold chairmanships of other committees, or party leadership positions. Thus Table II distinguishes instances where potential chairmen whose seniority was violated seem to have been compensated in the appointment process from instances where no such compensation is visible.

Compensation was not fully in the discretion of House leaders. A senior member who picked between chairmanships was not necessarily in the debt of the Speaker. Appointments to new positions as good as or better than a relinquished chairmanship were undoubtedly negotiated through the party leadership of the majority party (and, after Speaker Cannon established the custom, for minority members in negotiation with the leaders of the minority party) but it is difficult to interpret compensations as entirely within the Speaker's control, since it was necessary for the Speaker to use the appointment power to build a coalition that would support him in office by rewarding his allies and mollifying the leaders of rival factions within his party.[24]

Uncompensated violations of seniority can be interpreted as purer examples of central leadership, since they represent instances where the committee assignment process was used by party leaders to intervene in the careers of members but where no payment in kind can be detected. As Figure 3 makes clear, this sort of intervention declined rapidly over the years surveyed, barely surviving after the 1911 rules changes vesting the Speaker's jurisdiction over committee assignments in party committees on committees.

Compensated violations of seniority, however,

TABLE 2. COMPENSATED AND UNCOMPENSATED VIOLATIONS OF SENIORITY*

Congress	Year	Compensated Violations	Uncompensated Violations (#)	Uncompensated Violations (%)	Total Violations
47	1881	12	25	68	37
48	1883	16	14	47	30
49	1885	7	12	63	19
50	1887	12	9	43	21
51	1889	19	8	30	27
52	1891	22	13	37	35
53	1893	15	9	38	24
54	1895	30	9	23	39
55	1897	11	5	31	16
56	1899	13	2	13	15
57	1901	5	3	38	8
58	1903	7	4	36	11
59	1905	5	3	38	8
60	1907	10	3	23	13
61	1909	8	10	56	18
62	1911	21	6	22	27
63	1913	13	7	35	20
64	1915	6	0	0	6
65	1917	7	3	30	10
66	1919	19	3	14	22
67	1921	15	0	0	15
68	1923	16	1	6	17
69	1925	20	2	9	22
70	1927	1	0	0	1
71	1929	7	0	0	7
72	1931	16	2	11	18
73	1933	7	0	0	7
74	1935	13	0	0	13
75	1937	4	0	0	4
76	1939	9	0	0	9
77	1941	6	1	14	7
78	1943	10	1	9	11
79	1945	9	0	0	9
80	1947	4	0	0	4
81	1949	0	0	0	0
82	1951	0	0	0	0
83	1953	1	0	0	1
84	1955	0	0	0	0
85	1957	0	0	0	0
86	1959	0	0	0	0
87	1961	0	0	0	0
88	1963	0	0	0	0

* Uncompensated violations of seniority occur when members eligible to be chairman are not and meet one or more of the following conditions: Demoted, Jumped, Received no new assignment, or Held a chairmanship on a less desirable committee.

Compensated violations occur when potential chairmen receive or hold better assignments, or equal or better chairmanships or are elected to party leadership.

For rankings of committees, see footnote 23.

Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Judiciary, Post Office and Civil Service, Public Works, and Science and Astronautics. 3) Seven committees are *non-exclusive*. A member may serve on any two of these seven, or on any one plus one of the ten-semi-exclusive committees. The seven are: District of Columbia, Government Operations, House Administration, Interior and Insular Affairs, Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Un-American Activities, and Veteran Affairs. Chiu mentions four committees not listed above as having some importance in the period (1896–1928) covered by his study. These are committees on Military Affairs, Naval Affairs, Post Offices and Post Roads and Rivers and Harbors. For our purposes, we considered these four semi-exclusive committees.

A total of 57 standing committees other than the ones mentioned in our sources also existed at some point in the period covered by our study. These were added to the non-exclusive committees for our purposes. In general, changes in the total numbers of committees over the years (until the major consolidation of 1946) reflect changes in the number of minor committees.

[24] For examples, see Abram and Cooper, *op. cit.*, pp. 63 ff.

FIGURE 3. Compensated and Uncompensated Violations of Seniority, 1881-1963



survived well into the 20th century. Table 3 demonstrates that most of these violations occurred on committees whose chairmen had become chairmen of committees of equal or greater importance. Less significant numerically are potential chairmen of insignificant committees who take up appointments instead on more important committees. Before 1911, these appointments to new committees were not necessarily at the bottom; committee rank was assigned at the Speaker's discretion—although this was not frequently used to disturb committee rank orders.

Seniority is now strictly observed in the placement of new members, which means that the costs of transferring from a chairmanship to membership on a better committee have risen over the years. Even so, a compensated violation of a chairman's seniority can be recorded for the 91st Congress. In the waning days of the 90th Congress Rep. Omar Burleson of Texas gave up his chairmanship of the moribund Committee on House Administration to fill a vacancy on the Ways and Means Committee—where he will rank below Democrats far junior to him in House service. For obvious reasons, this is not a frequent occurrence.

Almost as infrequent, indeed, is the transfer of any member from the middle or top range of any committee to the bottom of any other, no matter what the disparity in the prestige of the two committees. When such a transfer does take place, it is generally at the request either of party leaders or of the leaders of a particularly large and cohesive state delegation that can find no other or more satisfactory way of exercising its option to occupy a seat on a key committee.

Compensated violations, in short, do not reflect the concentration of political power in any reliable way, since they may occur as the outcome of bargains between party leaders and members, but more often involve a choice between chairmanships. Uncompensated violations, on the other hand, disclose more about options available to party leaders. The sharp decline in the frequency of this sort of violation during the

TABLE 3. COMPENSATED VIOLATIONS

Congress	Year	Chairman of Equal or Better Committee		Better New Assignment		To Leadership		Total Compensated Violations
		(#)	(%)	(#)	(%)	(#)	(%)	
47	1881	8	67	3	25	1	8	12
48	1883	15	94	1	6	0	0	16
49	1885	7	100	0	0	0	0	7
50	1887	8	67	4	33	0	0	12
51	1889	12	63	7	37	0	0	19
52	1891	13	59	9	41	0	0	22
53	1893	6	40	9	60	0	0	15
54	1895	25	83	5	17	0	0	30
55	1897	8	73	3	27	0	0	11
56	1899	10	77	3	23	0	0	13
57	1901	3	60	2	40	0	0	5
58	1903	2	28	4	57	1	14	7
59	1905	1	20	4	80	0	0	5
60	1907	8	80	2	20	0	0	10
61	1909	5	62	3	38	0	0	8
62	1911	9	43	10	48	2	9	21
63	1913	7	54	6	46	0	0	13
64	1915	3	50	3	50	0	0	6
65	1917	5	71	2	28	0	0	7
66	1919	10	53	8	42	1	5	19
67	1921	10	67	5	33	0	0	15
68	1923	13	81	3	19	0	0	16
69	1925	18	40	2	10	0	0	20
70	1927	1	100	0	0	0	0	1
71	1929	6	86	1	14	0	0	7
72	1931	11	69	4	25	1	6	16
73	1933	5	71	0	0	2	28	7
74	1935	10	77	2	15	1	8	13
75	1937	3	75	0	0	1	25	4
76	1939	6	67	3	33	0	0	9
77	1941	5	83	1	17	0	0	6
78	1943	9	90	1	10	0	0	10
79	1945	8	89	1	11	0	0	9
80	1947	4	100	0	0	0	0	4
81	1949	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
82	1951	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
83	1953	0	0	1	100	0	0	1
84	1955	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
85	1957	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
86	1959	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
87	1961	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
88	1963	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

period covered by our investigation suggests that these options were somewhat circumscribed and could hardly have been exercised whimsically or without cost. A closer look at patterns of violation before 1911, to which we now turn, may suggest ways in which party leaders managed and conserved their options in the committee assignment process.

III. HOW SPEAKERS MANAGED: PATTERNS OF VIOLATION BEFORE 1910

Until the 1910 revolt against Cannon, Speakers held the formal power to name committees from top to bottom, majority and minority. They were expected to use this power to enhance their ability to lead their party to legislative success. Their allies expected to be favored, their rivals to be placated. The extent to which Speakers fulfilled these expectations is reflected in the pattern of uncompensated seniority violations before 1910.

The Speaker's discretion in the appointment of committee chairmen was not a free good. It had to be employed carefully. Thus, instead of tearing up committee rosters root and branch at the opening of each Congress, Speakers concentrated on a relatively few appointments on only a few committees. Pollock mentions a tabulation by Representative Luce showing "that in the seven appointings that took place from 1896 to 1910 about 407 chairmen were named. Of these 265 were reappointments, 93 were promotions of men already on the committees, and only 49, or an average of seven for each appointing, were new men brought to chairmanships from outside the ranks of the respective committees."[25] Our figures, tabulated on a slightly different base (since we were limited as indicated in the note to Table 1) and classifying as violations instances where potential chairmen were jumped from within the committee as well as cases where they were replaced from outside, are nevertheless confirmatory: for the same seven Congresses (55th through 61st) 304 out of 397 appointments (77%) involved no violations of seniority at all. Only 34 of the 397 (8.5%) were uncompensated violations. For the longer period, 1881 to 1910, 133 of the 750 appointments to chairmanships were uncompensated violations of the seniority principle.

The strategies available to Speakers in the appointment process before 1911 varied according to easily described external conditions. There was, first of all, the problem of creating a coalition, when a new Speaker took control of a new majority after an election which brought a new party to the control of all committees. Under these circumstances a new Speaker had new friends to reward and rivals to neutralize, and so it is not surprising that violations of seniority in these circumstances were higher than in years when the Speaker was new but the majority was not, or when there was no change in leadership. This is the finding expressed in Table 4.

Speakers under these circumstances were also able to replace incumbent chairmen (as contrasted with the more vulnerable men newly eligible for chairmanships) to a degree not possible when there had been no party turnover as Table 5 shows.

When Speakers replaced incumbents, they preferred to move the chairman off the committee rather than keep him on looking over his successor's shoulder; this was less necessary for nonincumbents, as Table 6 suggests.

Table 7 shows a sharp contrast between the treatment of incumbent chairmen and others in

TABLE 4. WHEN THERE IS A NEW SPEAKER AND A NEW MAJORITY SENIORITY VIOLATIONS ARE FREQUENT 1881–1910

	New Speaker, Party Turnover	New Speaker, but No Turnover	No Turnover
Seniority Followed	25% [55]	77% [83]	69% [287]
Seniority Violated	75% [168]	23% [26]	31% [127]
	100% [223]	100% [109]	100% [414]

TABLE 5. WHEN THERE IS PARTY TURNOVER, THE NEW SPEAKER CAN VIOLATE THE SENIORITY OF INCUMBENT CHAIRMEN WITHOUT COMPENSATION (1881–1910)

	New Speaker Party Turnover	New Speaker No Turnover	No Turnover
Incumbent	58% [40]	17% [1]	26% [14]
Nonincumbent	42% [29]	83% [5]	74% [40]
	100% [69]	100% [6]	100% [54]

TABLE 6. WHEN AN INCUMBENT CHAIRMAN'S SENIORITY IS VIOLATED, HE IS MOVED TO ANOTHER COMMITTEE RATHER THAN DEMOTED

	Uncompensated Violations	
	Chairmen	Nonchairmen
Demoted	20% [11]	61% [45]
Moved	80% [44]	39% [29]
	100% [55]	100% [74]

TABLE 7. IN YEARS WHERE THERE IS NO PARTY TURNOVER, THE POWER OF CHAIRMEN TO RESIST DEMOTION IS INCREASED

	Turnover Years		No Turnover Years	
	Chairman	Non-chairman	Chairman	Non-chairman
Demoted	25% [10]	39% [11]	7% [1]	53% [24]
Moved	75% [30]	61% [18]	93% [14]	47% [21]
	100% [40]	100% [29]	100% [15]	100% [45]

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[25] Pollock, *op. cit.*

TABLE 8. COMPENSATED AND UNCOMPENSATED VIOLATIONS REMAIN CONSTANT, REGARDLESS OF CHANGES IN MAJORITY PARTY 1881–1910

	New Speaker Party Turnover	No Party Turnover
Violations		
Compensated	59% [99]	61% [93]
Uncompensated	41% [69]	39% [60]
	100% [168]	100% [153]

years when there is no party turnover. Party turnover, in other words, appears in our data as a strong force legitimizing activities that in more "normal" circumstances were not permitted to Speakers.

Even though new Speakers taking control of new majorities violated the seniority of chairmen and potential chairmen much more often than was true in most new Congresses, the ratio between compensated and uncompensated violations remained at about 3 to 2. That is, more violations were compensated than not, even when twice as many chairmanships were changing hands by means other than seniority. This is shown in Table 8.

Clearly, creating a coalition differs in its effects upon committee assignments from situations where a new Speaker had inherited a coalition or was acting to maintain a coalition. When there was a new Speaker but no party turnover, Speakers moved cautiously: these were the circumstances in which there were the fewest violations of seniority, as Table 4 indicates, and in which violations, when they occurred, were overwhelmingly of the compensated type. This is shown in Table 9.

Thus we can conclude that by far the most leeway existed for Speakers when they came fresh to office on the heels of a party victory establishing a new majority in the House. Violations of seniority in other circumstances were much less frequent, and much more subject to compensation.

TABLE 9. NEW SPEAKERS WITHOUT NEW MAJORITIES COMPENSATE WHEN THEY VIOLATE SENIORITY

	New Speaker No New Majority	Other Cases
Violations		
Compensated	77% [20]	58% [172]
Uncompensated	23% [6]	42% [123]
	100% [26]	100% [295]

This suggests that for the period 1881–1910 a number of small but significant constraints upon the Speaker's *de jure* options were developing. They can be noted in the restraint which seems to have been exercised in the violation of seniority when Speakers acted without a party turnover to legitimize their manipulation of assignments to committee chairmanships.

IV. SPEAKER CANNON: A TRANSITIONAL FIGURE

Speaker Joseph Gurney Cannon (1903–1911) more often than any other Speaker is responsible for exceptions to the patterns we have been describing. This is consistent with an interpretation of the committee assignment process as a method—undoubtedly the most important method before 1911—by which Speakers maintained a supportive coalition in the House in behalf of policies favored by the majority party. When the Progressive movement became powerful at the Republican grass roots, as it did in the 1890's, it was only a matter of time before this was reflected in party insurgency in the House of Representatives.

House chroniclers make it clear that the insurgents' successful challenge to Cannon's leadership in 1910 laid heavy stress upon his arbitrary use of the Speaker's power of appointment. George Rothwell Brown quotes Representative Nelson of Wisconsin:

> "Have we not been punished by every means at the disposal of the powerful House organization? Members long chairman of important committees, others holding high rank—all with records of faithful and efficient party service to their credit—have been ruthlessly removed, deposed, and humiliated. . . ." [Brown continues:] The House knew as it listened to this merciless indictment of the Speakership that it was true. Members were there who *had been removed from their committee places*, because they had displeased the organization, through the exercise of power which had raised the speakership of Mr. Cannon to an unprecedented height.[26]

George Norris, a Congressman in that era, wrote long afterward:

> Every two years the members knew they were confronted with the appointment of the various standing Committees; and one man, the Speaker,

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[26] Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 158–159.

possessed absolute authority to do what he pleased in these selections. He held in his hands the political life of virtually every member. He could reward the faithful, and he could punish the 'guilty'. I doubt if any Speaker in the history of Congress was as ruthless as Joe Cannon sometimes was.[27]

Booth Mooney says, "[Cannon] stacked the key committees with men who would unquestioningly support everything he favored and oppose everything he was against. He arbitrarily took chairmanships away from members who tried to flout his authority."[28]

Cannon may indeed have been the most ruthless Speaker in House history,[29] but these and other complaints about his "ruthlessness" are hard to substantiate with a casual look at the figures we have. Of the six Speakers between 1883 and 1910, Cannon ranks next to lowest in his overall violations of seniority. (See Table 10.)

TABLE 10. VIOLATIONS OF SENIORITY BY SPEAKER 1881–1910

Speaker	Violations	Violations as a % of all appointments
Keifer (1881–83)	37	92%
Carlisle (1883–89)	70	59%
Reed (1889–91)	27	57%
Crisp (1891–95)	59	61%
Reed (1895–99)	55	53%
Henderson (1899–1903)	23	20%
Cannon (1903–1911)	50	21%

What the data provide are indications of important differences in the timing of his violations of seniority as compared with those of his predecessors. Cannon became Speaker after Speaker Henderson, also a Republican, for somewhat mysterious reasons decided to retire from Congress. While Speakers customarily rearranged committee chairmanships after party turnovers, as we have seen, the custom when there was no party turnover was pretty much to maintain the existing arrangements. In his first term, Cannon succeeded the retired Henderson as chairman of the Rules Committee, a procedure which violated the seniority of John Dalzell (who under Cannon became second ranked member of Ways and Means as well as of Rules) but which was well in keeping with House custom. Then he committed one violation on a semi-exclusive committee, Post Office and Post Roads, and four violations on minor committees. This constitutes the most restrained first term performance of any Speaker, including Henderson, although the latter restricted his eight first term violations to minor committees. In his second term Cannon transferred two incumbents and skipped over three nonincumbents—all on minor committees.

In Cannon's last two terms, there began an increase in factionalism in the Republican Party that solidified into the Progressive and Farmer-Labor insurgent movements. This split in the Republican Party found a focus in hot legislative battles over tariff and conservation measures. Cannon responded in part[30] by *increasingly* tinkering with committee chairmanships. (See Table 11.)

What Cannon did involved a number of innovations as compared with his immediate predecessors. He compensated potential chairmen less often (Table 12). Although he deprived incumbent chairmen without compensating them to about the same degree as his predecessors, (Table 13) he violated seniority without compensation to a much greater extent after his first term (Table 14). He deprived many potential chairmen of major and semi-exclusive commit-

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[27] George W. Norris, *Fighting Liberal* (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1946), p. 111.

[28] Booth Mooney, *Mr. Speaker* (Chicago: Follett, 1964), p. 109.

[29] See, e.g., Victor Murdock, "After Cannonism, What?" *The Independent,* September 22, 1910, pp. 622–625, George B. Galloway, *History of the United States House of Representatives, op. cit.,* pp. 51–52; Hasbrouck, *op. cit.,* p. 48.

[30] Charles O. Jones describes a number of the powers available to a Speaker in this era which could be used as strategic resources: "He could appoint committees—including the chairmen, determine the schedule of business, recognize members on the floor, appoint members to conference committees, dispense favors of various kinds. Particularly significant was Speaker Cannon's power as chairman of the Committee on Rules. . . . Speaker Cannon was not above delaying the appointment of committees until his wishes on legislation had been met. In the famous 61st Congress, he appointed the important Rules and Ways and Means committees on March 16, the second day of the session. Most of the remaining appointments had to wait until the Payne-Aldrich tariff bill was in the conference committee—nearly five months after the session began." "Joseph G. Cannon and Howard W. Smith: An Essay on the Limits of Leadership in the House of Representatives" *Journal of Politics* 30 (August, 1968), 617–646. See also Hubert Bruce Fuller, *The Speakers of the House* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1909), pp. 256 ff.

TABLE 11. CANNON COMMITTED A HIGHER PROPORTION OF VIOLATIONS AFTER HIS FIRST TERM THAN ANY OTHER SPEAKER

	Number Post First Term Violations	Total Violations During Speakership	Post First Term Violations as % of Total
Carlisle	40	70	57%
Crisp	24	59	41%
Reed	16	55	29%
Henderson	8	23	35%
Cannon	39	50	78%

TABLE 12. CANNON COMMITTED A HIGHER PROPORTION OF UNCOMPENSATED VIOLATIONS AFTER HIS FIRST TERM THAN ANY OTHER SPEAKER

	Number Post First Term Uncompensated Violations	Total Uncompensated Violations During Speakership	Post First Term Uncompensated Violations as % of Total
Carlisle	21	35	60%
Crisp	9	22	41%
Reed	5	14	36%
Henderson	3	5	60%
Cannon	16	20	80%

TABLE 13. VIOLATIONS BY SPEAKER OF THE SENIORITY OF INCUMBENTS WITHOUT COMPENSATION (BY PERCENTAGES)

	Uncompensated Violations of Incumbents	Uncompensated Violations	% 1 of 2
Keifer	13	25	52%
Carlisle	12	35	34%
Reed	5	8	62%
Crisp	12	22	55%
Reed	6	14	43%
Henderson	0	5	0
Cannon	7	20	35%

TABLE 14. CANNON'S UNCOMPENSATED VIOLATIONS OF INCUMBENTS' SENIORITY OCCURS AFTER HIS FIRST TERM AS SPEAKER

	Post First Term Violations of Incumbents	Total Violations of Incumbents	% 1 of 2
Carlisle	4	12	33%
Crisp	3	12	25%
Reed	1	6	17%
Henderson	0	0	0
Cannon	6	7	86%

TABLE 15. UNCOMPENSATED VIOLATIONS OF SENIORITY ON MAJOR AND SEMI-EXCLUSIVE COMMITTEES BY SPEAKER

	Uncompensated Violations on Major and Semi-exclusive Committees	Total Uncompensated Violations	Major and Semi-exclusive as % of Total
Keifer	5	25	20%
Carlisle	10	35	29%
Reed	3	8	38%
Crisp	7	22	32%
Reed	7	14	50%
Henderson	0	5	0
Cannon	7	20	35%

TABLE 16. UNCOMPENSATED VIOLATIONS ON MAJOR AND SEMI-EXCLUSIVE COMMITTEES AFTER SPEAKER'S FIRST TERM BY SPEAKER

	Major and Semi-exclusive Committees after First Term	Total Uncompensated Violations on Major and Semi-exclusive Committees	% Post First Term
Carlisle	6	10	60%
Crisp	3	7	43%
Reed	0	7	0
Henderson	0	0	0
Cannon	5	7	71%

tees (Table 15) and did so after his first term to an unprecedented extent (Table 16).

Bolles says, "Cannon drove his advantage home in the House by dismissing the most obstreperous progressives and other insurgents from the committees where they could do him harm. Cooper lost his chairmanship of Insular Affairs, and Norris lost his membership on Public Buildings and Grounds. Cannon removed Fowler as chairman of Banking and Currency, and he dropped Lindbergh from Indian Affairs. He put Lenroot to one side by assigning him to the inane Committee on Ventilation and Acoustics."[31] In the Sixtieth Congress (1907) he removed four incumbent chairmen from nonexclusive committees, giving them no new committee assignments. These four removals of incumbents after a Speaker's first term were unprecedented. (See Table 14) At the same time Cannon skipped over John A.T. Hull on Militia and Gilbert Haugen on War Claims—both men from Progressive Iowa, to reward Helvor Stienerson (Minn.) and Kittredge Haskins (Pa.) with chairmanships on these two committees. He also transferred Stevens Henry (Conn.), about to become chairman on Agriculture, to a low ranking position on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and gave Henry's chairmanship to Charles Scott (Kansas).

Insurgents opposed Cannon's reelection to the Speakership in the first session of the 61st Congress (March, 1909), and supported Democratic leader Champ Clark's attempt to change the rules and sharply curtail the powers of the Speaker.[32] Cannon fought back with the main weapon at his disposal. He made John Weeks (Mass.) chairman of the semi-exclusive Committee on Post Office and Post Roads, thus violating John J. Gardner's seniority, filled vacant chairmanships with low ranked members on Banking and Currency and Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and deprived three incumbents and five non-incumbents of their chairmanships on minor committees.

In sum, after a cautious beginning, Cannon committed a higher proportion of violations on major and semiexclusive committees after his first term than any Speaker (Table 16), more post first-term violations of the seniority of incumbents than anyone (Table 14), and more uncompensated violations after his first term than anyone. These irregularities became entwined with Cannon's legislative conservatism in the insurgents' ideology of anti-Cannonism.

TABLE 17. CANNON NOT ONLY CONTRIBUTES DISPROPORTIONATELY TO THE NUMBER OF UNCOMPENSATED VIOLATIONS OF SENIORITY IN GENERAL AFTER SPEAKERS' FIRST TERMS, BUT ALSO CONTRIBUTES DISPROPORTIONATELY TO THE NUMBER OF DEMOTIONS AND JUMPS

Type of Violation	Uncompensated Violations in Speakers' First and Later Terms					
	Speaker's First Term			After Speaker's First Term		
	1 All Speakers	2 Cannon	% 2 of 1	1 All Speakers	2 Cannon	% 2 of 1
Demotion or Jumps	23	3	13	19	6	32
Transfers to Other Committees	52	1	2	34	10	29

Ultimately Cannon's maneuvers were not enough to stem the Progressive revolt in his party. This demonstrated that there were limits to the Speaker's ability to maintain his leadership position by depriving his opponents of chairmanships and awarding them to supporters. Cannon's problem seems to have been that he took over a relatively unified party and had little need at first to build a special supportive coalition. When the party began to split apart in his third term, he responded by attempting to maintain a workable coalition by dumping insurgent chairmen and rewarding loyal Republicans with chairmanships. In so doing he deprived more incumbents and chairmen of major and semi-exclusive committees, than had previously been done in the House. Cannon also resorted disproportionately after his first term to the strategy of demoting chairmen or jumping over potential chairman, rather than moving them to other committees. (See Table 17.) It is costlier to deprive an incumbent than a nonincumbent, a member of an exclusive committee than a minor committee. Likewise, it is costlier to demote than to transfer, and given the customary practice of previous Speakers, costlier to violate seniority after the Speaker's first term. Thus the costs of Cannon's efforts to maintain a supportive coalition are clear and his failure more understandable. It seems likely, then, that it was not the sheer number of his seniority violations that earned Cannon his notoriety as the House's most ruthless Speaker, but how and when they occurred.

Before 1911 each newly elected Speaker enjoyed a period in which he could build a supportive coalition, to maximize his party's legislative success or his own popularity or longevity as Speaker. During this period he could gain supporters by pursuing relatively low-cost strategies. He could violate the seniority of fewer incumbents than nonincumbents, fewer members of exclusive committees than minor committees, and make fewer changes by internal shifts than transfers. After the initial phase, support became more costly. For each increment of support the Speaker had to expend more resources to employ each possible strategy. The longer the Speaker waited to form his coalition, the more probable it became that he could not afford to do so. Therefore the greater the likelihood he would either have to rely on seniority and give in to the legislative preferences of committee chairman, or resist their preferences and risk losing party support.

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[31] Blair Bolles, *Tyrant From Illinois* (New York: Norton, 1951), p. 195.

[32] See Hasbrouck, *op. cit.*, pp. 4–6.

Similarly, the earlier a Speaker could build his coalition, the more he could rely on seniority in subsequent terms. Thus, even during the pre-1911 period, seniority had gained a foothold in the House of Representatives.

V. AFTER 1911: GROWING DECENTRALIZATION

After 1911, the power of appointment was taken from the Speaker and vested in party committees on committees, subject to the ratification (which was pro forma) of the whole House. For most of the first decade after this sweeping change, the appointment of chairmen was the business of the Democratic party, as the majority party in the House.

The revolt against Cannon did not immediately result in the decentralization of power in the House. Rather, power was shifted from the Speaker to the majority leader, Oscar Underwood, who chaired the House Committee on Ways and Means, the Democratic committee on committees, and led the Democratic caucus. George Rothwell Brown remarks:

> . . . The authority to name the committees of the House when taken from the Speaker was lodged theoretically in the most important committee of the House, but actually in the chairman of that committee. The Ways and Means Committee appointed the Committee on Rules, and the caucus adopted a resolution that no man should serve on more than one of the fourteen major committees.[33]

The Republican caucus had been destroyed by the revolt against Cannon, but not the Democratic caucus, with its two-thirds rule. In the 62nd Congress, rules changes were put through by the Democratic caucus vastly weakening the powers of the Speaker, with Speaker Clark's consent, but not decentralizing power in the House. The caucus was run by the Ways and Means committee, its chairman, and President Wilson. As American involvement in World War I increased, Wilson took more and more initiative and came to dominate Congressional activity.[34]

A recent study of the period observes:

> The emergence of the Democratic caucus as the real source of legislative power in the Congress was particularly galling to the insurgents. . . . Far from supplanting the caucus, Wilson relied upon it as his prime instrument of legislative power. Agreements on administration programs were hammered out in the Democratic congressional caucuses and then steam-rollered through Congress by solid Democratic majorities. In the standing committees Republican Congressmen and Senators, whether progressives or conservatives, were rarely allowed to play any significant part in the legislative process.[35]

The continued centralization of power in the first decade after the revolt against Cannon is reflected in our data as well. Table 18 shows a sizeable number of uncompensated violations of seniority in this first decade. When a potential chairman moved to a better committee, we interpreted the decision as also reflecting the influence of centralized power, since the shift had to be negotiated through the committee on committees. These two outcomes of seniority violation are contrasted in Table 18 with situations where members chose between chairmanships or themselves become party leaders, which we interpret as reflecting decentralization of discretion over the appointment process. The long-term trend toward decentralizaion is, of course, clear, and it emerges most strongly first in the decade of Republican dominance after the Wilson era, and continues on into the present day.

In 1919, decentralization took a major leap forward. In the election of 1918 the Republican party regained control of the House but was badly split between two leaders, James R. Mann of Illinois, a protege of Cannon (who was still serving in the House and active in party affairs), and the more progressive Frederick H. Gillett of Massachusetts. Gillett was elected Speaker on the first ballot, but did not fare so well in the Republican caucus on the matter of committee assignments, as the *New York Times* account indicates:

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[33] Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 175 ff.

[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 175–187. See also Wilder Haines "The Congressional Caucus of Today," this REVIEW 9 (November, 1915), pp. 696–706. The corresponding story in the Senate is told by Claude G. Bowers, *The Life of John Worth Kern* (Indianapolis: Hollenbeck, 1918), pp. 287–295.

[35] James Holt *Congressional Insurgents and the Party System 1909–1916* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 84–85.

TABLE 18. HOW DECENTRALIZATION IN COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS GREW. VIOLATIONS OF SENIORITY, BY PERIOD

Congress:	47–61	62–65	66–72	73–79	80–88
Year:	1881–1911	1911–1919	1919–1932	1933–1946	1947–1963
	Before Revolt Against Cannon	Democratic Caucus Dominates	Republican Era	F.D.R. Era	Since Reorganization Act
Centralized Decision-Making					
1. Uncompensated Violations	40% (129)	25% (16)	9% (9)	4% (2)	0
2. Potential Chairmen Awarded Better Assignments	18% (59)	33% (21)	22% (23)	14% (8)	20% (1)
	58%	58%	31%	18%	20%
Decentralized Decision-Making					
1. Member Chose Between Chairmanships	41% (131)	38% (24)	67% (69)	75% (46)	80% (4)
2. Member Joined Party Leadership	1% (2)	4% (2)	2% (2)	7% (4)	0
	42%	42%	69%	82%	80%
Total Violations	(321)	(63)	(103)	(60)	(5)

> At 12:30 o'clock this morning it was announced that the Mann forces had routed the Gillett faction in the matter of the selection of the Committee on Committees. . . . Mr. Mann offered a [motion] providing that each of the Republican states having representation in the House . . . should elect a member of a Committee on Committees [and providing that] the members of this committee should each respectively have a voting power equal to the State's pro rata Republican membership in the House.
>
> The duties of the proposed new form of Committee on Committees will be to elect the Republican members of the standing committees in the next House, to elect a Steering Committee of five, a Republican whip, and also a floor leader who should be ex officio Chairman of the new Committee on Committees, and likewise a Chairman of the Steering Committee.
>
> The adoption of the Mann substitute was interpreted as indicating that the movement . . . [for] breaking down and overthrowing the domination of House committees under the rule of seniority of service has been blocked and defeated. The Mann substitute was probably adopted because the members who are holdovers and who have worked their way toward the top of the Republican side of the various committees want to retain the benefit of the rule of seniority. The adoption of the Mann substitute was interpreted as meaning that the House committees would be organized and their Chairmen picked in virtually the same old way, after the manner that put Southern men at the top of most of the important committees in both House and Senate in the [outgoing] Congress.[36]

Save for slight differences in the prose style, this passage, now nearly 50 years old, might have been clipped from the *New York Times* of today. In the decades that followed, the split in the Republican majority led to the formation of a legislative coalition with increasingly dissident southern Democrats. Party cohesion and majority rule through the caucus gave way to majority rule in the House based on a powerful cross party alliance which supported and maintained the seniority system.

The great profusion of minor committees up until 1946 gave party leaders a small amount of room for maneuver, however. Table 19 demonstrates that virtually all uncompensated violations of seniority in the period after 1910 involved the chairmen of minor committees. But even these, as Figure 4 shows, occurred predominantly during the first decade, when power was still centralized in the Democratic caucus.

The year 1946 marks the passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act, which reduced the number of committees from 48 to 19, principally by consolidating or abolishing minor committees and, in the process, liquidating large numbers of minor chairmanships. Since 1946, the seniority

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[36] *New York Times* February 28, 1919.

TABLE 19. AFTER 1910 UNCOMPENSATED VIOLATIONS TAKE PLACE ON MINOR COMMITTEES

	1881–1910	1910–1963
Major	8% (10)	(0)
Semi-exclusive	22% (29)	4% (1)
Minor	70% (90)	96% (26)
	100% (129)	100% (27)

system has been virtually untouched, and chairmen have stayed put. The exceptions over two and a half decades are Omar Burleson, mentioned earlier, and Adam Clayton Powell, who was deprived of his chairmanship in 1967 in the course of proceedings which led to his exclusion from Congress altogether.[37] If 1911 signals the decline of uncompensated violations, 1946 marks the virtual demise of exceptions to the seniority system, as Table 20 illustrates.

But even before 1946, most exceptions to seniority reflected decentralized choices rather than the manipulations of party leaders. Here is a brief listing of the circumstances surrounding the eleven most recent violations of the seniority of a committee chairman in the House of Representatives, aside from the cases of Powell and Burleson.

(1) In the Republican-controlled 83rd Congress (1953–55), A. L. Miller of Nebraska became chairman of the committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. The ranking Republican member in the previous Congress, Fred Crawford of Michigan, failed to be renominated to Congress. The second ranking Republican, Dean P. Taylor of New York, whose seniority was violated, transferred to the Judiciary committee. Miller was third in seniority.

(2) In the 80th Congress, Richard Welch of California became chairman of the Public Lands Committee. He had been ranking member of three other committees in the previous Congress, two of which (Labor and Insular Affairs) ceased to exist in the 80th Congress when, under the reorganization of that year, they were combined with other committees. Welch's third committee in the 79th Congress was Merchant Marine and Fisheries, which he left to become chairman of Public Lands.

(3) In the 80th Congress, on the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Fred Bradley of Michigan, second ranked Republican, became chairman when the ranking member, Richard Welch, took the chairmanship of Public Lands instead.

(4) In the 79th Congress the chairman of the Committee on Elections (Number 3) gave up his chairmanship and became ranking member. He took the chairmanship of the Committee on Territories instead.

There were seven other violations of seniority in the 79th Congress, involving the following committees: Election of the President and Vice President (previous chairman transferred to Agriculture); Irrigation and Reclamation (previous chairman, a congressman from silver-rich Idaho, transferred to the chairmanship of the Committee on Coinage); Memorials (previous chairman, retaining five other committee assignments, transferred to UnAmerican Activities); Enrolled Bills (a freshman member became chairman, violating the seniority of Mary T. Norton, who chose instead to become Chairman of Labor. She retained her position on Enrolled Bills as ranking Democrat rather than move up to the Chairmanship); Expenditures in the Executive Departments (ranking Democrat failed to move up); and Indian Affairs (previous

TABLE 20. THE DECLINE OF UNCOMPENSATED VIOLATIONS

	1881–1910	1910–1946	1946–1963
Compensated	59% (192)	88% (204)	(1)
Uncompensated	41% (129)	12% (27)	(0)
	321	231	1

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[37] Seniority has also been pretty much inviolate since 1946 for committee rank and file as well as chairmen. There are only two exceptions. It took an elaborate warning procedure followed by a fight in the full caucus of the House Democratic party in 1965 to impair the seniority of two southern House Democrats, neither of them chairmen, who had campaigned actively for Republicans in the election of 1964. One of these Democrats promptly resigned his seat and was reelected to Congress as a Republican. The other quit the House soon thereafter and became Governor of Mississippi. Under a rule of the Democratic caucus, the so-called Byrnes Rule, the Democratic committee on committees' assignments are subject to review by the caucus. In practice, however, except for these two cases, there has been no review. The overwhelming liberal Democratic majority of 1965, mobilized by the Democratic Study Group, was able to threaten a review and thereby opened the question of the seniority of these two members.



FIGURE 4. Most Uncompensated Violations of Seniority After 1910 Take Place During the Period of Democratic Caucus Centralization

chairman and ranking Democrat failed to return to Congress; third ranking man, Samuel Dickstein of New York, moved up to second place but did not take the chairmanship. Dickstein was at the time chairman of the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization; no doubt there were more immigrants than Indians in his lower east side Manhattan constituency).

The seniority violations after 1919 appear to reflect not the Speaker's discretion, or the discretion of a leadership committee, but rather the application of a norm that no member should chair more than one committee. The exercise by members of their preferences in this connection was capable of setting off chain reactions reshuffling large numbers of committee chairmen; this accounts for the fact that even after 1919 there were a sizeable number of seniority violations. However, the main mechanisms at work before 1911, from 1911 to 1919, and thereafter seem quite different.

Party leaders did retain some room for maneuver, even in the post 1911 situation, owing to the large number of minor committees. When vacancies on important committees opened up, party leaders could offer senior men on minor committees the vacancy and thereby manipulate minor committee chairmanships. This option was effectively closed by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, which reduced the number of committees and also vastly cut down on the number and diversity of manipulable vacancies available at any one time.[38] And, of course, as

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[38] It also increased the difficulty for any member of attaining a chairmanship. Richard Brooks shows a tremendous contrast in the average number of years a member had to serve before becoming a committee chairman before and after 1946. From 1889–1910 the average wait was 6.1 years. From 1911–1946 the average wait was 7.5 years. From 1947–1954 chairmen served in the ranks an average of 16.6 years. Richard Stephens Brooks "The Sectional and Seniority Bases of the Standing Committee Chairmanships in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1889–1954" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1956), p. 89.


AT GRASS ROOTS
IN CONGRESS
Split in GOP ca. 1890 Insurgency
GOP in Congress Splits
Democratic-Insurgent Alliance
Speaker Punishes Insurgents 1907–09
GOP Caucus Weakened. Committee on Committees Makes Assignments Via Seniority (since 1919)
Demands to Weaken Speaker
Rules Changes 1910–11
SENIORITY SYSTEM
Democratic Committee on Committees Makes Assignments Via Caucus 1911–1919
SPEAKER WEAKENED
Can't Reward and Punish Members
Growth of Conservative Cross-Party Coalition
Reform of 1946 Minor Committees Abolished
Democratic Caucus Weakened Committee Assignments Via Seniority
Growth of Democratic Urban Safe Seats (since 1932)
Demands For Decentralization
U. S. Population Grows
U. S. Budget Grows
House Increases in Size
Workload Increases
Demands for Specialization, Routinization

FIGURE 5. Historical Causes of seniority sytem

the number of committee places diminished, the committee assignments of individual members were limited in most cases to only one committee.[39]

VI. CONCLUSIONS

What caused seniority? Historically, the answer seems to have been a split in the grass roots of the Republican party that ultimately produced a strong but unstable Democratic-Insurgent Republican majority coalition in the House—strong enough permanently to weaken the prerogatives of the Speaker, unstable enough to preclude the election of a strong Speaker of their own.[40] One of the consequences of this split was the reinforcement of weak preexisting norms favoring continuity of chairmanships and limiting in practice the freedom of Speakers to appoint chairmen when there was no party turnover. After the Democratic-Insurgent coalition weakened the power of the Speaker and of the Republican caucus, only the Democratic caucus was left as a centralizing force in the House. The Democrats lost control of the House in the 1920's, and in time a conservative cross-party coalition undermined the Democratic caucus.[41] Meanwhile, longer term pressures for routinization and specialization were having marginal effects. Ths is the complexly interrelated set of historical "causes" of seniority as it exists today that we try to diagram in Figure 5.

Seniority is also an ongoing social process that helps to maintain itself by creating conditions favorable to its own perpetuation. Our speculation as to the important causal relations in this process, and their connections with the processes that established the system, are diagrammed in Figure 6.

To summarize, we believe that our data show the effects of four main influences upon the growth of the seniority system in the U.S. House of Representatives. In the period between 1881 and 1911, a large number of committees

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[39] See Lewis C. Gawthrop, "Changing Membership Patterns in House Committees" this REVIEW, 60 (June, 1966), 366–373.

[40] Holt *op. cit. passim* makes this argument very persuasively.

[41] On the present-day weakness of the Democratic caucus, see Clem Miller *Member of the House*, John W. Baker, ed. (New York: Scribner, 1962), pp. 88–89, 92.


AT GRASS ROOTS
IN CONGRESS
HISTORICAL CAUSES (FROM FIGURE 5)
Weak Party Caucuses, Strong Cross-Party Coalition
Weak Speaker
Demands for Specialization Routinization
SENIORITY SYSTEM
Strengthens Sentiments Favoring Seniority
Gives Job Security, Decentralizes Power Over Policy
More Safe Seats Party System Stabilized
Lower Turnover Large Corps of Veterans
Service in House More Attractive

FIGURE 6. Now seniority maintains itself

and a discretionary system of appointment in which seniority and political considerations played a part produced a pattern of relatively frequent violations of seniority. Many of these were responsive to the necessity for new Speakers, after a party turnover in the House, to organize a majority coalition in the committees. After 1911 the system responded at first to the centralized decisions enforced by the Democratic caucus, and later to piecemeal bargaining and tinkering, as Representatives with many committee assignments adjusted their workloads with respect to a large number of narrowly focused committees. This produced some violations of seniority, but within a context providing much less power and discretion for party leaders in the House. After 1946, both the discretionary rights of leaders and the rich array of minor committees disappeared with the "streamlining" of the committee system, and thus from 1946 onward, the rule of seniority is virtually never breached. From a situation where seniority is one of a number of criteria determining committee chairmanships, then, we move through two intermediate periods, where centralized coordination of appointments is first undermined in the Republican party (1910) and later (after 1919) in the Democratic. Finally, the House moves after 1947 to a situation where there exists a full-blown seniority *system,* in which seniority is the single, automatic criterion determining the chairmanships of all committees, and the application of this criterion is not subject to the discretion of any body short of the relatively inactive full party caucuses.

These results are compatible with the argument that power in the House has decentralized rather than concentrated over time. They also reflect a general trend, discussed elsewhere, toward impersonal, automatic, and universalistic methods of conducting internal business, a characteristic pattern in the development of social organizations as they move from tentative, informal, and less complex stages toward institutional maturity.[42] It is an interesting anomaly that these two phenomena, progressive decentralization of power and institutionalization, are not normally associated, and that "ideal types" describing the natural history of organizational development typically presume a movement toward, rather than away from, concentration of power. The House of Representatives may be the exception that proves the rule, or it may serve as an occasion for the reconsideration of at least one small branch of organization theory.

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[42] See Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives," this REVIEW, 62 (March, 1968) pp. 144–168. The present discussion supersedes, and in some respects corrects, the preliminary findings on seniority offered there on pp. 160–161.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: DEVELOPMENTAL RELATIONSHIPS, II*

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Mass political participation increases as nations become more economically developed. In Part I of this study we attempted to identify the significant social experiences which explain the high levels of participation in economically developed nations. We formulated and explored the following general theory:

> Economic development alters the social structure of a nation. As nations become more economically developed, three major changes occur: (1) the relative size of the upper and middle classes becomes greater; (2) larger numbers of citizens are concentrated in the urban areas; and (3) the density and complexity of economic and secondary organizations increases. These social changes imply political changes. Greater proportions of the population find themselves in life situations which lead to increased political information, political awareness, sense of personal political efficacy, and other relevant attitudes. These attitude changes, in turn, lead to increases in political participation.

The theory can be presented schematically in the following form:

A ——→	B ——→	C ——→	D
Economic Development	Alterations in the Stratification, Urban, and Group Membership Patterns	Changes in the Distribution of Attitudes and Cognitions	Increases in Political Participation

We were able to demonstrate that individuals' levels of social status and organizational involvement were strongly and consistently related to their levels of political participation.[1] The survey data from five nations showed, further, that organizational involvement was more strongly related to participation, and more consistently from nation to nation, than was social status.[2] Residence in an urban area, contrary to

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** The authors are listed alphabetically to indicate equal coauthorship.

[1] See our "Social Structure and Political Participation, I," Appendix B, this REVIEW, 63 (June, 1969), for the multiple item scales used to test these relationships. Social status includes individual's education, income, occupation, and an interviewer estimate. Organizational involvement includes primarily number of organizational memberships and having held an office in an organization. Participation includes talking politics, contacting local officials, contacting national officials, and joining formal political parties or organizations—but not voting.

[2] The survey data are taken from the Almond-

our initial theory, was shown *not* to be related to individual political participation, although we did find an interesting sub-pattern.[3] More advanced nations had, of course, more citizens residing in urban areas, but these individuals did not participate in politics more frequently than their rural counterparts in the same nation.

After establishing that social status and organizational involvement consistently predicted rates of political participation, we merged the survey data with aggregate data on the level of economic development of the five nations. We were able to devise several different ways to examine how much of the inter-nation correlation between economic development and participation could be explained by reference to changes in the class structure and organizational life of a nation. Although it was difficult to provide a clear test with only five national cases, our series of tests pointed uniformly in a single direction. There were no development-related differences in mass participation which were not explained by differences in the status and organizational structure variables. That is, insofar as mass participation is related to economic development, such participation is best understood by analyzing how economic development affects the distribution of social status positions and the development of organized group life. Finally, although we observed some idiosyncratic differences in political participation from one nation to another, these differences were minor when compared with the general pattern: citizens of similar social class and organizational involvement participate in politics at about the same absolute level irrespective of the nation in which they reside.

Having explored, as far as our limited number of national cases would allow, the relationships between economic development, social structure, and participation, we turned our attention to the role of political attitudes and cognitions. Our theory suggested that changing attitude patterns constituted the link between social structure and political participation. Aggregate rankings tended to support this possibility. The mean levels of political information, political efficacy, political attentiveness, and citizen duty to participate were consistently higher in the more developed nations, although there were a number of variations within the pattern.

But average or aggregate measures of individual characteristics cannot be used to examine systematically the pathway from development to participation. More sophisticated methods of analysis are needed to explore the theory that social changes are related to participation because they change political socialization patterns. The primary objective of this part of the study is to utilize a technique of causal modeling to investigate the attitudinal and cognitive pathways from individuals' positions in the class structure and their involvement in the society's organizational life to their levels of political participation. Although we cannot, of course, prove causality in the direction of the relationship, we can raise the following questions concerning these pathways:

(1) Which, if any, of the political attitudes and cognitions introduced represent potential causal links between social status and organizational involvement on the one hand and political participation on the other? How much of the relationship between B and D in our schematic theory can be explained by such attitude linkages?

(2) Are there different attitudinal paths associated with social status and with organizational involvement? That is, we shall attempt to determine if the citizen who participates in politics because of his social status differs in his political attitudes from the citizen who participates because of his organizational involvement.

(3) Do the interrelationships among status, organizational involvement, political attitudes, and political participation remain consistent from one nation to the next; or are there significant differences?

Addressing ourselves to these empirical questions leads to several other very interesting problems in the analysis of political participation. Whereas in Part I of this study we were able to say some rather definite things about how economic development affects the *level* of mass political participation, in Part II we shall be able to make statements about the relative

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Verba Five-Nation Study. The five nations represented are Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, Mexico and Italy. See Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), for information on samples and survey design. See Part I of this study, this REVIEW, 63 (June, 1969), for an extended discussion of methodological issues related to how we processed these data.

[3] The size of community in which a citizen lives is negatively related to his local political participation level. However, this negative relationship is not sufficiently strong (it explains less than two percent of the variance in local participation) to account for the absence of any relationship between place of residence and general political participation. We concluded that although urbanization is a major part of economic development, it is not, even in part, responsible for great increases in mass political participation.

contribution of different groupings in the society to the participant stratum. This we can do in two ways. We can consider the degree of under- or overrepresentation of different class groups among citizens actively involved in politics. We can also consider the degree to which politically active citizens are likely, under various conditions, to manifest particular types of political attitudes and cognitions.

Assumptions of our causal model.—The use of statistical causal modeling techniques is gaining acceptance in political science.[4] The analysis undertaken here differs somewhat, however, from usual formulations. We are not using causal inference to eliminate logical alternative models. Rather, we are using it to examine the relative importance of various proposed linkages in a given model. The causal order to independent and dependent variable is fixed. Further, we are not interested in the causal priority of the hypothesized intervening variables. Our research question is whether the five attitude variables explain the persistent relationship between a citizen's socioeconomic traits and his rate of political participation, and, in addition, which of the five provide the strongest links in the chain. Because each link relates to a specific hypothesis and thus has considerable theoretical interest to us, we do not wish to eliminate any of them completely, at least at this time, but instead attempt to assess their relative importance.

For this purpose, as suggested by Otis Dudley Duncan,[5] the simplest procedure is not to construct prediction equations specifying certain relations—usually zero ones—but to compute path coefficients for the given model.[6] The direct path linkages between independent and dependent variables, for example, will be zero if the partial correlations would have been zero. Where not zero, we are able to derive measures of proportional importance in the total relationship. This is the procedure followed.

We must, of course, take note of some of the assumptions which are made in employing these techniques.[7] First, relationships between all variables are assumed to be additive and linear. Second, other causes of each of the eight variables are assumed to be uncorrelated with each other or other variables in the system.[8] Third, all causal relationships are assumed to be unidirectional, rather than reciprocal. This third assumption seems tenable in terms of the position of the independent variables (status and organizational involvement). It is obviously less satisfying and plausible in terms of relationships among the attitude variables and between attitudinal and participatory variables. At the moment this problem cannot be avoided.[9] We believe that it has little effect on the relationships between independent and dependent variables as they emerge in the causal model, but we present findings about the relative position of attitude variables in a more tentative vein. At a future date we hope to explore interactive models. Fourth, the assumptions of the specific causal order have been made for purposes of this analysis, and face the same problems as the assumption of unidirectionality.

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[4] For example, see Hubert Blalock, "Causal Inferences, Closed Populations, and Measures of Association," this REVIEW, 61 (March, 1967), 130–136; Hubert M. Blalock, *Causal Inferences in Non-Experimental Research* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964); Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," this REVIEW, 57 (March, 1963), 45–56; Arthur S. Goldberg, "Discerning a Causal Pattern among Data on Voting Behavior," this REVIEW, 60 (December, 1966), 913–933; and Donald J. McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde, "Towards a Communications Theory of Democratic Development," this REVIEW, 61 (March, 1967), 72–79. We owe a particular debt to the excellent discussion by Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Causal Inferences and Political Analysis," in Joseph Bernd (ed.), *Mathematical Applications in Political Science II* (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1966), pp. 7–43.

[5] Otis Dudley Duncan, "Path Analysis: Sociological Examples," *American Journal of Sociology*, 72 (July, 1966), 6–7.

[6] These path coefficients are the standardized B (slope) coefficients for a series of regression equations. The causal model is described by these simultaneous equations. The causal properties are linked to the fact that each succeeding equation adds a new variable to the model—and is described as a dependent variable "caused" by all preceding variables in the model, but by none of the ones subsequently added. The final dependent variable, participation in this case, is the product of all other variables. All equations after the first two ($X_2 = B_{21} X_1 + B_{2t} R_t$, and $X_1 = B_{1s} R_s$) are shown in the left hand column in Table 2. As Blalock, *op. cit.*, has suggested, unstandardized b weights provide rich interpretations that these standardized path coefficients do not. However, the scores obtained on the variables in our model are based in many cases on originally arbitrary variances. The different questions on competence, for example, had different numbers of alternative responses and even the meaningfulness of the zero points is not clear on an attitude variable of this type. In this situation the interpretation of the unstandardized scores is clearly very difficult. See the comments by John W. Tukey, in "Causations, Regression, and Path Analysis," in Oscar Kempthorne, *et al.* (eds.), *Statistics and Mathematics in Biology* (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State College Press, 1954). However, we do hope to examine unstandardized coefficients in models involving non-attitudinal variables only, particularly in regard to the lines of inquiry raised in the section on "Social Structure and the Participation of Class Groups," below, in future analysis.

[7] For a more complete discussion of these limitations see Alker, *op. cit.*; Duncan, *op. cit.*; Raymond Boudon, "A Method of Linear Causal Analysis: Dependence Analysis," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (June, 1965), 365–374; and Hugh Donald Forbes and Edward R. Tufte, "A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling," this REVIEW, 62 (December, 1968), 1258–1264. Although the useful Forbes and Tufte discussion was not available to us while this analysis was being conducted, we believe that our approach to causal modelling avoids many of the problems raised by them. We must continue to emphasize, of course, that the causal *order* of our variables is posited from deductive theory, not derived from the data.

In addition to these statistical assumptions, we should note that we are undertaking, in effect, analysis of a longitudinal causal pattern through cross-sectional analysis. Obviously, there is no substitute for over-time observation in finally ascertaining the development of patterns of political participation for various individuals of different social positions. This is a standard problem in analysis of political behavior, given the time and cost requirements of longitudinal observation, but it should be noted nonetheless.

I. THE FINDINGS: DIFFERENCES IN THE CAUSAL LINKAGE PATTERNS OF SOCIAL STATUS AND ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENT

We begin with the very general hypothesis that the causal relationship between social status and organizational involvement, on the one hand, and political participation, on the other, can be traced through intervening political attitudes. Figure 1 and Table 1 present data relevant to this hypothesis.

Initial examination reveals one pattern of overwhelming strength and consistency: social status and organizational involvement operate through quite different causal paths in their impact on political participation. This finding holds true in all five countries and remains the case in spite of various manipulations of the data, alteration of the order of the intervening variables, changing the number of the intervening variables, and the like.

The basic finding is both simple and important. Virtually all the relationship between social status and political participation is explained by the intervening linking attitude variables. The high social status citizen does not *just* participate in politics; he does so only when he has the attitudes such as efficacy and attentiveness which are postulated as intervening variables. Social status, then, affects rates of political participation through its effect on political attitudes. This does not mean, it must be emphasized, that the correlation between status and participation is spurious; on the contrary, it means that intervening attitude variables explain *how* a citizen's social status affects his political activity.

On the other hand, a very large part of the relationship between organizational involvement and participation *is unexplained by any variable in this model*. In every case, about 60 percent of the correlation between organizational involvement and political participation is accounted for by the direct link, that line that does not pass through social class or the attitudinal variables. (See link 2 → 8 in Figure 1).

The strength and cross-national consistency of this pattern is shown as well in Table 1. In a causal model of this type, the raw correlation (Pearson Product-Moment) between independent and dependent variable equals the sum of all pathways down the causal chain from independent to dependent variable.[10] The score of a "pathway" in this sense is the product of all path coefficients along the chain. Table 1 presents the percent of the raw correlation between social status and organizational involvement, on the one hand, and political participation, on the other, accounted for by: (1) the direct relationship only, unaccounted for by other variables in the model; (2) the path through the other inde-

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[8] Urbanization has been deleted as a variable in the model, since we know it to be significantly related to Social Status only, of all the variables in the model, and its deletion greatly simplifies calculation of paths. Deletion of urbanization is a violation of this assumption, in a minor fashion, when considering local participation only, rather than combined scales. It is therefore reintroduced below when considering the causal models of local and national participation separately.

[9] Nonrecursive path analysis is also possible. At a future point we hope to explore further interactive models for this and similar data. We have not yet moved to this stage of analysis. See Duncan, *op. cit.*

[10] In the eight variable causal model there are 54 paths from status to participation. No paths moving back along the model at any point are allowed by the constraints imposed.


Organizational Involvement 2
Social Status 1
Perceived Governmental Impact 5
Political Information 4
Citizen Duty 3
Political Attentiveness 7
Political Efficacy 6
Political Participation 8

FIG. 1. Eight variable causal model: paths from status and organizational involvement to political participation

Key to Figure 1:

(1) No arrow between variables indicates that the path coefficients are less than .150 in at least three of the five nations. There are 13 paths *not* shown in the figure.

(2) Heavy arrows between variables indicate path coefficients greater than .250 (about 5 times the average standard error) in at least three of five national samples. Light arrows between variables indicate path coefficients between .150 and .250 in three or more of the five national samples.

(3) Unbroken arrows (both light and heavy) indicate *difference* between largest and smallest of the five coefficients is *less* than .150 (about 3 standard errors). Broken arrows between variables indicate a difference greater than .150.

(4) See Table 2 below for full path coefficients for each nation. Variables are explained in text, footnotes, and appendix. All linkages shown are positive.

TABLE 1. PATH COMPONENTS OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TWO INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AS PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL CORRELATIONS[a]

	Independent Variables									
	Social Status					Organizational Involvement				
Proportion of Correlation Attributable to:	US	UK	GER	IT	MX	US	UK	GER	IT	MX
(1) Direct link to participation	20%	−8%	−33%	−15%	−1%	57%	62%	61%	51%	68%
(2) Paths thru other independent (1 or 2 variable only)	30	30	35	27	34	7	−2	−3	−2	0
(3) Paths thru other ind var *and* attitude variables	10	12	20	21	13	14	12	6	12	6
(4) Paths thru attitude variables only	40	61	78	67	54	20	25	35	40	26
Total percentage	100	95	100	100	100	98	97	99	101	100
Basic correlation between ind var and participation	.431	.303	.181	.283	.238	.523	.480	.486	.490	.515

[a] Path coefficients from Table 2. The correlations are equal to the sum of all pathways from independent to dependent variable. The pathways are computed by multiplying all path coefficients along the given path. Negative scores arise from negative path linkages. For those percentages, each independent variable is treated as if it were the first, undetermined, variable in the chain. Key: US = United States; UK = United Kingdom; GER = West Germany; IT = Italy; MX = Mexico.

pendent variable only; (3) the paths going first through the other independent variable and then through the attitude variables; and (4) the paths going directly from each independent variable through the attitude variables to political participation. For example, the correlation between organizational involvement and political participation in the United States is .523. Fifty-eight percent of *this* is accounted for by the direct path between these two variables (that is, the path that passes through no other variable in the model). Seven percent of the correlation between these two variables is accounted for by the path from organizational involvement to social status and then directly to participation; 14% of the correlation is explained by the path from organizational involvement through social status and then through the intervening attitude variables; and the remaining 21% of the correlation is accounted for by the path from organizational involvement through the various attitude variables but by-passing the social status variable.

The structure of the components of the organizational involvement relationship are almost uncannily consistent from nation to nation. The social status to participation relationships are less consistent, with the U.S. having a fairly large proportion accounted for by the direct link (although the path coefficient is less than twice the standard error and would not usually be considered statistically significant). In Germany the direct link between social status and participation has a high negative score, although the percentage is exaggerated by the weakness of the total correlation (and the score is also less than twice the standard error).[11] The basic pattern, nonetheless, is clear, and we suspect inconsistency reflects in part, at least, some of the problems in adequate measures of social status, or its sub-dimensions.

The general pattern for social status finds about 60 percent of the relationship going through the attitude variables, about 30 percent going directly through organizational involvement, and about 10 percent going through the attitude variables by way of involvement. The general pattern for organizational involvement shows about 60 percent accounted for by the direct link, about 30 percent going through the attitude variables only, and about 10 percent going through social status and then the attitude variables.

Thus, a large part of the relationship between organizational involvement and political participation cannot be explained by reference to other variables included in the model. It is clear that those who are organizationally involved participate in politics at rates far greater than citizens who are not involved. In addition, and of considerable importance, many citizens whose organizational involvement propels them into political life are *not* more politically informed, politically efficacious, or politically attentive than the non-participants. Unlike political participation stemming from high social status, participation stemming from organizational membership does not necessarily imply those attitudes normally thought to be associated with democratic political participation. We return later to the implications of these findings.

There are two alternative, though not mutually exclusive, explanations for why the organizationally involved are politically active even though they lack certain attitudes. First, organizations can mobilize their members toward political goals; and this can occur without an intervening state of changes in attitudes by the members. The organizations might provide inducements and gratifications to their members, such as sociability, which though producing political activity have nothing to do with political information, awareness, and so forth. Further, the organizations can mobilize members for relatively specific, short-term issues, a mobilization which again does not depend upon any facilitating attitudes other than a willingness to follow the lead of the organization leadership. A professional or business group circulating a petition to be signed or a union enjoining their members to vote are examples of such mobilization.

Second, both organizational and political involvement might be strongly affected by an underlying personality attribute or cultural norm. For instance, both types of activity might be related to a general propensity toward social activism which is unrelated to social status. This explanation implies that joining an organization, becoming active in it, and getting involved in politics are subsets of a more general social behavior which, for reasons of personality attributes, is more attractive to some citizens than others. It is an explanation stressing self-selection.

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[11] At an earlier stage in the analysis, scales were built with consistency checks on the SES dimension. Persons high on one status item and very low on another were deleted. This procedure increased correlations, but decreased the size of the valid sample, and was not, therefore, used in this analysis. It is especially noteworthy that while only about 10% of the original samples in the US, UK, Italy, and Mexico failed to meet the SES dimension consistency check, about *50%* of the German sample failed to meet it. This suggests the disruption of the social stratification system in Germany as a consequence, no doubt, of the historical upheavals. The strong wage position of workers in the post-war boom, following the leveling impact of World War II and the Third Reich, may also be a contributing factor. See the comments by Lewis J. Edinger, *Politics in Germany* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), pp. 19–30.

This is not the place to explore the merits of these alternative explanations—and the data available permit no direct test—but we do suggest that the former explanation has more merit than the latter. The self-selection hypothesis is weakened since we would expect a self-selective tendency to correlate with attitudes such as political efficacy and attentiveness. The absence of strong relationships between organizational involvement and these attitudes makes us suspicious of the self-selection explanation. The first explanation, that organizations are mobilizing their members, is intuitively more persuasive and has been supported by additional research. Data collected in the United States show that membership in organizations which have some relationship to public affairs and which have formal or informal discussions of politics at meetings, greatly increases the likelihood of being politically active. In contrast, members who belong to more apolitical organizations are only slightly more likely than non-members to participate in politics.[12]

II. FIVE INTERVENING VARIABLES AND PROVISIONAL HYPOTHESES ABOUT POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

An eight variable model is rather complex for adequate pictoral representation. Nonetheless, we felt that each of the intervening variables contributed to the theoretical richness of the model. Figure 1 presented a composite path diagram. The strongest path links in absolute terms are heavy arrows. "Strongest" means, here, more than five times the average standard error for all relationships (which is about .050). Somewhat weaker relationships, but still stronger than three times the average standard error in a majority of the nations, are shown as lighter arrows. Where there is a range of more than three standard errors (average) between highest and lowest coefficients, the arrow is shown with a broken line to indicate a less consistent relationship. (See the Key to Figure 1 for a more precise description.)

Table 2 shows the exact coefficients on which Figure 1 is based; Appendix I presents the corresponding standard errors. For a random sample, we would say that path coefficients which are more than double the standard error are statistically significant. However, given the problems in accurately estimating the real nature of the sample used in the five nations, we prefer simply to emphasize that the relationships are quite consistent, that some are relatively strong, and that others, such as the direct link between social status and participation, are always weak.[13]

Of course we are less confident about the ordering of the causal model as it pertains to the different attitudinal variables than we are about the independent → intervening → dependent ordering. There is, indeed, a high probability that a number of these attitude variables have an interactive relationship of the type disallowed by the conditions of the model. Thus any observations we make about the relative importance of these relationships must be suggestive rather than definitive.

Variables 1 and 2 in the model are, of course, social status and organizational involvement. These are the independent variables, as we have discussed. They are mildly related (except in the U.S. where the relationship is stronger). We assume that status is probably prior in the causal ordering: an individual's education, occupation, income, and life style tend to be established by his family background, and are less often a product than a cause of organizational involvement. But for analysis purposes, we treat these as the two independent "first cause" variables.[14] For that reason they are linked by a double

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[12] This research, carried out by Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, shows that a great majority of all types of voluntary organizations in the U.S. have an interest in public affairs and members engage in political discussions; this accounts for the strong relationship between organizational involvement and participation even when not controlling for the type of organization. These findings are based on preliminary analysis of the U.S. data from the "Cross National Research Program in Social and Political Change."

[13] As is described in Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 509–525, the national samples were cluster samples and collected in somewhat different ways with different degrees of success. In Mexico, as noted, no interviews were collected in towns under 10,000. Given these differences and the fact that much of the sampling data was not available in our analysis tapes, we have not attempted to compute a sampling error—it could only be a guess—and prefer to rely on the strength and consistency of relationships, rather than significance tests presuming probability samples. See the comments on significance of correlation coefficients in Part I, Table 1, this REVIEW, 63 (June, 1969).

[14] See Duncan, *op. cit.*

TABLE 2. PATH COEFFICIENTS*

Eight Variable Recursive Model

Dependent Variable Equation	Country	B_1	B_2	B_3	B_4	B_5	B_6	B_7
$\chi_3=B_{32}\chi_2+B_{31}\chi_1+B_{3u}R_u$	US	.345	.152					
	UK	.223	.195					
	GR	.169	.252					
	IT	.274	.314					
	MX	.190	.178					
$\chi_4=B_{43}\chi_3+B_{42}\chi_2+B_{41}\chi_1+B_{4v}R_v$	US	.302	.133	.344				
	UK	.337	.151	.269				
	GR	.258	.154	.333				
	IT	.347	.220	.248				
	MX	.287	.275	.219				
$\chi_5=B_{54}\chi_4+B_{53}\chi_3+B_{52}\chi_2+B_{51}\chi_1+B_{5w}R_w$	US	.132	.000	.182	.228			
	UK	.123	.049	.160	.225			
	GR	.057	.000	.122	.298			
	IT	.000	.080	.144	.350			
	MX	.041	.000	.067	.088			
$\chi_6=B_{65}\chi_5+B_{64}\chi_4+B_{63}\chi_3+B_{62y2}+B_{61}\chi_1+B_{6x}R_x$	US	.127	.125	.273	.242	.144		
	UK	.000	.174	.241	.184	.174		
	GR	.113	.186	.235	.307	.083		
	IT	.099	.138	.235	.264	.164		
	MX	.134	.108	.110	.319	.086		
$\chi_7=B_{76}\chi_6+B_{75}\chi_5+B_{74}\chi_4+B_{73}\chi_3+B_{72}\chi_2+B_{71}\chi_1+B_{7y}R_y$	US	.055	.106	.030	.228	.135	.328	
	UK	.115	.056	.130	.284	.030	.221	
	GR	.053	.101	.120	.287	.072	.285	
	IT	.095	.126	.078	.319	.043	.272	
	MX	.119	.176	.136	.251	.068	.195	
$\chi_8=B_{87}\chi_7+B_{86}\chi_6+B_{85}\chi_5+B_{84}\chi_4+B_{83}\chi_3+B_{82}\chi_2+B_{81}\chi_1+B_{8z}R_z$	US	.086	.296	−.008	.048	.060	.168	.236
	UK	−.024	.295	.054	.110	.122	.063	.316
	GR	−.061	.295	.037	.017	.071	.210	.290
	IT	−.041	.250	−.021	−.022	−.079	.234	.434
	MX	−.003	.351	.029	.125	.100	.071	.206

χ_1 = Social Status
χ_2 = Organization Involvement
χ_3 = Citizen Duty
χ_4 = Political Information
χ_5 = Perceived Impact of Government
χ_6 = Political Efficacy
χ_7 = Political Attention
χ_8 = Political Participation

* See footnote 6 and relevant literature for the meaning of the regression equations. See Appendix to Part I, this REVIEW 63 (June, 1969), for creation of the variables from which the regression equations' standardized B's were computed.

arrow in Figure 1. We have noted the differences in the causal linkages from these two variables to participation. Each of the subsequent variables is drawn from the literature on attitudes and participation, and these variables can be linked to participation in a series of complementary hypotheses. Our data permit us to comment on these, and their relative importance in the causal chain specified by this model, although we stress that these must be considered provisional observations, not tests of the hypotheses.

Obligation to participate.—Variable 3 measures the sense of citizen duty to participate.

The scale was constructed from replies indicating the degree of active participation mentioned by respondents when enumerating the duties of a good citizen. Commentators on democratic participation have hypothesized that higher social status and organizational involvement expose the citizen to value systems approving of the act of participation.[15] Political participation as a value is taught in the schools, reiterated in mass media, and reinforced as a norm in general social interaction. The variable is interesting because prevalence of such participatory norms would not seem an intrinsic part of the developmental process, but rather a special outcome of conditions and political education efforts in particular societies.

The data in Table 2 suggest that citizen duty does, indeed, play a part in the propensity of citizens in these five nations to become involved in politics as they become more organizationally involved and better educated. However, there is very considerable variance from nation to nation, both in the strength of the relationship and in the linkages to the independent variables. In some nations this variable is more strongly linked to group involvement than status. This variation is, indeed, what we might expect from a political orientation related to particular patterns of socialization, current and historical. In each of our five nations from 10 to 22 per cent of the correlation between status and participation is explained by paths through civic duty. Civic duty operates almost purely as an intervening variable: its effect on participation is felt through subsequent links to information and efficacy. That is, motivation through sense of an obligation to participate increases one's tendency to get information about politics and feel confident in political expectations, but does not directly propel one into the political arena.

Information as a political resource.—Variable 4 measures citizen knowledge of national political leaders and high governmental affairs, basic indicators of political information. The developmental hypothesis suggests that higher status and organizational involvement expose citizens to communication stimuli of all kinds, informing them in general and, hence, about political events in particular.[16] Information in turn, it is presumed, increases citizens' sense of competence, promotes awareness of a stake in public policies, and provides a basic interpretative resource for following and understanding public affairs. This is a type of factor which would seem intimately linked to the developmental process, particularly to increases in general levels of education and growth of mass media, as an intervening attitudinal resource for mass participation.

The data tend to support this hypothesis quite firmly. Information is strongly related as a direct product of social status. Information does not directly increase participation, but does act strongly and consistently through sense of governmental impact, political efficacy, and, especially, attentiveness to politics. Basic information is the most consistently patterned of all the attitudes. It seems to be a fundamental prerequisite to the interest and awareness which stimulate participation. (We must recall at all times, however, the strong component of organizational involvement which did *not* operate through any of the attitudes, including information.)

In each nation about 1/3 of the correlation between status and participation was explained by paths passing through information. This has interesting implications for political stability and coalition consistency in developed nations, given the research showing strong relationships between information levels and consistency of vote, inter-relatedness of belief systems, and the like. The growth of a middle class, as political scientists since Aristotle have observed, provides an anchor of political stability. One linkage may be the development of basic information levels among citizens likely to participate consistently.

Perceived stake in society.—There is a long tradition of speculation about participation which suggests that the "better elements" in the society participate more frequently because they have more of a stake in the outcomes of political decisions. Related to this speculation is the observation that higher status and more organizationally involved citizens are closer to the "center" of society, and more likely to be in touch with government in their daily economic and social routines. Although we have no data to test the idea that higher status citizens actually perceive greater need to contact officials, there were questions asking citizens about the level of impact which, they felt, local and national governments had on their daily life.

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[15] See Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, pp. 161–179; and Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), pp. 105–106. For a general review, see Richard Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, *Political Socialization* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1969), especially chapters 9 and 10.

[16] Alker, *op. cit.;* Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," this REVIEW, 55 (September, 1961), 493–514; Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1958); and see the essays in Lucian W. Pye (ed.) *Communication and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). It should be emphasized, however, that we are here dealing with very fundamental types of information, as captured by these responses naming party leaders and cabinet positions at the national levels. More detailed and sophisticated types of information might be expected to follow such factors as involvement and participation, rather than act as a basis for them.

Contrary to the speculations, perception of a general "stake" of this kind was not an important link between status or organizational involvement and participation. In most countries the link was negligible, and correlations spurious. Although generally related to political information, the sense of governmental impact (variable #5 in the model), had only weak links to attitudes further up or down the chain. At least as measured here, the hypothesis must be rejected.

Social competence and political efficacy.—Higher social status and organizational involvement, it has been argued, provide a citizen with a general sense of competence and importance; these feelings are transferred from the social to the political world. The socially advantaged citizen assumes that political events can be manipulated and controlled and this sense of political efficacy increases the likelihood he will participate in politics. Variable 6 is a sense of political efficacy, as measured by a number of indices, including the feeling that one understands political events, the perception that access channels exist in case of grievance, and the expectation of success if active participation is undertaken.[17]

Although we have no data on feelings of general social competence, it is clear that political efficacy does play a strong role in the relationship between social class and participation. What is striking is the importance of efficacy as an intervening variable in paths from the other intervening variables.

Efficacy does, however, show a great deal of variation from nation to nation. There are strong downward links to attentiveness in all cases, and very strong direct links to participation in two nations (Germany and Italy). We cannot explain the differences, however, which range from Italy, where half of the relationship between status and participation is explained by paths through efficacy, to Great Britain, where its role is a negligible 6%.

One further point has bearing on the efficacy hypothesis. In the course of analysis we decomposed our dependent variable, political participation, and examined the causal model in terms of each of its components. All the general patterns remained the same, confirming our faith that the scale was built from a relatively consistent dimension, except that political competence was more important as a link to the more active forms of participation, such as contacting local officials, than it was in talking politics. Attentiveness, on the other hand, was far more strongly related to talking politics, although still powerful in all cases. Thus a sense of efficacy, it would seem, is a more important resource for initiating government contacts than for less active forms of political involvement. More complete findings of this path analysis by type of political activity are reported in Appendix II.

Political attentiveness.—The last variable in the attitude chain was political attentiveness, a scale built from whether citizens reported following political affairs in general and through specific mass media. A frequently heard hypothesis is that higher levels of social status and organizational involvement increase the general awareness of social happenings and their consequences. As we have seen, increased levels of information seem to provide a resource for such attentiveness. This general awareness spills over into political awareness, which provides a resource and stimulus for political participation.

Our data confirm the critical linking role of attentiveness to politics, although we do not have data to relate general social awareness to political attentiveness. The pattern suggests that status leads to acquisition of attitudes which prepare the individual for active political involvement when appropriate stimuli or needs arise. The consistency of the attentiveness variable as the final link in the chain emphasizes the way in which these attitude distributions indicate generally attentive "publics" which are likely to play a consistent political role.[18] Attentiveness paths always account for at least one-fourth of the relationship between status and participation, and range to a high of two-thirds in Italy.

The most consistently important single paths through the attitude variables are from status and involvement to citizen duty and, particularly, information, which then act on efficacy and attentiveness, which in turn affect probability of participation.

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[17] As noted in Part I, footnote 15, efficacy is not a simple concept and other dimensions of it must be explored in other analysis. Efficacy as measured here is a sense of *personal* ability to cope with the political world. It seems to be a somewhat different concept from sense of approval or satisfaction that the political system is generally responsive.

[18] See V. O. Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961); and also Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954).

The variation in the roles of these intervening variables should not obscure one overwhelming fact: they explain much of the influence of social status; they have far less explanatory power in linking organizational involvement and participation. We must go beyond this causal model in developing our understanding of these very important differences. A more general perspective on the amount of political participation being explained can perhaps be gained from Table 3. The increasing percentages given in the table are the squares of the coefficient of correlation or multiple correlation with participation for the various independent variables, or independent *plus* intervening variables. Social status alone, obviously, only explained about 9 percent of the total variance in participation. It is this causal relationship which has been most adequately explained in our analysis. The addition of group involvement explains an additional 18 percent of the variance in participation, a fact which is both a tribute to the strength of the variable and a challenge to further investigation, since about two-thirds of that relationship has not been explicated by our model. Addition of all attitude variables explains another 16 percent —the total model explaining about 43 percent of the variance in participation. It is, of course, unclear to what degree the total explanation could be increased through addition of further variables, and to what degree a ceiling is provided by problems in empirical survey research. In any case, the ability to explain close to half of the variance in a comprehensive scale of political participation and to relate the variables in a fashion which lends itself to great consistency in cross-national investigation gives considerable confidence in the basic analysis.

III. URBANIZATION AND LOCAL PARTICIPATION: THE CAUSAL LINKAGE PATTERNS

In Part I of the analysis we showed that within each nation an individual's place of residence bore little relationship to his rate of political participation. For this reason we have disregarded size of place of residence as a variable in conducting our analysis of the attitudinal linkages between the social structural variables and political participation. As a double check on the findings about urbanization reported in Part I, we recomputed the causal model introduced in this part of the analysis, adding urban place of residence as Variable 1. The results were the same; the direct and indirect linkages were not altered by adding urbanization. We confirm the initial finding that knowing the size of the community in which a citizen lives adds nothing to

TABLE 3. AMOUNT OF PARTICIPATION EXPLAINED AS ADDITIONAL VARIABLES ARE ENTERED INTO THE CAUSAL MODEL

Independent Variables Added	Nation					Average Percent Explained	Average Percent Added
	US	UK	GER	IT	MX		
SES (r^2)	18%	3%	9%	8%	6%	9%	+ 9%
SES+Org.I (R^2)	32	24	26	26	28	27	+18
SES+Org.I.+Duty+Inf +Impact+Eff+Attent (R^2)	44	44	43	47	38	43	+16

Key: SES = Socio-economic Status
Org.I. = Organizational Involvement
Duty = Citizen Duty to Participate
Inf = Political Information
Impact = Perceived Impact of Government
Eff = Political Efficacy
Attent = Political Attentiveness
US = United States
UK = United Kingdom
GER = Germany
IT = Italy
MX = Mexico

our understanding of his general level of political participation.

Readers of Part I will recall that we carried the analysis of urbanization and participation one step further. We demonstrated that whereas the participation scale was unaffected by size of place of residence in our five nations, participation in local politics was somewhat influenced. Living in larger cities decreases the probability that the citizen will participate in local affairs. This finding has been tested again, but this time using the causal model. Where possible, the attitude measures were converted into indices having a local referent: sense of duty to participate in local affairs, perception of the impact of local government, sense of efficacy in local politics. The causal model, adding as independent variables the size of community in which the citizen lives and his length of residence there, was then recomputed. (See Appendix III for the path coefficients for the ten-variable recursive model of local participation.) Size of community is consistently *negatively* related to the attitude items and to actual local participation. Although the degree of negative influence is not great, accounting for about 2 percent of the variance in participation in local affairs; it is clear that moving to a larger community *reduces* the average citizen's sense of involvement, his feelings of efficacy, and his actual participation in local affairs.[19]

IV. SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND THE PARTICIPATION OF CLASS GROUPS[20]

Individuals vary in their political participation according to their social status and according to their organizational involvement, with the latter social characteristic having the stronger impact on political participation. This finding is consistent from one nation to another. Further, and because there is cross-national consistency, both social status and organizational involvement remain strongly related to political participation when we shift from the individual to the nation as a unit of analysis. That is, nations vary in their level of mass political participation according to the proportion of citizens in the middle and upper classes and according to the density and complexity of organizational life.

In addition, organizational involvement may represent an alternative channel for political participation for socially disadvantaged groups. The rural peasant, the industrial laborer, the disadvantaged black may become politically active through his organizational involvement even though he may otherwise lack the status resources for political participation. In these ways the class structure and the organizational structure of societies determine both the overall rate of participation and the relative amount of participation coming from various social groups.

We have argued that economic development changes both the class and organizational structures of a society. This is true, but other factors may also promote such changes. The class structure is, of course, intimately tied to the long-term development of human and capital resources. Governments may establish massive education programs and engage in forceful income redistribution. These efforts may well affect participation patterns. However, obviously major changes in the status structure, involving occupation, education, and income patterns, are extremely difficult to bring about. We suspect that the organizational structure may be susceptible to more direct and short-term manipulation. Assuming that our organizational correlations reflect causal patterns, rather than the operation of self-selection mechanisms (an assumption we feel is tenable), then the great influence of organizational structure on participation suggests important possibilities for political change.

Although there are few systematic and comparative studies of the process of organizational development, there are numerous examples of efforts by governmental and extra-governmental bodies to generate organizational structure. Religious groups, for example, have spawned an enormous variety of organizations. Governments have fostered—and impeded—the development of both political and non-political organizations such as farmers' associations, professional societies, trade unions, and youth groups. The European socialist movements and the accelerating actions of civil rights groups in the United States in the past few years are additional examples of group mobilization only partially related to economic development patterns. We should not underestimate the complexity of the problems. The new African states have discovered the difficulties in penetrating a pre-mobilized economic structure even with a mass political party, as the numerous coups in recent years illustrate. And the history of socialist and labor movements suggest the frequency of middle class leadership in initial generation of working class movements. Nonetheless, the historical examples suggest a potential manipulability of the organizational structure, as well as a potential for mediating the effects of social class, which make it a central variable in the analysis of participant societies.[21]

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[19] Carrying out the equivalent operation for participation in national politics yields even less distinctive patterns. Direct linkages between place of residence and contacting national officials are virtually zero in each nation; the basic interactive patterns analyzed in the general model are still the overwhelming ones; only sense of national efficacy shows a significant—and still very slight—positive relationship to living in larger cities (and only in three nations of our five). The effect of urban residence on patterns of contacting national officials, in other words, is possibly measurable, but very, very weak. No more than one percent of the variance in the national participation item is affected by urban residence in any of the five nations.

[20] We are indebted to Mr. Jae-On Kim for help with some of the methodology required for our analysis in this section.

The shape of the class structure, the extent of organizational involvement, and the relationship between social status and organizational membership are only partially determined by economic development levels. And these three factors have a complicated but identifiable impact on the overall rate of participation as well as on the amount of participation coming from the various social classes. In this section we explore how different mixtures of these factors affect the degree to which class groups will be under- or over-represented in the "stratum" of political participants in a society. An example illustrates what is meant by these terms as we employ them. Suppose that one-fourth of the citizens are active participants (by some explicated criterion) in the political life of their society. Suppose further that lower class peasants and industrial workers numbered half of the total society. Also suppose that a very limited proportion of this group were members of organizations. All of our previous analysis would therefore suggest that while this class group represented 50 per cent of the total society, it would probably represent a *much* smaller proportion of the 25 per cent who are active political participants. We would conclude that the peasants and workers were "under-represented" in the political stratum.

On the basis of the findings reported above and in Part I of this study, we can make some reasonable estimates about the effect on the level of mass political participation when changes occur in the society's class or organizational structure. We can also project or "simulate" the extent to which various class groups contribute more than or less than their share to the participant stratum. The basis of this analysis is the estimation of the participation level of the organizational members and non-members among the different class groups. This estimation is based on the matrix of correlations among the three variables of status, organizational membership, and political participation. For instance, of the citizens who are lower status but organizationally active, what proportion are likely to be politically active? Of the citizens who are middle class and not organizationally involved, what proportion will likely be political participants? And so forth. The changing size of these groups of citizens along with the strength of the association among the factors yield a projection of the changing participation patterns.

Once the correlation among the variables is known, the projections can be made by translating the correlation coefficients into percentage differences. This is by no means an exact process, but rather one of gross estimation—however, there are some guidelines in the statistical literature.[22] For our five nations the average correlation between social class and political participation is .30 and between organizational involvement and participation, about .50. The following estimates are indicated:

(a) With a correlation of .30 between social status and political participation, the higher social status groups in the society will have 15 to 25 per cent more political participants than the lower groups. (Assuming social status to be trichotomized and participation to be dichotomized.)

(b) With a correlation of .50 between organizational involvement and political participation, the organizationally involved citizens will have 30 to 40 per cent more political participants than the non-involved citizens. (Assuming organizational involvement and participation both to be dichotomized.)

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[21] It may also be true that the development of different types of national industries may create differential needs for economic organizations depending upon industry requirements to coordinate production, transportation, marketing and the like. See, for example, Barrington Moore, Jr.'s discussion of the differential impact that varying types of national industry have on the social structure, in *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

[22] See for interpretation of percentage differences, Robert H. Somers, "A New Asymmetric Measure of Ordinal Variables," *American Sociological Review,* 27 (1962), 799–811. Also for interpretation of percentages for 2 × 2 tables as "proportional reduction of error" comparable in meaning to the square of the product moment r, see Jae-On Kim, "Predictive Measures of Ordinal Association;" unpublished manuscript. We are also indebted to Mr. Kim for helping us work out these percentage differences in our data.

Given these percentage differences, a return to the actual data provides us with a realistic base line—approximately 15% of those defined as lower class who are not members of any organization can be classified as politically active. This base line approximates the proportion who report discussing politics at least once a week or some more active type of participation. (See other items in the participation scale in the Appendix to Part I.) Using this base figure and the percentages differences defined above, we can estimate the rates of political participation for the various mixtures of social class and organizational involvement.[23]

Upper Class,
  Organization Members = 70% Participants
  Non-Members = 35% Participants
Middle Class,
  Organization Members = 60% Participants
  Non-Members = 25% Participants
Lower Class,
  Organization Members = 50% Participants
  Non-Members = 15% Participants

These estimates permit us to make two types of projections. First, we can estimate the overall increase in mass political participation when the class structure of society is altered or when the organizational life of society is altered. Table 4 presents illustrative analysis. Nation #1 has a class structure corresponding to that of a relatively underdeveloped country: 70 per cent of its citizens are lower class, 20 per cent are middle class, and 10 per cent are upper class. Futher, this nation has little in the way of organizational infrastructure. Only 15 per cent of the citizens belong to organizations. Nation #2 resembles the previous nation in its class structure, but it has a much richer group life—60 per cent of its citizens belong to organizations. Nation #3 is a "middle class" country; its class structure, shaped like a diamond, resembles that of a relatively industrialized society. Twenty-five per cent of its citizens are lower class, 50 per cent are middle class, and the remaining quarter are upper class. This nation, however, deviates from most "middle class" societies in that its group life is underdeveloped; only 15 per cent of its citizens belong to groups. Finally, Nation #4 has both a diamond-shaped class structure and a well-developed organizational life. The last column in Table 4 presents a projection of the proportion of citizens who are politically active in each of the nations.

TABLE 4. ESTIMATING THE PARTICIPATION LEVEL OF SOCIETIES DIFFERING IN THEIR CLASS STRUCTURE AND DENSITY OF THEIR GROUP LIFE*

Nation	Given Social Conditions		Projected Participation
	Class Structure of Society: Proportion in Low, Middle, Upper Classes	Organizational Density: Proportion of Citizens Belonging to Organizations	Proportion of Citizens Who Are Politically Active
#1	70—20—10%	15%	25%
#2	70—20—10	60	40
#3	25—50—25	15	30
#4	25—50—25	60	46

* Correlation between class and participation is assumed to be .30. Correlation between organizational membership and participation is assumed to be .50. For explication of the projections in this table, see Appendix iv., below.

According to the simulation, the middle-class and organizationally developed society (#4) has nearly twice as many citizens actively involved in political life as does the society with a class structure resembling that found in many non-industrialized nations and where there is little organizational infrastructure (#1). Thus we see, as shown in our five nations in Part I, that the number of citizens actively involved in political life varies according to the shape of the stratification system in the society and the complexity of its organizational infrastructure, with the latter characteristic showing the stronger relationship. (Nation #2 has more participants than Nation #3.)

Estimating participation levels of different groupings in society permits us to make a second set of projections as well. Altering the shape of society's class structure and its distribution of organizational members does more than change the absolute level of political participation. It also changes the *relative contribution* of various class groups to the political participant stratum. We have noted that (1) because social status and political participation are positively correlated, the lower classes are always under-represented among the political participants; and (2) that for the lower status citizen, his involvement in organizations can somewhat compensate for his lack of other resources and can provide a channel for political access. Moreover, because the impact of organizational involvement may overweigh that of social status in societies with an extensive and complex group life, the relative disadvantage of the lower class citizens is less, providing that the distribution of organizations is equal among the social strata.

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[23] Note how closely these projective estimates come to the actual data presented in Table 4 Part I of this article.

If we assume that different class groups have different political goals and interests, then the persistent under-representation of lower class groups is a politically significant fact. However, caution must prevail in drawing inferences, since there is no way to move directly from the degree of under-representation of a class group in the participation patterns to a statement about the distribution of social values. For instance, there may be limited unity on certain issues among citizens sharing a similar class position, or limited perception of shared class interests. Further, "active participant" as we use the term is an arbitrary category; there may be checks through electoral participation and the anticipations by leaders of electoral sanctions even when direct contacts are not made with the political leaders.[24]

Nonetheless, the systematic under-representation of the lower class groups is a base-line fact in all the participation relationships examined. It is, therefore, of some importance to find that the effect of organizational membership *could* alter patterns of disproportionate contribution by class groups to the participant stratum. Table 5 presents the data originally presented in Table 4 plus additional relevant materials. Again, it is based on simulating the different variables in order to show their effect on the relative representation of social class groups among the political participants. In Table 5, column I shows nations with two different class structures as previously discussed. Column II shows nations with two different organizational structures, either 15 per cent or 60 per cent of the citizens belonging to groups. Column III gives the stipulated relationship between social status and organizational membership. In the examples chosen we show nations in which there is no relationship between status and membership, (organizational memberships are distributed evenly throughout the status groups), and nations with a strong (.5) relationship between status and organizational membership, (upper class persons are much more likely than lower class persons to be organizationally involved). In column IV we show the computed class structure of the active participants in society; this is computed from the size of the status-organizational membership groups and the participation of each group as discussed previously. (See Appendix iv for methodological details.) The proportion of lower, middle, and upper class citizens among the active participants can be compared with their proportions in the total population shown in the first column. Finally, in column V, we show the difference between the lower class's proportion of political participants and its size as a group in the society, divided by its total size. This is an index of the under-representation of the lower class in nations differing in their class structure, organizational life, and strength of relationship between social status and organizational membership. All the index scores are negative since the positive correlation between status and political participation means that the lower class is always to some degree underrepresented.

The simulation presented in Table 5 underlines several themes already introduced during the discussion of the manner in which social status and organizational involvement provide alternative routes into the politically active stratum of society. We can conclude that:

(1) The higher the total organization level, the less the lower class is under-represented. Increasing organization level from 15 to 60 per cent reduces lower class under-representation scores by about one-third. (Compare lines 1 and 3, 2 and 4, 5 and 7, 6 and 8.)

(2) The higher the correlation between status and organizational membership, the more under-represented the lower class. A correlation of .5 increases under-representation in these cases by at least one-half. (Compare 1 and 2, 3 and 4, 5 and 6, 7 and 8.)

(3) The smaller the size of the lower class, the more it is, relatively, under-represented. The consistent magnitude of the distortions in participation rates weighs more heavily against a basically smaller group. Thus, other factors equal, the diamond-shaped system has a smaller lower class, but one whose participatory representation suffers relatively more from the relationship between status and participation. The effect in these cases doubles under-representation. (Compare 1 and 5, 2 and 6, 3 and 7, 4 and 8.)

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[24] The need for caution in moving from analysis of social stratification, and even gross patterns of political participation, to assumptions about political decision-making patterns and outcomes has been amply demonstrated in the various studies of community power. See especially Robert Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); and Nelson W. Polsby, *Community Power and Political Theory,* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963). Factors shaping participation patterns must be incorporated as *one* element in such analysis.

TABLE 5. SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND CLASS GROUP PARTICIPATION: A SIMULATION

	Given Conditions			Projected Participation Patterns	
	I	II	III	IV	V
Simulation No.	Class Structure of Society: Proportion in Low, Middle, Upper Classes	Organizational Density: Proportion of Citizens Belonging to Organizations	Class-Organization Correlation	Class Structure of Politically Active: Proportion in Low, Middle, Upper Classes	Index of Underrepresentation for Lower Classes[a]
1	70% −20% −10%	15%	.0	59% −25% −16%	−16
2	70 −20 −10	15	.5	51 −28 −22	−27
3	70 −20 −10	60	.0	63 −23 −14	−10
4	70 −20 −10	60	.5	59 −25 −16	−16
5	25 −50 −25	15	.0	17 −50 −33	−32
6	25 −50 −25	15	.5	13 −50 −37	−48
7	25 −50 −25	60	.0	20 −50 −30	−20
8	25 −50 −25	60	.5	16 −50 −34	−36

[a] Computed by (1) subtracting the per cent of active participants in the lower class from the total per cent in the lower class, and (2) dividing the difference by the latter. For full explanation of the projections in this table, see Appendix IV, below.

The utility of the simulation analysis and the implications of the patterns reported in Table 5 will be clearer if we shift attention to the actual data from the five nations. That is, we can carry out the same analysis and show the degree of under-representation by the lower classes in each of the five nations we have used in this study. We will use cutting points which, with one exception, are identical from nation to nation to show the empirical data equivalent to that simulated above.[25] Table 6 presents the data.

The most striking pattern in Table 6 is the extent to which the lower class is under-represented among the politically active citizens in the United States; the lower class is more severely under-represented there than is true in any of the other nations. The simulations in Table 5 suggest the reasons for this (Note that the U.S. case corresponds roughly to simulation 8; Mexico to simulation 1.) The severe under-representation in the United States results first from the relatively *small size* of the lower class, which is confronted with a basic correlation between class participation which is higher than average. (Although it is not a powerful part of the phenomenon, the partial correlation between status and participation, controlling for organizational membership, remains higher in the U.S. than in the other nations. We have no explanation for this fact.) Secondly, while the high level of organization in the United States might have canceled out the effect of the relatively small class size (compare simulations 1, 5, 7), the high correlation between social class and organizational involvement (.44) eliminates the potential help offered by the organization structure. See Column III.

It seems likely that the high correlation between social class and organizational involve-

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[25] Since our scales were derived to give intranation distributions of maximum utility, their validity for cross-national absolute comparisons is somewhat limited. Nor is it entirely clear how one should treat an indicator like "years of education" as a social status indicator on a cross-national basis. The meaning of such absolute measures, like the real buying power of formal income equivalents, depends considerably on the distribution of the commodity within the society. Nonetheless, the chosen cutting points fitted four of the societies in fairly plausible fashion. Actual distribution of education in the United States, for example, reported in the 1959 census was about 17% college educated, 48% 9–12 years of education, and 35% with 8 years or less. (Compare the class distribution in Table 6.) Only in Britain was a slightly different scale cutting point used—the division between lower and middle class was lowered by one level to show 46% in the lower class rather than 60%. This seemed a more plausible distribution in comparable terms, although it does not greatly affect the class analysis.

TABLE 6. SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND CLASS GROUP PARTICIPATION: FIVE NATIONS

Nation	Given Conditions			Overall Participation Rate: Per Cent Classified as Politically Active[a]	Projected Participation Patterns	
	Class Structure of Society: Proportion in Low, Middle, Upper Classes	Organizational Density: Proportion of Citizen Belonging to Organizations	Class-Organization Correlation		Class Structure of Politically Active Proportion in Low, Middle, Upper Classes	Index of Underrepresentation for Lower Classes[b]
United States	30%—45%—25%	55%	.44	46%	16%—47%—37%	−47
Britain	46 —38 —16	49	.31	45	32 —43 —25	−30
Germany	44 —41 —15	39	.21	40	41 —36 —23	− 7
Italy	54 —32 —14	27	.30	27	42 —39 —19	−22
Mexico	77 —16 — 7	20	.23	25	64 —25 —10	−17

[a] Being classified as "politically active" is roughly equivalent to discussing politics at least once a week, or more active involvement, as measured by our original scale items. Appendix B, Part I, reports this scale.

[b] Computed by (1) subtracting the per cent of lower class among active participants from the total per cent in the lower class, and (2) dividing the difference by the latter. See Appendix

ment in the United States reflects the fact that in the three European countries there existed historical efforts by political parties to mobilize the lower class and, especially in Germany, to create an organizational structure deliberately parallel to that which had traditionally evolved among the established strata. Even where there may have been a considerable subsequent disengagement of the parties from organizational domination, the effects of such mobilization may have continuing consequences. Lipset and Rokkan have suggested the importance of the political organizational structures initially established during the social mobilization of the society in setting the party alternatives for the society in subsequent years.[26] Their analysis may well apply to the initial formation of organizational infra-structures more generally. In Mexico, the political regime itself has engaged in a protracted attempt to create a lower class infrastructure. For various reasons, such deliberate attempts at group formation in the United States have been more limited, and particular socio-economic features may have also inhibited the development of lower class organizations.[27] Explanation of these historical patterns is beyond the scope of our analysis. But it is at least clear from the American case that the growth of a lower class organizational structure is *not* part of the natural process of economic development. In fact, the consistent positive correlation between organizational involvement and social class points just in the opposite direction. As Olsen and other theorists of the costs of organizational development have suggested, the consequent "natural" evolution has limited the formation of mass organizations among groups with low resources.[28]

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[26] Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 50–56.

[27] A wide range of possible reasons for this failure of group mobilization of the American lower classes has been suggested. These include the presence of the frontier, the general belief in social mobility and economic progress, the tremendous linguistic, ethnic, and religious differences during the period of immigrations, and the lack of traditional social structures such as guilds. Others have suggested more specifically political factors. For example, Walter Dean Burnham, "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe," this REVIEW, 59 (March, 1965), p. 24. A unified interpretation is obviously beyond the scope of the present discussion.

[28] Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965). The organizational membership cutting points are the same from nation to nation; they correspond closely to the percentage of citizens in each nation reporting membership in one or more organizations (U.S. 57%; U.K. 47%; Germany 44%; Italy 30%; Mexico 24%), although our scale is composed of several items, rather than membership alone.

The evidence presented here, both actual data and the simulation, suggest a basis for analysis of trends in political participation and group representation. If, for instance, it proves to be the case, as recent data suggest, that the American lower class black population is developing a secondary group structure more rapidly than other similarly located groups in society, one should expect an emergent pattern of broader based representation in the political stratum—a movement from simulation 8 to simulation 7 in Table 5.[29] A more complete understanding of these processes, *and* of the reliability of the relationships under differing conditions, might enable us to foresee some of the outcomes of patterns of social change in various national settings.

However, although alerting us to conditions which affect the rates of political participation and the relative contribution of different social groups to the participant stratum, the simulation as presented ignores the issue of the "quality of participation." We saw in the previous section that persons mobilized into a politically active role through their organizational involvement need not share the attitudes normally thought conducive to "rational" political involvement. In the conclusion we attempt to sort out some of the issues connected with the costs and benefits of more equitably distributed access to the participant stratum.

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Evidence from five nations indicates that the relationship between economic growth and increases in mass political participation is largely explained through two changes in the social structure of society: larger numbers of upper and middle class persons, in both relative and absolute terms; and the emergence of organized economic and social groups. Stating the relationship between economic development and mass political participation in terms of structural changes in society provides strong empirical correlations and leads to inclusive social theory. The frequently cited correlations between such individual traits as years of education or number of organizational memberships and the citizen's specific acts of political involvement can be subsumed into the more general theory advanced in this study.

At the national level economic development is associated with urbanization, with the growth of secondary groups, and with the expansion of the white-collar class. Each of these variables has been cited as producing mass political participation. We find, however, that at the individual level urban residence has little effect on participation. Living in larger cities has some *negative* impact on *local* participation, but the total amount of variance explained is slight. An even weaker relationship between urban residence and national participation seems purely a function of the concentration of status resources in urban areas in these systems.

There is less of a correlation between social status and organizational involvement than is sometimes supposed. In their impact on political participation, these characteristics clearly can operate independently of one another. In addition, social status and organizational involvement are differentially linked to participation by intervening political attitudes.

Social status tends to affect political participation through its impact on political attitudes and cognitions which, in turn, facilitate political activity. Although the findings are tentative, the data do suggest that the most important causal link is the creation of *attitudinal resources* that sensitize an individual to political messages and provide him the sense of competence needed to engage in political behavior. There is also evidence indicating that higher status exposes the citizen to learning situations in which the duty to participate is stressed. Acquiring this normative predisposition leads the citizen to acquire other attitudinal resources, such as information and competence, which further increase his probability of political participation. (There is, however, wide variance from nation to nation in the importance of an attitude of civic duty and we present these remarks very tentatively.) Finally, the data tend to reject the hypothesis that the well-to-do citizens participate more frequently in politics because they perceive a higher stake in the day-to-day conduct of political affairs. Correlations between such views and participation appear to be spurious.

Involvement in organizations can also produce the attitudinal resources which facilitate political participation. In some cases, at least, organizational involvement is a source of the sense of a normative obligation to participate (in Germany, a stronger source than status). However, in the main the extremely strong relationship between organizational involvement and political participation does not operate through the acquisition of attitudes and cognitions which facilitate participation.

The causal links connecting social status with political participation, links which create attitudinal resources enabling the individual to participate when opportunities occur, are a minor part of the causal impact of organizational involvement. There is either some sort of self-selection effect which ushers the same citizens into both political activity and organized group life, or there is a strong role played by organizations in mobilizing group members for political activity. The latter interpretation is the more likely, although the two are not mutually exclusive. But such mobilization, if it occurs, does not necessarily result in or reflect higher levels of general political information or awareness. Apparently mobilization opens direct lines to participation, or provides attitudinal resources relevant to specific problems only. There might be, for instance, group-initiated political discussion, group-organized contacts with political authorities, or group-related political information relevant to a specific issue.

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[29] Anthony M. Orum, "A Reappraisal of Social and Political Participation of Negroes," *American Journal of Sociology,* 72 (July, 1966), 32–46.

Implications—The findings reported in this research paper have implications more far-reaching than those thus far discussed. The findings are, of course, closely related to an understanding of some of the stresses and strains in mass democracies. A research report of this type is not the most useful vehicle for speculating about issues of democratic theory, but insofar as our data suggest some observations, we would be remiss to ignore them completely. Let us at least consider what the patterns may imply about one particularly critical problem: the paradox of mass involvement in political life.

First, the data confirm one well-known finding: Even in industrialized nations a majority of citizens do not participate very actively in politics and do not have the attitudinal resources which lead to citizen control of public policies.

The data support social theories which suggest that industrialization is a necessary condition for the establishment of mass involvement in democratic politics.[30] A key component in this theory is the observation that the tendency to get involved in politics, and the attitudes associated with involvement are not randomly distributed in society. Rather, these tendencies and attitudes tend to cluster in the middle and upper classes. Political life styles of citizens will not be markedly changed until extensive industrialization alters the status structure of society, and thereby increases the overall level of political information, attentiveness, efficacy, and so forth.

Second, the data suggest the critical role which the structure of organized group life may play in the overall level of mass political participation. It appears that the richness and complexity of organizational life might be altered somewhat independently of economic development. Deliberate governmental policies, for instance, can increase the number of citizens who are politically active. Mobilization parties in the single-party states of Africa are one example of how this might happen. Unionizing the labor force, even if comprised of peasant farmers, is another illustration. That is, although historically the growth of secondary groups has been associated with economic development, mobilization politics need not await industrialization. New stimuli to group organization may provoke new patterns of growth, although we observe that complexities and difficulties (beyond this analysis) have met such efforts in practice.

Organizational membership, then, could be a political resource for the lower classes. Were this resource equitably distributed, the criteria for pluralistic democracy advanced by Dahl, Key and others would be more nearly met.[31] That is, all social strata in the society would participate in those political processes which presumably lead to control of political leadership and through this control to influence over public policy. Group mobilization could attract into political life larger numbers of those persons who presently are political isolates. These citizens need not have the enabling antecedents, such as higher levels of education, now thought to be necessary conditions for political participation. Alterations in the organizational structure, then, can serve to correct the tendency for even the most democratically organized societies to allow a disproportionate amount of political influence to be exercised by the well-to-do.

These observations about the organization-related potential for increasing political participation should be advanced cautiously, however.

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[30] For example, Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1960), pp. 27–63. Also see Philip Cutwright, "National Political Development," in Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler, and Paul L. Smith, (eds.), *Politics and Social Life* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963), pp. 569–582. In his critical analysis of Lipset and Cutwright, Deane Neubauer argues that economic development may be a necessary condition for democracy, at least to some threshold, but that the relationship is not linear, and does not seem to hold within the subset of more developed systems he examines. See Deane Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy," this REVIEW, 61 (December, 1967), pp. 1002–1009.

[31] Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); Key, *op. cit.*; and see the exchange between Jack Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy," and Robert A. Dahl, "Further Reflections on the 'Elitist Theory of Democracy,'" this REVIEW, 60 (June, 1966), 285–305, and Communications to the Editor.

For one thing, we reemphasize that in every nation examined social status and organizational involvement were somewhat correlated, though the relationship is not determinate. Indeed, it is important for the student of American politics to note that the distribution of organizational resources is more intertwined with the distribution of status resources in the United States than in any of the other four nations in the study. The natural growth of organizations, as Mancur Olson has suggested, seems to be one which places at a disadvantage very large potential groups when the individuals who might make up those groups have limited individual resources.[32] The cost to each individual of organization building is discouragingly great. It is probably no coincidence that those nations in which both political parties and governmental bureaucracies have been most active in encouraging secondary group formation show less upper class domination of the organized life of the society. What must be concluded is that processes of economic development will not automatically help redress class participation imbalances through the growth of secondary groups.

Another note of caution must be voiced as well. One cannot be certain, particularly on the basis of data presented here, about the quality of organization-based political participation. The individual mobilized by his group membership lacks the attitudes usually associated with political involvement. This may mean that the content of his effort to influence will be largely determined by the mobilizing leaders, a possibility suggesting that organizations are more the base of a "counter-elite" than a source of broader and more democratic patterns of political influence.

Whereas our findings suggest a potential for participatory democracy which is in optimistic contrast to most modern empirical studies of mass participation, these same findings raise again the specter of mass "irrationality" and "ignorant" involvement which has haunted democratic theorists since the Greeks. Organizations mobilizing their members and providing resources for their leaders present the possibility of large numbers of political activists who do not have the attitudes usually assumed to be associated with involvement in political life. Political information, a sense of civic duty, political attentiveness, and a sense of political efficacy are not preconditions for political participation among the organizationally involved.

Just what this implies is not entirely clear from the data at hand. While some modern American theorists have placed great stock in the moderating influence of norms of tolerance and accommodation, and of the gate-keeper role of those thoroughly socialized into recognition of democratic procedures and processes,[33] it is not evident that such norms are necessarily the property of elites rather than masses. If American data showing the informed substratum to be more tolerant and democratically oriented, although also more split on political issues, are correct, then group mobilization in this system is likely to be associated with higher levels of conflict and intolerance.[34] On the other hand, there is some evidence that in systems with a more ideological and conflict-ridden history, the better informed and more active citizens may possess belief systems into which deeply rooted hostility and suspicion of the opposition, as well as intransigent issue positions, are firmly integrated.[35] Such would seem to be the case in nations such as France, Austria, and Italy. In these circumstances, group mobilization of a certain type might draw into the system citizens oriented more pragmatically to specific issues and problems, who might press elites to abandon traditional attitudes of rigidity.

The problem is further complicated by the facts that (1) the relationship between basic attitudes, such as information and attentiveness, and the specific affective and normative content of opinions, has not been established; and (2) the possibility that under some conditions group activity itself may structure affective attitudes must be brought into the analysis. In nations where organized groups are linked to partisan camps, and few groups cut across party, class, and religious lines, then involvement itself may reinforce suspicions and hostilities. Thus, in nations such as Italy and Austria, where group members and leaders seem to be more distrustful of the opposition than citizens at large,[36] the mobilization of ever greater numbers of participants through this same group structure may only increase the number of distrustful participants, neither easing our exacerbating the hostility among political elites, but generally intensifying the political interactions in the system.

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[32] Olson, *op. cit.*

[33] Dahl, *op. cit.*; and Key., *op. cit.*

[34] James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy," *Journal of Politics*, 22 (1960), 276–294; Samuel Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1955); Herbert McClosky, Paul J. Hoffmann, and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus among Party Leaders and Followers," this REVIEW, 59 (June, 1960), 406–427.

[35] See, for example, Duncan MacRae, Jr., *Parliament, Parties and Society in France, 1946–1958* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967.) Also, for suggestive data from a single community, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Fragmentation and Hostility in an Austrian Community* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, forthcoming).

In short, the place of participation in the nature of democratic processes is a complex one, and the effect of increases in participation, particularly through operation of organized groups, depends on a number of other factors. Even such implications as we have suggested must be advanced only as speculations in no way tested by our data. What we have shown is that the relationship between individual political activity and mass political participation has some properties not heretofore recognized. It is a separate research task to specify how different bases of political participation produce different politics.

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[36] See the general discussion of organizational fragmentation; as well as the data on Italy, in Sidney Verba, "Organizational Membership and Democratic Consensus," *Journal of Politics,* 27 (1965), 467–497. Also see the discussion and data of Powell, *ibid.;* Chapters I and IV; Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), Chapter I; and Rodney P. Stiefbold, "Elite-Mass Opinion Structure and Communication Flow in a Consociational Democracy (Austria)," paper presented at the 1968 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

APPENDIX I. STANDARD ERRORS FOR STANDARDIZED PATH COEFFICIENTS IN EIGHT VARIABLE RECURSIVE MODEL REPORTED IN TABLE 2

Dependent Variable	Equation	Country	Standard Error for:						
			B_1	B_2	B_3	B_4	B_5	B_6	B_7
X_2	$=B_{21}X_1+B_{2t}R_t$	US	.046						
		UK	.013						
		GR	.037						
		IT	.027						
		MX	.018						
X_3	$=B_{32}X_2+B_{31}X_1+B_{3u}R_u$	US	.062	.062					
		UK	.015	.015					
		GR	.039	.039					
		IT	.031	.031					
		MX	.020	.020					
X_4	$=B_{43}X_3+B_{42}X_2+B_{41}X_1+B_{4v}R_v$	US	.070	.063	.061				
		UK	.016	.016	.016				
		GR	.041	.043	.043				
		IT	.034	.035	.038				
		MX	.021	.021	.021				
X_5	$=B_{54}X_4+B_{53}X_3+B_{52}X_2+B_{51}X_1+B_{5w}R_w$	US	.069	—*	.071	.081			
		UK	.019	.016	.017	.021			
		GR	.045	—*	.049	.055			
		IT	—*	.038	.040	.039			
		MX	.024	—*	.022	.025			
X_6	$=B_{65}X_5+B_{64}X_4+B_{63}X_3+B_{62}X_2+B_{61}X_1+B_{6x}R$	US	.077	.063	.073	.084	.060		
		UK	—*	.016	.018	.019	.017		
		GR	.045	.044	.051	.060	.045		
		IT	.040	.037	.041	.052	.036		
		MX	.024	.023	.022	.029	.019		
X_7	$=B_{76}X_6+B_{75}X_5+B_{74}X_4+B_{73}X_3+B_{72}X_2+B_{71}X_1+B_{7y}R_y$	US	.078	.064	.080	.088	.061	.090	
		UK	.019	.017	.019	.023	.017	.020	
		GR	.046	.046	.054	.062	.045	.057	
		IT	.041	.038	.043	.055	.038	.051	
		MX	.024	.023	.022	.032	.019	.027	
x_8	$=B_{87}X_7+B_{86}X_6+B_{85}X_5+B_{84}X_4+B_{83}X_3+B_{82}X_2+B_{81}X_1+B_{8z}R_z$	US	.077	.065	.079	.092	.062	.100	.091
		UK	.019	.017	.019	.024	.017	.021	.023
		GR	.046	.046	.054	.068	.045	.063	.071
		IT	.041	.038	.043	.061	.037	.055	.060
		MX	.024	.024	.023	.033	.019	.028	.032

* E level too low to be entered in equations. No standard error computed.

APPENDIX II. COMPARISON OF DIRECT PATH LINKAGES IN SIX VARIABLE MODEL USING PARTICIPATION SCALE, TALKING POLITICS, AND CONTACTING LOCAL OFFICIALS AS DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Sample	Direct Path	Dependent Variable		
		Talking Politics	Contacting Local Officials	Participation Scale
US	Status→Dep Var	.119	.015	.089
	Involvement→	.022	.209	.297
	Information→	.017	.031	.055
	Efficacy→	.209	.186	.176
	Attentiveness→	.333	.156	.248
UK	Status→Dep Var	.000	−.051	−.007
	Involvement→	.136	.121	.303
	Information→	.121	.114	.143
	Efficacy→	.100	.092	.100
	Attentiveness→	.366	.169	.330
Germany	Status→Dep Var	.008	.023	−.058
	Involvement→	.157	.072	.299
	Information→	.018	−.048	.043
	Efficacy→	.146	.230	.244
	Attentiveness→	.440	.199	.304
Italy	Status→Dep Var	−.029	.176	−.045
	Involvement→	.102	.081	.246
	Information→	.000	−.100	−.045
	Efficacy→	.104	.225	.211
	Attentiveness→	.606	.037	.426
Mexico	Status→Dep Var	.077	−.009	−.011
	Involvement→	.070	.110	.358
	Information→	.107	.030	.145
	Efficacy→	.066	.137	.091
	Attentiveness→	.408	.109	.194

APPENDIX III. PATH COEFFICIENTS FOR TEN VARIABLE RECURSIVE MODEL OF LOCAL PARTICIPATION X_1 = SIZE OF COMMUNITY

Dependent Variable	Country	B_1	B_2	B_3	B_4	B_5	B_6	B_7	B_8	B_9
X_2	US	−.022								
	UK	.130								
Length of Residence	GR	−.042								
	IT	.031								
	MX	.007								
X_3	US	.145	−.116							
	UK	.056	−.266							
Social Status	GR	.165	−.115							
	IT	.167	−.088							
	MX	.119	−.019							
X_4	US	−.080	.110	.462						
	UK	.031	.039	.323						
Organization Involvement	GR	−.040	−.026	.217						
	IT	−.073	.060	.321						
	MX	−.007	.063	.229						
X_5	US	.008	.024	.287	.154					
	UK	−.017	.047	.168	.184					
Local Citizen Duty	GR	−.061	−.002	.177	.237					
	IT	.017	−.011	.204	.300					
	MX	.008	.067	.177	.160					
X_6	US	−.022	−.022	.340	.142	.288				
	UK	−.021	−.063	.349	.171	.202				
Political Information	GR	.183	−.020	.237	.185	.254				
	IT	−.053	.007	.382	.231	.206				
	MX	.008	−.007	.380	.266	.180				
X_7	US	.068	.004	.043	.065	.121	.156			
	UK	−.023	.070	.104	.007	.149	.117			
Impact of Local Gov.	GR	−.007	.050	.036	.015	.050	.221			
	IT	−.115	−.021	.040	.014	.133	.273			
	MX	−.079	.129	.005	.011	.065	.078			
X_8	US	−.076	.063	.126	.150	.225	.160	.108		
	UK	−.022	.059	.018	.155	.139	.100	.164		
Political Efficacy	GR	−.168	.119	.123	.132	.160	.159	.025		
	IT	−.090	−.004	.179	.170	.170	.155	.094		
	MX	.038	.021	.125	.121	.051	.270	.080		
X_9	US	.081	.031	.084	.118	.060	.310	.106	.223	
	UK	.035	−.040	.123	.075	.145	.336	.006	.156	
Attentiveness to Politics	GR	.030	.067	.060	.139	.134	.356	.080	.161	
	IT	−.011	.023	.113	.136	.139	.389	.014	.147	
	MX	.046	−.017	.091	.182	.137	.262	.058	.209	
X_{10}	US	−.047	.030	.045	.192	−.058	.061	.033	.183	.174
	UK	−.056	.001	.054	.124	.020	.107	.080	.075	.171
Local Participation	GR	−.095	−.021	.031	.069	.040	−.033	.126	.202	.158
	IT	−.031	−.021	.173	.075	.031	−.064	−.057	.195	.066
	MX	−.037	.020	−.003	.110	.001	.033	.132	.127	.097

APPENDIX IV. PROCEDURES USED IN COMPUTING THE TABLES (4, 5, 6) IN THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND THE PARTICIPATION OF CLASS GROUPS

In our discussion of the representation of various class groups among the political participants in a society, we present three tables of simulated and empirical data. The following description of the computation of these tables should be compared to the analytic discussion in the text.

Table 4 and 5: Simulated Data. The following step-by-step analysis applies to the Columns in Table 5. For Table 4, use steps 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 only.

(1) Columns I–III are the conditions stipulated for the society whose participation pattern is to be simulated.

(2) From these three conditions it is necessary to compute the size of the six class-organization groups in the society (i.e. proportion of low class-uninvolved, low class-involved, middle class-uninvolved, middle class-involved, upper class-uninvolved, upper class-involved.)

(3) If the correlation between status and organizational membership is .0, then the organizational memberships—whose absolute number in the society is given in Column II—are distributed evenly through the class groups. The size of the group is multiplied by .15, .60, or whatever the proportion of memberships in the system, and this gives the size of the involved members' proportion in each class group. The uninvolved are the difference between the involved proportion and the original size of the group.

(4) If the correlation is .50, then our estimates (See footnote 14) suggest that the difference between the number of organization members in the upper class and the number in the lower class should be about 35%. The following equation can be solved for the percentage of organization members in each class group, given this range of difference and the stipulated level of organizational membership in the society:

$Ax+By+Cz=100\ M$

$z=x+35$, $y=x+17$; as simultaneous equations

where:

A is the proportion of lower class persons in the society

B is the proportion of middle class persons in the society

C is the proportion of upper class persons in the society

M is the proportion of organization members given

x is the proportion of organization members in the lower class; y is the proportion of organization members in the middle class; z is the proportion of organization members in the upper class.

A, B, C, and M are stipulated by the conditions. Other simulations for alternative correlations between status and organization could, of course, be carried out using estimates of the type noted in footnote 22—which determine the relationships between x, y, and z in the above equations.

(5) The proportion of each sub-group in the society is multiplied by the participation rates for that sub-group, shown in the text and originally estimated from the average cross-national correlation coefficients.

(6) The number of participants in each sub-group is summed to get the participation rate for the society. (See Table 4.)

(7) The numbers in the sub-group are compared to the total participation rate to show the proportion of participants made up of lower, middle, and upper class individuals. (See Column IV in Table 5).

(8) The difference between lower class proportion in the society and lower class proportion of political participants (from columns I and IV) is divided by the size of the class group (from Column I) to get the index of under or overrepresentation of the group. (See Column V in Table 5.)

Table 6: Empirical Data from Five Nations.

For Table 6 we use, of course, empirical data from the surveys in the five nations to determine the size and participation within the class-organization groups. As noted in footnotes in the text, similar cutting points on the various scales were used for all five nations, with one exception. The group sizes and participation rates for the United States are shown below as an example.

Size of Class-Organization Groups in United States		*Participation in Each Group*
Low class, uninvolved	20%	14.5%
Low class, involved	11%	43.5%
Middle Class, Uninvolved	21%	32.5%
Middle Class, involved	24%	60.0%
Upper Class, uninvolved	5%	40.8%
Upper Class, involved	20%	75.5%
Total	101%	

Using this data, the calculations can be made as above, steps 5–8, or the figures in the Table can be calculated from the data more directly.

URBANIZATION AS AN AGENT IN LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTABILITY: THE CASE OF MEXICO*

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I. INTRODUCTION

A large descriptive and conjectural literature has evolved during the past decade suggesting that rapid urbanization—conceived primarily as a massive demographic shift from country to city—constitutes an important agent of political instability in much of Latin America, favoring the growth of alienation and radicalism.[1] This effect is frequently attributed to the frustration of migrant expectations for economic improvement and social mobility in the large cities, or to the processes of personal and social disorganization allegedly inherent in the migration experience. Although field researchers have long suspected the inadequacy of such theory, derived largely from the urbanization experiences of advanced Western nations, for explaining political instability in Latin America, there have been few systematic attempts at testing the various propositions and unconfirmed generalizations advanced by the "urban instability-crisis-and-chaos" theorists. This paper attempts to explore, if not to test, some of the empirical implications of the general theoretical conceptions of the urbanizing process and its socio-political consequences as developed in recent social science literature on Latin America. Mexico is selected for analysis both by virtue of its extremely rapid rate of rural-urban migration in recent years and because of the opportunities afforded by the availability for Mexico of detailed survey data from a number of independent sources to examine systematically a wide range of theoretically relevant variables and relationships posited in the urbanization literature. While in certain areas (as indicated below) the particular nature of the Mexican political system and developmental pattern may render these findings imperfect as predictors for other parts of Latin America, the analysis presented here should serve to identify the major inadequacies of existing theory and illustrate the need for new conceptual models which can encompass both stabilizing and destabilizing concomitants of rapid urban concentration in a developing nation.

II. THEORY

For purposes of analysis it is possible to reduce current urbanization theory to three basic themes or clusters of interrelated propositions, which may be stated and schematized as follows:

(1) *Urbanization breeds economic frustration among the migrant population,* which aspires high but fails to participate in the material rewards of urban society. This "frustration gap" between high expectations and the ability to fulfill them results both from the inadequate premigration preparation of the migrants and the inability of urban government and private enterprise to accommodate them. Migrants are deficient in both the skills to earn a living in their new environment and the education needed to learn the

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* The author is indebted to Richard R. Fagen, Robert A. Packenham, and Barry S. Rundquist, all of Stanford University, for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

[1] Overviews of a large part of this literature are provided in Richard M. Morse, "Recent Research on Latin American Urbanization," *Latin American Research Review,* 1 (Fall, 1965), 35–74; William Mangin, "Latin American Squatter Settlements: A Problem and a Solution," *Latin American Research Review,* 2 (Summer, 1967), 65–98; and Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr., "The Political Sociology of Cityward Migration in Latin America: Toward Empirical Theory," in Francine F. Rabinovitz and Felicity M. Trueblood (eds.), *Latin American Urban Annual* (Vol. I; Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, forthcoming). Most discussions of Latin American urban affairs by social scientists and historians reflect a substantial intellectual debt to "mass society" theorists such as William Kornhauser and to the early "Chicago School" of urban sociology, especially the ideas of Robert E. Park and Louis Wirth. See W. Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (New York: Free Press, 1959); R. E. Park, "Human Migration and the Marginal Man," *American Journal of Sociology,* 3 (May, 1928), 881–893; and L. Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," in A. J. Reiss (ed.), *Louis Wirth on Cities and Social Life* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964). For detailed analyses of the Chicago School formulations see Robert E. L. Faris, *Chicago Sociology, 1920–1932* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1967); and R. N. Morse, *Urban Sociology* (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 15–38, 160–72.


Misinformation
High Expectation Levels
Demonstration Effect
"Frustration Gap"
RELATIVE DEPRIVATION
Low Fulfillment Capabilities
Inadequate Premigration Preparation
Limited Absorptive Capacity of Cities
High Level of Social Communication
High Salience of Political Activity
Accelerated Politicization
Opposition Voting
ALIENATION
POLITICAL RADICALIZATION
Primary-group Breakdown
Urban Life-style
Breakdown of Traditional Values
"Anomic Gap"
Lack of Replacement System
SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL MAL-ADJUSTMENT
Radical Agitation, Organizing Activity
Support for Protest Movements, Demonstrations
Increased Availability
Spatial Concentration

FIGURE 1. Migrant assimilation in Latin American urban environments: theory

skills; upward mobility is sharply restricted.[2] Moreover, the accelerated population input into cities makes it impossible for the public and private sectors to provide adequate housing, education, and other essential urban services. Thus for the majority of migrants, the city brings thwarted mobility expectations and objective living conditions often worse than those endured in the countryside. And the "demonstration effect" of concentrated buying power and highly conspicious forms of consumption in urban areas makes the migrants increasingly conscious of their marginal role in society. Cognitive mechanisms of relative deprivation are set into operation.[3] Frustrated material expectations and feelings of relative deprivation lead to alienation and increase the migrant's propensity to engage in radical political activity.[4]

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[2] Cf. Lawrence R. Alschuler, *Political Participation and Urbanization in Mexico* (Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1967; Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1968, No. 68–3156), p. 97; Leonard Cardenas, Jr., "Trends and Problems of Urbanization in the U.S.-Mexico Border Area" (unpublished paper presented at the Conference on Urbanization in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region, University of Texas at El Paso, June, 1968), p. 4; and R. H. Fitzgibbon, "Political Implications of Population Growth in Latin America," *The Sociological Review,* 11 (February, 1967), p. 41.

[3] The relative deprivation concept is relied upon frequently in research on political alienation in Latin American countries. It is argued that even though many migrants to the cities arrive with a relatively low level of expectations and perceive a relative increase in environmental satisfaction as they compare their present status with their rural past, these early feelings of relative reward give way—perhaps after ten or fifteen years of urban residence—to relative deprivation. Migrant consciousness of economic marginality in the city supposedly increases over time. Such arguments are incorporated into the conceptual framework developed in Gláucio A.D. Soares, "Desarrollo económico y radicalismo político," in Joseph A. Kahl (ed.), *La industrialización en América Latina* (Mexico City and Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1965), pp. 516–559; Soares, "The Politics of Uneven Development: The Case of Brazil," in S. M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (ed.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-Na-*

(2) *Migrants experience major difficulties in adjusting socially and psychologically to the urban environment.* Such difficulties originate in culture conflicts, the disorganization of previous living habits and customs, personal "identity crises," and primary-group breakdown.[5] Large nuclear families and kinship ties tend to disintegrate in urban society with its new standards, economic demands, and mobility patterns. The traditional social controls on deviant behavior may be weakened.[6] Ruralistic norms and modes of social interaction are found to be either irrelevant or harmful under urban conditions. Orthodox religious values are undermined, accompanied by a sense of normlessness, insecurity, and felt need for social reintegration by entry into new protective groupings. There results an "anomic gap,"[7] a time lag between the abandonment of the traditional value system and the acceptance of a replacement system. During this period the migrant is particularly vulnerable to recruitment into extremist political movements which seek to satisfy his psychological need for reintegration. Personal anomia and feelings of social isolation may persist long after the migrant is assimilated economically into his urban surroundings, threatening a chronic susceptibility to manipulation by demagogic political leaders.[8]

(3) *Urbanization, increased awareness of government and politics, and mobilization of radical opposition force go hand in hand.* Exposure to the urban environment with its higher level of social communication, intense competition among diverse social and economic interests, and salience of organized political activity accelerates the politicization of migrants and creates conditions for mass involvement in direct political action. Migrant frustrations and anxieties stemming from problems of assimilation into the urban environment are translated into support for opposition political parties and aggressive protest movements against established urban governments.[9] We may expect the anti-system, protest vote in a given area or locality to increase in response to high rates of in-migration.[10] Large influxes of migrants tend

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tional Perspectives (New York: Free Press, 1967), at pp. 488–489; and G. Soares and R. L. Hamblin, "Socio-economic Variables and Voting for the Radical Left: Chile, 1952," this REVIEW, 61 (December, 1967), pp. 1055–1056. For other discussions and applications of the relative deprivation concept in recent studies of urban disorder and civil strife, see Ted Gurr, "Urban Disorder: Perspectives from the Comparative Study of Civil Strife," *American Behavioral Scientist,* 11 (March-April, 1968), 50–55; Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," this REVIEW, 62 (December, 1968), 1104–1124; and Don R. Bowen, *et al.,* "Deprivation, Mobility, and Orientation Toward Protest of the Urban Poor," *American Behavioral Scientist,* 11 (March-April, 1968), 20–24.

[4] Cf. Margot Romano Yalour de Tobar and Edith Soubie, "Marginalidad y alienación en la clase obrera," *Cuadernos del Centro de Estudios Urbanos y Regionales* (Argentina), No. 9 (1967), pp. 129–132.

[5] Cf. Héctor Martínez, "Tensión y conflicto en el proceso de formación de la nacionalidad peruana," *Aportes* (France), 7 (January, 1968), p. 62; and Martin C. Needler, *Latin American Politics in Perspective* (Rev. ed.; Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1968), pp. 63–64.

[6] Cf. Martin C. Needler, "Political Implications of Urbanization in Mexico" (unpublished paper presented at the Conference in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region, University of Texas at El Paso, June, 1968), p. 15.

[7] The term is from Soares and Hamblin, *op. cit.,* p. 1054. Cf. J. Medina Echavarria and Philip M. Hauser, "Rapporteurs' Report," in P. Hauser (ed.), *Urbanization in Latin America* (New York: International Documents Service, 1961), p. 54.

[8] Cf. Mauricio Gómez Mayorga, *et al., La superurbanización caótica* (Mexico, D. F.: Prensa Universitaria, 1963), p. 4; Gerardo Andújar, "Migración urbano-rural y autoritarismo político," *Revista Paraguaya de Sociología* (Paraguay), No. 6 (1966); and Jorge Giusti, "Rasgos organizativos en el problador marginal urbano latino-americano," *Revista Mexicana de Sociología* (Mexico), 30 (January-March, 1968), pp. 73–75.

[9] Cf. Kenneth F. Johnson, *Urbanization and Political Change in Latin America* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 1963; Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1964, No. 64-2244), pp. 138, 339-340; K. F. Johnson, "Causal Factors in Latin American Political Instability," *Western Political Quarterly,* 17 (September, 1964), p. 442; Ben G. Burnett and K. F. Johnson, *Political Forces in Latin America: Dimensions of the Quest for Stability* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1968), p. 519; and Dankwart Rustow, *A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 245.

[10] Cf. K. F. Johnson, *The Guatemalan Presidential Election of March 6, 1966* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political

> to exacerbate the destabilizing forces already at work in major cities, inviting extreme responses from either governments or populations or both. Radical agitation among the increasingly politicized urban masses, made less patient by the visible abundance of the city and more powerful by their concentration, becomes one of the greatest long-term threats to orderly development within a non-authoritian framework.[11]

It should be emphasized that the above propositions are not deduced from an integrated, formal theory of urban migration and political behavior in Latin America which is elaborated or adhered to *in toto* by the writers cited in connection with them. They are, however, reflective of a general theoretical orientation persisting strongly in discussions of the socio-political implications of rapid urbanization in the region. This orientation places heavy stress on the personally disorienting, socially disintegrative, and politically disruptive consequences of the urbanizing process.

III. METHODOLOGY

We have little direct information on attitudinal and behavioral consequences of Latin American urbanization which would enable rigorous testing of the foregoing set of propositions on a cross-national basis. However, by secondary analysis of available data from field surveys, the national census, and national election returns, we can at least approximate this goal within the context of an individual country. In the analysis of the Mexican case which follows, I shall draw primarily upon survey data on urban political culture in Mexico originally gathered for Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba's pioneering cross-national study, *The Civic Culture*.[12] The relatively small number of retrospective questions in the main survey instrument used in this study, as well as the lack of a control group of non-migrant Mexicans still residing in rural areas to which the urban sample might be compared, impose certain limitations on the use of these data for an investigation of the urbanization process. Nevertheless, they still represent the most important body of systematic data on the urban Mexican's cognition and evaluation of, and sense of participation in, politics and government.[13] For purposes of the present analysis, a migrant sample consisting of 467 adult respondents born in rural villages or localities of less than 5,000 population, and who had migrated to urban centers of 10,000 or over by the time of the survey, was isolated from the universe of 1297 Mexican cases analyzed in *The Civic Culture*.[14] (Some 68 respondents interviewed in the Kahl survey in Mexico were also found to conform to our definition of migrant

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Systems, 1967), p. 18; Soares and Hamblin, *op. cit.*, p. 1062; and Soares in Kahl, *op. cit.*, pp. 553-555.

[11] Cf. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 281-283; Rex D. Hopper, "Research on Latin America in Sociology," in Charles Wagley (ed.), *Social Science Research on Latin America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 265; Paul Kelso, "A Developing Democracy," in Russel C. Ewing (ed.), *Six Faces of Mexico* (Tucson, Ariz.: University of Arizona Press, 1966), p. 164; Alan Angell, "Party Systems in Latin America, *Political Quarterly*, 37 (July-September, 1966), pp. 313, 316; and Philip L. Wagner, "Political Implications of Rapid Urbanization in Caribbean Countries" (unpublished paper presented at the 57th Annual Meeting of the American Association of Geographers, Miami Beach, Fla., 1962).

[12] Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963. See also the detailed interpretation of the Mexican survey results provided in Robert E. Scott, "Mexico: The Established Revolution," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.), *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

[13] Another useful source of survey data on attitudinal consequences of Mexican urban development, though lacking a specifically political focus, is Joseph A. Kahl's study, *The Measurement of Modernism: A Study of Values in Brazil and Mexico* (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1968). Occasional reference will be made in this paper to the results of a secondary analysis performed on this data, obtained through the International Data Library and Reference Service, University of California, Berkeley.

[14] The actual total of interviews was 1,008, which was upweighted to 1,297 to compensate for undersampling of Mexico City, done in order to allow for greater interior city coverage. (A complete description of the Mexican sample is provided in *The Civic Culture*, Appendix A, pp. 514–516.) My use of a place-of-birth criterion in defining the migrant population has certain obvious limitations. For example, we have no indication in a given case of the stages of the migratory process or of the respondent's stage in his life cycle when he arrived in the big city. Thus between the time of departure from the community of origin and the time of arrival in the city where interviewed, a migrant may have lived in several different communities of varying size, perhaps arriving in the interview city with a relatively high degree of anticipatory socialization into urban living pat-

status, and will hereafter be referred to as the *Measurement of Modernism* sample.[15]) The modal respondent in our *Civic Culure* sample is over 35 years of age and has resided in a city of over 100,000 population for ten or more years. Females are overrepresented in our sample by a factor of 1.2 (the ratio of percent female migrants to percent females in the 1960 Mexican census). This figure is roughly comparable to the slight degree of female predominance in lifetime migratory streams in the Mexican nation as a whole in recent decades, as well as in migration patterns of other Latin American countries. Such findings reflect the continuing attractiveness of urban opportunities for female employment in commerce, industry, and services.[16]

Before turning to an examination of the social and economic characteristics, attitudes, and behavior patterns exhibited by members of our migrant sample, it may prove useful to orient the discussion by providing a brief overview of the process of urban concentration in Mexico in recent years. Some knowledge of the nature, rate, and magnitude of the process is important to an assessment of the contextual basis for political radicalism and instability in the nation's major urban centers.

IV. DEMOGRAPHY

There is no lack of evidence to support the contention that Mexico is rapidly becoming one of the most highly urbanized nations in the Latin American region. According to recent estimates by the Inter-American Development Bank, Mexico's current rate of urban growth is among the three highest in the region.[17] Although both urban and rural populations have increased sharply in Mexico, between 1950 and 1960 the rural population expanded at a rate of 1.6% per year while the urban population grew at a rate of 6.1% per year.[18] The proportion of Mexico's population in cities of 10,000 or over rose from 12% in 1900 to 38% in 1960; and it

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terns (Cf. Anthony and Elizabeth Leeds, "Brazil and the Myth of Urban Rurality: Urban Experience, Work, and Values in 'Squatments' of Rio de Janeiro and Lima" [unpublished paper presented at the Conference on Urbanization and Work in Modernizing Societies, St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, November, 1967], pp. 17-18; and Arthur J. Field (ed.), *Urbanization and Work in Modernizing Societies* [Detroit, Mich.: Glengary Press, 1967], pp. 72–73). Analysis of survey data gathered in specific Mexican metropolitan areas does indicate, however, that a majority of migrants to such cities grew up in nearby rural areas and came directly to the big city with no extended intermediate steps. It has been suggested that for Mexico the model of "staged" migration might be an adequate description of the earlier moves from rural villages to large urban centers, but that once communication links are formed by the first movers from village to metropolis, succeeding waves of migrants do not necessarily have to follow in the same steps but may make a single move directly to the large urban center (see Jorge Alberto Harth Deneke, "The Colonias Proletarias of Mexico City: Low Income Settlements at the Urban Fringe," [unpublished M.A. thesis, M.I.T., 1966], p. 92). Support for this hypothesis comes from a number of anthropological and demographic studies of cityward migration in Mexico, including Oscar Lewis, "Urbanización sin desorganización," *América Indígena* (Mexico), 17 (July, 1957), p. 238; Douglas S. Butterworth, "A Study of the Urbanization Process Among Mixtec Migrants from Tilaltongo in Mexico City," *América Indígena,* 22 (July, 1962), p. 261; and Jorge Balán, *et al.* (eds.), *Movilidad social, migración, y fecundidad en Monterrey metropolitano* (Monterrey, Mexico: Centro de Investigaciones Económicas, Universidad de Nuevo León; and Population Research Center, University of Texas, Austin, 1967), pp. 73–75. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the primary place of urban socialization for most members of our migrant sample was the city where they were interviewed. The "missing" data on prior urban experience and its consequences for the assimilation process in large cities may well be non-existent.

[15] Note that subsequent references to "migrants" interviewed in the Kahl survey pertain only to those respondents meeting our criteria for definition of migrant status and not those employed by Kahl in his original analysis of the data (see *The Measurement of Modernism, op. cit.,* p. 26).

[16] See Zulma Carmen Camisa, "Effects of Migration on the Growth and Structure of Population in the Cities of Latin America," in United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Proceedings of the World Population Conference, 1965* (New York, 1967) (E/CONF.41/5), Vol. IV, pp. 408–411.

[17] See the data reproduced in Irving L. Horowitz, "Electoral Politics, Urbanization, and Social Development in Latin America," *Urban Affairs Quarterly,* 2 (March, 1967), Table 2, p. 10.

[18] Raúl Benítez Zenteno, "La población rural y urbana en México," *Revista Mexicana de Sociología,* 24 (September, 1962), 689–703. The best general survey of recent urban growth in Mexico is provided in Luis Unikel, "El proceso de urbanización en México: Distribución y crecimiento de la población urbana," *Demografía y Economía* (Mexico), 2 (1968) 139–283. Official Mexican use of the

is estimated that by 1980, nearly 70% of the population will be classified as urban.[19] Mexico's high rate of natural population growth (about 3.8% per annum in 1967 and 1968) has, of course, been an important factor in urban expansion. Of far greater importance, however, is the movement of population from the countryside into the cities, which reached torrential proportions in the 1950-1960 period, when over 2.4 million persons participated in the exodus from rural life.[20] Many left in search of greater occupational and educational opportunities in the cities; many more because of intolerable living conditions and population pressure on depleted rural land.[21] It is not surprising to find that most inter-state migration has originated in the six centrally-located states comprising the Mexican Bajío, a semi-arid agricultural region where population pressure on the land has been most severe.[22] Some 52% of the respondents in our migrant sample drawn from the *Civic Culture* survey were born in the Bajío region.

Long-distance migration has been concentrated overwhelmingly in a few large streams running from the centrally-located states to the Mexico City (Federal District) metropolitan area and the North Pacific (Baja California) region.[23] During the 1950-1960 period the population of the Federal District grew to over five million inhabitants; and growing at an annual rate of 7.2%, its population is expected to top the seven million mark by 1970.[24] The impact of migration on the capital's expansion can be gauged from the fact that over 37% of the people in the District in 1960 had migrated from elsewhere in the nation since 1950.[25] This influx contributed substantially to the truly spectacular expansion of the "*colonia proletaria*" zones, located for the most part on the periphery of Mexico City proper and extending beyond its legal limits. During the past two decades these marginal settlements expanded at an average rate of 46% per annum, while the core districts of the city grew at an annual rate of 2%. In 1966 it was estimated that nearly two million people—over one third of the population of Mexico City—made their homes in the *colonias proletarias*.[26]

V. ECONOMIC ASSIMILATION

There is some evidence that material deprivation in Mexican urban areas is not as serious as might be expected, given the massive influx of new residents from the countryside. Between 1940 and 1960, for example, the percentage of Federal District residents without access to public sanitation increased by only 18.9%, while the District's population grew by 177.1%.[27]

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figure 2,500 as the breaking point between urban and rural is considered to be highly unrealistic by most students of Mexican demography. The cutting point was adopted by Mexico from U.S. census practice without due regard for differing conditions in the smaller and less developed country. Most Mexican localities of less than 10,000 people are essentially rural communities with few commercial or other urban functions and services. Thus for purposes of this paper, the "urban" population will be conceived as including all those residents of localities of 10,000 or more population.

[19] Nacional Financiera, *50 años de revolución en cifras* (Mexico, D. F., 1963), p. 40; and Raúl Benítez Zenteno and Gustavo Cabrera Acevedo, *Proyecciones de la población de México, 1960-1980* (Mexico, D. F.: Banco de México, S. A.; Investigaciones Industriales, Oficina de Recursos Humanos, 1966), p. 58.

[20] Gustavo Cabrera, "La migración interna en México, 1950–1960," *Demografía y Economía,* 1 (1967), p. 357.

[21] For data-based analyses of motivations for rural-urban migration in recent Mexican experience, Balán, *et al., op. cit.,* pp. 107–159; Butterworth, *op. cit;* and Enrique Valencia, *La Merced: Estudio ecológico y social de una zona de la ciudad de México* (Mexico, D. F.: Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, 1965; Serie Investigaciones No. 11), pp. 243–258

[22] Cf. Julio César Olivé Negrete and Beatriz Barba de Piña Chán, "Estudio de las clases sociales en la ciudad de México: experiencias con un grupo obrero," *Anales del Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia* (Mexico), 14 (1962), pp. 237–238.

[23] See Cabrera, *op. cit.,* pp. 312-60; and Robert P. Stevens, "Algunos aspectos de la migración interna y urbanización en México, 1950-1960," *La geografía y los problemas de población* (Unión Geográfica Internacional, Conferencia Regional Latinoamericana), 1 (1966), 65–72.

[24] G. Luna, "Megalopolis Trends in Mexico," *Ekistics* (Greece), 24 (July, 1967), 15–20.

[25] Oliver Oldman, *et al., Financing Urban Development in Mexico City* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 7 ff.

[26] Deneke, *op. cit.,* p. 32.

[27] James W. Wilkie, *The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change since 1910* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 231. There are some fragmentary data from Mexican government surveys indicating that service deprivation is relatively more acute in the capital's peripheral *colonia proletaria* zones (see Deneke, "The *Colonias Proletarias* of Mexico City," *op. cit.,* pp. 73–74), where over 70% of the adult residents are first-generation migrants. However, survey data gathered by academic researchers indicate that a majority of *colonia* dwellers do

Thus for perhaps a majority of migrants to the capital, the move from country to city resulted in an improvement in the level of services and other material amenities to which they had access. This contention is supported by the results of an analysis of a sample of the 1960 Mexican census in the Federal District, which showed that, contrary to expectation, migrant residents do not differ significantly from the urban-born population with respect to standard of living indicators taken from the census data (e.g., availability of running water in households, sewage facilities, ownership of radios and household appliances).[28] Widespread service deprivation and deteriorating overall conditions of life for the in-migrant population are more often assumed than demonstrated. Confounding evidence takes on added significance in light of an analysis of aggregate data on urbanization and political development in the Latin American region, which found that "while ideological and psychological factors play a role in assuring or undermining stability, they are keyed to the real level of material services [provided] to urban residents."[29]

The migrant's decision to remain in the urban center to which he has moved must be based on a modicum of perceived satisfaction with the urban environment. Whether or not this measure of satisfaction derives from the migrant's subjective, retrospective comparison of his present situation with his rural past, or from an actual improvement in objective conditions of living which he has experienced in the post-migration period, his intention to remain in the city serves as one indicator of success in meeting the basic challenges of economic assimilation. The data from the *Civic Culture* survey suggest a far more widespread satisfaction with his new environment than the migrant is normally credited with. Among those respondents in our migrant sample with less than two years of residence in the city where interviewed, 41% express a definite intention to remain there; and after four years of urban residence this figure rises to over 80%. A relatively low rate of remigration (i.e., return to the countryside as a negative response to the urban environment) is suggested by these data.[30]

The quality of a migrant's economic assimilation is obviously a factor of critical importance in determining whether he will later develop a "frustration gap" leading to alienation or political radicalism. It is reasonable to assume that successful assimilation depends in large part upon the migrant's capacity to display salable productive skills. This in turn depends upon his premigration preparation: his basic education and work experience. Among the newly-arrived migrants in our *Civic Culture* sample (those with under two years of urban residence), 70% had attained some level of primary education (up to six years of schooling); and among the migrants as a whole, 69% had achieved a primary education or higher. It would thus appear that the bulk of migrants arriving in Mexican urban centers possess at least the basic educational equipment which would enable them to learn productive skills in the post-migration period. The data contained in Table 1 provide some indication of their success in acquiring such skills over time in the city. Of importance are the relatively large proportions of skilled workers, artisans, office workers, and small

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have access to basic urban services (see Olivé Negrete and Barba de Piña Chán, *Anales*, 14 (1962), *op. cit.*, p. 232).

[28] See Harley L. Browning, "Urbanization and Modernization in Latin America: The Demographic Perspective," in Glenn H. Beyer (ed.), *The Urban Explosion in Latin America* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967), p. 91.

[29] Francine F. Rabinovitz, "Urban Development and Political Development in Latin America," in Robert T. Daland (ed.), *Comparative Urban Research: The Administration and Politics of Cities* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, forthcoming, 1969). Respondents in Kahl's *Measurement of Modernism* survey were asked to comment on the adequacy of social welfare services available to them in the Federal District. As the following data indicate, migrant evaluations were significantly more positive than those of metropolitans (the latter defined as respondents living in Mexico City who had been living in large cities at the age of 10):

	Migrants (N = 68)	*Metropolitans* (N = 247)
Very good	31%	22%
Fair	52	47
Poor	18	32

(Migrant/metropolitan differences are significant here at the .05 level. Controlling for age does not alter the observed relationship between migrant status and positive evaluation of services.)

[30] Migrants to the capital city in the *Measurement of Modernism* survey were asked whether the move had made their lives better or worse. Some 71% of these respondents reported an improvement in living conditions as a result of cityward migration, and 76% stated that they would not consider remigration. Among migrants to the Monterrey metropolitan area surveyed in the Monterrey Mobility Study, 92% reported satisfaction with their decision to migrate, citing improved living conditions as the most important source of satisfaction: Balán, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 124–28.

TABLE 1. COMPARATIVE OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF MIGRANTS, URBAN-BORN, AND MEXICAN WORK FORCE

Occupation	Economically Active Migrants by Length of Urban Residence (in years)					All Economically Active Migrants	Urban-born[a]	Mex. Work Force[b]	Ratio: % Migrants to % Work Force
	under 2	2–4	5–9	10–19	20, over				
Unskilled worker[c]	32%	17%	25%	23%	16%	21%	11%	15%	1.4
Skilled worker, Artisan	21	46	31	38	38	36	44	11	3.3
Office worker	21	17	20	17	9	15	21	6	2.5
Agricultural	11	10	2	4	10	7	4	54	.13
Small Tradesman	11	5	17	14	22	16	12	9	1.8
Professional, Technician	5	5	5	3	2	3	6	4	.75
High Management, Business	0	0	0	2	3	2	2	1	2.0
Total[d]	101%	100%	100%	101%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
(N)	(38)	(41)	(64)	(114)	(125)	(380)	(710)		
	$\chi^2 = 44.00$, $p < .05$					$\chi^2 = 27.74$, $p < .001$			

[a] This category, as employed in this and subsequent tables, includes those respondents in the *Civic Culture* sample for Mexico born in localities of over 10,000 population.

[b] Data is for the total economically active population in 1960. Computed from International Labour Office, *Yearbook of Labor Statistics* (Geneva, 1966), pp. 168–69. Migrant and native-born distributions include data on husband's occupation reported by economically inactive, female respondents.

[c] Mexican work force percentages for skilled and unskilled workers are estimated on the basis of data included in official census categories suggesting skill level.

[d] Totals in this and subsequent tables may not add to 100% due to rounding.

tradesmen among those migrants with ten or more years of urban residence. Moreover, there is some evidence here to challenge the common assumption that the vast majority of migrants arrive in the city bereft of any useful skills and destined only to swell the ranks of the unemployed. Indeed, only 32% of the recently-arrived (under two years' urban residence), economically-active migrants in our *Civic Culture* sample may be classified as unskilled workers. When we compare the migrants as a group with the urban-born, we find about twice as many migrants as urban-born classed as unskilled workers; but differences in the distributions of cases among the remaining occupational categories are not large.[31] Comparison of the occupational distribution of all economically-active migrants with the distribution for the entire Mexican work force shows skilled workers and artisans to be over-represented among the migrants by a factor of 3.3; white-collar (office) workers by a factor of 2.5; and higher managerial personnel by a factor of 2.0. The movement of migrants into these higher status occupational groups, as well as the sharp decline in migrants classed as unskilled workers as length of urban residence increases, suggest that whatever the handicaps from which migrants suffer upon arrival in the city they are not so severe as to constitute a major obstacle to occupational mobility.[32] Kahl's survey data also indicate that urban migrants in Mexico show a tendency toward slightly more upward mobility than the native-born populations of the cities to which they move, although there is substantial variation in mobility rates among occupational status categories.[33]

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[31] For comparable survey findings from specific metropolitan areas, see Harley L. Browning and Waltraut Feindt, "Diferencias entre la población nativa y la migrante en Monterrey," *Demografía y Economía,* 2 (1968), 183-204; and Donald R. Case, "Differentiation among Manual Workers in Mexico City" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Texas at Austin, 1967), pp. 71–73, 96–106.

[32] The same conclusion is suggested by the data from the Monterrey Mobility Study. See especially Jorge Balán, "Are Farmers' Sons Handicapped in the City?" *Rural Sociology,* 33 (June, 1968), 160–74.

The *Civic Culture* data do not permit examination of the migrants' urban employment history or rate of job turnover. However, Table 2 shows the level of unemployment among employable migrants in our sample at the time of the survey. We find that the proportions of unemployed migrants and urban-born respondents are virtually the same. Although the level of unemployment among migrants is slightly higher than that among the total population of employable Mexicans, the latter figure conceals severe underemployment in rural areas, which, as we have noted, constitutes one of the major "push" factors in rural-urban migration.[34] Although no accurate underemployment data are available for urban areas, we can expect the problem there to be alleviated by the expansive capacity of the commercial and industrial sectors of the economy. In the Mexican case, absorption of increasingly large numbers of migrants into the major metropolitan areas has occurred under conditions of rapid and sustained industrial growth and relatively high structural mobility rates.[35] While apparently failing to contribute to higher real income levels for working-class Mexicans, this pattern of economic expansion is not without its implications for political stability and the moderation of demands upon governmental structures.[36]

TABLE 2. COMPARATIVE UNEMPLOYMENT LEVELS AMONG EMPLOYABLE MIGRANTS, URBAN-BORN, AND ALL EMPLOYABLE MEXICANS

Labor Force Participation Status	Employable Migrants	Employable Urban-born	All Employable Mexicans, 1960[a]
Unemployed	1.8%	1.3%	1.6%
Employed	98.2	98.7	98.4
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
(N)	(218)	(380)	
	$\chi^2 = 0.02$	(N.S.)[b]	

[a] Percentages computed from México, Secretaría de Industria y Comercio, Dirección General de Estadística, *VIII Censo general de población, 1960: Resumen general* (Mexico, D.F., 1962), Table 22, p. 362.1.

[b] In this and subsequent tables, the designation (N.S.) indicates that differences between migrant and urban-born respondents are not, by chi-square test, significant at or beyond the .05 level of significance.

Another objective measure of the quality of economic assimilation among urban migrants is family income level. The distribution of incomes for our *Civic Culture* sample of migrant respondents presented in Table 3 shows a larger proportion of migrant families than urban-born families falling into the lowest income bracket. This may be attributable to the larger proportion of migrants employed in personal services, small crafts industry, and very small-scale retail

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[33] See Joseph A. Kahl, "Social Stratification and Values in Metropoli and Provinces: Brazil and Mexico," *América Latina* (Brazil), 8 (January-March, 1965), p. 31; and Kahl, *Measurement of Modernism, op. cit.*, pp. 175, 182–183.

[34] Mexican government statistics for 1959 indicate that over half of the nation's five million agricultural workers were employed for only 145 days or less during the year (cited in U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Labor in Mexico* [Washington, D.C., 1963; BLS Report No. 251], p. 40).

[35] See Jorge Balán, "Migrant-Native Socioeconomic Differences in Latin American Cities: A Structural Analysis," *Latin American Research Review*, 4 (Spring, 1969), p. 21; and José Luis Reyna, "Some Patterns of Occupational Mobility: The Mexican Case," *Social Research*, 35 (Autumn, 1968), 540–564.

[36] Cf. Gino Germani, "Social and Political Consequences of Mobility," in Neil J. Smelser and S. M. Lipset (eds.), *Social Structure and Mobility in Economic Development* (Chicago: Aldine, 1966), pp. 391–394; and W. R. Armstrong and T. G. McGee, "Revolutionary Change and the Third World City: A Theory of Urban Involution," *Civilisations* (Belgium), 18 (1968), 353–376. Official statistics show that between 1950 and 1957, the income of the poorest 20% of the Mexican population decreased in both relative and absolute terms: Ifigenia M. de Navarrete, "Income Distribution in Mexico," in Enrique Pérez López, *et al., Mexico's Recent Economic Growth* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967), pp. 166, 170. The data on migrant perceptions of upward mobility and job satisfaction provided by the *Measurement of Modernism* survey are of particular interest in this connection. Migrants were asked whether they had gotten farther than they expected (in terms of occupational or career objectives), or not as far. Obtained responses are as follows:

Farther than respondent expected	72%
Equal with what respondent expected	23
Not as far as expected	5

In addition, some 72% of the same respondents reported that they held jobs which were "good" or "fine" in their estimation.

TABLE 3. COMPARATIVE FAMILY INCOME LEVELS OF MIGRANTS, URBAN-BORN, RURAL, AND ALL MEXICAN FAMILIES

Average Monthly Income in Mexican Pesos[a]	% of Migrant Families[b]	% of Urban-Born Families	% of All Mexican Families[c]	% Rural Families[d]
499 or under	56	34	61	73
500–999	22	28	26	19
1000–1499	13	16	10	8[f]
1500–2499	6	10	2	
2500–4999	3	7	1[e]	
5000 or over	1	5		
Total	101%	100%	100%	100%
(N)	(422)	(736)		
	$\chi^2 = 66.30$, $p < .001$			

[a] At the time of the surveys which provided income data for this table, Mexican pesos could be exchanged for U. S. dollars at a rate of 12.50 per dollar. This is the current exchange rate.

[b] Data for both migrant and non-migrant (urban-born) families reported in the *Civic Culture* survey are for the time period June–July, 1959.

[c] Calculated from Secretaría de Economia, Dirección General de Estadística, Departmento de Muestreo, *Ingresos y egresos de la población de México, en le mes de octubre de 1956: investigación por muestreo* (Mexico, D. F., 1958), pp. 76, 98, 119, 141, and 162. Time period for the data is October, 1956.

[d] Data from Pablo González Casanova, *La Democracia en México* (Mexico, D. F.: Editorial ERA, 1967), Table LXV, p. 277. Time period is 1961–1962.

[e] Includes all reported incomes above 2500 pesos per month.

[f] Includes all reported incomes above 1000 pesos per month.

trade, where wage levels have not kept pace with those in other sectors of the urban economy.[37] Comparison of the distribution of migrant incomes with those of all Mexican families shows that 23% of the migrant families fall into the higher income brackets (1000 or more pesos per month), as against the national proportion of only 13%. And the incomes of migrant families are clearly superior to those of families in the rural areas from which they come, where just 8% of the incomes fall into the upper-income groupings.

Whether or not we perceive the objective economic basis for the oft-hypothesized "frustration gap" characterizing the situation of the migrant, there is yet need to examine his subjective evaluation of that situation and the prospects for improvement. The data presented in Table 4 show a positive expectation of achieving family economic improvement among 57% of the cases in our *Civic Culture* migrant sample. This compares favorably with the level of positive expectations of improvement among the urban-born population.[38] Certainly there is little here to support the notion of widespread and deep frustration of expectations which is basic to much writing on urbanization and political instability in Latin America. Our data also indicate a curvilinear relationship between migrant expectations of improvement and length of urban residence, with the highest level of positive expectations occurring among those with five to nine years of residence in the city. It might be inferred from this that migrant expectations upon arrival in the city and in the early post-migration period are relatively low; that greater awareness of opportunities and the general affluence of urban society creates high, probably unrealistic expectations during the 5–9 year period of residence; that in subsequent years frustration of such inflated goals leads the migrant to adjust his aspirations closer to the possible. Thus our migrant data lend support to a general proposition regarding the attitudinal consequences of persisting deprivation: "In the very long run men's expectations about the goods and conditions of life to which they are entitled tend to adjust to what they are capable of attaining."[39]

What is the relationship between objective economic condition and subjective mobility expectations among the in-migrant population? Our data from the *Civic Culture* sample show a slight, positive relationship (Pearson $r = .14$, significant at the .002 level) between objective condition (indexed by family income level) and expectations of improvement. But even among the most objectively deprived, as indicated by family incomes of less than 500 pesos per month (U.S. $40), some 53% of the migrants have expectations of future economic improvement. This finding leads us to hypothesize that even for

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[37] Cf. Denis Lambert, "The Accelerated Urbanisation of Latin America and the Formation of a Tertiary Refuge Sector," *Civilisations* (Belgium), 15 (1965), 158–174, 309–325, 477–492; Fernando H. Cardoso and José Luis Reyna, "Industrialization, Occupational Structure, and Social Stratification in Latin America," in Cole Blasier (ed.), *Constructive Change in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968), pp. 22–44; and Reyna, *Social Research,* 35 (1968), *op. cit.,* pp. 542–543.

[38] Comparable data from the *Measurement of Modernism* survey are as follows:

	(N = 68)	(N = 249)
(Expectation)	*Migrants*	*Metropolitans*
Improve	87%	90%
Stay the same	9	9
Get worse	4	1

[39] Gurr, *op. cit.,* p. 1109. Further corroborating evidence for Mexico City is reported in Olivé Negrete and Barba de Piña Chán, *op. cit.,* pp. 235, 255–56.

TABLE 4. EXPECTATIONS OF FUTURE ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT AMONG MIGRANTS AND URBAN-BORN[a]

Expectation	Migrants by Length of Urban Residence (in years)					All migrants	Urban-born
	under two	2–4	5–9	10–19	20 or more		
Improve	57%	54%	65%	58%	54%	57%	64%
Stay the Same	27	25	18	15	12	17	16
Get Worse	11	6	8	14	14	12	9
Don't Know	5	15	8	13	20	14	10
Total	100%	100%	99%	100%	100%	100%	99%
(N)	(44)	(52)	(72)	(137)	(162)	(467)	(830)
	$\chi^2 = 20.79$, p <.05					$\chi^2 = 8.93$, p <.05	

[a] Item: "How will the economic situation of your family change in the next ten years?"

those individuals whose premigration training and experience is such that it significantly impedes social and economic mobility, city life brings satisfactions of a non-objective nature (e.g., opportunities for individual ownership of a homesite on the urban periphery) which help considerably to offset perceptions of relative deprivation and hold promise of future betterment.[40] Present and projected rates of Mexican economic expansion suggest that the goals of many aspirants from the lower-income strata of the newly-arrived, in-migrant population—as well as children of migrants with longer urban residence—may meet frequent disappointment. Nevertheless, the migrants' persistent non-perception of structural obstacles to vertical mobility seems supportive of the existing socio-political order.

VI. SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL ADJUSTMENT

The gap between mobility expectations and concrete socio-political orientations is not bridged directly, however. There are a number of variables of a socio-psychological nature which may also figure prominently in the calculus of support or non-support. All such variables relate to the alleged difficulties of migrants in making a successful mental adjustment to the urban setting. The deterioration of nuclear family and extended family bonds is postulated in much of the literature as one inescapable consequence of integration into the urban-industrial culture. As early as 1952, however, Oscar Lewis presented evidence that, at least in the case of Mexico, strong family and kinship ties were wholly compatible with urban life and industrialization.[41] Lewis's subsequent work in this area, based on a much wider sample of migrant families, served to corroborate these early observations and showed that migrant family life in Mexico City remained quite stable, and that extended family ties increased rather than decreased. He found that the average size of nuclear families in the city was at least as large or somewhat larger than in the migrants' native village.[42] Still more recent field studies of migrants to Mexico City have shown that migration is increasingly by family group and have failed to detect any significant deterioration of the family or kinship group in the post-migration situations.[43] My data strongly support these findings. The average nuclear family size of migrants in the *Civic Culture* sample is over 5.1 persons, with 35% of the migrant families having seven or more members. The distribution of migrant nuclear family sizes is essentially comparable to that of the urban-born and of all Mexican families according to the 1960 census. Thus we find little empirical basis for the notion of widespread primary-group breakdown as a significant factor contributing to migrant disorientation and maladjustment in the cities.

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[40] For a contrasting analysis, based on survey data for Mexico City only, in which urban experience is found to be essentially unrelated to subjective dimensions of living conditions, see Clifford Kaufman, "Urbanization and Political Involvement: Limited Reflections on the Case of Mexico City" (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September, 1968), pp. 6–10. On migrant satisfactions deriving from expanded opportunities for home ownership in marginal settlement zones, see Deneke, "The *Colonias Proletarias* of Mexico City," *op. cit.*, pp. 77–78, 108; William L. Flinn, "The Process of Migration to a Shantytown in Bogotá," *Inter-American Economic Affairs,* 22 (Autumn, 1968), p. 88; William P. Mangin, "Mental Health and Migration to Cities: A Peruvian Case," in D. B. Heath and R. N. Adams (eds.), *Contemporary Cultures and Societies of Latin America* (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 549; and Talton F. Ray, *The Politics of the Barrios of Venezuela* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 154–156.

[41] Oscar Lewis, "Urbanization Without Breakdown: A Case Study," *Scientific Monthly,* 75 (July, 1952), 31–41.

[42] Oscar Lewis, "La cultura de la vecindad en la ciudad de México," *Actas del III Congreso Internacional de Americanistas* (2 vols.; San José, Costa Rica, 1959), Vol. I, pp. 387–402.

A potentially more important factor, more difficult to measure and interpret, is that of anomie: the lack of stable cognitive orientations to a changed situation. In terms of classical folk-urban social theory, anomic response to urban life may take the form of a significant decline in religious participation, a high divorce rate, a loss of both trust and a sense of cohesion in interpersonal relations. All such phenomena are indicative of a breakdown of traditional norms, value systems, and social controls, with an attendant potential for embracing extremist ideologies or movements. Thus such demographic statistics as percentage of population divorced in a heavily Roman-Catholic Latin American country have been used as indicators of breakdown in traditional value systems and predictors of the percent voting for the radical left.[44] No clear pattern emerges from our data on anomic response among migrant and urban-born populations in Mexico. Table 5 shows that the migrants as a whole tend to be slightly more an-

TABLE 5. INDICATORS OF ANOMIC RESPONSE TO URBAN ENVIRONMENT

Indicator	Migrants by Length of Urban Residence (in years)					All migrants	Urban born
	under two	2–4	5–9	10–19	20 or more		
Frequency of Participation in Religious Services	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Weekly or more often	73	76	80	79	80	78	74
Once in a while	24	23	17	21	16	20	23
Only on holidays	2	0	3	0	3	2	2
Never	0	0	0	0	1	1	2
(N)	(41)	(49)	(69)	(131)	(153)	(443)	(795)
						$\chi^2=5.44$ (N.S.)	
Divorce Rate	0	5	7	1	5	4	2
(N)	(32)	(40)	(57)	(102)	(115)	(346)	(628)
						$\chi^2=3.64$ (N.S.)	
Social Trust							
Most people can be trusted	23	27	28	20	33	27	30
You can't be too careful	68	62	69	75	58	66	66
Depends, Don't Know	9	12	3	4	9	7	4
(N)	(44)	(52)	(72)	(137)	(162)	(467)	(830)
						$\chi^2=5.20$ (N.S.)	
Social Cohesion							
People are more inclined to help others	9	19	22	15	11	15	15
More inclined to help themselves	84	77	74	80	81	79	79
Miscellaneous, Don't Know	7	4	4	5	7	6	6
(N)	(44)	(52)	(72)	(137)	(162)	(467)	(830)
						$\chi^2=0.20$ (N.S.)	

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[43] See Butterworth, *op. cit.*, pp. 266–267; and Balán, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 128–151.

[44] Cf. Soares and Hamblin, *op. cit.*, p. 1055.

omic than the urban-born on two of the four indicators provided by the *Civic Culture* survey. The differences, however, are not statistically significant. The contention that "migration may produce anomie, but only in the long run," since it may take considerable time for migrants to lose traditional norms and values carried over from rural life,[45] is not confirmed here. In fact, the data indicate that participation in religious observances, social trust, and sense of social cohesion tend to increase among migrants with longer residence in the city.[46]

What specific politically-relevant attitudes might we expect to be associated with anomic response to the urban environment? Although this question has never been explored adequately in survey research involving Mexican or other Latin American populations,[47] we would, on theoretical grounds, expect an anomic person to be confused and bewildered by events in politics and government; to exhibit feelings of political ineffectiveness or impotence; and to display cynical attitudes toward the men and practices governing society and the state and their responsiveness to his needs.[48] Four items were selected from the *Civic Culture* interview schedule in an attempt to identify and measure some of these attitudinal correlates of anomie among members of our migrant sample.[49] Agreement with items 1 and 2, a "not-at-all-likely" response for item 3, and a "no" response for item 4 in our Table 6 could be interpreted as anomic. The data suggest that, in general, migrants are more inclined toward this type of response than urban-born Mexicans, although once again most differences between the two populations are slight. Only with respect to feelings of political cynicism (as measured by item 4) do migrants score significantly higher on the anomie index than urban-born respondents.

VII. POLITICIZATION

Even if one were to accept the prevailing orthodoxy that rapid urbanization provides a basis for political radicalization and instability through the creation of what we have defined as the "frustration gap" and the "anomic gap," still other variables of an explicitly political nature would have to be examined before attempting to assess the stabilizing or destabilizing consequences of the urbanizing process for developing political systems. Levels of migrant politicization, for example, are crucial in determining the conditions of stability or instability in rapidly expanding urban areas. Before people engage in political action, before they are moved to protest, articulate grievances or make demands upon governmental structures, they must be at least minimally politicized.[50] As we have noted, much of the recent developmental literature assumes a high level of politicization among urban populations, even among those elements whose

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[45] *Ibid.*, p. 1062; and Soares in Lipset and Rokkan, *op. cit.*, p. 489.

[46] Lewis also found that the religious life of Tepoztecan migrants to Mexico City appeared to be "at least as vigorous" and "more Catholic and disciplined" than in their native village (Oscar Lewis, "Further Observations on the Folk-Urban Continuum and Urbanization with Special Reference to Mexico City," in Philip M. Hauser and Leo F. Schnore (eds.), *The Study of Urbanization* [New York: Wiley, 1965], p. 495). Cf. Bryan R. Roberts, "Protestant Groups and Coping with Urban Life in Guatemala City," *American Journal of Sociology,* 73 (May, 1968), 753–767.

[47] See, however, the limited data on anomie and attitudes toward political participation among lower-class urban dwellers in Buenos Aires, reported in Margot Romano Yalour de Tobar and Maria Magdalena Chirico, "Clase obrera, anomia, y cambio social," *Cuadernos del Centro de Estudios Urbanos y Regionales* (Argentina), No. 9 (1967), 1–39.

[48] See Charles D. Farris, "Selected Attitudes on Foreign Affairs as Correlates of Authoritarianism and Political Anomie," *Journal of Politics,* 22 (February, 1960), p. 53; and Herbert McClosky and John H. Schaar, "Psychological Dimensions of Anomy," in Heinz Eulau (ed.), *Political Behavior in America* (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 483.

[49] Two of these items (listed as items 1 and 2 in Table 6) were also included as measures of political efficacy in the Survey Research Center's 1956 study of the U.S. electorate. For U.S. data and interpretations, see Angus Campbell, *et al., The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960), pp. 515–519.

[50] In this discussion we will adhere to the concept of politicization developed in the work of Daniel Goldrich, who conceives of the politicization process as "a continuum ranging from lack of perception of the revelance of government to one's life, through perception of it, to active involvement in politics" (Goldrich, "Toward the Comparative Study of Politicization in Latin America," in D. B. Heath and R. N. Adams (eds.), *Contemporary Cultures and Societies of Latin America* [New York: Random House, 1965], p. 361). "This concept of politicization has two dimensions: one, the perception of the personal relevance of government, is perceptual [or cognitive]; the other, political activity, is overt and behavioral" (Goldrich, *Sons of the Establishment* [Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966], p. 11).

TABLE 6. ATTITUDINAL CORRELATES OF ANOMIE

Item	Migrants by Length of Urban Residence (in years)					All migrants (467)	Urban-born (830)
(N)	−2 (44)	2–4 (52)	5–9 (72)	10–19 (137)	20+ (162)		
1. "Politics and government are so complicated that the average man cannot really understand what's going on."	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
* Agree	86	64	68	78	64	71	67
Disagree	0	27	25	18	28	22	26
Depends, misc.	14	10	7	4	8	8	7
						$\chi^2 = 2.70$ (N.S.)	
2. "People like me don't have any say about what the government does."							
* Agree	71	67	76	80	74	75	76
Disagree	27	29	19	16	22	21	21
Other, DK	2	4	4	4	4	4	4
						$\chi^2 = 0.06$ (N.S.)	
3. "If you made an effort to [influence some government decision], how likely is it that you would succeed?"							
Very likely	14	4	7	10	10	9	5
Somewhat likely	27	29	44	46	28	36	43
* Not at all likely	55	56	33	39	48	45	43
Don't know	5	12	15	6	14	11	8
						$\chi^2 = 15.02$, $p < .01$	
4. "Suppose there were some question that you had to take to a gov't office [would you receive equal treatment?]"							
Yes	27	25	29	38	32	32	45
* No	59	67	64	56	58	60	47
Depends, DK	14	8	7	6	10	8	8
						$\chi^2 = 22.15$, $p < .001$	

* Anomic response category.

political consciousness has been awakened only recently through cityward migration. Thus we find references to the threat of "teeming urban populations . . . so highly politicized that they have become in a sense loaded revolvers pointed at the responsible governments and on the verge of being triggered off at the slightest provocation."[51] Both the assumption of uniformly high urban politicization levels and of increased political cognition as a result of migration to the big city appear largely untenable, however, in the Mexican case. While some studies have detected a slight correlation between migration and heightened identification with the nation-state as a political entity,[52] they have failed to demonstrate any appreciable increase in migrant familiarity with, or interest or participation in, anything even resembling "national affairs," or even in popular programs of urban-based, national political groups.[53] Oscar Lewis found that among residents of two Mexico City *vecindades* (high-density, centrally-located, "conventional" slums) political apathy and lack of involvement in both formal and informal associations were just as common among persons who had been in the city for over 30 years as among recent arrivals.[54] Once again our data corroborate Lewis's observations. In Table 7 we find that among both migrant and urban-born populations less than half of the respondents have attained even minimal levels of politicization; and that on all nine indicators, the migrants as a whole exhibit lower cognition than the urban-born. On most indicators the migrants show considerable improvement with longer residence in the city, a pattern which persists with chronological age, sex, and education controlled. But even among those with 20 or more years of urban residence, 67% have failed to develop any sense of the personal relevance of the national government; 69% perceive no effect of local government; and only 13% regularly follow political and governmental affairs. The proportion of migrants who pay any attention to national election campaigns actually declines over time from 51 to 44 percent. Thus we find that, in terms of the taxonomy employed in the original analysis of these data, most migrants fall into the category of "parochials," i.e., those citizens manifesting little awareness of, or interest in, the national political system.[55]

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[51] Lucian W. Pye, "The Political Implications of Urbanization in the Development Process," in *United States Papers Prepared for the United Nations Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas* (7 vols.; Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), Vol. VII, p. 87.

Examination of the data on several behavioral indicators of politicization (Table 8) reveals essentially the same pattern. On all but one indicator (political party membership) the migrants show slightly lower participation frequencies than the urban-born population, but in most cases the differences do not prove statistically significant. On just one indicator (voting) do migrants show appreciably higher levels of political activity with longer residence in the city. Even after 20 years of urban residence, however, only 54% of the migrants eligible to vote in the 1958 election did so.[56] And when controls for age, sex, and education are introduced, we find educational attainment to be far more important in determining participation levels on this and other indicators than either length of urban residence or the other control variables.[57] Thus the general trends emerging from our analysis of migrant politicization in the Mexican context lend little support indeed to the common conception of the in-migrant populations of Latin American cities as increasingly politicized, "available masses." Even if differences in cognition levels between new arrivals and long-time urban residents are in fact

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[52] See, for example, Guy T. Ashton, "Early Adulthood and Mexican National Identity: Consequences of Migrations by Yucatec Adolescent Shoemakers," *América Indígena,* 27 (April, 1967), 301–316; Butterworth, *op. cit.,* p. 265; and Lelio Mármora, "Marginalidad y conciencia nacional en grupos migrantes," *Aportes* (France), No. 7 (January, 1968), 29-46. Cf. Frederick W. Frey, "Socialization to National Identification among Turkish Peasants," *Journal of Politics,* 30 (November, 1968), pp. 943–944.

[53] At least one analyst has suggested that urban migration promotes competitive party politics in Mexico because of the increased access to individuals resulting from urban clustering, which "permits and encourages transmission of political values to persons who formerly were untouched by political propaganda" (Johnson, *Urbanization and Political Change in Latin America, op. cit.,* pp. 99–100). Although similar arguments have been advanced in subsequent writings (see, for example, Burnett and Johnson, *Political Forces in Latin America, op. cit.,* p. 51), we are not aware of any data which demonstrates empirically the purported linkage between growing strength of opposition parties in Mexico and increased support from *in-migrant* populations now in a situation of "political availability."

[54] Lewis, in Hauser and Schnore, *op. cit.,* p. 496.

[55] Cf. Almond and Verba, *op. cit.,* pp. 17–18; and Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), p. 53.

[56] The national turnout of eligible voters in the 1958 general election was 49.4%. This was the first such election in which both men and women voted. More recent cross-national survey research in other Latin American countries also fails to reveal any marked increase in participant orientations among in-migrant populations with longer exposure to the urban environment. In Argentina and Chile, for example, longer urban residence was found to be *negatively* related to higher participation frequencies (unpublished research, Project on the Social and Cultural Aspects of Economic Development, Department of Social Relations, Harvard University, 1969).

[57] This finding is reflective of those reported in Almond and Verba, *op. cit.,* especially pp. 379–387, and elsewhere in the literature of political development with respect to education as the most accurate predictor of participation levels.

TABLE 7. POLITICIZATION INDICATORS: COGNITIVE

Item	Migrants by Length of Urban Residence (in years)					All Migrants	Urban-born
	−2	2–4	5–9	10–19	20+		
1. Perceived effect of national government on daily life:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Great effect	2	2	3	4	6	4	8
Some effect	20	14	32	24	28	25	24
None	78	84	65	72	67	71	68
(N)	(41)	(51)	(66)	(130)	(153)	(441)	(808)
						$\chi^2 = 7.25$, $p < .05$	
2. Perceived comprehension of national and international issues:							
Excellent	2	2	0	0	1	1	2
Fair	0	4	4	6	8	6	8
Poor	33	44	41	44	43	42	49
None	64	50	54	50	49	52	42
(N)	(42)	(52)	(68)	(134)	(160)	(456)	(805)
						$\chi^2 = 13.28$, $p < .01$	
3. Perceived effect of local government on daily life:							
Great effect	0	0	3	7	9	6	8
Some effect	7	16	26	23	22	21	26
None	93	84	71	70	69	74	66
(N)	(43)	(50)	(70)	(131)	(152)	(446)	(805)
						$\chi^2 = 7.67$, $p < .05$	
4. Perceived comprehension of local or regional issues:							
Excellent	5	2	3	2	3	3	7
Fair	0	10	7	13	13	11	15
Poor	34	40	44	51	48	46	49
None	61	48	46	34	35	41	29
(N)	(44)	(52)	(70)	(137)	(158)	(461)	(824)
						$\chi^2 = 25.34$, $p < .001$	
5. Has some conception of possible channels for influencing local government decisions*	55	58	70	69	61	63	67
(N)	(44)	(52)	(72)	(137)	(162)	(467)	(830)
						$\chi^2 = 2.14$ (N.S.)	
6. Has some conception of possible sources of political information*	55	54	50	56	49	53	61
(N)	(44)	(52)	(72)	(137)	(162)	(467)	(830)
						$\chi^2 = 8.02$, $p < .01$	
7. Follows accounts of political and governmental affairs:							
Regularly	5	12	4	15	13	11	17
Occasionally	27	37	47	40	37	39	40
Never	68	52	49	45	50	50	43
(N)	(44)	(52)	(72)	(133)	(161)	(462)	(819)
						$\chi^2 = 9.78$, $p < .01$	

* Detailed affirmative response.

TABLE 7—*(Continued)*

Item	Migrants by Length of Urban Residence (in years)					All Migrants	Urban-born
	−2	2–4	5–9	10–19	20+		
8. Attention paid to national election campaigns:							
Much	21	12	12	14	8	12	15
Little	30	35	31	41	36	36	41
None	49	53	57	45	56	52	45
(N)	(43)	(51)	(65)	(131)	(159)	(449)	(815)
						$\chi^2=6.21$, $p<.05$	
9. Able to identify one or more of the major ideals or goals of the Mexican Revolution	59	58	65	99	80	79	98
(N)	(44)	(52)	(72)	(137)	(162)	(467)	(830)
						$\chi^2=34.81$, $p<.001$	

TABLE 8. POLITICIZATION INDICATORS: BEHAVIORAL

Item	Migrants by Length of Urban Residence (in years)					All Migrants	Urban-born
	under two	2–4	5–9	10–19	20 or more		
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1. Membership in politically relevant groups or organizations[a]	2	8	14	14	8	10	11
(N)	(44)	(51)	(70)	(132)	(162)	(459)	(821)
						$\chi^2=0.25$ (N.S.)	
2. Political party membership	7	17	6	11	4	8	7
(N)	(44)	(52)	(71)	(135)	(158)	(460)	(825)
						$\chi^2=0.60$ (N.S.)	
3. Voted in last (1958) general election (if eligible)	43	52	46	57	54	52	58
(N)	(44)	(52)	(72)	(137)	(162)	(467)	(830)
						$\chi^2=3.88$, $p<.05$	
4. Ever done anything to try to influence a local government decision:							
Often	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Once or twice, a few times	0	2	3	11	4	6	5
Never	100	98	98	89	95	94	94
(N)	(43)	(50)	(71)	(135)	(158)	(457)	(821)
						$\chi^2=4.14$ (N.S.)	
5. Frequency of discussion of public affairs with other people:							
Nearly everyday	5	6	1	3	2	3	3
Once a week	5	4	3	7	2	4	4
Time to time	23	27	31	25	28	27	34
Never	68	64	65	66	69	67	59
(N)	(44)	(52)	(72)	(137)	(162)	(467)	(825)
						$\chi^2=7.13$ (N.S.)	

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[a] Organizations "in any way concerned with governmental, political, or public affairs;" which "take stands on or discuss public issues or try to influence government actions."

attributable to longer exposure to the urban environment, such differences do not necessarily imply a greater readiness to engage in articulation of demands or otherwise to seek access to the political decision-making process. Hence the importance of dealing separately with cognitive and behavioral dimensions of the politicization process among urban migrants.[58]

VIII. LEGITIMACY ORIENTATIONS

It may be argued, however, that urbanization as an agent in Latin American political stability or instability should not be assessed primarily in terms of its effects on politicization levels. More important as a threat to the stability of the political system is the ideological radicalization of urban politics; the development of nonsupportive, alienated attitudes and orientations toward the system among the migrant masses, due either to the nature of the assimilation experience or to factors intrinsic to the urban environment itself. Such feelings could be intensified and exploited by extremists or dissident political groups for the purpose of undermining the legitimizing argument for the system. The empirical questions to which these arguments lead are (1) the extent to which nonsupportive attitudes are distributed through the populace; and (2) the extent to which such feelings are actually translated into behavior contributing to conditions of political instability. In a one-party-dominant system of the Mexican type, such behavior may take the form of support for opposition parties or movements committed to major alterations of political structure or rules of the game, as well as for overt acts of political violence.

Our data on legitimacy orientations of migrants (Table 9) do not suggest any widely-shared attitude potential which could provide the basis for political radicalism and instability in Mexican urban areas. The migrant respondents in general demonstrate a relatively high level of system affect; in most cases higher than urban-born respondents. Some 85% of all migrants believe that the ideals and goals of the Mexican Revolution have already been realized or that people are still working to realize them; only 10% believe that the government party's policies or activities would "probably" endanger the national welfare.[59] The data for items four and five do show a significant decline in system affect among migrants with respect to local and national government outputs, as length of urban residence increases; yet even among those with 20 or more years of residence in the city, 85% continue to believe that Revolutionary goals and ideals have been achieved or are still being pursued actively, and just 10% believe that the official party's actions would eventually endanger the nation's welfare.[60]

It has been suggested that an estimate of the prospects for stability or instability in Latin American countries might be arrived at through simultaneous attention to two key dimensions of national systems, legitimacy and politicization.[61]

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[58] Cf. Daniel Goldrich, *et al.*, "The Political Integration of Lower Class Urban Settlements in Chile and Peru," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 3 (1967–1969), pp. 14–15; and Daniel Pécaut, "The Urban Working Class," in Claudio Véliz (ed.), *Latin America and the Caribbean: A Handbook* (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 677–678.

[59] A similar pattern emerges from the data on system affect provided by the *Measurement of Modernism* survey. The two relevant items and obtained response distributions are as follows:

	Migrants (N = 68)	*Metropolitans* (N = 249)
(1) Mexico is much better off today because we had the Revolution	79%	77%
The Revolution hasn't solved our problems	21	23
(2) Political parties that exist now are providing adequate solutions for the problems of Mexico:		
Always	21%	19%
Sometimes	62	53
Rarely	13	19
Never	4	10

[60] These results are consistent with Almond and Verba's original finding that Mexicans in general are more alienated from governmental output than from the system itself, especially as the latter relates to and embraces the goals and symbolism of the Mexican Revolution: see *The Civic Culture*, *op. cit.*, pp. 495–496; and Sidney Verba and Gabriel Almond, "National Revolution and Political Commitment," in Harry Eckstein (ed.), *Internal War* [New York: Free Press, 1964], pp. 205–232). As Kahl has noted, this ambivalence is explained in part by the general cynicism pervading Mexican political culture. "Since a Mexican expects everyone to be out for himself, he is not outraged by self-seeking politicians and union leaders. Nor would he anticipate that things would be very different if the political system were changed. Therefore he does not blame the Revolutionary institutions for the chicanery of his fellow citizens, which he sees merely as a reflection of the Mexican temperament. . . . He believes in a government whose representatives he distrusts": *Measurement of Modernism, op. cit.*, p. 116.

[61] See Daniel Goldrich, "Toward an Estimate of

TABLE 9. LEGITIMACY ORIENTATIONS

Item	Migrants by Length of Urban Residence (in years)					All Migrants	Urban-Born
	−2	2–4	5–9	10–19	20+		
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1. Regards political system as chief object of personal pride as a Mexican:	41	23	25	31	33	31	28
(N)	(44)	(52)	(72)	(137)	(162)	(467)	(830)
						$\chi^2 = 1.32$	(N.S.)
2. Evaluation of extent to which the ideals and purposes of the Mexican Revolution have been realized[a]							
Ideals have been realized	26	36	38	17	19	23	21
People still working to realize them	53	46	56	65	66	62	58
Ideals have been forgotten	16	18	3	10	10	10	16
Don't know	5	0	3	8	5	5	5
(N)	(19)	(22)	(32)	(89)	(83)	(245)	(552)
						$\chi^2 = 4.12$	(N.S.)
3. "Do you think that (the official party's) policies and activities would ever seriously endanger the national welfare?"							
Probably happen	11	14	9	10	10	10	12
Might happen	36	38	20	31	25	29	28
Probably not happen	39	36	39	35	39	37	43
Don't know	14	12	33	24	26	24	17
(N)	(44)	(50)	(70)	(135)	(158)	(457)	(826)
						$\chi^2 = 9.57$,	$p < .05$
4. Evaluation of extent to which national government's activities improve conditions in the country[b]							
Tend to improve	—*	—*	71	43	52	50	63
Sometimes improve, sometimes don't	—*	—*	8	20	11	15	22
Better off without them	—*	—*	21	37	36	35	15
(N)	(7)	(8)	(24)	(35)	(44)	(118)	(252)
						$\chi^2 = 18.67$,	$p < .001$
5. Evaluation of extent to which local government's activities improve conditions in the area[c]							
Tend to improve	—*	—*	75	45	42	49	50
Sometimes improve, sometimes don't	—*	—*	15	26	28	25	24
Better off without them	—*	—*	10	29	30	26	27
(N)	(3)	(6)	(20)	(38)	(43)	(110)	(260)
						$\chi^2 = 0.05$	(N.S.)

[a] Among those cognizant of the ideals and purposes of the Mexican Revolution.

[b] Among those perceiving effect of the national government on daily lives.

[c] Among those cognizant of effect of local government on daily lives.

* Too few cases.

These two dimensions can be conceived as ranging from support through acquiescence to opposition; and from non-politicization through moderate politicization to high politicization. Assessing significant groups of people according to their position within these dimensions would then indicate potential sources of political stability or instability.[62] The matrices appearing as Tables 10–11 order the data for our migrant sample in this manner. Important in an assessment of the potential for instability stemming from urbanization in Mexico is the fact that the largest group of migrants according low legitimacy to the political sytem (the "opposed," clustered in cell *C* of the matrices) are also among the least politically aware and involved (the "non-politicized"). Thus, while these individuals may harbor basic political dissatisfactions, their attitudes would not appear to be immediately threatening to system stability. Of equal significance is the fact that no more than five out of over 340 cases cluster in cell *A* of the matrices, where we would expect to find those most predisposed to radical political activity.

TABLES 10–11. LEGITIMACY-POLITICIZATION MATRICES[a]

Legitimacy Orientation[b]	Politicization (Cognitive)[c]		
	Highly Politicized	Moderately Politicized	Non-Politicized
Opposed	*A* 5	*B* 9	*C* 31
Acquiescent	*D* 6	*E* 52	*F* 72
Supportive	*G* 4	*H* 34	*I* 129

(N = 342; χ^2 = 30.99, p < .001)

Legitimacy Orientation[b]	Politicization (Behavioral)[d]		
	Highly Politicized	Moderately Politicized	Non-Politicized
Opposed	*A* 0	*B* 12	*C* 35
Acquiescent	*D* 7	*E* 48	*F* 76
Supportive	*G* 6	*H* 64	*I* 100

(N = 348; χ^2 = 29.23; p < .001)

[a] Based on data from the *Civic Culture* migrant sample only. Cell frequencies represent actual numbers of cases. "Don't know" cases have been excluded from the matrices.

[b] As measured by a summative index constructed from responses to items 2 through 5 in Table 9, and validated through inter-item correlations. Respondents were assigned a score of 0, 1, or 2 on each item, from least to most legitimacy accorded the system. Summing scores across all items in the index, a respondent's total score may range from 0 to 8. A score of 0–2 is coded as "opposed;" a score of 3–5 as "acquiescent;" and one of 6–8 as "supportive."

[c] Measured by a summative index constructed from items 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, and 8 in Table 7. Respondents were assigned a score of 0, 1, or 2 on each question, from lowest to highest level of political awareness indicated by the response. Summary scores range from 0 to 12. A score of 0–3 is coded as "non-politicized;" a score of 4–8 as "moderately politicized;" and one of 9–12 as "highly politicized."

[d] Measured by a summative index constructed from items 4 and 5 in Table 8. Respondents were assigned a score of 0, 1, or 2 on each item, from lowest to highest level of political involvement indicated. Sums of scores range from 0 to 4. A score of 0 is coded as "non-politicized;" a score of 1–2 as "moderately politicized;" and one of 3–4 as "highly politicized."

IX. POLITICAL RADICALIZATION

In an effort to assess the extent to which non-supportive legitimacy orientations and feelings of alienation among migrants are translated into actions, or advocacy of actions, which might contribute to political instability, we may examine patterns of support for opposition parties and movements. Kenneth F. Johnson has documented several cases among "numerous open expressions of citizen discontent with Mexican public policy in urban areas," focused on such matters as excessive taxation and service deprivation.[63] He regards as one indicator of political radicalism among the materially-depressed urban masses their support for such "independent civic protest movements against established urban regimes . . . [movements which have] preferred to remain aloof from any of the established political parties."[64] However, the data for our migrant sample presented in Table 12 suggest a very low level of potential support for such movements among the in-migrant population. Only 9% of the migrants regard protest demonstrations as the most effective way of influencing government decisions; some 37% believe this form of political action to be the least

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the Probability of Social Revolutions in Latin America: Some Orienting Concepts and a Case Study," *The Centennial Review*, 6 (1962), 394–408.

[62] Goldrich, *Sons of the Establishment*, *op. cit.*, pp. 13–15.

[63] Johnson, *Urbanization and Political Change in Latin America*, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

[64] *Ibid.*, p. 111.

TABLE 12. POLITICAL RADICALIZATION INDICATORS

Indicator	Migrants by Length of Urban Residence (in years)					All Migrants	All Urban-born	Alienated Migrants[c]	Alienated Urban-born[c]
	under two	2–4	5–9	10–19	20 or more				
Opposition party preference[a]	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
PAN	6	5	2	0	5	3	9	15	22
PP	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Other	0	0	0	2	0	1	1	1	2
(N)	(32)	(39)	(64)	(101)	(140)	(376)	(670)	(40)	(90)
						$X^2 = 6.86$, $p < .05$		$X^2 = 0.9_4$ (N.S.)	
Opposition party voting[b]	—*	11	0	4	15	10	17	8	9
(N)	(19)	(27)	(33)	(78)	(87)	(244)	(472)	(106)	(232)
						$X^2 = 5.38$, $p < .05$		$X^2 = 0.00$ (N.S.)	
Regards protest demonstrations as the *most* effective method of influencing a government decision	5	17	14	11	4	9	10	9	7
(N)	(44)	(52)	(72)	(137)	(162)	(467)	(830)	(170)	(355)
						$X^2 = 0.01$ (N.S.)		$X^2 = 0.47$ (N.S.)	
Regards protest demonstrations as the *least* effective method of influencing a gov't decision	59	23	26	38	40	37	51	43	52
(N)	(44)	(52)	(72)	(137)	(162)	(467)	(830)	(170)	(355)
						$X^2 = 21.66$, $p < .001$		$X^2 = 2.19$ (N.S.)	

[a] Among those expressing a party preference. The PAN (Partido de Acción Nacional) is Mexico's principal right-wing opposition party; the PP (now the PPS, or Partido Popular Socialista) is its counterpart on the left.

[b] For the candidate of the PAN in the 1958 presidential election, among those voting. For all practical purposes, "opposition voting" in 1958 was limited to the PAN, since the PP and another splinter party, the PARM, supported the official party's candidate for president. The Communist Party's candidate received fewer than 10,000 write-in votes.

[c] Those respondents scored as "opposed" on the legitimacy orientation index employed in Tables 11–12.

* Too few cases.

effective method. Even among politically alienated migrants, the same proportion of respondents perceive demonstrations as the most effective tactic, and 43% consider them the least effective.

With respect to preference for opposition political parties, we find once again a very low level of migrant support. Only 3% of all migrant respondents in the *Civic Culture* sample express a preference for an opposition party; 10% report voting for the opposition candidate in the 1958 presidential election. These migrant proportions are somewhat lower than those for the urban-born population. There is no large increase in migrant support for opposition parties as length of urban residence increases. Thus it would appear, on the basis of survey data, that the increased political availability of large segments of the populace now concentrated in the nation's major urban centers has not been effectively translated into support for groups opposed to incumbent national leaders. On the basis of the same evidence it might also seem reasonable to conclude that the stability of the electorate and the ability of the ruling party to control the political life of individual states or localities would not be closely tied to the volume of migration into such political units. However, aggregate electoral and demographic data show an increasingly strong, positive correlation between net in-migration into these entities and frequency of opposition voting (Spearman rank coefficient = .28 for the 1958 presidential election; .40 for the 1961 congressional elections; and .60 for the 1964 presidential election).[65] Yet in such cases as Baja California Norte and the Federal District, which have experienced the highest rates of both in-migration and opposition voting, it is doubtful that the relative potency of migration in determining electoral outcomes has been nearly as great as the aggregate indices suggest. In Baja California, for example, level of economic development, distance from the national capital and proximity to the United States, historical antecedents, localized issues of political corruption and abuse of power, the quality of state and local governmental outputs, and the dynamism and political skill of opposition leadership, are all key factors to be considered in attempting to account for the high incidence of opposition voting in the state's major urban centers.[66] Moreover, there would appear to be a strong possibility that patterns of partisanship among urban migrants are dependent in large measure upon the political coloration of the city in which they take up residence.[67] While his rural and/or small-town socialization insures that the migrant is far from a *tabula rasa* upon arrival in the big city, he is frequently, as Hobsbawm has observed, an individual with "no prior commitment—or even potential commitment—to any version of urban or national politics, or indeed to any beliefs which could form the basis of such politics."[68] Under these circumstances, a migrant vote against the official party's candidate for president or congressman may represent more a conformist adaptation to the dominant political opinion of the host community than a protest reaction against the hardships of adjustment to city life. If the ineptitude, non-responsiveness, or corruption of the official party regime at the local level has aroused widespread dissatisfaction, the probability of opposition voting among migrants as well as all other elements in that locality to fill elective positions at all levels of the system is greatly enhanced. The disparity between the apparently strong relationship of in-migration to opposition voting in such states as Baja California Norte and the Federal District as reflected in the aggregate data, and the much weaker association between migrant status and opposition voting reflected in our national survey data underscores the hazards of the so-called "ecological" or "aggregative" fallacy in writing and theorizing on Latin American urbanization and its socio-political consequences. Lacking better data, it may seem efficacious to attempt inferences about the behavior of micro units (such as migrants) using aggregate data from macro units (such as states).[69] But the need anticipated by some researchers for testing the results of macro-level, ecological-correlational analysis of the association between urbanization and political attitude and activity patterns against sample survey data, is confirmed here.[70]

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[65] Computed for all federal entities experiencing a net gain in population due to in-migration in the 1950-1960 period, from electoral data reported in González Casanova, *La democracia en México*, *op. cit.*, Table 46, p. 249, Table 55, p. 258, and Table 57, pp. 262–63; and net in-migration data presented in Cabrera, *Demografía y Economía*, 1 (1967), *op. cit.*, Table 12, Col. 2, p. 357. This trend does not appear when urbanization is indexed by simple percentage change in proportion of state population residing in rural areas: see Barry Ames, "Bases of Support for Mexico's Dominant Party" (unpublished paper, Dept. of Political Sci-

X. CONCLUSION

Two general impressions which emerge strongly from the foregoing examination of the Mexican case are (1) a sense of the extraordinary complexity of the urbanization phenomenon itself; and (2) the inadequacy of most conventional theory for dealing with the phenomenon in research on political instability in a Latin American context. As the results of field studies undertaken in a number of countries begin to accumulate, it becomes increasingly evident that there is a high degree of within-region variation with respect to patterns and consequences of urbanization. It would be inaccurate to regard the outcomes flowing from such a process as tending essentially toward stability or instability in the political order, from either a long- or short-term perspective.[71] Certainly in the Mexican case

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ence, Stanford University, 1968, pp. 23–24).

[66] For enlightening commentary on the corruption issue and recent political trends in Baja California Norte, by an ex-governor of the state now expelled from the official party due to his heretical utterances during the 1964 national election campaign, see Braulio Maldonado Sández, *Baja California: Comentarios políticos* (Mexico, D.F.: Costa-Amic, 1960).

[67] The analysis of urban political behavior in Brazil presented in Frank P. Sherwood, *Institutionalizing the Grass Roots in Brazil: A Study in Comparative Local Government* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1967), especially pp. 28-30, points toward essentially the same conclusion with respect to that country.

[68] E. J. Hobsbawm, "Peasants and Rural Migrants in Politics," in Claudio Véliz (ed.), *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America* (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 60.

[69] One recent study of political consequences of urbanization in Mexico utilizing such an aggregate data approach is Alschuler, *op. cit.*

[70] See Myron Weiner, "Urbanization and Political Protest," *Civilisations* (Belgium), 17 (1967), p. 50; and Soares and Hamblin, *op. cit.*, p. 1064.

[71] Cf. Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 283. As Kalman Silvert has suggested, there is need to abandon the conventional view that "the mere fact of an urban agglomeration means a specific set of things for the persons who live in that agglomeration" in favor of a more probabilistic viewpoint, "that urban conglomerations in any part of the world can lead to a very broad variability of human reactions" (Silvert, "Seminar Summary," *Proceedings* of the Seminar on Social Science and Urban

there can be little doubt that rapid urbanization has contributed to conditions of material scarcity, overcrowding, and service deprivation in the big cities, while straining the absorptive capacity of both the public and private sources of employment. Yet it would appear that the rate of demand creation among the urban masses, and therefore the magnitude of the collective "frustration gap," is not as great as has been assumed. Thus given sustained economic expansion and a modicum of improvement in real income levels, the fact of discrepancy between rates of urbanization in the nation and the capacity of commerce and industry to provide adequate employment opportunities at the rate of in-migration may not be crucial to the stability of the political system.[72] Maintenance of system support will depend upon expansion of governmental performance capabilities, at all levels, and on the success of the ruling party-government apparatus in coöpting leaders emerging from the newly urbanized population into supportive political roles.[73] In any event, we find little empirical evidence to support the standard conception of the city as essentially a radicalizing environment. Nor does there appear to be an empirical basis for frequent perceptions of imminent threat to existing authority structures stemming from the rapid influx of migrants to cities. In Mexican *colonias proletarias*, as in the *favelas* of Brazil and the *barriadas* of Lima,[74] contradictions between the migrant's values regarding the city as a place of economic opportunity and his actual situation seem more likely to lead to cynical criticism of the "malfunctioning" of authority structures and institutions (due to self-seeking politicians, corrupt and unresponsive bureaucrats, etc.), than to a political questioning of the legitimacy of such structures. Finally, we find that there is little or no difference between migrants and urban-born individuals on many indices of social condition, political attitudes, and behavior patterns; and that the ratio of migrants to non-migrants is probably one of the less critical factors accounting for urban political phenomena. It would appear that a similar pattern of relationships obtains in some other Latin American countries undergoing rapid urbanization, even though these nations for the most part are not characterized by the conditions of general political stability and economic progress which mark the Mexican case. Evidence reported from such diverse countries as Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Peru, and Venezuela indicates that even though first and second generation migrants frequently comprise a large proportion of the electorates they join, their presence in the urban center does not seem to result in any significant radicalization of politics in their new place of residence.[75] Nor do there appear to be conspicuous differences between migrants and city-born residents with respect to

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Development in Latin America, Jahuel (Aconcagua), Chile, April, 1968, forthcoming).

[72] Parallel conclusions are reached with reference to other Latin American political systems in Robert H. Dix, *Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 40–41; and Daniel Goldrich, "Peasants' Sons in City Schools: An Inquiry into the Politics of Urbanization in Panama and Costa Rica," *Human Organization,* 23 (Winter, 1964), 328–333.

[73] As Almond and Verba have observed, "The Mexican system may be described as living off its capital of system affect. Unless the output performance of the system can match the aspirations of the citizens (and what is relevant is not the objective level of output, but the evaluation of its adequacy by the citizens), then the Mexican pattern . . . may have within it the seeds of instability": *The Civic Culture, op. cit.,* p. 497.

[74] See Leeds and Leeds, "Brazil and the Myth of Urban Rurality," *op. cit.,* pp. 31, 35; and William P. Mangin, "Poverty and Politics in Cities of Latin America," in Warner Bloomberg, Jr., and Henry J. Schmandt (eds.), *Power, Poverty, and Urban Policy* (Vol. II: *Urban Affairs Annual Reviews;* Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1968), pp. 419–420.

[75] See François Bourricaud, "Lima en la vida política peruana," *América Latina* (Brazil), 7 (October-December, 1964), 89-95; Ernst Halperin, "The Decline of Communism in Latin America," *Atlantic Monthly,* 215 (May, 1965), 65-70; George F. Jones, "Urbanization and Voting Behavior in tinctive mix of economic pressures, social con- Venezuela and Chile, 1958–1964" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Stanford University, 1967); Mangin, *Latin American Research Review,* 2 (1967), pp. 82–85; Lisa Redfield Peattie, *The View from the Barrio* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968), pp. 139–40; Sandra Powell, "Political Participation in the Barriadas [of Lima, Peru]: A Case Study" (unpublished paper, Dept. of Political Science, San Francisco State College, 1969); José Arthur Rios, "El pueblo y el político," *Política* (Venezuela), (February, 1960), 11–36; Bryan Roberts, "Politics in a Neighborhood of Guatemala City," *Sociology* (London), 2 (May, 1968), 185–204, and *idem,* "Poverty and Politics in Guatemala City" (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association, Seattle, Wash., November, 1968). Nevertheless, the radicalization conception cannot

several key socioeconomic attributes and attitudinal patterns.[76]

If some kind of migrant/non-migrant dichotomy does not prove useful in analyzing the conditions which tend toward alienation and instability in a given area, then what tack should investigators take in trying to deal with the urbanization phenomenon and its impact on Latin American political systems? It would appear that specific metropolitan areas and metropolitan subunits and their varying patterns of interaction with larger political environments provide the most promising focus of attention for research in this field. The migrant population of a large city contains a large and disparate array of social types, who may react in very different ways to the same set of basic social and economic conditions, or who may in fact be exposed to very different types of conditions imposed by urban settlement patterns. Even geographically contiguous "squatter settlements" on the periphery of the central city may differ sharply in the degree to which they and their inhabitants are integrated into urban social and political life. As several investigators have argued recently, settlement-zone integration should be viewed as a significant variable, subjecting migrants to a distinctive mix of economic pressures, social controls, and political influences.[77] Some settlements

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simply be dismissed as mere folklore lacking *any* empirical referent in Latin American experience, past, present, or future. As Germani and others have noted, the conventional wisdom would appear to have a rather high degree of fit with the Argentine situation in the Perón era (see Gino Germani, "The Transition to a Mass Democracy in Argentina," in Arpad von Lazar and R. R. Kaufman (eds.), *Readings in Latin American Politics* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1969), pp. 138–140; and Andújar, *Revista Paraguaya de Sociología,* 6 (1966), *op. cit.*); and it may also be accurately descriptive of some aspects of the situation in Santo Domingo during the 1965 Dominican revolt (see José A. Moreno, *Barrios in Arms: Revolution in Santo Domingo* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, forthcoming), Chap. 5). Moreover, the evidence is as yet too fragmentary to discount the applicability of the radicalization proposition to second and third generation in-migrants, even though the data which have been reported thus far do not reveal any significant radicalization of the second generation in terms of support for extremist parties, frustration of socio-economic expectations, or diminished confidence in existing socio-political institutions: see Goldrich, *Human Organization,* 23 (1964), *op. cit.*, pp. 332–333; and Adolfo Gurrieri, *Situación y perspectivas de la juventud en una población urbana popular* (Santiago de Chile: United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, 1965; Doc. E/LACCY/BP/L.2), pp. 16-18, 24–27. Yet with respect to newly-arrived migrants and first generation in-migrants in general—the groups to which the commonly-accepted notions of "explosive potential" are most frequently applied—theorists do indeed "have a burden of proof that there is an empirical reality that corresponds to their abstractions": Kahl, *Measurement of Modernism, op. cit.*, p. 97.

[76] See Balán, *Latin American Research Review,* 4 (1969) (summarizing survey data from Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and El Salvador), *op. cit.;* Guillermo Briones, "Movilidad ocupacional y mercado de trabajo en el Perú," *América Latina,* 6 (July-September, 1963), 63–76; Bertram Hutchinson, "Urban Social Mobility Rates in Brazil Related to Migration and Changing Occupational Structure," *América Latina,* 6 (July-September, 1963), 47–61; Leeds and Leeds, "Brazil and the Myth of Urban Rurality," *op. cit.*, pp. 16–17; Héctor Martínez, "Las migraciones internas en el Perú," *Aportes* (France), 10 (October, 1968), pp. 144–145; and William P. McGreevey, "Causas de la migración interna en Colombia," in Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE), *Empleo y desempleo en Colombia* (Bogotá: Ediciones Universidad de los Andes, 1968), p. 215. For a general discussion of the methodological inadequacies of the migrant/non-migrant dichotomy for social science research on Latin America, see Harley L. Browning and Waltraut Feindt, "Natives vs. Migrants: A False Dichotomy?" (unpublished paper, Population Research Center, University of Texas at Austin, 1967).

[77] Elizabeth R. Leeds, "Political Complementarity of *Favelas* with the Larger Society of Rio de Janeiro" (unpublished paper presented at the 37th International Congress of Americanists, Mar del Plata, Argentina, September, 1966; forthcoming in Anthony Leeds (ed.), *The Favelas of Rio* (Austin: University of Texas Press for the Institute of Latin American Studies); Lloyd H. Rogler, "Slum Neighborhoods in Latin America," *Journal of Inter- American Studies,* 9, (October, 1967), 507–528. Several forthcoming survey studies of lower-class urban settlements will provide extensive data on the operation of this variable in the Mexican context. These include Susan Eckstein, "Social, Economic, Political, and Cultural Integration of the Urban Poor in Mexico City" (title approx.; Ph.D. dissertation in progress, Columbia University); Charles Ornelas, "Land Tenure Sanctions, and Politicization in Mexico City" (Ph.D. disserta-

are afflicted with recurrent waves of tension, antagonism, and conflict; others show evidence of no such stress.[78] Much systematic research focused on these ecological variations and their relationship to rates and modes of politicization and demand creation will be necessary if we are to arrive at meaningful generalizations regarding the importance of urbanization as an agent in Latin American political instability.

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tion in progress, University of California, Riverside); and Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr., "Political Correlates of Migrant Assimilation in Mexican Urban Environments" (Ph.D. dissertation in progress, Stanford University).

[78] The work of Oscar Lewis and John F. C. Turner also suggests the need for examination of differential structural and contextual properties of lower-class urban settlement zones in Latin American cities. In his well-known anthropological study, *The Children of Sánchez* (New York: Vintage Books-Random House, 1963, pp. xii-xviii), Lewis describes sharp economic and socio-psychological contrasts between two slum neighborhoods in Mexico City which he studied in depth. Similarly divergent sets of characteristics and functions are ascribed by Turner to the "bridgehead" and "consolidation" settlements of metropolitan Lima: "Uncontrolled Urban Settlement: Problems and Policies," *International Social Development Review* (United Nations), 1 (1968), pp. 116–120, and *idem, The Squatter Revolution: Housing as a Vehicle for Social Change* (Cambridge: MIT Press, forthcoming). See also the conceptualization of "slums of hope" and "slums of despair" in Charles J. Stokes, "A Theory of Slums," *Land Economics,* 38 (August, 1962), 187–197.

PARTY COMPETITION AND WELFARE POLICIES IN THE AMERICAN STATES*

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Recent comparative, quantitative studies of state politics conclude that party competition and other political variables have little or no impact on important state policies such as per pupil expenditure, old age assistance, unemployment compensation, and aid to dependent children.[1] These are rather unexpected and disturbing conclusions for they disconfirm relationships predicted by some of the most important theoretical formulations concerning democratic politics. Before re-examining the bases for these conclusions, a review of theory is in order.

I. THEORY

V. O. Key, Jr., set the context for examining the effects of political variables on state policies.[2] He stressed the importance of two-party competition, or bi-factionalism in one-party states, as a determinant of policy. Key sees the degree of party competition as crucial because it reflects the extent to which politics is organized or unorganized. Party competition by producing some semblance of an organized politics lessens the difficulty of lower status groups in sorting out political actors and issues, thereby enabling them to promote their own interests more effectively. Since state social welfare policies are undoubtedly relevant to the interests of "have-nots," we can utilize state expenditures in this area as a measure of the success that these groups have enjoyed. Key's formulation, then, would lead to a simple two variable model:

$P = e_1$
$S = k_1P + e_2$
Where P is inter-party competition, S is expenditure on social welfare, and e_1 and e_2 represent error or variables left out of the system, and k_1 is a constant.

This model simply states that, all other things being equal, increasing competitiveness will produce increased social welfare expenditures.

Lockard's analysis of policy in the New England states brought some refinements to Key's model.[3] Lockard argued that states with complex economies would be more likely to have competitive parties since the diversity of economic interests would provide a context within which two partyism could flourish. He also noted that this diversity makes it difficult for a few powerful interests to dominate policy-making. The addition of Lockard's thinking to the basic model is straightforward:

$D = e_1$
$P = k_1D + e_2$
$S = k_2P + e_3$
Where D is the level of economic development and all other symbols are the same as above.

This model states that there is a developmental sequence between the three variables; a high level of economic development yields inter-party competition which in turn produces the level of welfare expenditures.

The more recent literature rejects the developmental sequence predicted by the Key-Lockard observations.[4] Utilizing multiple and partial correlational analysis, or their non-parametric analogues, this recent literature finds that when socio-economic factors are held constant, the impact of party competition largely disappears, while the effects of socio-economic development do not vanish when party competition is held constant. From these findings these researchers conclude that party competition does not serve as an intervening variable between socio-economic development and policy. They conclude that party competition and policy are both dependent on socio-economic development. Their revised model then is:

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[1] See, especially Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables and Welfare Policies in the American States," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 25 (1963), pp. 265–289 and Thomas R. Dye, *Politics, Economics and the Public* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1966).

[2] V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics* (New York: Vintage Books, 1949), p. 307.

[3] Duane Lockard, *New England State Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), see, especially, pp. 336–337.

[4] Dawson and Robinson, *op. cit.*, and Dye, *op. cit.*

$D = e_1$
$P = k_1D + e_2$
$S = k_2D + e_3$
All symbols are the same as above.

This model states that any association between competition and social welfare expenditures is spurious. There is no causal connection between competition and welfare, rather they are both caused by socio-economic development.

This model is certainly unexpected in that the theoretical formulations, if not the conclusions, of these recent studies are perfectly consistent with those of Key and Lockard. The framework common to these studies is that of Easton's systems analysis which stresses the importance of environment, process, and outputs.[5] Economic and social development are treated as aspects of the environment, party competition is categorized as an aspect of the political process, and governmental expenditures are conceptualized as the outputs of the system. Easton's notion that aspects of the political process are a consequent of the environment and serve to translate factors of that environment into policy outputs is also common to these efforts. These research designs, then, began with the hypothesis that political factors such as party competition act as intervening variables between the socio-economic environment and output measures. This hypothesis is the same as that embodied in the Lockard model above. That this hypothesis appears to be disconfirmed, raises serious questions concerning assumptions regarding the importance of political variables in explaining policy outcomes.

Yet, if we return to examine the theoretical notions underlying the predictions from Key and Lockard, it may still be possible to find grounds upon which to reexamine the relevance of political variables. First, it seems clear that Key's thinking would not lead us to expect that party competition, or any other political variable, would serve as an important explanatory variable for all types of public policies. While this statement may seem trivially true, it leads to an important question. What kinds of policy would party competition be important for? Key's answer seems to depend on what he thought are the politically significant questions; questions of the sort that may have become lost in recent literature.

> The significant question is, who benefits from political disorganization? Its significance is equalled only by the difficulty of arriving at an answer. There probably are several answers, depending on the peculiar circumstances in each case. Politics generally comes down, over the long run, to a conflict between those who have and those who have less. . . . It follows that the grand objective of the haves is obstruction, at least of the haves who take only a short-term view. Organization is not always necessary to obstruct; it is essential, however, for the promotion of a sustained program in behalf of the have-nots, although not all party or factional organization is dedicated to that purpose.[6]

Party competition, then, may not have an appreciable impact on some types of policies, but Key's discussion would lead us to specify the conditions under which it would have its greatest effect: the have-not oriented policies. If party competition serves to provide political organization useful to the have-nots in their struggle with the haves, then party competition would be most intimately related to those policies which are central to that struggle. Key's status conflict formulation enables us to discard the simplistic hypothesis that party competition is important for explaining policy in general. We would hypothesize that party competition would differentially explain policies as a function of the centrality of the policy area to the have, have-not struggle. For example, party competition may not be important for many kinds of education policies. Although they may belong to a social welfare dimension, education policies fall much less clearly in this dimension than other more controversial and more have-not oriented policies such as aid to dependent children.[7]

If we expect the explanatory strength of party competition to vary with the type of policy, it seems but a short theoretical leap to expect similar variation in the importance of other characteristics of the political system. In fact it is possible to consider variables which are most important in exactly those situations in which variables such as party competition are least important. What we are thinking of here are the perceptual and attitudinal distributions of the individuals who occupy the important political roles in state systems. Thus as Lockard has pointed out competition may place rather rigid electoral restraints upon the kinds of policy appeals that can be made.[8] However, where these external restraints do not exist, or are weakest, the greatest room would seem to exist for individual variation in policy-making. In these situations, our level of explanation would remain meager as long as we restrict our measurements to non-individual based variables.

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[5] David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," *World Politics*, 9 (1957), 383–400.

[6] Key, *loc. cit.*

[7] See, Ira Sharkansky and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy," in this issue of this REVIEW.

Of course such variables may never be gathered systematically for any but a few states at any one point in time. In this paper, we wish to merely raise the possibility of the importance of such variables. The explanatory value of such variables in other areas of political research emphasizes the fact that very little effort has been expended at rounding out the measurement of the many political variables that may intervene between state environments and policy.[9] From these additional theoretical considerations we can derive the following model:

$$
\begin{aligned}
&D = e_1\\
&P_1 = k_1 D + e_2\\
&P_2 = k_2 D + e_3\\
&P_3 = k_3 D + e_4\\
&\cdot\\
&\cdot\\
&\cdot\\
&P_n = k_n D + e_{n+1}\\
&k_{n+1}P_1 + k_{n+2}P_2 + \ldots + k_{2n}P_n + e_{n+2}
\end{aligned}
$$

Where $P_2, P_3, \ldots P_n$ are political variables other than party competition which intervene between socio-economic development and social welfare policy.

This model states that there are "n" number of political variables all of which serve to transform aspects of the environment into public policy.

We of course do not know if this model best fits any data. However, we can use it to make predictions about what would happen if it were descriptive of the policy making process and we measured only one or a few of the intervening variables in any one study. If, for example, we measured only P_1, then the model would be:

$$
\begin{aligned}
&D = e_1\\
&P_1 = k_1 D + e_2\\
&S = k_2 P_1 + k_3 D + e_3
\end{aligned}
$$

In this model social welfare policies are the result of two forces, both of which originate in socio-economic development. One is transmitted through the intervening variable party competition and the other appears as a direct effect of development because we have ignored the additional intervening political variables.

In review, the evidence and theoretical formulations we have considered suggest three primary models which have some kind of relevance to the issues in this literature. The first we shall label the Key-Lockard model because we derived it from their work and it calls for a developmental sequence between the three types of variables. The second we shall call the Dawson-Robinson model because those authors were the first of a series to postulate a spurious relationship between competition and social welfare policy. The third model depends on our reworking of these theoretical strains and can be thought of as a hybrid of the others. This model predicts effects from both party competition and socio-economic development with party competition's effect as part of a developmental sequence originating in development.

II. METHODOLOGY

If we can derive three different models from the existing theoretical formulations, the next step is to select a methodology that enables us to choose between them empirically. Severe difficulties arise at this point, however, because our theory has to some extent outpaced conventional research techniques. For this reason, we will develop the logic of a cluster of tests which will help to alleviate these problems.

Normally in a test of a developmental sequence like the Key-Lockard model $j \rightarrow k \rightarrow i$ we control for the hypothesized intervening variable (k) to determine whether the original relationship between the independent (j) and dependent (i) variables remains. In making this test we are attempting to choose between the developmental sequence model and another model in which the test variable does not intervene and effects from the independent variable remain. This is the case because we would not control for the hypothesized intervening variable unless there were zero-order relationships between the three variables in the first place. On the other hand, when controlling in a test for spuriousness such as the Dawson-Robinson model would require, we normally partial for the in-

$$\begin{tikzcd}
 & k \\
j \arrow[ur] \arrow[dr] & \\
 & i
\end{tikzcd}$$

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[8] Lockard, *op. cit.*

[9] For example, see Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," this REVIEW, 57 (1963), 45–56.

dependent (j) variable which hypothetically accounts for the original relationship between two dependent (k and i) variables. In making this test, we are attempting to choose between the spuriousness model and another in which an effect remains between the latter two variables. Once again we proceed with the test only after determining whether zero-order relationships exist between all three variables.

In both tests, we are attempting to choose between the hypothesized model and a second. However, in this instance, we are attempting to choose between models associated with the two tests: developmental sequence and spuriousness models. At this point, the conventional testing procedures becomes inadequate.

If we use partial correlation coefficients, or some analogous technique, often we can not distinguish between these models. In such controls, we are attempting to hold "constant" that variation in other variables which is due to the control variable. We can conceptualize what is involved in these procedures by thinking of residual variation after the control. In the developmental sequence test, we hold constant variation in the independent and dependent variables which is related to the control variable. The relationship which remains after the control, therefore, is the association between the residuals in both variables. Thus if the variation in the dependent variable which is due to the independent variable is entirely transmitted through the intervening variable, then, the residual relationship should be zero in the pure case. If the residual relationship is of a magnitude to make us think that it does not really depart from that of the original relationship, usually we would reject the developmental sequence model. However, this does not mean that we can then infer the spuriousness model, because it is not the only alternative model.

Similarly, if we make the spuriousness test, we examine the residuals (which are not related to the control variable) between the two variables under test. If a relationship remains after the control, we may want to reject the spuriousness model, but this test alone does not allow us to infer that a developmental sequence exists.

Moreover, even if we use the two tests in combination often we will be unable to distinguish between the two models. The reason for this is that when we proceed with the test for spuriousness, we will observe a reduction in the relationship between the two variables under test when either model fits the data. If the relationship is that of a developmental sequence, when we control for spuriousness we remove variation due to the most independent variable in the sequence. Therefore, the controlled relationship between the remaining variables is due to their residuals which are unrelated to the control variable. If the relationship is that of a developmental sequence, we will be examining the correlation between residuals that are left over after variation due to the initial variable in the sequence has been removed. In this case, we would not expect a very high partial relationship because with the first causal variable in the sequence removed, we are left with relationships that are primarily outside the sequence. In other words, we will observe reductions in the partial relationship with this kind of control when the relationships are *either* spurious *or* developmental.[10] As a result we can not use this test to distinguish between the two models. This is the procedure utilized in the recent literature.

The advice when either of these models is a possibility is to partial using unstandardized regression coefficients rather than partial correlation. Since these coefficients are unstandardized they are unaffected by the reduction in variation due to controlling for background factors. Therefore, if we test for spuriousness when a developmental sequence exists, the magnitude of the partial regression coefficient will remain unchanged and we will not improperly infer spuriousness.

However, this strategy also breaks down when in addition to the developmental sequence and spuriousness models we also have our third hybrid model as a possibility. Thus, if both a direct effect from the independent variable and a developmental sequence through an intervening variable exists, the behavior of the regression coefficients will be affected by a control for spuriousness. In this situation the magnitude of the regression coefficient between the intervening and dependent variables will be reduced because we will be subtracting from that association any relationship due to the direct effect of the independent variable. Therefore, if we make this test, we may confuse the spurious with the hybrid model because we will observe a reduction in the regression coefficients in both cases. Due to the complexity of our hybrid theory, the introduction of our model to the set of possibilities for testing represents a second breakdown in the straight-forward methodology of causal inference.

To overcome this second difficulty, we propose that partial regression coefficients be utilized with controls for both spuriousness and de-

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[10] For the argument in this and the subsequent paragraph, see, Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Causal Inferences in Non-Experimental Research* (Chapel Hill: U. of North Carolina Press, 1964), pp. 83–87.

TABLE 1. BEHAVIOR OF REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS UNDER TESTS FOR SPURIOUSNESS AND DEVELOPMENTAL SEQUENCE AND MODEL TO BE INFERRED

Inference	Test for: Spuriousness	Developmental Sequence
Spuriousness	Reduction	No Reduction
Developmental Sequence	No Reduction	Reduction
Hybrid	Reduction	Reduction

velopmental sequences—a combination of controls which might lead to improper inferences if partial correlations are used, as discussed above. If a test of spuriousness, on significant zero-order regression coefficients, does not yield a reduction in the regression of party competition on a welfare policy, we may safely infer the most appropriate model is that of a developmental sequence. On the other hand, if the test does produce a reduction in the regression coefficient, we are still faced with the problem of choosing between the spuriousness and hybrid models for both models predict a reduction.[11]

We have a basis for inference, however, if we also test for a developmental sequence. Both the hybrid and developmental sequence models predict a reduction in the regression of the environment on the policy, while the spuriousness model predicts no reduction.[12] In other words, only when we observe a reduction in the regression coefficient under *both* tests should we infer the hybrid model. When the spuriousness and developmental sequence tests yield a reduction in one case but not in the other, we are in a position to choose between the other two models. Table 1 summarizes this discussion.

Yet a third difficulty remains. If we focus on the *magnitude* of the regression coefficients and use the significance test most commonly associated with regression (the F test), we would often conclude that our controls resulted in regression coefficients which are not significant. The reason for this is that this test, like correlation, is related to the amount of variation in our variables. If we happened to control for a background variable, as in the test for spuriousness, we would be reducing that variation perhaps to the point of making the partial regression not significant.[13] Normally, we avoid this outcome by being careful not to control for background variables. However, when two of the theoretical models under test require controlling for background variables, we must confront this difficulty.

The proposed solution in this situation is to make use of the fact that our theory predicts a *change* in the magnitude of the regression coefficients. Thus the null hypothesis is that the magnitudes will remain the same even after the control. Because of this, we can utilize confidence limits within which the magnitudes could have varied on a chance basis. Our research problem then is not just whether the controls reduced their magnitudes, but whether they reduced them by an amount greater than they could have by chance, given a significance level of, say, .05. If the partial is smaller than the corresponding lower confidence limit we conclude that there has been a significant reduction, if it is not smaller, we conclude that we cannot reject the null hypothesis.

III. ANALYSIS

Key's notions of variation in the relevance of party competition to policy, according to the centrality of the policy to the conflict between the haves and have-nots, led us to select four state expenditure policies for analysis—per pupil expenditure, old age assistance, unemployment compensation, and aid to dependent children.[14] All of these policies can be thought of as belonging to the same dimension of social welfare liberalism, broadly defined. Important differences exist, however, in the degree to which they are defined in the United States as embodying a welfare dimension. In other words, they vary in how central they are to the conflict between haves and have-nots. Thus, although educational policy is very important as an arena of conflict between the haves and have-nots, it includes rewards for both groups and has not been defined generally as a policy specifically designed for the poor, at least in recent times. Aid to dependent children, on the other hand, is designed explicitly to provide funds for the poor and is frequently defined as a "dole." Old age assistance and unemployment compensation, defined as policies designed to assist those who have worked long and hard before retirement or who are *temporarily* unemployed, would seem to occupy something of a middle ground between education and aid to dependent children.

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[11] See mathematical appendix below.

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Social Statistics* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960), p. 355.

[14] Data for per pupil expenditures and per receipt payments for old age assistance, unemployment compensation, and aid to dependent children taken from *The Book of the States: 1962–63* (Chicago: Council of State Governments, 1963). Data for Hawaii and Alaska, not included.

TABLE 2. REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN INTER-PARTY COMPETITION AND FOUR SOCIAL WELFARE POLICIES IN THE AMERICAN STATES, WITH CONTROLS FOR FOR FOUR SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FACTORS

	Regression Coefficients					
	Simple b	Lower Confidence Limit	Partial			Non-Agricultural Occupations
			Education	Urbanization	Income	
Per Pupil Expenditure Reduction	1.878	1.391	1.402* — *	1.257 (30%)	.218 (88%)	1.176 (37%)
Old Age Assistance Reduction	.319	.207	.129 (60%)	.262* — *	.233* — *	.357** — **
Unemployment Compensation Reduction	.132	.098	.086 (35%)	.101* — *	.058 (56%)	.100* — *
Aid to Dependent Children Reduction	.859	.636	.685* — *	.728* — *	.581 (32%)	.766* — *

* Not significant at .05 level.

** Control slightly, but not significantly, increases its value.

The test for spuriousness between party competition[15] and each of the four policies by controlling for each of four socio-economic factors is shown in Table 2. In every policy area, at least one control variable significantly reduces the regression coefficient between party competition and the policy. The regression for per pupil expenditure is reduced significantly by income, non-agricultural occupations, and urbanization. The regressions for old age assistance, unemployment compensation, and aid to dependent children are significantly reduced by education, education and income, and income, respectively. As discussed in the methodology section above, we are now in a position to reject the Key-Lockard pure developmental sequence model, because it predicts no reduction in the regression coefficients. On the other hand, we are not in a position to choose between the spuriousness and hybrid models, because they both predict a significant reduction.

Before proceeding to the test for a developmental sequence, we would like to note two other implications of Table 2. First, the socio-economic factor that reduces the regression coefficient the most for each policy area, income for per pupil expenditure, education for old age assistance, income for unemployment compensation, and income for aid to dependent children, varies considerably in how much reduction it produces. Thus, income reduces the regression for per pupil expenditure by eighty-eight percent (88%), while income only reduces the regression for aid to dependent children by thirty-two percent (32%). The reductions for old age assistance and unemployment compensation, sixty percent (60%) and fifty-six percent (56%), fall between these two poles. In other words, the extent to which we can reject the model at issue may correspond to the rough ranking of the centrality of these issues to the have, have-not struggle.

Second, in every policy area, there is at least one socio-economic variable which does not significantly reduce the regression of party competition on the policy. Education does not significantly reduce the regression coefficient for per pupil expenditure. Urbanization and income do not affect the regression coefficient for old age assistance. Urbanization and non-agricultural occupations do not reduce the regression for unemployment compensation. Three variables, education, urbanization and non-agricultural occupations fail to have an effect on aid to dependent children. This suggests that all four variables are not always equally relevant as control variables for all policy areas, as implied by previous research.[16] The theoretical implications of this are clear. We must have a clear notion of what it is that we are controlling for and why.

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[15] Our measure of party competition is drawn from Austin Ranney, "Political Parties," in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines (eds.), *Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), pp. 64–65, which combines competition for governor, the lower house, the upper house, and percent of divided executive-legislative control into one overall index of party competition. Our indices of wealth (per capita income), urbanization (percent urban), education (median school year completed), and percent in nonagricultural occupations for 1960–61 were drawn from Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1962* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962).

This finding also emphasizes that we must be very careful when we utilize multiple controls. For example, since income is the only socio-economic variable to significantly reduce the regression coefficient between party competition and aid to dependent children, to control for the other three socio-economic factors may lead to unwarranted inferences. The variables which do not significantly reduce the effect of party competition may still be significantly related to that variable. When we control their effects in a multiple-partial correlation analysis, we are further reducing the variation in the political variable which may artificially reduce the party competition-dependent variable correlation. Such gross use of controls, then not only obscures what may be important theoretical differences between these socio-economic factors, but also may lead to unwarranted inferences of spurious relationships due to "over-controlling."

Table 3 shows the tests for a developmental sequence. Controlling for party competition fails to produce a significant reduction in the regression of income on per pupil expenditure and education on old age assistance (almost significant, p = .08), though the other three socio-economic factors are sharply reduced in their effects. In the other two policy areas, however, the control for party competition significantly reduces the regression coefficients of all four socio-economic

TABLE 3. REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN FOUR SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FACTORS AND FOUR SOCIAL WELFARE POLICIES IN THE AMERICAN STATES, WITH A CONTROL FOR INTER-PARTY COMPETITION

	Regression Coefficients			
	Simple b	Lower Confidence Limit	Partial b	Reduction
Per Pupil Expenditures				
Education	44.464	30.350	17.483	(61%)
Urbanization	3.722	2.757	2.489	(33%)
Income	.164	.140	.152*	—*
Non-Agricultural Occupations	12.008	8.801	7.103	(41%)
Old Age Assistance				
Education	9.478	6.674	6.998*	—*
Urbanization	.485	.240	.228	(53%)
Income	.020	.012	.008	(60%)
Non-Agricultural Occupations	1.286	.452	−.076**	—**
Unemployment Compensation				
Education	3.350	2.425	1.701	(49%)
Urbanization	.224	.150	.125	(44%)
Income	.010	.008	.007	(30%)
Non-Agricultural Occupations	.738	.496	.320	(57%)
Aid to Dependent Children				
Education	19.559	12.936	6.378	(67%)
Urbanization	1.238	.709	.524	(58%)
Income	.056	.039	.025	(55%)
Non-Agricultural Occupations	4.134	2.411	.942	(77%)

* Not significant at .05 level.

** Actually changes the sign for the regression coefficients indicating reduction greater than 100 percent.

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[16] See Dye, *op. cit.*

variables with aid to dependent children and unemployment compensation.

The combination of the two tests suggests that the spurious model is the better inference for per pupil expenditure and old age assistance. The test for spuriousness produced a significant reduction in the regression coefficients, while the test for a developmental sequence did not.

The more appropriate inference, in aid to dependent children and unemployment compensation would seem to be the hybrid model. A significant reduction in the regression coefficient between party competition and these two policies in the test for spuriousness is matched by a significant reduction in the regression coefficients of the four socio-economic factors in the test for a developmental sequence.

IV. CONCLUSION

Our analysis leads us to several major conclusions. First, our examination of the methodology utilized in previous research into the effects of political variables on state expenditure policies convinces us that the spurious model now predominant in state politics literature rests on shaky empirical foundations. Reliance on correlational analysis can lead to unwarranted causal inferences.

Second, only for per pupil expenditure and old age assistance does the spurious model appear to be the more appropriate inference. Per pupil expenditure policies, especially, seems to be virtually a pure case of spuriousness as a function of the wealth of a state.

Third, because we have not found sufficient support for the relatively simple models in the areas of aid to dependent children and unemployment compensation our hybrid model appears as an alternative. Although it is not possible to estimate the exact magnitude of the impact of party competition if this is the appropriate model, it does indicate that this political variable does have an impact. Rejection of the spuriousness model then does suggest that even if there are direct effects from the environment party competition still serves as an intervening variable.

Fourth, as might have been predicted by Key, we tend to have different models with different policies. The extent to which we can reject the spuriousness model seems to vary as a function of the centrality of the policy to the struggle between the haves and have-nots. Our inferences therefore are consistent with the theory that given the advantages possessed by the haves, the organization, continuity, and visibility of alternatives provided through inter-party competition is important for the capacity of have-nots to attain policies in their own interests.

Finally, we think several research directions are suggested by our analysis. The model outlined above which suggested that there may be n number of intervening political variables implies that we need to place great stress on conceptualizing and measuring relevant political variables. To the extent that this model is the appropriate one we will continue to have trouble estimating the effects of the few political variables measured. The variation between models across the few policies considered in this analysis also suggests that we need to place as much, if not more stress on conceptualizing and measuring policy outputs beyond expenditures, especially outputs relevant to the struggle between haves and have-nots.[17]

APPENDIX

As Blalock points out if we make the test for spuriousness (control by the background variable) when the appropriate model is a pure developmental sequence the regression coefficients will be unaffected, i.e., the simple and partial coefficients will be equal. However, if we make the same control when the appropriate model is the hybrid case the coefficient will be reduced. We can prove this assertion by examining the hybrid model below. In addition to the developmental sequence $j \rightarrow k \rightarrow i$ we also have a direct effect of j on i. Employing the equation for partial regression coefficients and the fact that $(bjk)\ (bkj) = r^2jk$ we can set bij equal to $(1-r^2kj)\ (bij \cdot k) + (bik)$ (bkj). When we make the test for spuriousness we then have:

$$\begin{tikzcd} & j \arrow[dl] \arrow[dr] & \\ k \arrow[rr] & & i \end{tikzcd}$$

$bik \cdot j$

1. $$= \frac{bik - (bij)(bjk)}{1 - r^2jk}$$

2. $$= \frac{bik - [(1-r^2kj)(bij \cdot k) + (bik)(bkj)]bjk}{1 - r^2jk}$$

3. $$= \frac{bik - (bjk)(1-r^2kj)(bij \cdot k) - (bik)(bkj)(bjk)}{1 - r^2jk}$$

4. $$= \frac{bik - (bjk)(1-r^2kj)(bij \cdot k) - (bik)(r^2kj)}{1 - r^2jk}$$

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[17] See Donald J. McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde, "On Measuring Public Policy," in Robert E. Crew, Jr. (ed.), *State Politics: Readings on Political Behavior* (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 523–530 for an attempt to measure a qualitative output of state systems—anti-discrimination laws.

5. $$=\frac{bik-(bik)(r^2kj)-(bjk)(1-r^2kj)(bij\cdot k)}{1-r^2jk}$$

6. $$=\frac{bik(1-r^2kj)-(bjk)(1-r^2kj)(bij\cdot k)}{1-r^2jk}$$

$bik\cdot j$

7. $$=bik-(bjk)(bij\cdot k)$$

In other words the value of the partial regression coefficient will be that of the simple after it has been reduced by the effects of the other two links. If Blalock's pure developmental sequence were actually the appropriate model, $bij\cdot k$ would equal zero and according to equation #7 $bik\cdot j$ would equal bik, i.e. no reduction.

We can similarly show that the developmental sequence test (control for an intervening variable) when this model is the appropriate one will also result in a reduction in the coefficient. In that case we set bik equal to $(1-r^2jk)$ $(bik\cdot j)+(bij)$ (bjk) and when we make the test we have:

$bij\cdot k$

1. $$=\frac{bij-(bik)(bkj)}{1-r^2kj}$$

2. $$=\frac{bij-[(1-r^2jk)(bik\cdot j)+(bij)(bk)](bkj)}{1-r^2kj}$$

3. $$=\frac{bij-(bkj)(1-r^2jk)(bik\cdot j)-(bij)(bjk)(bkj)}{1-r^2kj}$$

4. $$=\frac{bij-(bkj)(1-r^2jk)(bik\cdot j)-(bij)(r^2kj)}{1-r^2kj}$$

5. $$=\frac{bij-(bij)(r^2kj)-(bkj)(1-r^2jk)(bik\cdot j)}{1-r^2kj}$$

6. $$=\frac{bij(1-r^2kj)-(bkj)(1-r^2jk)(bik\cdot j)}{1-r^2kj}$$

$bij\cdot k$

7. $$=bij-(bkj)(bik\cdot j)$$

Once again the value of the partial will be that of the simple after reductions due to the other two links. On the other hand, if the purely spurious model is the appropriate one in this test we know that $bik\cdot j=0$ which means that according to equation #7 $bij\cdot k=bij$. In other words the control will not reduce the value of the coefficient.

DIMENSIONS OF STATE POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY*

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I. INTRODUCTION

A question often posed by students of American state politics is: "Do state political systems leave a distinctive imprint on patterns of public policy?" Prior to recent years the nearly automatic response of political scientists was an unqualified "yes." More recent research has led to a qualified but increasingly confident "no."[1]

Several recent publications have explored relationships between various indices of state politics, socio-economic characteristics, and public policy. The general conclusion has been that central features of the political system such as electoral and institutional circumstances do not explain much of the variation in policy. There are occasionally high correlations between individual measures of voter turnout, party competitiveness, or the character of state legislatures and some aspects of governmental spending. But these political-policy correlations seem to disappear when the effect of socioeconomic development is controlled.

These are disturbing findings. They have not gone unchallenged.[2] But the challenges, rather than reassuring those who have asserted the relevance of parties, voting patterns, and government structures, have demonstrated that the burden of proof now rests on those who hypothesize a politics-policy relationship. The problem has not been resolved.

Part of the problem may rest on the conceptualization and measurement of the central variables. Electoral balance or alternation in office is not "inter-party competition," except in the most mechanical sense. Compare Massachusetts' loose-knit party structure to the centralization of Connecticut's. "Party competition" is not the same as "party organization." And party competition, voting habits, and patterns of apportionment fall far short of being equivalents of "political systems." We have been too simple-minded in our measurement of "politics" and "policy." Concepts are, hopefully, ever more closely approximated by the things we use to denote them. We propose to advance further in the approximation of "politics," "economics," and "policy" as they are used in comparative state research. As an added payoff, we offer some clarification of their interrelationships.

Our results confirm some and challenge other findings of recent research. Because we deal with factors and not isolated variables, we can speak with improved precision of which *dimensions* of policy respond to what *dimensions* of politics and economics. Our findings show that different social and economic characteristics have different relevance for policies, and their relevance varies between substantive areas of policy. Furthermore, central features of state politics are important for some policies, even when socioeconomic variation is controlled.

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[1] Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States," *Journal of Politics,* 25 (May, 1963), 265–289; Thomas R. Dye; *Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relation Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," this REVIEW, 60 (March, 1966), 73–82. One of the present authors has employed a different conception of "political" characteristics and his results qualify those of the authors listed above. See Ira Sharkansky, *Spending in the American States* (Chicago: Rand MacNally, 1968).

[2] See Sharkansky, *op. cit.,* plus James A. Wilson, *City Politics and Public Policy* (New York: Wiley, 1968), Chapter 1; and Duane Lockard, "State Party Systems and Policy Outputs," in Oliver Garceau (ed.), *Political Research and Political Theory* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 190–220.

II. METHODS OF INDEX CONSTRUCTION

The conceptualization of state policy making into three sectors—social, political-governmental, and policy—has proven sufficiently fruitful to warrant its continued use. We have followed the guidance of previous studies in separating the objects of our study in this manner. Within each sector, however, there is no *a priori* reason to assume that the component variables are unidimensional or of equal weight. For that reason, we wish to employ techniques which test for dimensionality and which assess the relative contribution of specific variables to the patterns of relationship.

In any situation where one seeks to pin numbers on a concept, a wise strategem is to employ multiple measures in the hope that they will, in a sense, triangulate on the conceptual target more accurately than any single item.[3] Multiple measurement, however, still leaves one guessing what is the common element of the many variables used. Averaging scores or ranks and constructing composite indices of unweighted items runs the risk of making several unwarranted and unnecessary assumptions.[4] It allows for no indication of the relative impact of the items included. Multiple regression analysis runs a similar risk. It provides no means for handling the multiple measures of dependent variables. A strong case can be made for a lengthy list of indicators, but one also needs a mechanism for sorting out their commonality and diversity. If used with some sensitivity, factor analysis serves this need.[5]

Some writers have been critical of some uses to which factor analysis has been put, particularly with the increased availability of pre-packaged programs and sophisticated computing facilities. Two major criticisms are relevant in the present context. First, it is charged that factor analysis has been used in lieu of theory.[6] If one simply plugs into the machine all of the data at his command, some kind of factors will emerge. Factor analysis is not a substitute for theory. There must be some prior rationale which justifies the particular variables fed into the computer. Secondly, the technique has been criticized because the factors which emerge often seem to make little sense in terms of the theory with which one is working.[7] Theory is juggled to accommodate the machinery.

This is not the appropriate context in which to explore the intricacies of factor analysis. But we do recognize the necessity to account for some of the major criticisms and to point out how we have tried to minimize the difficulties in our inquiry. We have attempted to avoid these pitfalls in two ways. First, the variables we include have been employed because of their widespread currency in analyses by other scholars and the appealing theoretical rationale which these analysts have offered.[8] Second, as will be apparent, the factors we obtain *do* make sense and we have employed a number of checks to insure that the apparent sense they make is not an artifact of the technique.[9] In order to use the results of factor analysis to test relationships among various dimensions of politics, economics, and public policy we derived "factor scores" for each state from the combination of its value on the individual variables and the loading of each variable on each factor. The derivation of state scores on the socioeconomic factors is discussed elsewhere.[10] With factor scores as our independent and dependent variables, we use simple, partial and multiple correlation techniques to assess relationships between dimensions of state economics, politics, and public policy.

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[3] For a lucid critique of single indicator analysis and a discussion of the methodological justification for multiple indicators see Eugene J. Webb, Donald T. Campbell, Richard D. Schwartz, and Lee Sechrest, *Unobtrusive Measures: Nonreactive Research in the Social Sciences* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), pp. 3ff.

[4] For an example of such an index, see Hofferbert, "The Relation . . . ," *op. cit.*

[5] The technique of factor analysis starts from the basic assumption that interrelations among separate variables signal the existance of underlying traits—or "factors"—that they share in common. A factor analysis manipulates a collection of variables in order to discern the various patterns of relationships among them. The groups of variables that relate closely to one another, but only loosely (or not at all) to variables in other groups are extracted as the principal factors. The individual variables that show the strongest relationships with other members of their factor have, in the language of factor analysis, the highest *loadings*. A variable's *loading* is, in effect, the coefficient of correlation between that variable and the underlying factor. By knowing the variables with the highest loadings on each factor, it is possible to infer something about the underlying traits that the factor represents. The variables with the highest loadings come closest to representing the underlying trait, although it is unlikely that any single variable represents that trait perfectly. The factoring technique used with the political and service variables employs orthogonal rotation. The device examines the correlation matrix of the individual variables and extracts factors whose members show maximum correlations among themselves and minimum correlations with the members of other factors. The program used is "Image," by Walter Stoly, Mass Communications Center, University of Wisconsin, Madison, version of July 2, 1968. For an explanation of techniques used in the socioeconomic factor, see Hofferbert, "Socioeconomic Dimensions . . . ," *op. cit.* Although Hofferbert employed oblique rotation in the extraction of his factors, the comparability to our political and service factors is not appreciably affected. The intercorrelation of the two socio-economic factors for 1960 is .023.

[6] J. Scott Armstrong, "Derivation of Theory of Means of Factor Analysis or Tom Swift and His Electric Factor Analysis Machine," *American Statistician* (December, 1967), 17–21.

[7] See, for example, John E. Mueller, "Some Comments on Russett's 'Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations,'" this REVIEW, 61 (March, 1967), 146–148.

Political Factors. In choosing the items for construction of the political indices an effort was made to include a comprehensive list of characteristics that have long been of concern to political scientists. We chose measures of participation and party competition, the character of the legislative, judicial and executive branches of state government, and the individual and mutual aspects of state, local and intergovernmental fiscal structures.

The measures of turnout and competition assess prominent aspects of the electoral process, involving contests for both governor and United States Representative. The measures of party competition include both the spread of the vote received in recent elections and the distribution of legislative and gubernatorial control between parties and over time.

The variables indicating government structures, personnel and revenues tap several aspects of state and local government that may affect perception of and responsiveness to citizen interests. The variables pertaining to the legislature include three separate indices of apportionment equity, plus the number of legislators, the length of the legislature's session, the number of committees, the salary of members and total expenditures for legislative services, and the number of bills introduced and passed at a recent session. Other scholars have used these variables to assess the representativeness of state legislatures, their "professionalism" and their activism.[11] Several of the variables pertaining to the executive branch assess the magnitude and professionalism of the civil service, and the formal nature of leadership in the executive branch. They show the relative number of employees and their conditions of work. Two variables relative to executive leadership are the score of each state's governor on an index of formal authority,[12] and the number of administrative officials who are directly elected. The age and length of the state constitution and the number of its amendments have been used by one scholar to assess the activism of state interest groups and their orientation toward constitution-building.[13] Also examined are terms, official qualifications, compensation and pension opportunities of the state judiciaries; these should denote some central aspects of judicial professionalism.

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[8] But we have been sensitive to the possibility of biased results. Certain initial steps have been taken to reduce this bias. Factor analysis cannot be relied upon to define the dimensions of a complex phenomenon (e.g., the state political system), particularly if the collection of variables subject to factor analysis is pre-loaded with many measures of the same phenomenon, each of which is highly correlated with others. Thus our first task was to insure that we did not "stack" our deck of variables with highly intercorrelated measures ($r > .70$) of the same phenomenon. This problem was particularly acute in the case of measures of party competition. Similar screening of the policy variables we examined did not reveal comparable redundancies.

[9] To maintain *prima facie* relevance, we use factor analysis in "stages" first to select from among a large collection those variables that load highly on principal factors and then to define the loadings of these variables on factors that contain only those highly-loaded components. In this way, the factor technique produces relatively "pure" factors, devoid of large numbers of variables that contribute only weakly to the principal factors. In both the political and policy analyses, a large number of variables load low on two principal factors, and several variables load about equally on each principal factor. In order to simplify these factors for the purposes of clarity and further analysis, we eliminated all variables loading below .5 on both principal factors and those loading at least .5 on one but above .4 on the other factor in each sector. (The variables surviving this elimination are noted as such on Tables 1 and 3.) We then made separate factor analyses of the variables that remained after this culling procedure. (The results in Tables 2 and 4.) The values derived from this final set of analyses constitute the bases for constructing indices of the political and policy sectors of our model.

[10] Hofferbert, "Socioeconomic Dimensions of the American States: 1890–1960," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* 12 (August, 1968), 401–418. The factor scoring program used for the political and policy factors if "FACTSCR2" by Keith R. Billingsley, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison, version of July 20, 1968. The scoring technique is described in Henry F. Kaiser, "Formulas for Component Scores," *Psychometrika,* 27 (March, 1962), 83–87.

[11] Dye, *op. cit.,* and John G. Grumm, "Structure and Policy in the Legislature," a paper presented at the Southwestern Social Science Association annual meeting, Dallas, March, 1967.

[12] Joseph A. Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Executive," in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N.

We measure state and local tax systems by the proportion of revenues raised from the major taxes. Each tax has a distinctive impact upon a particular segment of the population;[14] thus, the composition of state and local revenue systems may reflect the political strength of different economic groups, and affect the relationship between each group of taxpayers and state and local governments.

Several measures of intergovernmental relationships assess the mutual dependence of state and local governments and the role of federal agencies in financing public services. These variables permit an answer to the question: "Which government pays the bills?" Federal, state and local taxes vary in their progressivity-regressivity. A state that relies heavily on locally financed services may generate a different type of response among taxpayers than one that relies on state or federal revenues. It is also likely that each level of government differs in its responsiveness to demands. Thus a state that emphasizes services financed by federal or state agencies may present a different complexion of need-gratifications than one which is localist in orientation. Finally, the supervision of "avoided" programs is likely to differ from that of programs financed locally. A heavy reliance on federal and state revenues, therefore, may have administrative implications that influence other dimensions of state politics.

No two of our political variables measures the same phenomena in exactly the same manner. It is possible, however, that our penchant for a comprehensive list of indicators will overload the factor analysis in favor of phenomena (e.g., party competition) that have been the subject of several earlier measurements. In order to guard against this kind of overloading, we computed a matrix of simple correlation coefficients between all of our political variables. In those cases where variables measuring similar phenomena showed high coefficients of correlation ($r > 7$), we eliminated one of the highly intercorrelated pair from the factor analysis. The 41 variables that survived this first screening process are indicated in Table 1 and were entered into a preliminary factor analysis. This analysis was used to identify those variables which loaded high on two or more factors or loaded high in no factor. (See notes 8 and 9) A second factor analysis was performed without these ambiguities and irrelevancies, and produced the two principal factors reported in Table 2.

The first principal factor is labeled "Professionalism-Local Reliance." It draws its name from the *positively-loaded* measures of judicial and legislative compensation, expenditures on legislative services, and legislative activity; and from the *negatively-loaded* measures of reliance upon *state* government expenditures and *federal* aids. States scoring high on this factor show high salaries for judges and legislators, well-financed legislative staffs, and primary reliance on locally raised and spent revenues. The inverse juxtaposition in factor #1 of professionalism in government and the use of state and federal aids makes sense in terms of functions that intergovernmental payments are reputed to serve. They are often defended as devices that are used most by governments which redistribute resources from *have* to *have not* jurisdictions. And in fact, the recipients have apparent needs for assistance. Factor #1 suggests that states making heavy use of intergovernmental assistance have judicial and legislative institutions that are less well-developed than average.

The second factor—"Competition-Turnout"—has as its highest-loaded variables the measures of turnout in a gubernatorial election, an index of suffrage liberality, and (negatively) one-party dominance in the state legislature and in recent elections for governor.[15] The Competition-Turnout dimension provides some post hoc justification for the many studies of state politics that have focused almost entirely on electoral processes and inter-party struggles. Books and articles by V. O. Key, Duane Lockard, and John Fenton, among others, view party competition and electoral behavior as the primary stuff of politics.[16] Our factor analyses

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Vines (eds.), *Politics in the American States* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), pp. 207–238.

[13] Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "Some Effects of Interest Group Strength in State Politics," this REVIEW, 60 (December, 1966), 952–962.

[14] See George A. Bishop, "The Tax Burden by Income Class, 1958," *National Tax Journal*, 14 (March, 1961), 41–58.

[15] In interpreting the results of the factor analysis, a loading of .700 will be considered to be high.

[16] V. O. Key, Southern Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949); Key, *American State Politics: An Introduction* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956); Duane Lockard, *New England State*

TABLE 1. POLITICAL VARIABLES SUBJECT TO ANALYSIS†

(Participation and Party)

**1. Percent voting age population voting for Governor
2. Percent voting age population voting for U.S. Representative
**3. Number of items on Milbrath's list of suffrage regulations on which a state scores as a "facilitator"
**4. Percent of gubernatorial vote won by major party
5. Percent of congressional vote won by major party
**6. Percent of seats in lower house of state legislature held by major party
7. Percent of seats in upper house of state legislature held by major party
*8. Number of years during 1952–62 when major party controlled Governor's office
**9. Number of years during 1954–62 when major party controlled lower house of legislature
*10. Number of years during 1954–62 when major party controlled upper house of legislature

(Institutions and Personnel)

*11. Dauer-Kelsay index of legislative apportionment
*12. David-Eisenberg index of legislative apportionment
*13. Shubert-Press index of legislative apportionment
*14. Number of state legislators
**15. Legislators' compensation
**16. Total expenditures on legislative services per legislator (minus compensation)
*17. Number of legislative committees
**18. Number of bills introduced into the legislature
19. Number of bills passed by the legislature
*20. Proportion of bills introduced that were passed
*21. Number of days in the legislative session
*22. Term of judges on state court of last resort
*23. Minimum age requirement for judges on appeals courts
*24. Minimum age requirement for judges on trial courts
**25. Compensation of judges on court of last resort
*26. Minimum term that will make state judges eligible for pension
27. Number of state employees per 10,000 population
28. Average salary of state employees
*29. Percent of state employees covered by state personnel system
*30. Schlesinger index of gubernatorial formal power
*31. Number of separately elected executive officials in the state government
*32. Number of state plus local government employees per 10,000 population
*33. Average salary of state plus local government employees
*34. Percent of state and local government employees covered by government supported health and hospital insurance
*35. Percent of state and local government employees covered by government supported life insurance
36. Number of words in state constitution
*37. Number of amendments in state constitution
*38. Date of state constitution's ratification
*39. Population per local governmental unit

(Fiscal Structure)

*40. Percent of state and local government revenues collected from real property taxes
*41. Percent of state and local government revenues collected from individual income taxes
*42. Percent of state and local government revenues collected from general sales taxes
43. Percent of state and local government revenues collected from excise taxes
*44. Percent of state and local government revenues collected from current service charges
45. Percent of state government revenue received as federal aid
**46. Percent of state and local government revenue received as federal aid
47. Percent of state and local government revenue raised by state government
**48. Percent of state and local government revenue spent by state agencies
49. Percent of state and local government revenue raised by local governments
50. Percent of local revenue received from the state government
*51. Percent of state aid to localities allocated on the basis of fixed criteria of population or the amount of certain taxes collected locally
52. Percent of state aid to localities allocated on the basis of need
*53. State aid to localities per capita

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† Unless indicated otherwise, the data pertain to 1962.

* Variables surviving test for high intercorrelations among substantively similar variables.

** Variables surviving test for high loading on a single factor. (All ** variables also meet the test of those being noted with * only.)

TABLE 2. LOADINGS OF POLITICAL VARIABLES ON TWO PRINCIPAL FACTORS

Variables*	Professionalism—Local Reliance	Competition—Turnout
Compensation of judges (25)	.897	.045
Compensation of legislators (15)	.865	.142
Legislative Service expenditures (16)	.821	.025
Number of bills introduced (18)	.812	−.130
State and local revenue from federal government (46)	−.763	−.293
State and local revenue spent by state agencies (48)	−.732	−.330
Lower house seats of major party (6)	−.280	−.861
Gubernatorial election turnout (1)	.033	.827
Gubernatorial vote for major party (4)	−.077	−.775
Liberal suffrage laws (3)	−.006	.717
Lower house tenure of major party (9)	−.061	−.623
Percent of Total Variance	36.7	28.8

* The parenthesized numbers correspond to the variable numbers in Table 1.

suggest that an electoral-party dimension has indeed some importance as a distinct component of state politics.

Public Policy Factors. Our list of policy measures is limited in conception to the expenditures for and outputs of major public services. It is not designed to measure "everything government does." Some measures of government activity seem better conceived as measures of state politics than as measures of policy.[17] In the factor analysis of state public policies, the variables were chosen to represent both current expenditures for major services and approximations of results from service operations.[18] The non-expenditure variables measure "outputs" expressed as service actually rendered. Table 3 lists the variables entered into the factor analyses of policy outputs.

The measures of educational output show the capacity of secondary schools to entice students to remain until graduation and the success of each state's residents on a nation-wide examination. Presumably, the first measure assesses the schools' ability to serve the needs of the students, whether they are inclined toward college preparation or immediate placement in business or the trades. The incidence of examination passes should reflect the quality of information and the intellectual skills that state residents possess by the time they finish secondary school.

The highway output measures record the mileage of various types of state roads in relation to population. Population seems to be the best measure of traffic needs that is readily available.[19] Therefore, the measures show the incidence of various roads in relation to the demands of traffic. Admittedly, road location is not considered. Some states may build many

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Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959); John H. Fenton, *Politics in the Border States* (New Orleans: Hauser Press, 1957); and Fenton, *Midwest Politics* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966).

[17] We have described above our justifications for including measures pertaining to government personnel, structure, and revenue among our political variables. In brief, they represent features of revenue inputs and governmental structures that may affect response to citizens' needs and demands. Our policy measures are more narrow in representing the benefits which governments actually provide to their citizens within the prominent categories of service.

[18] Although some research has relied almost exclusively on expenditures as indicators of public policy, a recent study shows the risk in assuming an expenditure-service relationship. The current expenditures of state and local governments may not be uniformly reliable indicators of the service that is actually provided to the population. But on the other hand spending may represent the effort that state and local governments are making in order to improve or maintain their services. Therefore it deserves a place on our list of policy variables. See Sharkansky, "Government Expenditures and Public Services in the American States," this REVIEW, 61 (December, 1967), 1066–1077.

[19] See Philip H. Burch, Jr., *Highway Revenue and Expenditure Policy in the United States* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1962), p. 23.

miles of roads but place them unwisely with respect to centers of population, commercial needs, etc. The completion rate of the interstate system provides some indication of state highway department administrative skills and capacity to respond quickly in the face of a major opportunity. The inverted death rate provides a measure of road safety. Where a state scores high on the latter measure, it should indicate high standards of road design and maintenance and/or an adequate system of highway patrol.

Output measures in the public welfare field reflect both the generosity of payments and the coverage of each major public assistance program. These specific programs have been in operation generally for several years. They represent much of the work carried out by state departments of public welfare. However, the indicators do not assess such things as quality or quantity of counselling services, cost of living differences, or activities under the newer programs sponsored by the federal Office of Economic Opportunity.

Measures of health policies assess the likelihood of white and non-white children surviving their first year. Admittedly, these variables cover only a small portion of health-relevant services within each state. And they show the influence of many social and economic processes. Nevertheless, we assume that high scores on these scales reflect the presence of health and hospital facilities that are adequate in the face of cultural and medical needs.

Natural resources policies are reflected in measures of the tendency of state residents to use the programs and facilities offered by state departments of parks and wildlife. High scores on these variables should signal attractive programs. The basic assumption is that an attractive program stimulates usage by state residents.[20]

TABLE 3. POLICY VARIABLES SUBJECT TO ANALYSIS†

(Education)

*1. Percent of ninth grade students (1959) graduating three years later
*2. Percent of candidates passing selective service mental examination
3. State and local government expenditures for education per capita

(Highways)

4. Total road mileage per capita
*5. Rural road mileage per rural resident
6. Municipal road mileage per urban resident
7. Percent of designated Interstate mileage completed
8. Population per highway fatality
*9. State and local government expenditures for highways per capita

(Welfare)

*10. Average payment, Aid to Families of Dependent Children
*11. Average payment, Old Age Assistance
*12. Average payment, Aid to the Blind
*13. Average payment, Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled
14. Incidence of AFDC recipients among population with incomes of less than $2,000
*15. Incidence of OAA recipients among population with incomes of less than $2,000 and over 65 years of age
16. Incidence of AB recipients among population with incomes of less than $2,000
17. Incidence of APTD recipients among population with incomes of less than $2,000
18. State and local government expenditures for public welfare per capita

(Health)

19. Proportion of white infants surviving their first year of life
20. Proportion of non-white infants surviving their first year of life
21. State and local government expenditures for health, hospitals, and sanitation per capita

(Natural Resources)

22. Visits per 10,000 population to state parks
*23. Fishing licenses sold per 10,000 population
*24. Hunting licenses sold per 10,000 population
*25. State and local government expenditures for natural resources per capita

(General)

26. Total state and local government general expenditures per capita

† The data all pertain to 1962.

* Variables surviving test for high loading on a single factor.

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[20] In collecting the data for the measures of outputs and services, the assumption was made that recorded information is a reasonably accurate reflection of fact. The authors recognize considerable controversy about the reliability of the data. Yet the data chosen appear to be the best available, and they enjoy wide use among social scientists. For comments about each item the reader is referred to the sources. The sources for the political variables include: *Census of Governments, 1962: The Book of the States 1964–1965; Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1964;* the index of gubernatorial power comes from Schlesinger's article cited in note #12; the index of suffrage regulations comes from Lester Milbrath, "Political Participation in the States," in Jacob and Vines, *op. cit.*, pp. 25–60; the indices of legis-

Examination of the simple correlations among the policy measures revealed no redundancies comparable to those found in the list of political variables. A preliminary factor analysis of the policy variables led us to eliminate ambiguities and irrelevancies which loaded high on two factors or on no factors. (See notes 8 and 9). Then a second factor analysis was performed with the remaining variables. The variables retained and their loadings are shown in Table 4. The first factor—"Welfare-Education"—emphasizes generous welfare payments, the tendency of high school pupils to remain until graduation, and the success of state residents on the national examination.

The second principal policy factor is "Highway-Natural Resources." Its major components are measures of rural highway mileage and highway expenditures, plus measures of fish and wildlife services and expenditures for natural resources. A curious variable that is loaded highly on this factor is Old Age Assistance recipients. At first glance, it seems out of its proper place in the Welfare-Education factor. Aid to the aged, however, is the product of a policy process that is distinct from that of other welfare and education programs. A number of rural states that have paid little attention to the average level of welfare benefits have shown considerable concern for their aged and have made the program available to a large number of beneficiaries. Some of this concern may be related to the political strategy of state governmental decision makers. Aside from welfare mothers (who are tainted with a stigma of illegitimacy), the aged are the largest groups of potential welfare recipients who are eligible to vote.[21] The lines of reasoning suggested by this instance will be more carefully explored in Section III below.

Socioeconomic Factors. The factor analysis of socioeconomic characteristics is discussed in detail elsewhere.[22] It includes measures of income, urbanization, industrialization, ethnicity, education and other likely components of "economic development." The variables included are listed in Table 5 in the order in which they load on two principal factors. The factors are here labelled "Industrialization" and "Affluence" ac-

TABLE 4. LOADINGS OF POLICY VARIABLES ON TWO PRINCIPAL FACTORS

Variables*	Welfare—Education	Highways—Natural Resources
AFDC payments (10)	.911	.049
OAA payments (11)	.864	.170
High school graduates (1)	.848	.113
AB payments (12)	.834	.042
Examination success (2)	.779	.414
APTD payments (13)	.719	−.274
Rural road mileage (5)	.109	.869
Hunting licenses (24)	−.058	.860
Highway expenditures (9)	.118	.857
Fishing licenses (23)	.040	.800
Natural resource expenditures (25)	.310	.719
OAA recipients (15)	.041	.709
Percent of Total Variance	35.4	34.9

* The parenthesized numbers correspond to the variable numbers in Table 3.

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lative apportionment comes from Paul T. David and Ralph Eisenberg, *Devaluation of the Urban and Suburban Vote* (Charlottesville: Bureau of Public Administration, University of Virginia, 1961), p. 5, 15, and Glendon Shubert and Charles Press, "Measuring Malapportionment," this REVIEW, 58 (1964), 969. The sources for policy variables include: National Education Association, *Rankings of the States, 1963*; U.S. Bureau of Public Road, *Annual Report 1963;* Social Security Administration, Social Security Bulletin: *Annual Statistical Supplement 1963; The Book of the States, 1964–1965; Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1964.*

[21] For a discussion of the politics of old age assistance in Alabama, see Sharkansky, *Spending in the American States*, pp. 138–141.

[22] Hofferbert, "Socioeconomic Dimensions . . . ," *op. cit.*

TABLE 5. LOADINGS OF SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES ON TWO PRINCIPAL FACTORS: 1960*

Industrialization		Affluence	
value added by manufacture/capita	+.907	median school years completed	+.909
percentage employed in manufacturing	.877	estimated valued of real property/capita	.792
value/acre of farm land and buildings	.831	personal income/capita	.730
population/square mile	.775	motor vehicle registration/1,000 population	.703
percent foreign	.703	telephones/1,000 population	.675
total population	.672	percent increase in population	.551
percent urban	.657	percent urban	.522
telephones/1,000 population	.650	acreage per farm	.488
average no. of employees per manufacturing establishment	.638	divorce rate	.430
personal income/capita	.573	percent failures business+commercial establishments	.287
percent failures business+commercial establishments	.421	percent housing owner occupied	.240
estimated value real property/capita	.132	percent foreign	.230
percent Negro	.066	total population	.045
percent illiterate	.039	value per acre of farm land and buildings	.024
		value added by manufacture/capita	.015
		population/square mile	.008
percent increase in population	.006	percentage employed in manufacturing	.132
median school years completed	.026	average no. of employees per manufacturing establishment	.351
percent farms operated by tenants	.266	percent farms operated by tenants	.468
percent housing owner occupied	.316	percent illiterate	.737
divorce rate	.325	percent Negro	−.752
acreage per farm	.503		
motor vehicle registration/1,000 population	−.568		
percent of total variance	32.4		25.3

* Source: Hofferbert, "Socioeconomic Dimensions of the American States," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, August, 1968.

cording to the variables that load highest on each one.[23] In this article, these factors are used to assess the socioeconomic conditions that support various aspects of state politics and public service and to test the interaction between the major dimensions of state economics, politics, and policy.

III. ECONOMIC-POLITICAL-POLICY RELATIONSHIPS: A COMPARISON OF FACTOR VERSUS INDIVIDUAL VARIABLE RELATIONSHIPS

One controversy that is clarified by the use of factor scores concerns relationships among political and economic characteristics of the states that are alleged to influence the nature of public policies. Several publications employ individual variables to answer the question raised in our introduction, i.e., how do political and economic elements relate with each other and with the nature of public policies? Although most authors use comparable measurements and attempt to make their research additive with respect to each others', the interpretation of their findings is made difficult by the discreteness of the variables examined. The correlations reported by Dye, for example, often show differing policy relationships with "industrialization" and "urbanization" than with "income" and "education."[24] The findings claimed when the "political" measures assess a certain type of voter turnout or party competition differ from the findings derived from "political" measures that assess the equity of apportionment or the centralization of state-local financial relationships. Likewise, findings vary with the use of expenditures or other

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[23] *Ibid.* The label given to one of the socioeconomic factors is new with this article. In the original article "Affluence" was labelled "Cultural Enrichment," the present term seems more appropriate as a description of the contents of this factor.

[24] See, for example, Dye, *op. cit.*, p. 125 and p. 162.

TABLE 6. FACTOR SCORES FOR THE STATES ON TWO POLITICAL AND TWO POLICY FACTORS

State	Professionalism—local-reliance	Competition—turnout	Welfare—education	Highway—natural resources
Alabama	−.399	−2.504	−1.753	−.405
Arizona	−.005	−.141	−.266	.175
Arkansas	−.827	−1.360	−1.263	.056
California	2.140	.363	1.849	−.345
Colorado	−.255	.679	.711	.473
Connecticut	.200	.431	.846	−.845
Delaware	.116	.192	−.390	−.779
Florida	.260	−.560	−.875	−.589
Georgia	.087	−2.516	−1.452	−.535
Idaho	−1.052	1.266	−.045	1.583
Illinois	1.154	1.034	1.258	−.877
Indiana	.036	1.152	.155	−.399
Iowa	−.163	.326	.845	−.059
Kansas	−.159	.359	.852	−.082
Kentucky	−.661	−.351	−1.041	−.420
Louisiana	.031	−1.152	−.729	−.361
Maine	−.619	.045	−.465	.344
Maryland	.500	−.377	−.155	−.787
Massachusetts	1.651	.071	1.446	−1.363
Michigan	1.354	.627	.761	−.578
Minnesota	.417	1.339	1.316	.594
Mississippi	−.210	−1.770	−2.432	−.191
Missouri	.126	.305	−.378	−.298
Montana	−1.095	1.235	−.063	1.847
Nebraska	−.297	1.494	.705	.337
Nevada	−.221	−.170	−.535	2.866
New Hampshire	−.752	.191	1.035	.183
New Jersey	1.010	.843	1.035	−1.115
New Mexico	−.734	−.615	.184	.269
New York	4.230	−.643	1.152	−1.079
North Carolina	−.161	−.198	−1.079	−.857
North Dakota	−.869	.780	.901	.614
Ohio	.619	.226	.284	−.756
Oklahoma	−.799	−.293	.785	−.262
Oregon	−.207	.913	.735	.656
Pennsylvania	1.648	.192	.085	−.769
Rhode Island	−.328	.166	.640	−1.144
South Carolina	−.013	−2.838	−1.580	−.808
South Dakota	−.976	−.138	−.072	1.546
Tennessee	−.582	−.556	−1.738	−.169
Texas	.289	−.566	−.808	−.493
Utah	−1.032	1.629	.124	.688
Vermont	−1.546	−.483	−.615	1.313
Virginia	−.243	−.964	−1.062	−.645
Washington	−.160	.694	.789	.063
West Virginia	−.739	.281	−1.360	−.422
Wisconsin	.558	.949	1.445	.095
Wyoming	−1.421	.413	.220	3.728

variables that purport to measure public policy.[25]

At this point it is possible to face the issue of political or economic influences on public policies with some important new tools. The six factors measure prominent dimensions of state economics, politics, and public policies. They should enable us to see which types of economic and political phenomena are most relevant for which types of public policy. The statistics employed in this section are commonly used in the analysis of policy determinants: coefficients of simple, partial, and multiple correlation. The innovation here is in the variables. Instead of individual measures, the variables are represented by the factor scores reported in Table 6.

There is a strong association between Competition-Turnout and the Affluence dimension of state economics. (See Table 7.) Evidently, citizens are more likely to participate in politics and parties are most likely to compete with one another where the residents are well-educated and relatively wealthy. Of course, this finding is not new. However, it is a very important relationship in the political and economic systems of American states that is highlighted by the use of factor analysis.[26]

Another strong relationship is that between the Professionalism-Local Reliance dimension of

TABLE 7. COEFFICIENTS OF SIMPLE CORRELATION BETWEEN SOCIOECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FACTORS

Political Factors	Socioeconomic Factors	
	Industrialization	Affluence
Professionalism—Local Reliance	.73	.14
Competition-Turnout	.11	.66

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[25] See Sharkansky, *Spending in the American States.*, Chapters 4 and 7.

[26] The strength of relationships between the political and economic factors is stronger than that customarily obtained with individual variables. The correlations that we have described are .73 and .66. Only two out of the forty-eight simple correlations between economic and political variables that Dye reports in his study reach the level of .66 and none reach .73 (see his Chapter 3). The underlying dimensions that are tapped by factor analysis appear to be more salient representations of the economic-political nexus than are apparent in studies using single variables.

state politics and the Industrialization dimension of state economics. It is apparently the value of industrial output and the incidence of industrial employment—instead of education, wealth, or ethnicity—that has the most to do with the development of legislative and judicial professionalization and the tendency of local authorities to rely on their own economic resources. It may be that a large industrial tax base and an urbanized population permits governments to rely on locally-raised revenues. An industrial economy may also encourage states to develop professional, active policy making institutions in response to comparable models in the private sector.

The Welfare-Education dimension of state policy shows positive relationships with each of the political and economic factors. (See Table 8.) The coefficients of partial correlation reveal that this policy factor is associated most closely with high scores on Competition-Turnout and Affluence, with neither being significantly more important than the other. The elements of inter-party competition, high voter participation, high levels of educational attainment, and wealth seem to provide the impetus—independently from other governmental and economic conditions—for public officials to provide generous welfare payments and successful educational services.[27]

This finding of importance for the Competition-Turnout factor with respect to welfare and education services provides some latter-day support for hypotheses derived from Key and others that electoral and party characteristics of state politics have something to do with the nature of services that are provided.[28] Our findings do not, however, fit the neat, linear, single determinant structure of causality suggested by some of Key's followers. Rather, the data suggest that it is not any one element of state politics, but an underlying factor that is only partly measured by individual variables which exerts an independent influence on public services. The prominence of this finding is increased by the importance of the policy factor involved. Welfare and education services consume a substantial proportion of state and local government resources: 49 percent of general expenditures and 51 percent of government employment in 1965–66. Policy making in welfare and education are characterized by sharp controversies; this may explain their relation with electoral and partisan processes in a manner quite different from other areas of public policy.

The Highway-Natural Resources dimension of public policy shows its primary dependence

TABLE 8. COEFFICIENTS OF SIMPLE, PARTIAL, AND MULTIPLE CORRELATION, AND MULTIPLE DETERMINATION BETWEEN SOCIOECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND POLICY FACTORS

	Simple Correlation		Partial Correlation*	
	Welfare —Education	Highways —Natural Resources	Welfare —Education	Highways —Natural Resources
Professionalism — Local Reliance	.39	—.54	.26	—.24
Competition — Turnout	.68	.25	.47	—.02
Industrialization	.37	—.69	.17	—.55
Affluence	.69	.43	.43	.53
	Multiple Correlation		Multiple Determination	
Socioeconomic Factors	.77	.82	.59	.68
Political Factors	.78	.60	.61	.36
Socioeconomic + Political Factors	.83	.84	.69	.70

* Controlling for the other factors.

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[27] The political and economic factors are more successful in accounting for interstate variance in the policy factors than are most individual measures of these phenomena. Table 8 shows simple, partial, and multiple correlation coefficients between policy factors as dependent variables and the political and economic factors as independent variables. It shows that both political factors together account for 61 and 36 percent of the variance in the policy factors. In contrast, the multiple correlation coefficients that Dye reports show that his collection of individual political variables account for 36 percent of the variance in only fifteeen out of fifty-four dependent variables, and they account for 61 percent of the variance in only two out of the fifty-four instances. (See Dye, *op. cit.*, pp. 286–287.) Both of our socioeconomic factors account for 59 and 68 percent of the variance in the policy factors. In contrast, Dye's collection of individual social and economic variables account for 59 percent of the variance in only fourteen of fifty-four dependent variables, and they account for 68 percent of the variance in only eight of fifty-four dependent variables. A similar finding appears when we compare with his data the success of our economic and political factors together in explaining variance in our policy factors. We explain 69 and 70 percent of the variance in the policy factors by means of all political and socioeconomic variables: variables Dye explains 69 percent of the variance for only thirteen of fifty-four dependent variables,

[28] See their works cited in note #16, *supra.*

on economic factors. It is inversely and strongly related to Industrialization and directly related to Affluence. Thus it appears that *low* levels of industrial output and employment, population density and urbanization together with *high* levels of personal wealth and education incline a state toward heavy investments in roads (especially in rural areas) and active fish and wildlife programs. Wide-open spaces present an abundance of recreational opportunities, the need for highway facilities, and the rural interests that have concentrated their political efforts in behalf of these services. Highway-Natural Resource policy also is inversely dependent on the Professionalism-Local Reliance dimension of state politics, but this is secondary to its dependence on socioeconomic characteristics.

Why the lack of dependence on political factors for highway and natural resource policies? Despite conflicting interests, the particular programmatic activities involved in these policies do not fall neatly along the symbolic continua which are most commonly the objects of partisan controversy. There seem to be few issues, for example, which array taxpayers and the economic *haves* against recipients of services and the *have nots* (in contrast to the case in education and welfare). This may be a function of highways, parks, wildlife, and conservation programs being "self-financed" by means of earmarked taxes, licenses and user fees. The recipients pay for much of the benefits received, and do not generate a great deal of conflict across the lines of different social classes or ethnic groups.

IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This article reports two separate factor analyses of state politics and public policies. And together with two socioeconomic factors, it employs the political and policy factors to clarify relationships among three sectors of a widely used model of the state policy process. The major findings are:

1) The factor analysis of political variables reveals two underlying dimensions of state politics. These are Professionalism-Local Reliance and Competition-Turnout. The distinctiveness of the Competition-Turnout factor testifies to the importance of this dimension in distinguishing the politics of each state from the others. And it credits the perception of Key, Lockard, Fenton and other political scientists who took aspects of electoral and party behavior as the focus of their own work.
2) The factor analysis of policy variables reveals two principal dimensions of Welfare-Education and Highway-Natural Resources.
3) The examination of political and economic factors shows strong associations between Competition-Turnout and Affluence, and between Professionalism-Local Reliance and Industrialization.
4) The relationships among political, economic, and policy factors show that the Welfare-Education dimension of state policy is significantly dependent upon the Competition-Turnout dimension of state politics and the Affluence dimension of the state economy. Where a state is wealthy and shows high turnout and intense interparty competition, it is likely to score high on the level of welfare and educational services. The Highway-Natural Resources dimension of policy appears most dependent upon the Industrialization dimension of the states' economies. The relationship is inverse, indicating that well-developed highways and fish-game programs accompany low levels of industrialization and population concentration.
5) The relationships among economic, political, and policy factors are generally stronger than the relationships between individual variables that have previously been used. Thus the underlying dimensions tapped by factor analysis strengthen as well as simplify our explanations of policy making in the American states.

The single most important finding of this article may be its emphasis upon multidimensionality in state economics, politics and public policy. There is no single answer to the question: "Is it politics or economics that has the greatest impact on public policy?" The answer (contrary to the thrust of much recent research) varies with the dimensions of each phenomena that are at issue.[29] Welfare-Education policies relate most closely with the Competition-Turnout dimension of state politics *and* with the Affluence dimension of the economy. Highway-Natural Resource policies show their closest (inverse) relationships with the Industrialization dimension of the state economy.[30]

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[29] Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States, this REVIEW, 63 (September, 1969).

[30] One limitation of the data employed throughout this article is their lack of historical perspective. A separate study of the two socioeconomic factors and their relationship with individual policy

While these findings add to the inquiry into political and economic determinants of public policies, they offer little encouragement to those who would seek to expand the level and scope of public services by manipulating one political or structural characteristic of state government (e.g., voter turnout, party competition, or apportionment). It is apparent only that certain aspects of politics having to do with voter turnout and interparty competition are related to certain public policies. But this does not terminate the inquiry. Factor analyses depend on the nature of the variables included in them. Although this study has included a wide range of political, economic, and policy variables in its factor analyses, it is likely that further analysis—with more measures of political, economic, and policy traits—will permit the extraction of additional dimensions from the sectors of state policy systems.

The present factors leave unexplained much of the variance in state politics and policy.[31] This unplumbed variance might be reduced by adding more variables to the factor programs. However, it may be inherent in the nature of the phenomena that much variance will remain unexplained by factor analysis. This unexplained variance may reflect the importance of particularistic, unpatterned happenings that fashion and lend excitement to political institutions. The effort to explain why politics and policies differ from one state to the next may be helped considerably by examining the dimensions lying beneath readily measured variables. But no amount of archival search and factor analysis will account for the contributions made to the institutions of policies of individual states by dynamic personalities or the force of strong traditions. The study of elite and organizational behavior, plus exploration of the values that prevail in the cultural environments of the individual states may be essential for a thorough understanding of inter-state differences in politics and public policy.

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and electoral variables has shown that the strength of relationship is, in some cases, quite fluid over time. (See Hofferbert, "Socioeconomic Dimensions . . . ," *op. cit.*) This fluidity, however, may be a result of simple changes in the value of isolated dependent variables and not an accurate picture of the more analytically interesting dimensions of policy and political life which we have been considering here. Hofferbert found that the relative contribution of individual variables maintained a high degree of consistency in their loadings on the principal factors from one decade to the next, although individual variable-by-variable correlations shifted considerably. If it were possible to analyze the full component of political and service variables over extended time, the same type of configuration could probably be expected. Consequently, the strength of relationship of *factors* could be fairly constant over time even though the individual variable correlations changed considerably. Because of limited availability of the political and policy data for previous years, however, this must remain a matter for speculation.

For a useful discussion of the methodological problems of theory construction employing measures standardized for a specific population and time, such as the correlation coefficients used here, versus unstandardized regression coefficients see Hubert Blalock "Causal Inferences, Closed Populations, and Measures of Association," this REVIEW, 61 (March, 1967), 130–136. Blalock argues that in building theoretical statements of more general application, the regression is the most use since it is not as sensitive as the correlation coefficient to specific population values at a given time. However, in an investigation such as ours, where possibility of longitudinal analysis is limited due to the availability of relevant data, it seemed advisable to retain the greater precision of standardized measures. Furthermore, in the case of the states, the relative magnitudes of most of the variables is not particularly fluid as might be the case with some other types of indicators, such as the congressional roll call votes discovered by Blalock.

[31] Although the figures in Table 2 report that the political factors account for 66 percent of the variance, this pertains to the variance in the eleven variables that were subject to this factor analysis. These factors do not account for this much of the variance in the total collection of fifty-three variables that are presented in Table 1.

THE DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS AMONG THE AMERICAN STATES*

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We are now in the midst of a notable revival of interest in the politics of the American states. During the last decade many studies have been conducted of the social, political and economic determinants of state policy outcomes.[1] Several of these writers have argued that the relative wealth of a state, its degree of industrialization, and other measures of social and economic development are more important in explaining its level of expenditures than such political factors as the form of legislative apportionment, the amount of party competition, or the degree of voter participation.[2] It has been claimed that such factors as the level of personal income or the size of the urban population are responsible *both* for the degree of participation and party competition in a state, *and* the nature of the system's policy outputs. By making this argument these writers have called into question the concepts of representation and theories of party and group conflict which, in one form or another, are the foundations for much of American political science.[3]

There is a growing awareness, however, that levels of expenditure alone are not an adequate measure of public policy outcomes. Sharkansky has shown, for example, that levels of expenditure and levels of actual service are seldom correlated; presumably, some states are able to reach given service levels with much less expenditure than others.[4] Besides establishing the appropriate level of expenditure for a program, policy makers must also decide about the program's relative scope, provisions for appeal from administrative orders, eligibility requirements, the composition of regulatory boards and commissions, and many other matters which have little to do with money. Before we can evaluate the relative importance of structural and political factors as determinants of policy, therefore, we need to investigate decisions outside the budgetary process. In order to advance that object this study will focus on one of the most fundamental policy decisions of all: whether to initiate a program in the first place.

States have traditionally been judged according to the relative speed with which they have

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[1] Beginning with Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States," *Journal of Politics* (May, 1963), 265–289, there have been numerous articles and books on the subject. The most recent summary is: John H. Fenton and Donald W. Chamberlayne, "The Literature Dealing with the Relationships Between Political Processes, Socio-economic Conditions and Public Policies in the American States: A Bibliographical Essay," *Polity* (Spring, 1969), 388–394.

[2] For examples see: Herbert Jacob, "The Consequences of Malapportionment: A Note of Caution," *Social Forces* (1964), 260–266; the chapters by Robert Salisbury, Robert Friedman, Thomas Dye, and Dawson and Robinson in: Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines (eds.), *Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis* (Boston, 1965); Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relation Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," this Review (March, 1966), 73–82; and Thomas Dye, *Politics, Economics and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States* (Chicago, 1966).

[3] For an evaluation of the significance of this literature and its implications for political science see: Robert Salisbury, "The Analysis of Public Policy: A Search for Theories and Roles," in Austin Ranney (ed.), *Political Science and Public Policy* (Chicago, 1968), pp. 151–178.

[4] Ira Sharkansky, "Government Expenditures and Public Services in the American States," this Review (1967), 1066–1077. Sharkansky also identifies important political variables in his: "Economic and Political Correlates of State Government Expenditures: General Tendencies and Deviant Cases," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* (1967), 173–192.

accepted new ideas. Wisconsin, because of its leadership during the Progressive period and its early adoption of the direct primary, the legislative reference bureau, and workmen's compensation, gained a reputation as a pioneering state which it has never lost. Reputations of this kind are usually based only on random impressions and they may be inaccurate or misleading, but if it is true that some states change more readily than others a study of the way states adopt new ideas might lead to some important insights into the whole process of political change and development.

This essay is primarily an exercise in theory building. My aim is to develop propositions which might be used as guides to the study of the diffusion of innovations and which might also apply to budgeting and other forms of decision making.[5] Limitations in the data I have collected do not allow empirical testing of all the explanations I propose; the currently untestable propositions are presented in the hope that they may help in preparing the ground for future research. The study begins with an effort to devise a measure of the relative speed with which states adopt new programs. Once a measure of this phenomenon is created efforts are made to discover its principal demographic and political correlates. The article concludes with an effort to devise an explanation for the adoption of innovations based on insights gathered from studies of decision making, reference group theory, and the diffusion of innovations. The major questions being investigated are: (1) why do some states act as pioneers by adopting new programs more readily than others, and once innovations have been adopted by a few pioneers, (2) how do these new forms of service or regulation spread among the American states?

I. DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS

Several terms have already been used here which have ambiguous meanings and it is important to make clear just how they are to be defined. The most important, and potentially misleading, is the term "innovation." An innovation will be defined simply as a program or policy which is new to the states adopting it, no matter how old the program may be or how many other states may have adopted it. Even though bureaucratic innovations or new departures by regulatory commissions or courts may be mentioned in the course of the discussion, the data used to measure the relative speed of adoption of innovations consists exclusively of legislative actions, simply because the data was readily available only in that form.

We are studying the relative speed and the spatial patterns of *adoption* of new programs, not their invention or creation. Invention, or bringing into being workable, relevant solutions to pressing problems, is an important activity and has been the subject of fascinating research.[6] We will concentrate on the way in which organizations select from proposed solutions the one which seems most suited to their needs, and how the organizations come to hear about these new ideas in the first place.[7] We are not trying to specify the circumstances under which new ideas or programs will be conceived or developed; we are studying instead the conditions under which state decision makers are most likely to adopt a new program.

The object of this analysis is the process of diffusion of ideas for new services or programs. Sometimes new legislation is virtually copied from other states. The California fair trade law, adopted in 1931, "was followed either verbatim or with minor variations by twenty states; in fact, ten states copied two serious typographical errors in the original California law."[8] No assumption is being made, however, that the programs enacted in each state are always exactly alike or that new legislation is written in exactly the same way by every legislature. It is unlikely that the highway department established in Wisconsin in 1907 had the same organizational format as the one adopted by Wyoming in 1917, or that the council on the performing arts created in New York in 1960 bears an exact resemblance to the one created by Kentucky in 1966. In each case, however, a commitment was made to offer a new service, establish a new principle of regulation, or create an agency which had never existed before. Our concern is the origin and spread of the idea to provide public subsidies for the arts, not the detailed characteristics of institutions created in each state to implement the policy.

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[5] There is a well established body of research on the diffusion of innovations from which I have drawn many insights. For general reviews of this literature see: Everett M. Rogers, *Diffusion of Innovations* (New York, 1962), Elihu Katz, Martin L. Levin, and Herbert Hamilton, "Traditions of Research in the Diffusion of Innovations," *American Sociological Review* (1963), 237–252. For early attempts to study the American states from this perspective see: Ada J. Davis, "The Evolution of the Institution of Mothers' Pensions in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology* (1930), 573–582; Edgar C. McVoy, "Patterns of Diffusion in the United States," *American Sociological Review* (1940), 219–227; and E. H. Sutherland, "The Diffusion of Sexual Psychopath Laws," *American Journal of Sociology* (1950–51), 144–156. Also see: Torsten Hagerstrand, *Innovation Diffusion as a Spatial Process* (Chicago, 1967); and Robert Mason and Albert N. Halter, "The Application of a System of Simultaneous Equations to an Innovation Diffusion Model," *Social Forces* (1968), 182–193.

[6] For examples see: Gary A. Steiner (ed.), *The Creative Organization* (Chicago, 1965); and Tom Burns and G. M. Stalker, *The Management of Innovation* (London, 1961).

[7] There is much confusion over this distinction in the literature on diffusion. For an excellent discussion of the problem see: Lawrence B. Mohr, "Determinants of Innovation in Organizations," this REVIEW (1969), 111–126.

[8] Once the mistake was discovered, the Arkansas statute, which reproduced a model prepared by the National Association of Retail Druggists, was

No ideological bias was employed in selecting issues for study. The patterns of diffusion for each issue have been treated equally, and no effort was made to develop any method of determining the relative importance or desirability of the programs.[9] Programs are sometimes enacted only to provide symbolic rewards to groups within the population and once created are left with inadequate funds or otherwise disabled.[10] Oklahoma's legislature, for example, emulated other states by creating a state civil rights commission, but once the commission was established, only $2,500 was appropriated for its operation.[11] For the purposes of this study, however, all adoptions are equal. My goal is to provide an explanation of the relative speed of adoption and the patterns of diffusion of innovations; I am not interested in the effectiveness of Oklahoma's civil rights commission, but in where the legislature got the idea to create such a commission and why it acted when it did.

II. THE INNOVATION SCORE

My first aim is to explain why some states adopt innovations more readily than others. I assume that the pioneering states gain their reputations because of the speed with which they accept new programs. The study must begin, therefore, with an attempt to devise an innovation score that will represent the relative speed with which states adopt innovations.

The innovation score is based on the analysis of eighty-eight different programs (see the Appendix for a list) which were enacted by at least twenty state legislatures prior to 1965, and for which there was reliable information on the dates of adoption. In order to make the collection of programs as comprehensive and representative as possible, I adopted a list of basic issue areas similar to the one employed by the Council of State Governments in its bi-annual reports included in the *Book of the States*. I tried to study six to eight different pieces of legislation in each of these areas: welfare, health, education, conservation, planning, administrative organization, highways, civil rights, corrections and police, labor, taxes, and professional regulation. In the course of my analysis I studied issues ranging from the establishment of highway departments and the enactment of civil rights bills to the creation of state councils on the performing arts and the passage of sexual psychopath laws. Most of the programs were adopted during the twentith century, but sixteen of them diffused primarily during the latter half of the nineteenth century.

Once the eighty-eight lists of dates of adoption were collected they were used to create an innovation score for each state. The first step was to count the total number of years which elapsed between the first and last recorded legislative enactment of a program. Each state then received a number for each list which corresponded to the percentage of time which elapsed between the first adoption and its own acceptance of the program. For example, if the total time elapsing between the first and last adoption of a program was twenty years, and Massachusetts enacted the program ten years after the first adoption, then Massachusetts received a score of .500 on that particular issue. The first state to adopt the program received a score of .000 and the last state received a 1.000. In cases in which all the states have not yet adopted a program, the states without the program were placed last and given a score of 1.000.[12] The in-

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copied either verbatim or with minor changes by seventeen states. Ewald T. Grether, *Price Control Under Fair Trade Legislation* (New York, 1937), pp. 19–20.

[9] In later work I will report the results of comparisons of the diffusion patterns of issues from different subject matter areas. Preliminary efforts at such comparisons, however, have not revealed significant variations. There does not seem to be much difference in the diffusion patterns of issues of different types.

[10] For a discussion of this phenomenon see: Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana, 1964), chapters 2 and 9.

[11] Duane Lockard, *Toward Equal Opportunity* (New York, 1968), p. 23.

[12] The beginning point for the existence of each state was the date upon which it was officially organized as a territory. Using this system, Oklahoma is the last state to come into being, having been organized in 1890. If a program began its diffusion before a state came into existence, that

novation score for each state is simply 1.000 minus the average of the sum of the state's scores on all issues. The larger the innovation score, therefore, the faster the state has been, on the average, in responding to new ideas or policies. The issues may be divided into groups according to subject matter areas or time periods, and separate scores can be created for these smaller groupings of issues by following the same procedure. The results of this scoring procedure, using all eighty-eight issues, are presented in Table 1.

A note of caution should be sounded before the results of this exercise are analyzed. We are endeavoring to measure a highly complex process in which an enormous number of idiosyncratic influences are at work; an official with an unusually keen interest in a particular program, a chance reading of an article or book by a governor's aide, or any number of other circumstances peculiar to any one issue might lead to the rapid adoption of a piece of legislation by a state which is usually reluctant to accept new programs. Mississippi, which has the lowest average score and ranks last among the states in relative speed of adoption, was nonetheless the first state to adopt a general sales tax.

If this reservation is kept in mind, the data in Table I provide a crude outline of the standard or typical pattern of diffusion of new programs or policies among the American states. The states at the top of the list tend to adopt new programs much more rapidly than those at the bottom of the list. Having provided a preliminary measurement of this phenomenon, we must now try to explain it. Why should New York, California and Michigan adopt innovations more rapidly than Mississippi, Wyoming and South Dakota?

III. THE CORRELATES OF INNOVATION

Demographic Factors: After studying the acceptance of technological innovations by both individuals and organizations, several writers have concluded that the decision maker's relative wealth, or the degree to which "free floating" resources are available, are important determinants of the willingness to adopt new techniques or policies.[14] If "slack" resources are available, either in the form of money or a highly skilled, professional staff, the decision maker can afford the luxury of experiment and can more easily risk the possibility of failure.[15] Other studies, especially in the areas of agriculture and medicine, have also shown organizational size to be a strong correlate of innovation.[16] Given these results from prior studies in other fields we might expect to find

TABLE 1. COMPOSITE INNOVATION SCORES FOR THE AMERICAN STATES[13]

New York	.656	New Hampshire	.482	Idaho	.394
Massachusetts	.629	Indiana	.464	Tennessee	.389
California	.604	Louisiana	.459	West Virginia	.386
New Jersey	.585	Maine	.455	Arizona	.384
Michigan	.578	Virginia	.451	Georgia	.381
Connecticut	.568	Utah	.447	Montana	.378
Pennsylvania	.560	North Dakota	.444	Missouri	.377
Oregon	.544	North Carolina	.430	Delaware	.376
Colorado	.538	Kansas	.426	New Mexico	.375
Wisconsin	.532	Nebraska	.425	Oklahoma	.368
Ohio	.528	Kentucky	.419	South Dakota	.363
Minnesota	.525	Vermont	.414	Texas	.362
Illinois	.521	Iowa	.413	South Carolina	.347
Washington	.510	Alabama	.406	Wyoming	.346
Rhode Island	.503	Florida	.397	Nevada	.323
Maryland	.482	Arkansas	.394	Mississippi	.298

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issue was not included in figuring the innovation score for the state.

[13] Alaska and Hawaii were omitted from the analysis because data for their years of adoption were often missing.

[14] Everett M. Rogers, *Diffusion of Innovations* (New York, 1962), pp. 40, 285–292. Also see: S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* (New York, 1963), p. 27, 33–112.

[15] For a discussion of "slack" resources and innovation see: Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963), pp. 278–279.

[16] Rogers, *op. cit.,* Mohr, *op. cit.;* and also: Edwin Mansfield, "The Speed of Response of Firms to New Techniques," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (1963), 293–304; Jerald Hage and Michael Aiken, "Program Change and Organizational Prop-

that the larger, wealthier states, those with the most developed industrial economies and the largest cities, would have the highest innovation scores. It would seem likely that the great cosmopolitan centers in the country, the places where most of the society's creative resources are concentrated, would be the most adaptive and sympathetic to change, and thus the first to adopt new programs.

In order to test these assumptions several measures of social and economic development were correlated with the innovation score. As we can see in Table 2, there is evidence that the larger, wealthier, more industrialized states adopt new programs somewhat more rapidly than their smaller, less well-developed neighbors. Fairly strong relationships exist between the innovation score and the value added by manufacturing, the average per acre value of farms, the size of the urban population, and the average per capita income. These relationships remain virtually unchanged in all time periods. In fact, the only relationship which changes substantially over time is that between innovation and the percentage of illiterates in the population which declines steadily across the three time periods. This declining relationship and the low correlation between innovation and the median school year completed is caused primarily by the states in the Rocky Mountain region which have the highest rankings on median school years completed and yet are among the slowest to adopt new programs.[17] The median of educational attainment in the states with the highest innovation scores is pulled down by the presence of a large, poorly educated, lower class, living primarily in the inner cities. The highly industrialized states with large urban concentrations are characterized by great inequality of social status and attainment. It would seem, however, that the elements necessary to foster innovation are present in these states even though they do not have highest average level of educational achievement.

Political Factors: Although students of policy

TABLE 2. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INNOVATION SCORES AND FIVE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC VARIABLES, BY TIME PERIODS

Social-Economic Variables	Innovation Scores*			Composite Score
	1870–1899	1900–1929	1930–1966	
Per Cent Population Urban:	.62**	.69	.62	.63
Total Population:	.52	.40	.50	.59
Average Income, Per Capita:	—***	.62	.50	.55
Value Added Per Capita by Manufacturing	.46	.55	.57	.66
Average Value, Per Acre, of Farms:	.70	.52	.52	.54
Per Cent Population Illiterate:	−.58	−.44	−.12	−.23
Median School Years Completed:	—***	—***	.24	.26

* In order to insure that the innovation score and the social and economic variables came from comparable periods, separate innovation scores were calculated for three time periods: 1870–1899, 1900–1929, and 1930-1966. In constructing this table each innovation was placed in the time period during which the first ten states adopted it. Thus, if a program was adopted by only four states during the 1890's, and completed its diffusion during the 1900's, the program is placed in the second time period: 1900–1929, even though its first adoptions took place during the nineteenth century. Social and economic data are taken from the years 1900, 1930, and 1960. The composite score is correlated with social and economic data from 1960.

** The table entries are Pearson product-moment correlations.

*** Measures of these phenomena corresponding with these time periods do not exist.

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erties: A Comparative Analysis," *American Journal of Sociology* (1967), 516–517; and Richard J. Hall, S. Eugene Haas, and Norman J. Johnson, "Organizational Size, Complexity and Formalization," *American Sociological Review* (1967), 903–912.

[17] Regional affects of this kind appear frequently in analyses of data from the American states. In many studies, especially those which involve measures of political participation or party competition, strong relationships appear which are actually only a result of the distinctive nature of the southern states. In order to insure that the correlations in this analysis were not merely a result of the social and political peculiarities of the South, the eleven states of the confederacy were removed from all distributions. Since the Southern states do not cluster at one extreme of the innovation scale, no great changes occurred in correlation coefficients based upon data from the thirty-nine states outside the South. Within the eleven Southern states, however, almost all the relationships were substantially reduced in size. Because only eleven states are involved, this fact is difficult to interpret, but will be treated more fully in later work. For an example of this problem discussed in another context see: Raymond Wolfinger and John Osgood Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," this REVIEW (1966), 306–326. For a more extensive discussion of the methodological implications see the discussion of "interaction effects" in Hugh Donald Forbes and Edward R. Tufte, "A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling," this REVIEW (1968), pp. 1261–1262; and the communication from Dennis D. Riley and Jack L. Walker, this REVIEW (September, 1969), pp. 880–899.

making have begun to doubt the importance of the political system as an independent determinant of the behavior of decision makers, it seems likely that both the degree of party competition and a state's system of legislative apportionment would affect its readiness to accept change. It would seem that parties which often faced closely contested elections would try to out-do each other by embracing the newest, most progressive programs and this would naturally encourage the rapid adoption of innovations. Lowi argues that new departures in policy are more likely at the beginning of a new administration, especially when a former minority party gains control of the government.[18] If this tendency exists it would also seem likely that state political systems which allow frequent turnover and offer the most opportunities to capture high office would more often develop the circumstances in which new programs might be adopted.[19]

Another prerequisite for the rapid adoption of new programs might be a system of legislative apportionment which fully represented the state's urban areas and which did not grant veto power to groups opposed to change. Such a system might be expected to allow consideration and debate of new policies and programs in all areas. Some recent findings, such as Barber's study of legislators in Connecticut,[20] lead us to speculate that representatives from newly developing urban and suburban areas would be more cosmopolitan, better informed, and more tolerant of change. If nothing else, urban legislators would probably be more willing to deal with problems of sanitation, planning, transportation, and housing peculiar to large metropolitan areas.

TABLE 3. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INNOVATION SCORES AND MEASURES OF POLITICAL VARIABLES, BY TIME PERIODS

Political Variables*	Innovation Scores			Composite Score
	1870–1899	1900–1929	1930–1966	
Party Competition for Governorship:	.36	.02	.14	.24
David-Eisenberg Index of Malapportionment:	**	.07	.55	.65

* The Index of party competition used in this table is the per cent of the total vote going to the gubernatorial candidate coming in second, times 2. This yields a scale from 0 to 100. It was created by Richard Hofferbert. The apportionment Index appears in Paul T. David and Ralph Eisenberg, *Devaluation of the Urban and Suburban Vote* (Charlottesville: Bureau of Public Administration, University of Virginia, 1961).

** Measures of this phenomenon corresponding with this time period do not exist.

No matter what the composition of the legislator's constituency, however, it would seem that the presence of competent staff, superior clerical facilities, and supporting services would allow him to give serious consideration to a larger number of new proposals. Several studies of the diffusion of technological innovations have demonstrated that the best informed individuals are most likely to pioneer in the use of new techniques or tools,[21] and so the states which provide the most extensive staff and research facilities in their legislatures ought to pioneer in the adoption of new programs.[22]

In Table 3 efforts to test some of these hypotheses in different time periods are displayed. Measures of political variables are usually based on evidence only from contemporary periods because data are seldom available on state and local elections or the operation of legislatures in earlier decades. Measures are available, however, for the degree of party competition and the extent of legislative malapportionment.[23] As we can see in Table 3 party competitiveness does not seem to be consistently related to the innovation score, at least as it is measured here.[24] Legislative apportionment is not correlated with the innovation score in the 1900–1929 period, but is related in the 1930–1966 period. Since legislatures steadily became less representative of urban populations after 1930, it may be that we have here some empirical evidence of the impact of malapportionment on policy making in the states.

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[18] Theodore Lowi, "Toward Functionalism in Political Science: The Case of Innovation in Party Systems," this REVIEW (1963), 570–583. Evidence which seems to confirm Lowi's theory may be found in: Charles W. Wiggens, "Party Politics in the Iowa Legislature," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* (1967), 60–69; and Frank M. Bryan, "The Metamorphosis of a Rural Legislature," *Polity* (1968), 191–212.

[19] Joseph A. Schlesinger has developed an index of the "general opportunity level" in each state. The index measures the relative number of chances which exist in each state to achieve major political office. See: *Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States* (Chicago, 1966), pp. 37–56.

[20] James D. Barber, *The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life* (New Haven, 1965). For testimony from legislators about the importance of reapportionment see: Frank M. Bryan, "Who is Legislating," *National Civic Review* (December, 1967), 627–633; Allan Dines, "A Reapportioned State," *National Civic Review* (February, 1966), 70–74, 99.

[21] Rogers, *op. cit.* Also see: Mansfield, *op. cit.;* James S. Coleman, Elihu Katz, and Herbert Menzel, *Medical Innovation: A Diffusion Study* (Indianapolis, 1966); and John W. Loy, Jr., "Social Psychological Characteristics of Innovators," *American Sociological Review* (1969), 73–82.

[22] For a somewhat different view see: Norman Meller, "Legislative Staff Services: Toxin, Specific, or Placebo for the Legislature's Ills," *The Western Political Quarterly* (June, 1967), 381–389.

Recent studies of state expenditures have shown that the explanatory effects of political variables could be eliminated if statistical controls for social and economic variables were applied. Therefore, in Table 4 I have presented both the zero-order correlations of the composite innovation score with measures of party competition, turnover in office, legislative apportionment, and legislative professionalism,[25] and

TABLE 4. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE COMPOSITE INNOVATION SCORE AND MEASURES OF LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT AND PARTY COMPETITION

		Partials				
	Zero-Order	Value Added Manufacturing	Per Cent Urban	Total Population	Per Capita Income	Four Factors Combined
Apportionment						
David-Eisenberg Index	.65	.47	.64	.67	.60	.58
Schubert-Press Index	.26	.12	.34	.31	.26	.21
Party Competition						
Hofferbert Index	.54	.35	.34	.50	.26	.12
Riley-Walker Index —Gov.	.40	.33	.22	.47	.09	.17
Riley-Walker Index —Legis.	.31	.24	.17	.34	.04	.07
Turnover in Office						
Schlesinger Index of Opportunity	.53	.40	.39	.32	.34	.24
Legislative Services						
Grumm's Index of Legislative Professionalism	.63	.38	.33	.41	.51	.11

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[23] There is one other index in existence which deals with political phenomenon: Rodney Mott's Index of Judicial Prestige. The Mott index measures the degree to which state supreme courts were used as models by the legal profession. It is based on a study of citations in federal Supreme Court decisions and all state supreme court decisions, the number of cases reprinted in standard textbooks, and the opinion of a panel of prominent legal scholars; it covers the period 1900 to 1930. The Mott index and the innovation score from the same time period are correlated at .62. This finding might be interpreted to mean that emulative behavior in the judicial arena is not much different from that in the legislative arena. For details of the Judicial Prestige Index see: Rodney L. Mott, "Judicial Influence," this REVIEW (1936), 295–315.

[24] Data for this table was derived from Richard Hofferbert's collection, "American State Socioeconomic, Electoral, and Policy Data: 1890–1960" which he has graciously allowed me to use.

[25] The sources are: Richard Hofferbert, "Classification of American State Party Systems," *Journal of Politics* (1964), 550–567; Dennis Riley and Jack L. Walker, "Problems of Measurement and Inference in the Study of the American States" (Paper delivered at the Institute of Public Policy Studies, University of Michigan, 1968); David and Eisenberg, *op. cit.;* Glendon Shubert and Charles Press, "Measuring Malapportionment," this REVIEW (1964), 302–327, and corrections, 968–970; Schlesinger, *op. cit.;* and John Grumm, "Structure and Policy in the Legislature," (Paper presented at the Southwestern Social Science Association Meetings, 1967).

also partial correlations with four social and economic variables controlled. The control variables are value added by manufacturing, per cent urban population, total population size, and per capita personal income, all of which earlier proved to be independently related to the innovation score. In Table 4 the effect of each control variable is displayed separately along with the combined impact of all four. The results tend to corroborate earlier analyses which minimize the independent effects of these political variables on policy outcomes. The Schlesinger index of opportunity, which measures the difference among the states in the average number of times major offices have changed hands, and the Hofferbert index of inter-party competition seem to have some independent impact on innovation, although it is greatly weakened when all four control variables are combined. This finding lends some credence to Lowi's argument that turnover in office fosters change.

Certainly, the most important result depicted in this table is the consistent strength of the correlation between innovation and the David and Eisenberg index of urban representation.[26] Earlier studies, using expenditures as a measure of policy outcomes, have consistently found that apportionment has little importance as an explanatory variable.[27] Our findings indicate that apportionment does make a difference where innovation is concerned. Although the other political factors do not have great independent impact on innovation, the clear implication arising from Tables 3 and 4 is that those states which grant their urban areas full representation in the legislature seem to adopt new ideas more rapidly, on the average, than states which discriminate against their cities.

Given the results of this correlational analysis, we might conclude that New York, California and Michigan adopt new programs more rapidly than Mississippi, Wyoming, and South Dakota primarily because they are bigger, richer, more urban, more industrial, have more fluidity and turnover in their political systems, and have legislatures which more adequately represent their cities. Although these findings are important, they leave many important questions unanswered. The political system does not react automatically in response to the growth of manufacturing industries or to the increase in the percentage of the population living in cities. Developments of this kind obviously cause problems which public officials might try to solve, but the mere presence of such a stimulant does not cause public officials to act, nor does it determine the form the solution will take, or which state might act first to meet the problem. Our analysis has provided us with evidence that change and experimentation are more readily accepted in the industrialized, urban, cosmopolitan centers of the country, but we have not improved our understanding of the institutions and decision-making processes which cause strong statistical relationships between industrial output and innovation. Also, we have not explained the way innovations spread from the pioneering states to those with lower innovation scores. In order to develop explanations of these processes we must go beyond the search for demographic correlates of innovation and develop generalizations which refer to the behavior of the men who actually make the choices in which we are interested.

IV. POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INNOVATION

In one form or another, interest group theories, based on self-regulating systems of countervailing power, are at the heart of much of the recent research into American politics.[28] Studies of the legislative process in the United States, for example, have been strongly influenced by theories which emphasize the importance of the group basis of politics. Beginning with the efforts of A. Lawrence Lowell[29] political scientists have worked to discover the basic factions within the legislature and have striven to develop operational definitions of power or influence.[30] Extensive efforts have been made to isolate and measure the various influences which come to bear on the individual legislator and motivate him to join one or another legislative bloc: what is a legislator's most important source of cues; is it a lobbyist with whom he has close connections, his party leaders, members of his constituency, the governor, or members of his own family? What impact on his attitudes does the legislative institution itself have; do its informal rules and traditions affect the legislator's decisions, and if so, in what way?[31] Great emphasis has been placed on the analysis of roll-call votes and several sophisticated research techniques have been developed to pursue this work, ranging from Beyle's cluster bloc analysis and Guttman scaling to the more complex, computerized routines presently in use.[32] But all this machinery is useful only in studying those roll-calls which cause divisions in the house; all unanimous votes, nearly eighty per cent of the total in most legislatures, are ignored. Riker has devised a technique in which he uses the percentage of the total membership which is present for the vote and the closeness of the division to determine the relative significance of roll-call votes in legislatures. The more legislators present and the closer the vote, the more significant the issue involved.[33] The full attention of the researcher is thus focused on the relatively small number of decisions which cause significant disagreements, because it is assumed that these are the most important votes; at least, they are the only ones which will provide clues to "the conflicting forces and pressures at work in the legislative system,"[34] and the discovery of those forces and pressures, according to the group theory of politics, is the principal object of political science.

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[26] Although much simpler than the Schubert and Press measure, the David and Eisenberg index seems to have more relevance to political outcomes. Thomas Dye had the same experience. See Dye, *op. cit.*, pp. 19–20, 63–69, 112–114, 146–148, 174–177, 236–237, 270–281.

[27] Herbert Jacob, "The Consequences of Malapportionment: A Note of Caution," *Social Forces* (1964), 260–266; Thomas R. Dye, "Malapportionment and Public Policy in the States," *Journal of Politics* (1965), 586–601; Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relation Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," this REVIEW (1966), 73–82; David Brady and Douglas Edmonds, "One Man, One Vote—So What?" *Trans-action* (March, 1967), 41–46. A recent article calls some of the conclusions of this research into question: Alan G. Pulsipher and James L. Weatherby, Jr., "Malapportionment, Party Competition, and the Functional Distribution of Governmental Expenditures," this REVIEW (1968), 1207–1219.

[28] Examples of this general approach to policy making are: David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1960); Edward Banfield, *Political Influence* (New York, 1961); and Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York, 1960). For an excellent critique of theories which employ concepts of power as a major explanatory variable see: James G. March, "The Power of Power," in David Easton (ed.), *Varieties of Political Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, 1966), pp. 39–70.

One of the main purposes in this study is to develop an approach to governmental policy making which will serve as a guide in the analysis of *all* legislative decisions, the unanimous as well as the contested ones, and which will lead as well to a better understanding of decisions made by bureaucrats, political executives and other governmental officials. Rather than focus upon the patterns of conflict among factions within the legislature or the administrative agencies, I will search for the criteria employed by legislators and administrators in deciding whether a proposal is worthy of consideration in the first place. This search rests on the belief that whoever the decision maker may be, whether administrator, lobbyist, party leader, governor or legislator, and however controversial a particular issue may become, a set of general criteria exists in every state which establishes broad guidelines for policy making. Regardless of the interests supporting an innovation, no matter whether the decision system is primarily monolithic or pluralistic, if a proposal for change does not fall within those guidelines its chances for acceptance are slim. Many of the propositions I will develop cannot be verified until they are tested with evidence from individual decision makers;[35] they are presented here only as a first, tentative step toward a more comprehensive theory of governmental policy making.

V. EMULATION AND DECISION MAKING IN THE STATES

We are searching for answers to three major questions: 1) why do certain states consistently adopt new programs more rapidly than other states, 2) are there more or less stable patterns of diffusion of innovations among the American states, and 3) if so, what are they? Our answers to these questions will be founded, in part, on the theories of organizational decision making developed in recent years by writers like Simon, March, Cyert and Lindblom.[36] At the heart of these theories is the concept of the decision maker struggling to choose among complex alternatives and constantly receiving much more information concerning his environment than he is able to digest and evaluate. An ordinary decision maker, required to make frequent choices and faced with an inconclusive flood of reports, programs, suggestions and memos, must simplify his task in some way. According to Simon, he does not—cannot—search in every case for the best possible solution to the problems he faces; he has neither the time nor the energy. Instead, he makes decisions by searching until he finds an alternative which he believes is good enough to preserve whatever values are important to him. The limits of rationality imposed by human capacities prevent him from maximizing his benefits in every situation; rather, he "satisfices," or chooses a course of action which seems satisfactory under the circumstances.

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[29] A. Lawrence Lowell, "The Influence of Party Upon Legislation," *Annual Report of the American Historical Association* (1901), pp. 321–543.

[30] The best example is: Robert Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science* (1957), pp. 201–215.

[31] For the best general review of the results of research on the legislative process, see: Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, *The Legislative Process in the United States* (New York, 1966).

[32] For a discussion of these techniques see: Lee F. Anderson, Meridith W. Watts, Jr. and Allen R. Wilcox, *Legislative Roll-Call Analysis* (Evanston, 1966). Also see Jewell and Patterson, *op. cit.*, pp. 528–550.

[33] William H. Riker, "A Method for Determining the Significance of Roll Calls in Voting Bodies," in John C. Wahlke and Heinz Eulau (eds.), *Legislative Behavior* (Glencoe, 1959), pp. 337–383.

[34] Jewell and Patterson, *op. cit.*, p. 416.

[35] Thanks to a grant from the Carnegie Corporation I have been able to launch a pilot study involving interviews in several states.

[36] I refer to: Herbert Simon, *Administrative Behavior*, Second Edition (New York, 1957); Richard M. Cyert and James C. March, *A Behavioral*

The individual in a complex organization, therefore, does not deal directly with all the sources of information potentially available to him, nor does he evaluate every conceivable policy option. In place of the debilitating confusion of reality he creates his own abstract, highly simplified world containing only a few major variables. In order to achieve this manageable simplicity he adopts a set of decision rules or standard criteria for judgment which remain fairly stable over time and which guide him in choosing among sources of information and advice. A decision maker decides both where to look for cues and information and how to choose among alternatives according to his decision rules; these rules also embody the current goals and aspirations of his organization, or the values which the organization is designed to advance and protect. Hence, if we wish to predict the decision maker's behavior, we should try to discover these rules of thumb, or "heuristics" as they are sometimes called, which shape his judgment. His choices could then be explained in terms of the alternatives he considers, his knowledge of each alternative, the sources of his knowledge, and the standard decision rules he applies in cases of this kind.[37]

Taking cues from these theories of human choice and organizational decision making our explanation of the adoption of innovations by the states is based on the assertion that state officials make most of their decisions by analogy. The rule of thumb they employ might be formally stated as follows: *look for an analogy between the situation you are dealing with and some other situation, perhaps in some other state, where the problem has been successfully resolved.*[38]

We are looking to what has been called the "inter-organizational context."[39] or the *horizontal* relationships among the states within the federal system, for the principal influences which regulate the speed of adoption and the patterns of diffusion of innovations. Most of the existing work on intergovernmental relations and federalism concentrates on the question of centralization within the American system of government. In line with the general interest of most political scientists in the factors which affect the access of organized groups and the lines of authority within a political system, many writers are concerned with the virtues of centralization or decentralization and try to determine how much of either exists in the system. They have studied primarily the *vertical* relationships among national, state and local governments, and have usually identified the party system and its demands as the institutional influence most responsible for maintaining the present, decentralized, federal relationships.[40] I want to focus attention on the mutual perceptions and relationships among state governments and to show how

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Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1963); and Charles E. Lindblom, *The Intelligence of Democracy* (New York, 1965).

[37] For a comprehensive review of the literature on decision making see: Donald W. Taylor, "Decision Making and Problem Solving," and Julia Feldman and Herschel E. Kanter, "Organizational Decision Making," in James G. March (ed.) *Handbook of Organizations* (Chicago, 1965), pp. 48–86, 614–649. Also see: W. Richard Scott, "Theory of Organizations," in Robert E. L. Faris (ed.), *Handbook of Modern Sociology* (Chicago, 1964), pp. 485–529.

[38] Decision rules of this kind are mentioned in both Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 73–74; and Cyert and March, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 34–43.

[39] William M. Evan, "The Organization-Set: Toward a Theory of Inter-Organizational Relations," in James D. Thompson (ed.) *Approaches to Organizational Design* (Pittsburgh, 1966), pp. 173–191.

[40] Some recent examples are: William Anderson, *The Nation and the States, Rivals or Partners?* (Minneapolis, 1955); M. J. C. Vile, *The Structure of American Federalism* (London, 1961); William Riker, *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance* (Boston, 1964); Daniel J. Elazar, *American Federalism: A View From the States* (New York, 1966); Morton Grodzins, *The American System* (Chicago, 1966). For a general critique see: A. H. Birch, "Approaches to the Study of Federalism," *Political Studies* (1966), 15–33.

these relationships affect the behavior of state decision makers.[41]

One of the most common arguments used in state legislatures against raising taxes or passing measures designed to regulate business is the fear that such measures might retard industrial development or force marginal plants to leave the state. Lawmakers often are called upon to deal with the problems which arise when one or two states establish extremely permissive standards for the granting of licenses, such as the corporation laws in New Jersey and Delaware, or the divorce laws in Nevada. However, interstate competition does not always drive standards down; it has a positive side as well. State decision makers are constantly looking to each other for guides to action in many areas of policy, such as the organization and management of higher education, or the provision of hospitals and public health facilities. In fact, I am arguing that this process of competition and emulation, or cuetaking, is an important phenomenon which determines in large part the pace and direction of social and political change in the American states.[42]

Uncertainty and the fear of unanticipated consequences have always been formidable barriers to reform. Proponents of new programs have always had to combat the arguments of those who predict dire consequences if some innovation is adopted. Even though American history is full of cases where the opponents of change have later had to admit that the dangers they feared never materialized, inertia and the unwillingness to take risks have prevented a more rapid rate of change.

Inertia can more easily be overcome, however, if the proponent of change can point to the successful implementation of his program in some other similar setting. If a legislator introduces a bill which would require the licensing of probation officers, for example, and can point to its successful operation in a neighboring state, his chances of gaining acceptance are markedly increased. As Harsanyi has asserted:

> . . . it is not an overstatement to say that a very considerable part of the social values of most societies is based on sheer ignorance. . . . One of the reasons why other persons' example is so important in encouraging changes in people's values and behavior lies in the fact that it tends to dispel some groundless fears about the dismal consequences that such changes might entail. Another reason is of course that people can more easily face the possible hostility of the supporters of the old values if they are not alone in making the change.[43]

In fact, once a program has been adopted by a large number of states it may become recognized as a legitimate state responsibility, something which all states ought to have. When this happens it becomes extremely difficult for state decision makers to resist even the weakest kinds of demands to institute the program for fear of arousing public suspicions about their good intentions; once a program has gained the stamp of legitimacy, it has a momentum of its own. As Lockard found in studying the passage of Fair Employment Practices laws the actions of other states are sometimes key factors in prompting reluctant politicians to accept controversial programs.

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[41] This is not the first study to discover the important role of emulation and competition in the development of public policy. Richard Hofferbert in: "Ecological Development and Policy Change in the American States," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* (1966), p. 485; and Ira Sharkansky in: "Regionalism, Economic Status and the Public Policies of American States," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly* (1968) both mention the influence of other states in the calculations of state decision makers. Several earlier students of local government complained that sparsely populated, arid Western states had blindly copied from the heavily populated Eastern states forms of local government which were inappropriately suited for the conditions prevailing in the Great Plains. See: A. Bristol Goodman, "Westward Movement of Local Government," *The Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics* (1944), pp. 20–34; Herman Walker, Jr. and Peter L. Hansen, "Local Government and Rainfall," this REVIEW (1946), 1113–1123. Robert L. Crain has recently used emulation as a principal explanatory variable in his study of the spread of water fluoridation programs among American cities: "Fluoridation: The Diffusion of an Innovation Among Cities," *Social Forces* (1966), 467–476; as did Thomas M. Scott in his: "The Diffusion of Urban Governmental Forms as a Case of Social Learning," *The Journal of Politics* (1968), 1091–1108.

[42] This set of hypotheses is consistent with more general theories concerning the manner in which human beings formulate judgments and establish expectations in all areas of life. See: Leon Festinger, "A Theory of Social Comparison Processes," *Human Relations* (1954), 117–140; and Robert Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Rev. Ed.; Glencoe, 1957), pp. 225–420.

[43] John C. Harsanyi, "Rational Choice Models v. Functionalistic and Conformistic Models of Political Behavior," (Paper delivered at American Political Science Association Meetings, 1967), p. 17.

> Pressure mounted in New Jersey during 1944 and 1945 for some stronger policy, and when New York passed its FEP law certain key politicians in New Jersey decided to act. Governor Walter E. Edge concluded, apparently reluctantly, that he had to commit himself to such a law. "As the session drew to a close," Edge wrote in his autobiography, "minority racial and religious groups pressed for adoption of an antidiscrimination program. While it was a subject which I would have preferred to give greater study, politically it could not be postponed because New York had passed a similar measure and delay would be construed as a mere political expedient."[44]

For similar reasons there have been numerous efforts to enact a program of homesteading in Hawaii as a way of disposing of its arable public lands even though the circumstances there are quite different from other states where homesteading was successfully introduced.[45] And in Connecticut one of the most powerful arguments in favor of introducing the direct primary system during the 1950's was simply that all the other states had adopted one.[46]

The Connecticut case neatly illustrates some of the generalizations we are developing. Lockard points out that the leaders of both political parties privately opposed the introduction of a primary system but felt that an endorsement of the idea had to be put into their platforms to avoid having their opponents charge them with "bossism." Demands for the primary came for the most part from small groups in the state's suburban areas which were interested in the issue as "a consequence of the influx of migrants from states with primaries."[47] Speaking as a professional political scientist as well as a legislator, Lockard was well suited to counter the extreme fears expressed by the party leaders who predicted that party organizations would be completely destroyed if primaries were introduced. Lockard reasoned by analogy to the experience in other states both in countering the opponents of change and in shaping his own moderate position:

> I expressed my considerable doubts about the effect of party primaries on party organization. From observations of politics in some of the most thoroughgoing party primary states, [however,] it seemed that the party organizations had been shattered with many undesirable consequences. In my campaign I expressed support only for a limited form of a primary and not one calculated to wreck the party system.[48]

Events like these illustrate the way in which the agenda of controversy in a state is determined, at least in part, by developments in other states, and they also show how experiences and examples from outside the system help to overcome the natural reluctance of any institutional structure to risk the consequences of change. The constituent units of any federal system are under considerable pressure to conform with national and regional standards or accepted administrative procedures. These norms result primarily from the processes of emulation and competition we have described and also from the efforts of nationally organized interest groups. They are affected also by the growth and development of professional organizations and other forms of communication among state administrators, and the natural circulation of active, politically involved citizens among the states, such as the Connecticut suburbanites who began agitating for a primary system in their adopted political home.

VI. REGIONAL REFERENCE GROUPS AND STANDARDS OF EVALUATION

Nationally accepted standards or norms provide a convenient measure which can be used by interested citizens or political leaders to judge the adequacy of services offered in their own states. But these norms have an ambiguous influence on the performance of state governments. On the one hand, the existence of national standards probably encourages *higher* performance among the *poorer* members of the federation than we could expect if functions and service levels were established independently within each unit of government, solely as a result of internal demands. An example of this tendency was discovered by May in his study of Canadian federalism:

> Newfoundland chose for a long time to remain outside the Canadian federation, thus not subjecting itself to the forces of national reorientation, and when, after joining the Dominion, a royal commission reported on its financial position, the commission observed that Newfoundland's public services were very backward in re-

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[44] Duane Lockard, *Toward Equal Opportunity* (New York, 1968), pp. 20–21.

[45] Allan Spitz, "The Transplantation of American Democratic Institutions," *Political Science Quarterly* (1967), 386–398.

[46] Duane Lockard, *Connecticut's Challenge Primary: A Study in Legislative Politics* (Eagleton Case #7, New York, 1959).

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

lation to those of the other provinces, including even the maritimes. . . .[49]

In the United States, Mississippi, Vermont, and North Dakota are good examples of relatively poor states which are making unusually large efforts to bring their public services into closer approximation of national standards. But, on the other hand, national standards and norms can have a *conservative* impact, especially in the richer, industrial states which are able to provide services somewhat above the national averages with relatively little effort.[50] Hansen complains of this tendency when he points out that:

> Some northern states fall considerably below their northern neighboring states in public service standards. . . . Their fiscal problems arise not because they are poor but because their tax levels are low by northern standards. This is notably true for example of a tier of large industrial states—Illinois, Indiana, Ohio and Pennsylvania. . . . These states are not excessively hard pressed by tax burdens relative to the country as a whole.[51]

This statement by Hansen is drawn from an essay in which he expresses disapproval of what he considers the inadequate public services of large industrial states which have relatively low tax burdens. But the statement we have cited contains several ambiguities. For example, Hansen charges that "some northern states fall considerably below their northern neighboring states in public service standards," but then he specifically points as examples to Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, states which border on each other. It is not clear whether we are being asked to compare these states to their neighbors, to other northern states with higher tax burdens, or to "the country as a whole." Within Illinois, however, the states' decision makers are probably comparing their own performance with their counterparts in Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania or New Jersey. Officials in Illinois may know of the procedures and performance levels in New York or California, but they are unlikely to think of events in these states as legitimate guides to action.[52]

When examining the public policy of any state, therefore, it is important to discover in which "league" it has chosen to play. For example, Salisbury, in a statement much like Hansen's, reasons by analogy in arguing that Missouri does not provide as much aid for its schools as its potential resources might warrant. He points out that in 1959 the "state ranked 18th in per capita income but 38th in per capita expenditure for local schools."[53] This relatively low level of support seems to result from the correspondingly low aspirations of the officials of the Missouri State Teachers Association who, according to Salisbury, "have chosen to get what they can with a minimum of agitation or conflict rather than attempt broader public campaigns in behalf of larger objectives."[54] The officials of MSTA "are fully conscious of the gap between the Missouri school aid level and that of, say, neighboring Illinois," but they are quick to point out "that by comparison with other neighboring states—Arkansas, Oklahoma, or Nebraska, for example—Missouri's record is much more impressive."[55] It would seem from this example that Missouri's leaders, at least those concerned with public education, are emulating and competing primarily with the states to their south and west, rather than with the Great Lakes states to their north and east, or the Rocky Mountain states, the Deep South or the Far West. The choice of relatively poor states like Arkansas and Oklahoma as the principal, legitimate reference groups establishes an upper limit of aspirations which is considerably below that which might exist if Missouri's accepted basis for comparison were the public services of Illinois, Wisconsin or Michigan.

VI. REGIONAL GROUPINGS AMONG THE STATES

We have come far enough in our analysis to see that our original presentation of the innovation scores in Table 1 as a linear distribution masked some pertinent information. A more useful representation of the data, which would conform more closely to the actual patterns of diffusion, would have to be in the form of a tree. At the top of the tree would be a set of pioneering states which would be linked together in a national system of emulation and competition. The rest of the states would be sorted out along branches of the tree according to the pioneer, or set of pioneers, from which they take their principal cues. States like New York, Massachusetts, California, and Michigan should be seen as regional pace setters, each of which has a group of followers, usually within their own region of the country, that tend to adopt programs only after the pioneers have led the way. For example, Colorado, which ranks ninth in Table 1, might be seen as the regional leader of the Rocky Mountain states. The rest of the states in that region are found much further down the list: Utah is twenty-second, Idaho is thirty-third, Arizona is thirty-sixth, Montana is thirty-eighth, New Mexico is forty-first, Wyoming is forty-sixth, and Nevada is forty-seventh. All of these states, with the possible exception of Utah which may share in the leadership of the region, might be seen as Colorado's followers who usually pick up new ideas only after the regional pioneer has put them into practice.

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[49] Ronald J. May, *Financial Inequality Between States in a Federal System* (unpublished doctoral dissertation submitted to Nuffield College, Oxford University, 1966), p. 168.

[50] For a somewhat similar argument concerning government spending see: Anthony Downs, "Why the Government Budget is too Small in a Democracy," *World Politics* (July, 1960), 541–563.

[51] Alvin H. Hansen, *The Postwar American Economy: Performance and Problems* (New York, 1964), pp. 30–31.

[52] For evidence of this perspective, see Thomas J. Anton, *The Politics of State Expenditure in Illinois* (Urbana, 1966), p. 263.

[53] Nicholas A. Masters, Robert Salisbury, and Thomas H. Eliot, *State Politics and the Public Schools* (New York, 1964), p. 12.

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 21. For a similar discussion of the importance of aspirations in determining the speed with which innovations are adopted see: Rufus P. Browning, "Innovative and Noninnovative Decision Processes in Government Budgeting," in Robert T. Golembiewski (ed.), *Public Budgeting and Finance* (Itasca, Illinois, 1968), pp. 128–145.

If we are right about the general patterns of competition and emulation, we should discover in our data some evidence of the existence of regional clusters among the states. In an effort to find such groupings, a varimax factor analysis was performed, using a matrix of pair-wise comparisons of all state innovation scores on all eighty-eight issues. If states in the same region are adopting programs in a similar order or pattern over time, a factor analysis should uncover several underlying dimensions in the matrix along which all states would be ordered according to their responses to the programs upon which the innovation score is based. The results of the factor analysis are presented in Table 5.

As we can see, the regional groupings we expected to find do exist, although the patterns are not as neat and clear as we might have hoped. To produce each factor I recorded all loadings which were over .400. The five factors which result bring the states into generally recognizable, contiguous groupings. The states with the largest loadings in each region are not necessarily those with the highest innovation scores. Instead, they are states like Connecticut, Florida, or New Mexico whose innovation scores are closer to the average for their regions. The presence of Nebraska, Iowa and South Dakota on Factor 1, which otherwise identifies Southern states, may indicate that more than one regional cluster is being identified on that factor.

There are several ambiguities in the data. For example, New York, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Arkansas, and Illinois are loading on more than one factor. The easiest explanation of this may be that the states actually have connections with more than one region. This is especially true of New York, the state with the highest innovation score, which displays fairly strong connections in this analysis with the New England. Mid-Atlantic, and Great Lakes states. I believe that this finding reflects the fact that New York actually serves as a model for states in all three areas. Certainly New York is formally involved in interstate compacts with all three regions, and, if nothing else, enjoys a perfect geographical position from which to carry on relations over such a large area. If the findings concerning New York seem explainable, those concerning California do not. I cannot explain why California loads on Factor V, especially since many of its neighbors load on Factor III. These ambiguous findings concerning New York and California might be merely a reflection of ambiguity in the data. Factor analysis will identify regional groupings in the data only if the regions respond to new programs as a unit, adopting some new ideas with haste and lagging behind on others. Since New York and California consistently lead the country in the adoption of new programs, they may not be members of the cohesive regional group or "league" of states, a fact which may prevent their neat categorization through factor analysis.

There is no accounting at all in this analysis for the behavior of three states: Arizona, Colorado, and Kansas. Both Colorado and Arizona load at the .300 level on Factor III, the one which includes most of the rest of the Rocky Mountain states. Colorado and Nevada both load strongly (.577 and .485 respectively) on a separate factor which was not reported since no other state scored higher than .300 on the factor and its contribution score was only 1.7. The same is true for Kansas which was the only state loading strongly (at .658) on a factor whose contribution score was only 1.9.

VII. SPECIALIZED COMMUNICATIONS AMONG THE STATES

Our analysis has provided evidence that a continuum exists along which states are distributed from those which are usually quick to accept innovations to those which are typically reluctant to do so; we also know something about the correlates of innovation and have evidence of regional groupings among the states; but it is not always easy to identify a regional pioneer or to know exactly which states make up each

TABLE 5. VARIMAX FACTOR ANALYSIS OF INNOVATION SCORES FOR FORTY-EIGHT STATES

Factor Loading	State
FACTOR I (South)	
.756	Florida
.711	Tennessee
.663	Alabama
.661	Virginia
.656	Georgia
.630	Mississippi
.621	Delaware
.600	North Carolina
.590	South Carolina
.576	Arkansas
.543	Texas
.517	Nebraska
.464	West Virginia
.460	Louisiana
.459	Iowa
.454	South Dakota
.433	Nevada
7.8	Total Factor Contribution
FACTOR II (New England)	
.795	Connecticut
.766	Massachusetts
.758	New Hampshire
.659	Rhode Island
.536	New York
.512	Vermont
.434	Maine
.404	Pennsylvania
4.1	Total Factor Contribution
FACTOR III (Mountains and Northwest)	
.791	New Mexico
.719	Idaho
.702	Montana
.694	Utah
.638	Washington
.620	North Dakota
.610	Wyoming
.569	Oklahoma
.516	Louisiana
.503	South Dakota
.432	Oregon
.419	Maryland
.410	Arkansas
.407	West Virginia
6.7	Total Factor Contribution
FACTOR IV (Mid-Atlantic and Great Lakes)	
.795	New Jersey
.637	Wisconsin
.605	New York
.577	Minnesota
.536	Illinois
.516	Pennsylvania
.451	Indiana
4.0	Total Factor Contribution
FACTOR V (Border, Great Lakes and California)	
.698	California
.610	Missouri
.584	Kentucky
.577	Michigan
.548	Ohio
.515	Nebraska
.458	Illinois
4.1	Total Factor Contribution

"league" or sub-system of cue-taking and information exchange. Some states seem to have connections with more than one region and may regularly receive cues from states in both groupings. As the American political system has developed, an increasing number of specialized communication systems have been created which cut across traditional regional lines and bring officials from many different regions into contact with each other and with federal and local officials, journalists, academic experts, and administrative consultants.

Several organizations now exist, such as the Council of State Governments, the Federal Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, and the recently established Citizen's Conference on State Legislatures, whose primary function is to improve communications among the states. Most important of these specialized communications networks are the professional associations of state officials, such as the National Association of State Budget Officers, or the National Association of State Conservation Officers. Associations of this kind were first created late in the nineteenth century and more seem to be forming each year. There were only five formed prior to 1900, but by 1930 there were approximately thirty-one, and by 1966 there were at least eighty-six in existence.[56]

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[56] Unpublished memo from the Council of State Governments, Chicago, Illinois.

These groups serve two general purposes: first, they are sources of information and policy cues. By organizing conferences or publishing newsletters they bring together officials from all over the country and facilitate the exchange of ideas and knowledge among them, thus increasing the officials' awareness of the latest developments in their field. Secondly, these associations serve as "occupational contact networks" which expedite the interstate movement or transfer of personnel. Through the efforts of these groups officials become aware of desirable job openings in other states and are able to create professional reputations that extend beyond the borders of their own states.[57]

By rapidly spreading knowledge of new programs among state officials and by facilitating the movement of individuals to jobs in other states, professional associations encourage the development of national standards for the proper administration and control of the services of state government. Just as in other sectors of American life such as the business, the military and the academic world, as individuals increase their mobility, their role perceptions are likely to change; they are likely to adopt a more cosmopolitan perspective and to cultivate their reputations within a national professional community rather than merely within their own state or agency.[58]

Since general awareness of new developments is achieved much more quickly now than ever before, we would expect that the time which elapses from the first adoption of an innovation by a pioneering state to its complete diffusion throughout all the states would be greatly reduced. Certainly, several recent innovations, such as educational television or state councils on the performing arts, have diffused rapidly. In Table 6 we have measured the average speed of diffusion in years for three periods of time: 1870–1899, 1900–1929, and 1930–1966. The results shown in the first column of this table make it very plain that the speed of diffusion has been constantly increasing as time has passed. This measurement, however, is somewhat misleading. The second column of the table indicates the average number of years it took the first twenty states to adopt the programs in each time period. The same trend toward increased speed of diffusion is evident here, but the differences among the three time periods are much smaller.[59] This evidence suggests that the pioneering states, those with high innovation scores, adopted new programs about as quickly in the early part of this century, prior to the development of many specialized communication links, as they did in the 1960's. The total elapsed time of diffusion, however, has decreased primarily because the laggard states, those with low innovation scores, are now reacting more quickly to pick up new programs adopted by the pioneers. This development results partly from the efforts of the federal government to stimulate state action through grants-in-aid, and partly from the increasing professional development in state government. Both these tendencies seem to have had a larger impact on the behavior of the more parochial states than the more cosmopolitan, pioneering states.

TABLE 6. AVERAGE ELAPSED TIME OF DIFFUSION IN YEARS FOR INNOVATIONS IN THREE TIME PERIODS

Time Periods	For All Adoptions	First Twenty Adoptions
1870–1899:	52.3	22.9
1900–1929:	39.6	20.0
1930–1966:	25.6	18.4

VIII. THE PERSISTENCE OF REGIONALISM

Improved communications and greatly increased contacts of all kinds among state officials seem to be accelerating the process of diffusion, but this does not necessarily mean that the regional clusters or "leagues" of states to which we have referred have been destroyed.[60] In order to investigate this question the innovation scores in the time periods from 1870 to 1929 were combined, and two matrices of innovation scores of almost equal size were created, one for 1870–1929 and the other for 1930–1966.[61] Within each of these matrices each state's set of innovation scores (issue by issue) was correlated with the set of innovation scores for each other state. A varimax factor analysis was performed on each matrix, just as was done earlier to produce Table 5.

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[57] For a discussion of the role of professional organizations in determining career lines see: Fred E. Katz, "Occupational Contact Networks," *Social Forces* (1958), 52–58. Also see: Jack Ladinsky, "Occupational Determinants of Geographic Mobility Among Professional Workers," *American Sociological Review* (1967), 253–264.

[58] Merton, *op. cit.* Also see: Alvin W. Gouldner, "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles," *Administrative Science Quarterly* (1957), 281–306; and Harold L. Wilensky, *Intellectuals in Labor Unions* (Glencoe, 1956).

[59] A small portion of the difference between the two columns in Table 6 is an artifact of measurement. Since not all the programs in this analysis have been adopted by all forty-eight states, laggard states sometimes remain. As time passes and programs receive widespread acceptance these laggard states slowly fall into line and adopt the programs. Since the programs in the first two time periods have been around longer, they have more likely completed their spread among the states and thus, given our scoring procedure, are also more likely to have a longer period of diffusion.

The results of this analysis are presented in Table 7. The factors derived from 1870–1929 are presented in the left column of the table and those from 1930–1966 are presented in the right column. The factors from each time period are arranged with the highest loadings first and the rest following in descending order. As we can see, the factors from the two time periods are not completely comparable. Some states change their relative rankings on the two factors, and some appear on a factor during only one of the time periods. The state of Georgia, for example, is found at the bottom of Factor 1 during 1870–1929 and moves all the way to the top of the same factor during 1930–1966. Some regional groupings, such as New England, seem to be disintegrating, while others, such as the Middle Atlantic states, seem to be more clearly defined in the later period. The factors for the later period include more states, on the average, and have slightly higher contribution scores, but they are not quite as distinct as those in the early period and include more inappropriate loadings. These data do not contain evidence of any large scale erosion of regionalism in the United States, but a drift away from clearly defined clusters of states is apparent.

During the last thirty years many new professional associations have been formed and more inter-state and federal agencies have begun facilitating communications and encouraging national uniformity. The diffusion process is operating much faster today than ever before, especially among those states which have traditionally lagged behind in adopting new ideas. The older, established modes of communication and evaluation, based on traditional ties of region and common culture, are persisting, but there are indications in these data that the system is slowly changing. Decision makers in the states seem to be adopting a broader, national focus based on new lines of communication which extend beyond regional boundaries.

IX. CONCLUSIONS

This essay began as an effort to explain why some states adopt innovations more rapidly than others, but in order to explain this aspect of American federalism, we have had to make a more extensive investigation of the complex system of social choice by which we are governed. The approach to policy making which has emerged from our investigation is founded on the perceptions and attitudes of individual state decision makers. Of course, as I have already mentioned, the theory cannot be fully elaborated or put to a test until data can be gathered directly from legislators, bureaucrats, governors, and other officials in several states, on a comparative basis. Enough evidence has been presented already, however, to make apparent the major theoretical and practical implications of this approach.

The theory presented here directs our attention to the rules for decision employed by policy makers, rather than their formal group affiliations or their relative power or authority, and thus enables us to offer useful explanations of all policy decisions, not merely those which generate controversy. Emphasis is placed on those factors which lead to the establishment of parameters or guidelines for decision, not on the groups or interests supporting one policy over another. In Figure 1 the outlines of the diffusion process are depicted as it operates in a single state. There are undoubtedly many other influences on the level of agitation for change than the ones presented here, and many other secondary effects stemming from the enactment of new programs; this simple diagram is only meant to summarize the fundamental process operating in most cases of diffusion. Relationships are characterized by plus and minus signs but no effort has been made to estimate their relative importance in the system.

The process we have been describing is extremely complex; many influences shape deci-

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[60] The best recent analysis of long-term changes in the American political system is: Donald Stokes, "Parties and the Nationalization of Electoral Forces," in William N. Chambers and William D. Burnham (eds.), *The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development* (New York, 1967), pp. 182-202. Also see: Norval D. Glenn and J. L. Simmons, "Are Regional Cultural Differences Diminishing?" *Public Opinion Quarterly* (1967), 196–205; and Ira Sharkansky, "Economic Development, Regionalism and State Political Systems," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* (1968), 41-61.

[61] When the data are combined in this manner the 1870–1929 matrix contains 42 issues and the 1930–1966 matrix contains 46 issues.

TABLE 7. VARIMAX FACTOR ANALYSIS OF INNOVATION SCORES FOR FORTY-EIGHT STATES IN TWO TIME PERIODS

FACTOR I (South)

1870–1929		1930–1966	
Factor Loading	State	Factor Loading	State
.762	Tennessee	.793	Georgia
.748	Mississippi	.759	Virginia
.745	Florida	.649	Delaware
.705	North Carolina	.629	Tennessee
.662	West Virginia	.623	Florida
.646	Kentucky	.593	Texas
.521	Louisiana	.570	North Carolina
*.499	Arizona	*.541	Utah
.465	Delaware	.524	Alabama
.426	Virginia	.494	Maryland
.425	South Carolina	*.493	Nebraska
*.424	Iowa	.493	South Carolina
.404	Georgia	*.451	Arizona
		*.432	Montana
5.7	Total Factor Contribution	*.426	Kansas
		*.415	Iowa
		*.415	Maine
		.413	Louisiana
		*.410	New Hampshire
		7.1	Total Factor Contribution

FACTORS II AND III (New England—Mid-Atlantic—Great Lakes)

1870–1929		1930–1966	
.851	Connecticut	.800	Connecticut
.814	New Hampshire	.702	Massachusetts
.707	Vermont	.629	New Hampshire
.705	Massachusetts	*.564	Colorado
.670	Rhode Island	*.498	Oregon
.576	Maine	.467	Rhode Island
.509	Delaware		
.487	New York	1.7	Total Factor Contribution
.467	Pennsylvania		
.467	Virginia		
.405	Maryland		
*.405	Alabama		
5.3	Total Factor Contribution		
.808	Kansas	.778	New York
.694	Indiana	.686	Pennsylvania
.643	Wisconsin	.684	New Jersey
.622	Illinois	.666	Wisconsin
.601	Minnesota	.537	Illinois
*.448	Texas	.491	Michigan
		.486	Indiana
4.5	Total Factor Contribution	.474	Minnesota
		.448	Maryland
		4.8	Total Factor Contribution

FACTOR IV (Plains and Mountains)

1870–1929		1930–1966	
.769	North Dakota	.710	North Dakota
.762	New Mexico	.683	New Mexico
.722	Montana	.682	Kansas
.709	Utah	.641	Wyoming

TABLE 7—(*Continued*)

FACTOR I (South)

1870–1929		1930–1966	
Factor Loading	State	Factor Loading	State
.665	Idaho	.633	Oklahoma
.639	Washington	.598	Washington
.567	South Dakota	.572	Oregon
*.494	Maine	.557	Utah
		*.494	Alabama
4.7	Total Factor Contribution	.462	Idaho
		*.457	Vermont
		*.439	West Virginia
.751	Arizona	*.416	Wisconsin
.588	Nevada	.410	Montana
.578	Wyoming	*.406	Mississippi
*.469	Arkansas		
		6.5	Total Factor Contribution
2.5	Total Factor Contribution		
.730	Oregon		
.611	California		
.645	Colorado		
*.433	Maryland		
2.9	Total Factor Contribution		

FACTOR V (Mid-America)

1870–1929		1930–1966	
.885	Missouri	.726	Missouri
.767	Nebraska	.614	Mississippi
*.639	Michigan	*.600	South Carolina
.419	Ohio	*.589	Idaho
*.400	California	.573	Arkansas
		.530	Tennessee
3.4	Total Factor Contribution	.432	Illinois
		.426	West Virginia
		*.409	South Dakota
		*.409	Montana
		4.5	Total Factor Contribution

* States which are loading on inappropriate factors are marked with an asterisk.

sions to adopt innovations and no two ideas diffuse in exactly the same way. In all cases, however, the likelihood of a state adopting a new program is higher if other states have already adopted the idea. The likelihood becomes higher still if the innovation has been adopted by a state viewed by key decision makers as a point of legitimate comparison. Decison makers are likely to adopt new programs, therefore, when they become convinced that their state is relatively deprived, or that some need exists to which other states in their "league" have already responded.

Before states may respond to new programs adopted in other states their political leaders must be aware of these developments, so interstate communications are an important factor in the process of diffusion. We have mentioned that many specialized systems of communication among the states have grown up during the last thirty years, mainly through the creation of


Awareness of the Adoption of a New Program by a State Taken as a Legitimate Reference Group
(−)
SENSE OF RELATIVE WELL BEING
(+)
(−)
Awareness of Expert Support and Evidence Favoring Adoption of a New Program
(+)
(+)
Agitation for the Adoption of a Similar New Program
(+)
(+)
(+)
Adoption of a Program Modeled After the One Adopted by Reference Group State
(+)
(+)
Specialization and Professional Development of State Government Bureaucracy

FIGURE 1. Factors Affecting the Adoption of Innovations.*

* Secondary effects depicted by broken lines.

professional associations among state administrators. These new information networks are spreading into all the states, but even today the isolation of some state capitols from the major cosmopolitan centers of the country is a major obstacle to the adoption of new ideas.[62]

Emerging from this study is the picture of a national system of emulation and competition. The states are grouped into regions based on both geographical contiguity and their place in the specialized set of communication channels through which flow new ideas, information and policy cues. Through this nationwide system of communications a set of norms or national standards for proper administration are established. This system links together the centers of research and generation of new ideas, national associations of professional administrators, interest groups, and voluntary associations of all kinds into an increasingly complex network which connects the pioneering states with the more parochial ones. Because of the limitations of the data presently available to us we can only outline each regional grouping of states, and we cannot yet construct an elaborate theory of the interactions among professional associations, federal officials, private interest groups, and political leaders in setting the agenda of politics within a state. Normative questions arise, which cannot be considered here, concerning the responsiveness of this system and the degree to which it is subject to the control of democratic, representative institutions.[63] Much more investigation will be necessary before we can gain a full understanding of this system and its function as a device for controlling the pace and direction of policy development in the American states. Once we know more, it might be possible to prescribe with confidence some changes in the decision-making system, or the creation of some new governmental institutions, which might accelerate or redirect the process of innovation.

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[62] See Alan L. Clem's description of the isolation of Pierre, the capitol of South Dakota, in his: *Prairie State Politics: Popular Democracy in South Dakota* (Washington, 1967), p. 137; and Norton E. Long's emphasis on the importance of information sources in his: "After the Voting is Over," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* (1962), 183–200. For a general review of communications theory and its application to politics see: Richard R. Fagen, *Politics and Communication* (Boston, 1966), especially pp. 34–69, 88–106. Also see: Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government,* Second Edition, (New York, 1966), especially pp. 145–256.

[63] Questions of this kind have been raised already in: Daniel P. Moynihan, "The Professionalization of Reform," *The Public Interest* (1965), 6–16; Theodore J. Lowi, "The Public Philosophy: Interest Group Liberalism," this REVIEW (1967), 5–24; and Philip Green, "Science, Government, and the Case of RAND: A Singular Pluralism," *World Politics* (1968), 301–326.

APPENDIX

NOTE: Following are the eighty-eight programs upon which the innovation score is based.

1. Accountants Licensing
2. Advertising Commissions
3. Agricultural Experiment Stations
4. Aid for Roads and Highways
5. Aid to the Blind (Social Security)
6. Aid to Dependent Children (Social Security)
7. Aid to Permanently and Totally Disabled (Social Security)
8. Air Pollution Control
9. Alcoholic Beverage Control
10. Alcoholic Treatment Agencies
11. Anti-Age Discrimination
12. Anti-Injunction Laws
13. Architects Licensing
14. Australian Ballot
15. Automobile Registration
16. Automobile Safety Compact
17. Beauticians Licensing
18. Board of Health
19. Budgeting Standards
20. Child Labor Standards
21. Chiropractors Licensing
22. Cigaret Tax
23. Committee on the Aged
24. Compulsory School Attendance
25. Conservation of Oil and Gas
26. Controlled Access Highways
27. Council on the Arts
28. Court Administrators
29. Debt Limitations
30. Dentists Licensing
31. Direct Primary
32. Education Agencies
33. Education Television
34. Engineers Licensing
35. Equal Pay for Females
36. Fair Housing—Private
37. Fair Housing—Public Housing
38. Fair Housing—Urban Renewal Areas
39. Fair Trade Laws
40. Fish Agency
41. Forest Agency
42. Gasoline Tax
43. Geological Survey
44. Highway Agency
45. Home Rule—Cities
46. Human Relations Commissions
47. Initiative and Referendum
48. Integrated Bar
49. Junior College—Enabling Legislation
50. Juveniles Supervision Compact
51. Labor Agencies
52. Legislative Pre-Planning Agencies
53. Legislative Research Agencies
54. Library Extension System
55. Mental Health Standards Committee
56. Merit System
57. Migratory Labor Committee
58. Minimum Wage Law
59. Normal Schools—Enabling Act
60. Nurses Licensing
61. Old Age Assistance (Social Security)
62. Parking Agencies—Enabling Act for Cities
63. Park System
64. Parolees and Probationers Supervision Company
65. Pharmacists Licensing
66. Planning Board—State Level
67. Development Agency
68. Police or Highway Patrol
69. Probation Law.
70. Public Housing—Enabling Legislation
71. Real Estate Brokers—Licensing
72. Reciprocal Support Law
73. Retainers Agreement
74. Retirement System for State Employees
75. Right to Work Law
76. School for the Deaf
77. Seasonal Agricultural Labor Standards
78. Slaughter House Inspection
79. Soil Conservation Districts—Enabling Legislation
80. Superintendent of Public Instruction
81. Tax Commission
82. Teacher Certification—Elementary
83. Teacher Certification—Secondary
84. Urban Renewal—Enabling Legislation
85. Utility Regulation Commission
86. Welfare Agency
87. Workmens' Compensation
88. Zoning in Cities—Enabling Legislation

COMMUNICATIONS

To the Editor:

In the March, 1969 issue of the Review (pp. 157–162) Thomas Dye reported on an analysis of relationships between political processes, socio-economic characteristics, and policy outcomes in the American states. The analysis featured the Gini Index, a measure of the degree of inequality in the distribution of income within states, a characteristic never before investigated by political scientists. The format and methodology of the study resembled many others published on this subject during the last six years in that no effort was made to isolate regions within the country to find if relationships changed in different cultural or political settings.[1] We consider this a major shortcoming of Dye's analysis.

Since the Southern states all have relatively large inequalities in income distribution, they cluster at the top of the scale created by the Gini Index and are also grouped at the top or bottom of many of the the other measures of political participation and economic development employed in Dye's study. The differences are so great between the South and the rest of the country and the Southern states so homogeneous on many of the measures used by Dye that he is often dealing with two distinct populations. When regions cluster in this way the correlations reported from bi-variate relationships often reflect only the social and political distinctiveness of geographic regions within the country rather than the functional relationships between variables within state political systems. Because of the distinctive nature of the South, correlational analyses based on all the American states may either obscure important relationships existing at the regional level or may lead one to see relationships where none actually exists.

For example, Dye reports a strong negative correlation of —.64 between per capita personal income and his measure of income inequality. When the eleven states of the confederacy are removed from this distribution, however, the correlation for the remaining thirty-nine states is reduced to —.39, about half its original strength. Within the eleven Southern states the relationship increases to —.85, almost twice its original strength. In Figure 1 we display a scatter-plot of the relationship between the Gini Index and per capita personal income which demonstrates graphically why the removal of the South has such an impressive impact.[2] The Southern states are concentrated in the upper left portion of the graph and the remaining states are much more widely and irregularly dispersed. For the thirty-nine states outside the South, knowledge of a state's score on the Gini Index allows one to explain only 15 per cent of the variance in state scores on per capita personal income.

The removal of the South may affect correlations of data on the states in many different ways. In Table 1 we display correlations of Dye's Gini Index with twelve variables; scores for each relationship are shown with the South both included and removed from the distributions.[3] The result of the South's removal usually

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[1] For a review of research on this subject see: John H. Fenton and Donald W. Chamberlayne, "The Literature Dealing With the Relationships Between Political Processes, Socio-economic Conditions and Public Policies in the American States: A Bibliographical Essay," *Polity* (Spring, 1969), pp. 388–94.

[2] The Gini Index is taken from Dye's article, *op. cit.;* the data on per capita personal income by state are for 1960 and are taken from: U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (Washington, 1967).

[3] All demographic data are for 1960; all expenditure data are for 1959. Sources are: U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Ibid.* The industrialism factor score is from: Richard Hofferbert, "Socioeconomic Dimension of the American States: 1890–1960," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* (August, 1968), 401–418. Party competition scores for the Senate and House cover 1961-62 and are taken from: John Grumm, Calvin Clark and Edward Flentje, *State Data* (compiled for the Citizen's Conference on State Legislatures, 1967). The scores represent the minority party percentage of the two-party membership times two. Party competition scores for the Governorship cover 1962 and are taken from: Richard I. Hofferbert, *American State Socioeconomic, Electoral, and Policy Data: 1890–1960.* (By permission of the compiler). The scores represent the percent of the total vote going to the candidate coming in second, times two. Turnout figures have been computed on the basis of total population above voting age. Turnout scores are calculated for senatorial and gubernatorial races in non-presidential years from 1946 to 1962, and are reported in: Lester Milbrath, "Political Participation in the States" in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (eds.), *Politics in the American States* (Boston, 1965), pp. 25–60. The apportionment index appears in: Paul T. David and Ralph Eisenberg, *Devaluation of the Urban and Suburban Vote* (Charlottesville: Bureau of



FIGURE 1. Per Capita Personal Income and the Gini Index.

is a sharp reduction in the correlation for the remaining thirty-seven states. The only exception is the case of per capita expenditures on welfare, where correlations increase when both regions are taken separately. The correlations within the Northern states for urbanism, industrialism, apportionment, and the formal powers of the governor are lowered, but do not change radically. Relationships are reduced to insignificance, however, for per cent Negroes, measures of party competition, electoral turnout, total per capita expenditures, or per capita expenditures for highways. Within the South the relations between the Gini Index and the political system measures are either eliminated, rendered insignificant, or greatly reduced in size. By testing for the regional effect, however, we have uncovered a strong positive relationship within the South between the Gini Index and Hofferbert's industrialism factor score which was concealed in Dye's analysis. Dye also reports that total per capita expenditures and per capita expenditures for highways are negatively correlated with income inequality, but we find, even though the coefficients are still small, that within the South the two variables actually are *positively* related to one another.

We have concentrated on the eleven states of the confederacy because Dye's Gini Index tends to emphasize their distinctiveness and there are good reasons to assume that they form a natural region. They are not only contiguous, but also share sociological and economic characteristics which set them apart from the rest of the country. Of course, the boundaries of the region are not necessarily confined to the states we have chosen; the distinctive political culture of the South may be found within portions of states outside the region, just as some parts of Texas or Florida could no longer be considered part of the South in sociological terms.[4] Nor is

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Public Administration, University of Virginia, 1961). The index of the formal powers of the governor can be found in: Joseph A. Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Executive," in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (eds.), *op. cit.* pp. 207–237.

[4] For recent analyses of regions within individual states see: V. O. Key, Jr. and Frank Munger, "Social Determinism and Electoral Decision: The Case of Indiana," in Eugene Burdick and Arthur

TABLE 1. INCOME INEQUALITY CORRELATED WITH SELECTED ECONOMIC VARIABLES*

Economic Development Measures	All States	Northern States	Southern** States
Percentage Population Negro	.74	.16	.68
Industrialism Factor Score	.33	.28	.74
Percentage Population Urban	−.48	−.37	−.58
Political System Measures			
Competition for Senates	−.70	−.06	−.17
Competition for Houses	−.76	−.03	−.26
Competition for Governorships	−.54	.16	.13
Percentage Voter Turnout	−.82	−.18	−.39
David and Eisenberg Apportionment	−.45	−.40	−.03
Formal Powers of Governor	−.43	−.33	−.22
Policy Output Measures			
Per Capita Expenditures—Welfare	.26	.36	.32
Per Capita Expenditures—Highways	−.29	−.10	.24
Total Per Capita Expenditures	−.20	.01	.28

* Alaska and Hawaii were omitted because of missing data for several variables.

** Southern states are: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.

the South the only distinctive region in the country. If median school years completed were one of our predictor variables we would find that the Rocky Mountain states form a distinctive area, and if we were concerned with the size of legislative bodies or per capita expenditures for higher education we would have to deal with the peculiar characteristics of New England.[5]

Whichever region one examines, the results we report in Table 1 should be a convincing argument for the importance of testing relationships for the possible effects of regional differences. This would seem to be a necessary prerequisite to the creation of general theories of political participation or policy making. In an earlier work, however, Dye has made the opposite case, arguing that hypotheses must be tested using all fifty states:

> Since the object of comparative study is to develop general explanations which will apply to political systems universally, the universe of American state politics must include all the states. If we excluded any group of states from our analysis, or if we tested explanatory hypotheses with reference to regional groupings of states, we would be engaged in something other than genuine comparative analysis . . . if regional conditions, historical circumstances, or cultural patterns prevent the development of explanatory statements which apply to all fifty states, then genuine comparative study is impossible and general explanatory models have little value. . . . Certainly the inclusion of the 11 Southern states in our research operations will affect the results: but so does the inclusion of any other 11 states.[6]

The removal of any eleven states chosen at random would have no systematic impact upon correlation coefficients unless the states selected happened to form a natural or sociological region within the country.[7] Studies which proceed as if there were no regional peculiarities in data on the states must also make the prior assumption that an increase in party competition, a change in the system of legislative apportionment, or an increase in industrialism will have the same kind of impact on states as dissimilar as Nevada, New York, Mississippi, and Vermont. This assumption may be justifiable for some variables, but it plainly is not justifiable for many of those employed in recent studies. As Hayward Alker has written:

> A good deal of the literature of social science suggests that relationships between variables will be different for data from different geographic or cultural contexts. The best approach to these pos-

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J. Brodbeck (eds.), *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe, 1959), pp. 281–299; Raymond Wolfinger and Fred I. Greenstein, "Comparing Political Regions: The Case of California," this REVIEW (March, 1969), 74–85; and Daniel J. Elazar, *American Federalism: A View From the States* (New York, 1966).

[5] The importance of regions in the American political system has been recognized in several recent articles: Norval D. Glenn and J. L. Simmons, "Are Regional Cultural Differences Diminishing?" *Public Opinion Quarterly* (1967), 176–193; Ira Sharkansky, "Economic Development, Regionalism and State Political Systems," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* (1968), 41–61; and Jack L. Walker, "The Adoption of Innovations by the American States," this REVIEW (September, 1969).

[6] Thomas R. Dye, *Politics, Economics and the Public* (Chicago, 1966), p. 43.

[7] To check on this point a sample of eleven states was chosen from an alphabetical listing using a table of random numbers. Correlations of the Gini Index and several variables were then calculated using these new distributions. There were only small unsystematic changes in correlation coefficients based on distributions of forty-eight states and the eleven state sample, and no appreciable differences at all between the forty-eight state distributions and the thirty-seven state distributions.

sibilities of 'configurative regionalism' is a heightened sensitivity on the part of those who do universalistic analyses to possible regional or cultural differences. Regional specialists, on the other hand, should make continual distinctions between local events and worldwide patterns; they should state their findings in the most universal terms possible. There is a need to use and develop more adequate formal models of the various ways in which particular regional contexts influence configurations.[8]

We can never fully realize the potential of the American states for comparative political research if we attempt to build explanations based on correlations which are the result of statistical artifacts. Dye suggests that the distribution of resources within the state is more effective in shaping the character of political systems than in establishing the levels of public spending and service. The results of Table 1 provide little support for such a generalization; when the regions are taken separately there are as many significant correlations with measures of policy output as with measures of the political systems, and in both cases there are few strong relationships.

One of the virtues of the American states as objects of comparative analysis is that they are different. Some states are highly developed urban and industrial systems, others have vast unsettled stretches of land with total populations less than one fourth the size of New York City; some bear the impact of Southern history and traditions, others the influence of the Western frontier. One of our principal theoretical tasks is the creation of explanations for the way these differences, including regional differences, affect the political processes and governmental systems of the states. A truly universal theory would identify the common characteristics of states and also provide an explanation of their differences.

DENNIS D. RILEY
JACK L. WALKER

The University of Michigan

TO THE EDITOR:

A great deal of the research on state politics in recent years has employed a comparative approach in which propositions are developed and tested against data derived from *all* fifty states. This represents a departure from earlier studies of "New England politics," "Southern politics," "Midwest politics," "politics in Wisconsin," etc. The Riley-Walker note suggests that the field of state politics is ripe for a debate analogous to the "comparative approach" versus "area studies" debate in the field of comparative government. I hope this debate will develop along constructive rather than argumentative lines.

It is true that the removal of the eleven Southern states from an analysis of the impact of inequality on politics and public policy reduces the size of the coefficients. Since the Southern states are the most unequal in the nation, their removal reduces the range of variation in our inequality measure. Removing the Southern states, therefore, reduces our ability to assess the full impact of inequality on political systems. Fortunately for the sake of analysis (albeit unfortunately for many inhabitants), the Southern states *do* provide us the opportunity to observe the political correlates of inequality. Their inclusion in our analysis permits us to view relationships between inequality and politics which would not be observable in subsets of states where the range of inequality is narrow.

Riley and Walker are quite wrong in saying correlations based on all fifty states are "statistical artifacts." They are no more statistical artifacts than correlations based on 39 states, or 25 states, or any other number of states. Riley and Walker may choose to see whether a proposition developed in a comparative study of all fifty states applies within regional subsets, but such an exercise cannot detract from the validity of the general proposition as it applies to all fifty states. Their Table 1 does not contradict our findings that among the fifty states, where variation in inequality is substantial, inequality is independently related to a number of important political variables.

In short, I am interested in developing propositions based on all fifty states, propositions which describe the full range of system behavior in the American states. Riley and Walker develop some propositions which apply to regional subsets of states. Both are equally valid exercises depending upon the purposes of the researcher.

THOMAS R. DYE

Florida State University

TO THE EDITOR:

It is embarrassing to have to defend the merits of one's own work. I do so chiefly in the hope that the objectionable tone like that exhibited throughout Mr. Ashcraft's attack on my *The Liberal Politics of John Locke* (this REVIEW, March, 1969, pp. 191–192) might in future induce the Editor to check whether such a tone does not indicate the libelous character of a review.

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[8] Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Regionalism Versus Universalism in Comparing Nations," in Bruce Russett, *et al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven, 1964), p. 323. Also see Alker's discussion of the "Universal Fallacy" and the "contextual fallacy" in his: *Mathematics and Politics* (New York, 1965), pp. 101–106; and the discussion of "interaction effects" in Hugh Donald Forbes and Edward R. Tufte, "A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling," this REVIEW (December, 1968), 1261–1262.

1. The reviewer states the absence of "a defensible (historical) definition of liberalism." Even if my treatment on pp. 17–26 of "the complexity" of and "the misapprehensions about liberal theory" (*Lib. Pol.*, pp. 26, 21), were not a contribution towards a re-definition of liberalism, my view of the full picture of liberalism emerges quite clearly since throughout the book I relate each of the components of Locke's politics to accepted notions about the liberal tradition. Ashcraft's slanted choice of quotations is sufficient evidence against his denial of the fact.

2. In his article, "Locke's State of Nature: Fact or Fiction?" (this REVIEW, Sept., 1968, p. 915), Ashcraft offers views on empirical and traditional theory which I, too, express—and apply—in my book. Yet, he completely misconstrues my view on the affinities between "operative democratic theory and Locke" (*Lib. Pol.*, p. 301). He disregards my explanation that, if empirical theory shows "that the democratic process is not as democratic as ideology would have it," Locke was no democrat in the first place (p. 302). Although I refer to Dahl, Kaplan and Laswell (pp. 285, 293) in connection with what remains important in democratic procedures, Ashcraft maintains that from my references to these scholars (and Easton) it follows that they are "the true sons of liberalism." What the reviewer seems to have in mind is liberalism that *inter alia* would not exclude "rule by a Supreme Court or a Poohbah."

3. In all his statements, including those on executive prerogatives, he overlooks that especially throughout part III I make it clear that Locke "is the harbinger of a liberal constitutionalism which is stricter and more unqualified than the constitutionalism with which he was satisfied" (p. 372). Thus, in his derision of what I associate with "'liberal' regimes," Ashcraft fails to take notice of the historical perspective in which I express on p. 293 the view on the adjustability of the liberal principle of the sharing of power to "elitist, authoritarian and extra-constitutional notions." My central thesis that, in denying general suffrage, Locke leaves the people only the right of extra-constitutional dissent, is historically hardly surprising, and the reviewer's fragmented quotations are intentionally misleading. The account of my interpretation of Locke's theory of popular consent—and of other topics—given in the *Times Literary Supplement* of February 13, 1969, shows that my way of interpretation is no hindrance to the accurate evaluation of its contents.

4. As an unprejudiced reading of pp. 32–33 will confirm, I do not refer to the controversies of contemporaries to justify disregard of historical evidence and contemporaneous writings. Detailed comparisons concerning property can be found in Chapter VI. Elsewhere, too, I have evaluated Locke's views in relation to other thinkers (especially Filmer) and to contemporaneous practices. I have also shown that Locke himself viewed issues in historical categories and perspectives, especially one-man rule.

5. The reviewer equally misleads the reader in producing one sentence bearing on a threadbare aspect of economic liberalism, while keeping silent on my attempts to reassess the relationship in the *Treatises* between property and politics and to highlight its principles which permit government intervention, and even a welfare policy, although in practice Locke was not prepared to recommend it. (Chapter VI, 4.)

6. To offer the so far most detailed analysis of Locke's "mature political thought as expressed in the *Treatises*" (*Lib. Pol.*, p. 40), would not seem to be an improper limitation if it distorted or added nothing to our understanding of one of the classics of political thought, or if the analysis were entirely unrelated to the state of political science in our time. Ashcraft's objections are the less convincing since in his "Locke's State of Nature," he does not make a single point which is relevant to Locke's political thought and which the *Treatises* could not bear out. He does not improve his case by clamouring for the reasons of Locke's "change of heart" about revolution, as if Cranston had not broken new ground and Laslett added more emphasis to what follows in this respect from Locke's association with Shaftesbury. Ashcraft does not mention my references to the association in my treatment of Locke's revolutionism (*Lib. Pol.*, pp. 36, 312–13, 364), I do also not ignore or reject the evidence of earlier and other works of Locke when it differs from my reading of the *Treatises* but in these cases I try to explain the difference or I suggest a change of mind (*Lib. Pol.* pp. 152 and 276).

7. Bits of quotations torn out of context are so arranged by the reviewer as to suggest that to distinguish between various senses in which Locke used the notion of the state of nature attests by itself confusion. Ashcraft himself speaks in his article of "the three possible states of nature" (p. 901). This highlights what is essentially wrong with Ashcraft's attitude.

Not all points in his article are different from mine. Yet he refrains from registering any agreement, nor does he dedicate any of the roughly

1200 words of his review to *proving* one single instance where I misread Locke, as distinct from simply ruling, for instance, against the distinction between rebellion and revolution, noted also by other scholars (cf. *Lib. Pol.* note 44, p. 316), or against that between "absolute" and "arbitrary" power. His failure to express agreement or prove a misreading accords with his failure to approximate in his article a decent proportion between the mention of other scholars and the reproduction of their views. (Examples supplied to the Editor.) Ashcraft does not give the slightest indication of what his conclusion owes and adds to existing interpretations. It is no novelty to evaluate Locke's state of nature as "an historical and a moral description of human existence" (p. 898) and to identify the second description as "a critique of existing society by indicating the legal and moral boundaries of political relationships" (p. 914). Yolton and Polin (who mention also Lamprecht) speak of "a normative device" and of "un état normatif," Strauss and Laslett say the same in other words. (References in *Lib. Pol.*, notes 36–37, p. 99 and note 2, p. 83).

Ashcraft's inability or unwillingness to give other scholars' works their due explains the nature of his conclusion that, applied to my book, my own criticism of an unhistorical attitude should prove "suicidal." This wishful thinking reflects itself in the method not to disprove but to cut to measure quotations bearing on a fraction of the topics the book deals with, or rather, like "conquerors' swords . . . cut up . . . by the roots, and mangle . . . to pieces," to adapt Locke's words (II, 211) to the case in hand.

M. Seliger
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

To the Editor:

Every author is, in my opinion, entitled to present an intelligent, clear, and persuasive reply to a critical review of his work. I see no reason why Professor Seliger's failure to avail himself of that privilege necessitates my engaging in polemical argument with him. In addition to the fair treatment of a work owed to the author, a reviewer has an obligation to the reader to advise him on the merits of the book. Given the number of books published annually, the limitations of an individual's reading time, and three careful readings of Professor Seliger's book, I advised the reader that he could better employ his time than by groping his way through the fog-bound thinking of the author.

Aside from the specific textual criticisms mentioned in my review, I pointed out that Seliger had chosen to disregard (a) more than thirty volumes of Locke's correspondence, journals, and manuscripts, (b) the majority of Locke's published writings, (c) numerous works by seventeenth-century writers important to Locke's political thought, and (d) the historical context of events which shaped Lockean ideas. The result is that Seliger set out to write a book on Locke with a seriously inadequate knowledge of his subject and virtually no knowledge of the seventeenth century in which Locke lived. Instead, Seliger throws a few scattered pieces of Locke's thought into a cauldron, and I suggested that from such intellectual alchemy few golden truths were likely to emerge. If the reader is persuaded by Seliger's reply that these defects are irrelevant, he is free to disregard my advice and read the book.

However, in response to Professor Seliger's rather strange notion of scholarship, viz., that original sources may be disregarded with impunity, but secondary sources should be meticulously cited (point 7), I will glady recommend an excellent secondary source on Locke to the reader; namely, Mr. John Dunn's *The Political Thought of John Locke* (Cambridge Press, 1969). As to Seliger's compaints about the brevity of my quotations from his work, I would willingly have provided further illustrations of his confusion, but my space was limited. Professor Seliger had 372 pages to state his case; I was allowed 1000 words. That is a little like trying to cure a diseased elephant with a sugar cube.

Richard Ashcraft
University of California, Los Angeles

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES

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REVIEW ARTICLE

ON MODELS AND THE FRENCH POLITICAL SYSTEM:

Commentary on Duncan MacRae Jr.'s *Parliament, Parties, and Society in France 1946–1958*[1]

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Without exaggeration, it can be stated that the study of French politics has witnessed a certain *immobilisme* in the past half century. Duncan MacRae Jr.'s *Parliament, Parties, and Society in France 1946–1958* marks an important turning point in the application of quantitative methods, specifically in the use of scaling and regression models. In analyzing this commendable work, I attempt to indicate what I believe are nevertheless more appropriate methodological strategies for the study of the French political system. Questions of method, in turn, are paramount to an evaluation of MacRae's substantive interpretations. Insofar as MacRae uses techniques that are being increasingly applied in political science and sociology, this essay may prove of interest to those with more general methodological interests.

The measure of *immobilisme* is that we must return to Siegfried's *Tableau Politique de la France de l'Ouest* (1913!) to find a major innovation along scientific lines.[2] To be sure, the postwar period has not missed "wise" men (Aron, Duverger, Fauvet, Goguel, Hoffmann, Leites, Leuthy, Williams, etc.) on both sides of the Atlantic. But their insights rarely represent theories or models that express skills and techniques required for empirical replication.[3] Some of us will see a certain opening to the study of social systems and authority relations. However, the breach has been small. Wylie's perceptive observations have not led to rigorous analysis. While the speculative conclusions of Crozier's study of the bureaucratic system have interested political scientists, they have failed to adapt his brilliant empirical strategies to the study of the political system. Similarly, Boudon and Davidovitch's simulation of the minor judiciary has not been followed in political science.[4]

Of course, public opinion surveys are an innovation. While students of politics have an obligation to the first pollsters in France, particularly Stoetzel, it must be regretted that polls have been so heavily treated by simple enumeration (marginals and cross-tabulations), a device inherent in Siegfried's work even if applied to aggregate data.

To claim total *immobilisme* would be course be wrong. New methodology exists in works like Converse's analysis of the spatial distribution of party preferences.[5] Nevertheless, the record is far from brilliant.

Against this background, MacRae's attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of the political system of the Fourth Republic represents a breakthrough.

MacRae's central concern is the most salient aspect of the Fourth Republic: cabinet instability. His thesis is that cabinet instability existed despite a consensual system among the *ministrables* of the inner political club. The *ministrables* tended to support cabinets on critical roll-call votes and managed to take defensive action in thwarting three challenging "surge" movements, Gaullism, Mendesism, and Poujadism. Nevertheless, this club could not form lasting coalitions capable of positive action in many domains, particularly the fatal Algerian situation. Instead, unstable government occurred.

This instability resulted, in MacRae's view, largely from pressures put upon deputies by *ideological* party militants. These pressures broke the leadership consensus by either dividing parties internally in National Assembly votes or, in the case of the Socialists, a party with relatively disciplined voting, forcing party leadership to desert the governing coalition. These ideological defections might have been acceptable were it not that generally one-third of the Assembly votes were "unavailable" to the central consensus.

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[1] St. Martin's Press, New York, McMillan & Co., London, 1967, xiii + 375 pp. Further unreferenced page numbers refer to this work.

[2] Second edition, Armand Colin, Paris, 1965.

[3] The exceptions are disappointing. Thus, Goguel has basically continued the Siegfried tradition without modification. Leites, who brilliantly draws attention to the psychic world of deputies, fails to indicate how he samples language and fails to relate the psychic world to other influences such as constituency pressures.

[4] Raymond Boudon, *L'Analyse Mathematique des Faits Sociaux*, Paris, Plon, 1966.

[5] Authors mentioned above and not cited are referenced in MacRae's bibliography.

The unavailable votes were produced by election outcomes. Although voters were, MacRae argues, even less ideological and politicized than those in the United States, the governing parties could not enlarge upon their clientele since France's social divisions were constrained by a vertical communications system. Consequently, each of the stable parties aimed its communications at a small range of voters. The Communists, the major bloc of unavailable votes, also had a specific clientele. Shifts in opinion were channeled into the "surge" movements cutting across social cleavages to add to the unavailable votes. While the social cleavages responsible for voting behavior were rather unrelated to the ideologies of militants, both factors contributed to cabinet instability.

MacRae's thesis, it should be noted, has no explicit concept of a "rational" deputy: one who is trying to meet various aspiration levels of political power such as reelection and cabinet status. In fact, *Parliament, Parties, and Society* rejects the hypothesis that instability resulted because the *ministrables* themselves engaged in gaming behavior designed to further their personal ambitions.

The strength of MacRae's work lies in his effort to link the Parliamentary system to the behavior of voters and militants. The latter category is the book's weakest link, for little empirical research is reported. MacRae infers the ideological character of militants only from the high levels of party membership and partisan political activity in France and from descriptive reports. Voters are studied through analysis of survey data and multiple regression analysis of election results. Finally, the book's major empirical work is a scale analysis of roll-call votes in the Assembly.[6]

The scale analysis is carefully done and takes its place beside MacRae's earlier work on the American Congress.[7]

In the present work, MacRae has computed separate scales for each of the major parliamentary groups for each legislature. For a given group, roll-calls where the group had less than 90% consensus were considered. MacRae's interpretations of most of the scales is that they are "issue-specific." Consequently, he sees roll-call voting as being organized along ideological patterns. In applying scale analysis to roll-call voting, MacRae has made a major innovation in the study of parliamentary bodies.

The usefulness of this innovation and the remainder of MacRae's analysis is aptly demonstrated by his treatment of the religious issue. Most observers simply relate greatly attenuated Catholic-laic antagonisms. Leites very much ridicules their importance.[8] A much more precise and correct analysis of the religious question is available from MacRae's work.

As for voters, MacRae shows that religiousity remained important, perhaps foremost, among the divisions that rigidified party clienteles and led to the unstable "political arithmetic" of the Assembly.[9] MacRae also argues that the religious question was more important locally than at the national level. Consequently, while deputies may have taken a consensual approach, they may have been pressured by militants, eg. public school teachers, into more rigid positions.[10] Through scale analysis, MacRae shows how Radicals were consistently split on this issue. Even more critical was the Socialists' total opposition to the bills providing funds for church schools passed under the Pleven government in the Second Legislature. This defeat likely influenced those in the party who forced their consensual leader, Guy Mollet, to bring about Pleven's fall. Thus, both directly and indirectly, religious matters had real import for Fourth Republic politics.

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[6] The scales represent heuristic clusterings of roll-calls. All items in a scale have Yule's Q coefficients of .8 or better with one another. While better scaling procedures, particularly multidimensional scaling, might now be available, I present no critique on this topic given the development of data processing at the time MacRae carried out his research. Also, while MacRae largely selected roll-calls on the basis of *L'Année Politique* and while a better selection might have been made, I assume the improvement would have had only a marginal impact on the results.

[7] *Dimensions of Congressional Voting*. University of California Publications in Sociology and Social Institutions, Vol. 1, No. 3. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1958.

[8] Nathan Leites, *On the Game of Politics in France*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1959, pp. 29–32.

[9] This finding is held subject to the reservations about the multiple regression analysis made below. On the continued importance of religious practice for voting behavior, see Howard Rosenthal, "The Popularity of Charles de Gaulle: Findings from Archive-Based Research," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Summer, 1967.

[10] Specific data on such local pressures is now available from a survey of Fourth Republic politicians conducted by the French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP). See Guy Michelat and Howard Rosenthal, "Studies of Electoral Coalitions in the Fourth Republic," Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie-Mellon University, mimeo. 1968.

The religious question clearly indicates the utility of MacRae's modes of analysis. He also adds to our knowledge of the degree of imbalance between shifts in governments and their policies and shifts in public opinion; the types of issues that divided the parties; and several other substantive points. As to his more general hypotheses about cabinet instability, if the elements of his view have been advanced in the past, less analytical writers are far from a consensus. Thus, Fauvet and Leites have taken opposing views regarding the strength of the influence of ideology. I would suggest that MacRae's interpretation is correct: ideology counted, mass social cleavages counted, and a consensus operated among the *ministrables*. On the other hand, MacRae's picture is far from complete; other factors, including personal ambitions of deputies, may well have influenced cabinet instability. This lack of completeness or balance—which is part of the inherent approximation of research and which does not suggest that one refrain from giving this book a careful reading—leads to a number of criticisms. Hopefully these criticisms constitute useful research strategy. While, for reasons of brevity, these criticisms are focused upon MacRae's scaling analysis of roll-call votes and regression analysis of party voting, the criticisms would apply to the analysis of social cleavages and other topics considered by MacRae.

Simply reinterpreting MacRae's roll-call analysis in a different framework raises some doubt as to his emphasis on ideological factors in the fall of cabinets. Two points must be considered: which deputies were scaled and which roll-calls were scaled.

As to the deputies, among the non-Communists, about 50 were excluded from scaling analysis for the First Legislature and over 100 in the Third.[11] In the Second Legislature, the dissident Gaullists, the ARS, were not scaled.

The ARS began to break with De Gaulle's RPF by supporting Pinay, the first Moderate premier since the Liberation. Perhaps the ARS dissidence was precipitated by support for Pinay's conservative policies, but the non-ideological issue of opportunistic participation in the spoils of Fourth Republic government had long been latent within the RPF. The ARS was rewarded with cabinet participation in the subsequent Mayer government while the loyal Gaullists waited until Laniel in order to join the club.

It is not denied that the ARS members were on the "Right," with respect both to the entire political spectrum and to the Gaullist movement. Their conservatism may explain why they deserted De Gaulle over Pinay rather than Pleven or Faure, but it does not explain why they failed to vote the investiture of another Moderate, Petsche, at the beginning of the Legislature. It can be advanced that the ARS simply wanted to ride the winning tide of Gaullism; when Gaullism lost its force, as good "gamesmen" they sought better fortunes.

Similarly, the unscaled deputies in the other Legislatures may well have been maneuvering with personal ambition foremost in mind. Some of them were gentlemen who shifted their party identification while others belonged to small parties. At the margin, their votes were important, and they must be studied before formulating any conclusions about the Assembly.

The question of omitted deputies, however, is probably less important than that of omitted roll-calls. In fact, a large proportion were not scaled. In only one case, that of First Legislature Moderates, where 28% of votes involving dissidence within the party did not enter scales, does MacRae provide precise information on this point.[12] Elsewhere, the proportion seems lower; thus, of divided MRP votes, about 78%, 51%, and 86% were not scaled in the First, Second, and Third Legislatures, respectively.[13] What interpretation can be placed on these roll-calls that were not shown to be strongly related to general patterns of party division? Rarely, as in the case of the school aid question in the Third Legislature, they represent an important division that was infrequently put to a vote. More frequently, these roll-calls may have represented different dimensions for different deputies. For example, one deputy might interpret a roll-call as "European" while another sees it as "economic." Even in this case, such differential perceptions would hardly suggest widely shared ideological structures. A third possibility is specific questions of interest, sugar beets, etc. But such roll-calls would certainly show that deputies and militants are pursuing non-ideological interests of economic, electoral, and other types. Finally, the non-scaled roll-calls can indicate specific gaming maneuvers within the coalition system. (However, the "ideological" explanation might still be retained through multivariate techniques not used by MacRae. See the remarks on methodology, below.)

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[11] These figures are estimates made from various tables as MacRae does not give precise figures. Even if separate analyses were carried out by party, it would have been useful to have a scale analysis of all deputies to treat the problem of unscaled deputies. Such an analysis would also have presented a dimensional portrait of the parties. Consequently, one would have been able to handle more precisely the question of the left-right position of the Radical, MRP, Moderate, and Gaullist blocs. One could also relate such a "mapping" to the various government coalitions. Michael Leiserson has made an initial attempt in this direction. See his "Political Coalitions," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Yale University, 1966.

[12] P. 96. On p. 181, MacRae unfortunately leaves the impression that only unanimity was a reason for a vote not being scaled. Such is obviously not the case; many roll-calls were not scaled because they did not fit into a cluster.

[13] Based on Tables 3.6, p. 56; 4.5, p. 104; 5.5, pp. 146–147; 6.5, p. 174.

For these numerous non-scaled roll-calls, it is especially important to look at their distribution over roll-calls of obvious importance to government instability. Here I include roll-calls where a premier is invested or rejected, where his cabinet is approved or rejected, and where he falls or chooses to resign.[14] Since party divisions on these roll-calls are presented graphically by MacRae, we can only gauge approximately whether a sufficient proportion of the members (10%) voted in such a way that MacRae treated the vote as expressing dissidence.[15]

On roughly 111 occasions a scaled group—Socialists, Moderates, MRP, and Radicals plus UDSR in all three Legislatures, the Gaullist URAS in the Second—divided on these critical votes. Since only 39% of these divisions entered into scales, conceivably a majority of the divisions expressed ample "gaming." The pattern holds even for the relatively "ideological" groups, the MRP and the Gaullists. Only 8 of 19 MRP divisions and 3 of 11 for the Gaullists were scaled.[16]

These aggregate results must be focused in terms of the history of coalition formation and breakdown. For the First Legislature, MacRae rightly argues that the Socialists were responsible for the fall of cabinets. In turn, the Socialists were split internally on ideological lines. But one needs more information on the extent to which ideology was more than a symbolic overlay for power struggles within the party, Mollet being particularly concerned with his personal position. Furthermore, MacRae himself raises the possibility of dissent within the party coming from conditions of electoral competition within constituencies as well as from the personal beliefs of militants.[17]

In addition to the Socialists, one ought to look at the Radicals whose support was generally essential to any First Legislature coalition. A mark of Radical power in coalition formation was their ability to receive cabinet posts in greater proportion than the number of Radical votes supporting the cabinet.

At the beginning of the Fourth Republic, after uniting on a series of investiture votes, the Radicals split on Ramadier's fall and Blum's subsequent investiture attempt. Then unity was refound on the investiture of Schuman but readily lost when his cabinet was presented five days later. The first two of these divisions are not part of any scale. The division over Schuman belongs to a scale (I-2 Marie-Queuille) that is not particularly related to specific issues but includes all investiture and cabinet votes until the vote on Queuille's first cabinet. All scale items fall in the period November, 1947, July, 1949. Thus, it might be suggested that Ramadier's fall marked the beginning of coalition bargaining that yielded a relatively stable pattern with the Schuman cabinet.

Nevertheless, the pattern showed signs of collapse over Schuman's fall, which was not scaled. After Queuille's first investiture, the Radicals could not be scaled on any of the "critical" votes in the remainder of the Legislature. If united on investitures, dividing only over Mollet and Pleven, the party split, and *split differently,* at the end of the final three governments to fall, Queuille, Bidault, and Pleven.[18]

This overview of Radical voting suggests that the Radicals engaged in coalition in-fighting. MacRae's scale analysis has the merit of isolating a period when alignments were relatively stable. It would be possible for the most successful bargainers to have paid for their rewards by supporting the government while the least successful attempted to demonstrate their power by casting negative votes. From this viewpoint, which still permits gaming, finding an association between *ministrable* status and support for cabinets is not surprising.

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[14] This categorization omits critical roll-calls during the life-time of a cabinet. Such roll-calls, which could be spotted by more detailed research and which would present great interest in the general study of instability, are not necessary to the points made here.

[15] Although some roll-calls which appear on the graphs to contain 10% dissidence may not have been scaled because some of the dissidents did not stay within the group for the whole Legislature, such dissidents, as suggested above, bear close watching for "gaming" behavior.

[16] In the entire Fourth Republic, the Socialists divided on only two "critical" votes, the Thorez and De Gaulle investitures.

[17] P. 292.

[18] Queuille's final government simply terminated with the elections for the Second Legislature.

As for the other parties, the Right was heavily divided throughout the Legislature, splitting on 24 of the 31 "critical" roll-calls. When these Moderates split on a roll-call that was scaled, they may have done so along ideological lines, for 7 of the 10 such roll-calls belonged to their general left-right scale (I-1). However, 14 roll-calls were not found in any scale. Similarly, when the MRP divided it did not do so in ways that led to scaling (5 of 6 cases). In summary, even if we go so far as to admit that First Legislature governments fell from the Socialists' ideological disputes, instability may also have resulted from gaming over the composition of governments.

In the Second Legislature, the MRP was more divided than in the First although these divisions may have reflected splits on issues rather than coalition maneuvers as 7 of the 11 splits were scaled. Yet the scaled roll-calls were scattered about four scales, the major contrast being between votes on Mendès-France and votes on other premiers. In turn, MacRae admits that Mendès was fought as much for his unwillingness to abide by the rules of the club as for ideological reasons.

The Moderates were less divided than in the First Legislature, but 7 of their 11 divisions could not be scaled. The two scaled votes on Mendès investiture seemed to be specific reactions to Mendès while the fall of Mendès and of Pleven were related to key foreign policy issues.

Continued suggestion of Radical gaming comes from 9 roll-calls that could not be scaled. If three scaled roll-calls bear some relation to issues, three others (Mendès' fall and Faure's second investiture and fall) are related to a specific coalition struggle stemming from the club's unwillingness to submit to the popular Mendès.

For the Second Legislature, however, MacRae rests his case on the Gaullists, who caused the fall of most governments. If the eventual members of the URAS were unified until Mayer's fall, thereafter they seemed to have the usual ambitions of the system. After Mayer's fall there was a prolonged crisis of one month when four candidates, Reynaud, Mendès, Bidault, and Marie, all lost investiture votes. Although the Gaullists divided on all of these votes, none was found in a scale. The three votes on Laniel were scaled, but on three distinct scales, one of which was simply titled "disaffection from Laniel"; thus, gaming can not be ruled out here. Finally, none of the succeeding divisions on Mendès, Pineau, and Faure could be scaled. Consequently, for critical votes, MacRae's results do not suggest that Gaullist splits were primarily ideological but rather that without De Gaulle there is no Gaullism.

In fact, MacRae's conclusions concerning Gaullism appear to follow more from preconception than from empirical research. When, for example, he attempts to relate roll-call voting to constituency factors, instead of a set of research results, we find the assertion:

> We should expect the constituency relations of the Gaullists, as inferred from their scale positions after they began dividing on roll-calls, to have been loose. In its early years, the Gaullist movement was ideological, and the most enthusiastic Gaullists took their stands as a matter of personal conviction than because they came from "Gaullist districts"—or conformed to them.[19]

In a recent essay, however, I have indicated that the Gaullist scales are rather strongly related to a measure of electoral interest in the constituencies. I have also shown that measures of electoral interest are closely related to Gaullist choices in electoral coalitions under the *apparentement* system.[20] These findings suggest that non-ideological considerations are important to the analysis of Gaullism, even as early as 1951.

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[19] P. 299.

[20] Howard Rosenthal, "The Electoral Politics of Gaullists in the Fourth French Republic: Ideology or Constituency Interest?", this *Review,* June, 1969, pp. 476–487.

Other limitations of MacRae's analysis of constituency relations are: (1) While he suggests that party militants limited bargaining at the local level (pp. 11, 289–302), study of *apparentement* alliances for the 1951 elections shows that the "highly organized" MRP formed the most coalitions. Another type of coalition, joint lists among two or more parties, in turn seems as related to the size of their vote as to their membership ratios. See Howard Rosenthal, "Voting and Coalition Models in Election Simulation," in William Coplin, ed., *Simulation and the Study of Politics,* Chicago, Markham Press, 1968; (2) Generally, the treatment of the role of electoral interest vs. that of ideology is too superficial. Thus, MacRae interprets (p. 176) an association between scales specific to issues and scales specific to cabinets as supporting evidence for the lack of a game and infers that high specificity was a characteristic of "ideological" parties. A "perfect" data point in this respect is represented by the Socialists' unique First Legislature scale which was entirely specific to one cabinet and to one issue, the electoral law. Yet MacRae only hurriedly investigates (pp. 290–

Similarly, MacRae finds that Gaullism as a "surge" movement had "politically unskilled" leaders.[21] Further on, although forced to note that the Gaullist parliamentary group indeed tended to come from skilled occupational groups, he argues, "they lacked the skills of negotiation and compromise."[22] This contention seems to revolve about De Gaulle's failure to come to power before 1958.[23] But are we now to believe that in the Fifth Republic the Gaullists are skilled and the unsuccessful men of the Fourth unskilled? By rejecting the Fourth Republic, the Gaullists had to appear as uncompromising. At least their local coalition choices were well in keeping with the skill of electoral rationality. Thus, it seems dubious that the Gaullists were a group of unskilled ideologues who caused the instability of the Second Legislature.[24]

The Third Legislature, in contrast, comes closest to supporting MacRae's emphasis on ideology. The Moderates, who were primarily responsible for the fall of governments in this brief legislature, were divided at the fall of Mollet, Bourgès-Maunoury, and Gaillard. The latter two votes as well as Pflimlin's investiture on the *treize mai* belong to two scales dealing with the Algerian issue, and Mollet's fall is more related to the "Algeria" scale than any other.[25]

Algeria was also important for the Radicals. Although the vote ending Mollet's reign fell on the Europe scale, both Bourgès and Gaillard fell on two highly associated scales that MacRae labelled "Mendesism" but could as well go under "Algeria."

Still, gaming was perhaps not absent, for the Moderate votes on three investitures and the Radical votes on four were not members of scales. While the MRP only divided on two investiture votes among the "critical" roll-calls, neither of these entered the single MRP scale for the Legislature. It is perhaps of consequence that the Moderates and MRP, excluded from the first two cabinets, participated in the Gaillard government. Furthermore, as MacRae himself contends that "a more fundamental reason for the Moderates' defection [from Mollet] was their feeling of growing strength in the country," ideological motivations were certainly not unrelated to tactical considerations.[26]

If the foregoing successfully suggests that ideology's role in cabinet instability may not be as secure as MacRae would like us to believe, doubts arise regarding not only the interpretation MacRae gave his results but also the methodology used to obtain the results. In fact, the foregoing reinterpretation must be regarded as provisional, given MacRae's methodological structure.

In effect, MacRae initiated scale analysis of all divided roll-calls and afterwards inspected the results in relation to the fall of cabinets. It would perhaps be preferable to treat the critical votes as a series of dependent variables. Then, in terms of roll-calls, one could see what other votes clustered with each critical vote. In MacRae's heuristic, a critical vote is unfortunately excluded from scaling if it fails the necessary association level for one or two votes in an existing cluster. The method suggested here would permit focusing directly on the correlates of each critical vote.

Another alternative and perhaps superior strategy would be to perform a scale analysis on all roll-calls except critical roll-calls and to then develop multivariate measures of association between the scales and the critical roll-calls. Within such a model, one could also accommodate measures relative to past critical votes, to the constituencies, to ministerial rewards, etc.[27]

In any case, his inference of a consensual system from ministrable support for cabinets can be questioned in that examination of Table 7.2 (p. 187) discloses that the association between *ministrable* status and cabinet support was strong only for the First Legislature. Furthermore, on p. 193,

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291) the extent to which Socialists were simply voting their electoral interests on this issue. While awaiting such an examination, an alternative proposition can be advanced; namely, that since specificity seems to be related to the number of votes scaled, it is primarily related to the extent of party discipline rather than ideology. Since, when discipline breaks down, it may tend to do so during a brief period of time over a single question (which may be either ideological or tactical), cabinet and issue specificity may be associated. Hence, neither of these measures by themselves can be expected to reveal much about either ideology or coalition formation.

[21] P. 9.

[22] P. 53 and n.35, p. 63.

[23] Pp. 308, 313–315.

[24] Similarly, it is doubtful that the Mendesists were unskilled.

[25] P. 169.

[26] P. 161.

[27] With respect to ministerial rewards, MacRae has only considered differences in support between *ministrables* and non-*ministrables*. He thus has no measures on those who aimed at office but were unsuccessful. He also did not report on the relationship of voting to the allocation of posts over time.

Such a strategy would give a more comprehensive view of behavior on critical votes and, in particular, it would remove much of the vagueness now present concerning the non-scaled votes.

The argument for a methodology centered about dependent variables also applies to MacRae's regression analysis of the geographic variation of the vote over the French departments.[28] Again, instead of creating an appropriate model for each dependent variable, he uniformly applies the same set of four independent variables to seventeen voting outcomes. For the stable parties, this method is moderately successful with "explained" variance (in terms of squared Pearson correlations) ranging from 27% to 52%. Much lower levels were obtained for the Gaullist gain in 1951 (26%) and the Poujadist vote in 1956 (19%).

Even if such a technique has comparative interest, its danger is that, if the model is incorrectly specified, one will generate improper interpretations from the resulting coefficients. An example is available by comparing a more elaborate study of Poujadism to that of MacRae.[29]

In the former, first a simple regression was run using "ruralism" (defined as per cent of the labor force in non-agricultural occupations) plus six other independent variables: % independent non-agricultural proprietors; % Communist vote in the 1951 elections; wine-growers as % of male labor force; home distillers as % of male labor force; automobile registration per capita; North-South based on the Vichy occupation line. As a simple regression, there is an adjusted squared multiple correlation of .43 as against .19 for MacRae.[30] While MacRae reports "ruralism" (which he defines somewhat differently) as the most important correlate of Poujadism, in the seven variable analysis, "ruralism" has no "significant" relationship to the Poujadist vote, significant coefficients being found only for home distillers, automobiles, and North-South.

To go one step further toward proper specification, another seven variable model was run incorporating a number of detailed hypotheses about the geographic variation of the Poujadist vote. While the Communist vote again entered the equation, the Communist vote weighted by Ruralism was introduced to capture the competition between Poujadism and Communism in rural areas. Thus, while the former term had a positive partial correlation with the Poujadist vote, the latter was negatively related. Similarly, the two alcohol variables were multiplied (weighted) by automobiles, expressing the hypothesis that discontent must be related through communications. Finally, automobiles, independent proprietors, and North-South were all weighted by ruralism to express the hypothesis that these effects were strongest in rural areas. This model, in which all coefficients are "significant" has an adjusted squared correlation of .53. Although many elements of this model are mentioned in passing by MacRae, his failure to give them explicit statistical analysis leads to a fragmentary intepretation of Poujadism. His interpretation of other voting phenomenon should also suffer from this tendency to compare associations rather than specify models.

MacRae's preference for general patterns of association may be a deliberate avoidance of complexity as the book has been carefully written to reach those without mathematical knowledge. Following a preface offering some uncomplex "conjectures" that can be "perceived" by the "nonstatistical observer," the book frequently resembles the "wise" man's argument for a particular thesis rather than an attempt to provide a rigorous statement of the measure of multiple influences on complex behavior.[31] Of

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MacRae incorrectly interprets data in support of his hypothesis:

> For one *ministrable,* Antoine Pinay, there is additional evidence of his support for cabinets of which he was a member. Pinay's friends constituted a well-known group . . . four of the seven are in the top row on Scale II-2. They were somewhat more favorable to the cabinet than other members of the party.

We can hardly believe this since 43 of the total 63 Moderates scaled were also in the top row (see Table 7.4, p. 192).

[28] Actually 82 departments or dioceses, except for the Poujadist vote where there were fewer units. MacRae originally published these results in the *American Journal of Sociology* in 1958. While it may now appear subject to reservations, MacRae's study was undoubtedly instrumental in stimulating the use of multiple regression in French political studies.

[29] See Howard Rosenthal, "Poujade's Voters: Suggestions for the Study of the Social Geography of the New French Politics," Carnegie-Mellon University, Graduate School of Industrial Administration, mimeo., 1968. This study further raises the point that beyond the particular case of "ruralism" discussed below, MacRae did not consider that Poujadism might represent a more complex reaction to modernization than the simple "defense" of *"situations acquises"* (p. 12).

[30] MacRae does not indicate whether his correlations are adjusted.

[31] P. vii. The lack of rigor seems especially true for the comparisons MacRae draws between France

course, although "nonstatistical observers" may think in black and white, one need not research and write for such an audience.

Beyond questions of audience, the methodological problems of *Parliament, Parties, and Society* reflect a lack of theoretical underpinnings. While there is some reference to sociological theory (albeit in such non-operational terms as "structure," "norm," "status," and "ideology"), there are no references to what might be termed the "neo-rational" school of political science. No mention, for example, is made of the Simon-March-Cyert work on organizations, and, particularly, incrementalism.[32] Yet their conceptual framework has heavily influenced the work of Boudon and Crozier in France and, to speak specifically of a legislative process, the work of Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky on budgetary processes in the United States.[33] Similarly, there is no reflection of marginalist explanations of voting behavior beginning with Downs nor of the growing interest in coalition theory proceeding from Riker.[34]

To suggest one way in which "neo-rational" thinking is likely to be of help, consider the first proposition MacRae would question:

> Cabinets tended to be brought down by the operation of a parliamentary game in which prospective ministers were the center of opposition.[35]

MacRae's main attack on this "conjecture" comes from finding that *ministrables* tended to support cabinets more than non-*ministrables*. But setting up a "conjecture" and dealing with it so simply is a quite narrow tactic. Surely one would be better to assume that cabinet status was an important goal for at least some deputies—MacRae does not indicate the contrary. How, one would ask, did deputies implement this goal? Once that question is answered, one could investigate the consequences of such behavior for cabinet instability.

One would also investigate how the cabinet status goal interacts with other goals, particularly reelection. If, for example, the *ministrables* have more secure electoral bases that non-*ministrables*, they can afford to support the cabinet even when it might mean losing some voter support. This would generate differential levels of support for the government without excluding "gaming" at opportune junctures.

Goal interactions should be related to the characteristics of roll-calls. Among the possibilities: (1) investiture votes, which focus on little-known personalities, may be less salient in the constituencies than votes on intense issues that lead to the fall of governments. Consequently, one might expect "gaming" for the cabinet status goal to be more important on the former. (2) On matters where a positive vote and a negative vote would have equal effect on the reelection goal, a deputy would be relatively free to vote according to personal ideology. (3) Even if a deputy would be inclined, *ceteris paribus*, to vote in line with his constituency interest, his vote is likely to be influenced by his past support for the current government.

The type of approach that has just been suggested can be extended to the other "conjectures" considered by MacRae. In general, we need behavioral models of the mass "market" of voters, party organizations, and the Assembly itself. Without having achieved such objectives, MacRae has prompted their pursual.

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and the United States. The qualitative differences between, say, lack of white-black communication in the U.S. and *ouvrier-patron* in France are so important that it is very risky to rely on the types of statistical tables now available for international comparisons and thereby establish such propositions as, "In personal relations and social structure, France is more divided than the United States" (p. 6).

[32] James G. March and Herbert Simon, *Organizations*, New York, John Wiley, 1957; Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, *Behavioral Theory of the Firm*, New York, Prentice-Hall, 1964.

[33] Otto A. Davis, M. H. Dempster, and Aaron Wildavasky, "A Theory of the Budgetary Process," this *Review*, 60, 1966, pp. 529–547.

[34] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, New York: Harper & Row, 1957; William Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962.

[35] P. vii.

BOOK REVIEWS

Public Policymaking Reexamined. By Yehezkel Dror. (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1968. Pp. 370.) *Political Science and Public Policy.* Ed. by Austin Ranney. (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1968. Pp. 287.

TWO VIEWS

"Public policy" is a historic concern of political scientists. Two books that reflect current concerns with policy are *Public Policymaking Reexamined* by Yehezkel Dror and *Political Science and Public Policy* edited by Austin Ranney.

It is not very often that we see a book like Yehezkel Dror's *Public Policy-making Reexamined.* Dror offers a great leap forward in the analysis of public policy. His scope is huge and his ambition is extensive. He tries to encompass the whole field in this volume, not merely for the sake of description but for the purpose of assessing the present quality of policymaking and proposing major reforms. The book warrants the label "definitive" insofar as it defines a full sweep of concerns that are held in common by political scientists interested in normative *or* behavioral approaches to public policy. Dror does not fill all the segments of this field, however, and some of the gaps raise serious questions about the larger enterprise.

The field that Dror's book defines is "policymaking." This includes the substance of policies that are considered and implemented by governments, the structures and behaviors—both official and private—that combine to make policy, plus other structures and behaviors that shape and modify policymaking procedures.

The breadth of Dror's book ranges from first principles through empirical findings, a major reform proposal, and detailed prescriptions. The most elementary of Dror's "first principles" is his distinction between homo sapiens and the primates on the basis of the ability to "make conscious and rational decisions, at least part of the time." His concern for empirical findings is more often asserted than demonstrated; he excuses himself from paying greater attention by alleging inadequacies in the literature.

> At best, the empiric study of policymaking is just now emerging. A significant and increasing amount of work is being done on minor decisions and secondary policies, but most of it suffers from its lack of comprehensive, theoretical frameworks. Very little empiric work is being done on the macrosystem of public policymaking. At present, even suitable research methods are conspicuous by their absence.

At this and other points, Dror should plead his lack of familiarity with much of political science, especially that dealing with American legislatures, legislative-administrative relations, voting and attitudes, and the newer varieties of comparative state and urban policy-analysis. Such authors as David Easton, Richard F. Fenno, John P. Crecine, Warren Miller, Donald Stokes, Heinz Eulau and Thomas R. Dye have contributed far more to our understanding of policymaking than Dror acknowledges.

The central feature of Dror's book is his "optimal model" for policymaking. This is both a standard against which he compares existing modes of policymaking, and the goal of his reforms. Dror is especially critical of those policymaking procedures he calls "muddling through" and "incrementalism." These have insufficient concern for rational assessment and control of policymaking. "The most harmful effect of the incremental-change argument (which denies the possibility that significant improvements could be made in public policymaking by some innovative jumps) is that it paralyzes efforts, and thus tends to be a self-fulfilling prophecy." Dror describes his own model in several places, but qualifies himself often enough to complicate the tasks of identifying and assessing it. The basic features of Dror's model resemble the components of "rational decision-making" that have been abstracted before by Charles Lindblom and others. To his credit, it should be said that Dror accommodates many of the *caveats* pertaining to pure rationality. He recognizes the high costs of information, and admits the need for cutoff points in assessing alternative policies. He concedes the need for "extrarational" components in policymaking, and suggests a pragmatic mixing of political and economic feasibility in the criteria that are used to select the "best" policies from those available. His concern for "extrarationality" in policy-making, a continuing examination of policy-feedback, and the redesign of policymaking in the face of this examination are central features of his proposal. "Extrarationality" appears to be little more than "creativity." It is an ability to leap from empirical evidence about existing concepts and offer a new proposal that will make "progress" in an attack against intractable social, economic or political difficulties. Dror uses "intuition" and "judgment" to characterize his concept of extrarationality, and shuns the connotations of "mysticism" and "charisma."

The major question about Dror's herculean task concerns its success: Do his proposals fit into the empirical literature about policymaking, and prescribe a set of goals that are consistent with existing knowledge? Because Dror does not give adequate coverage to the empirical literature a reader must evaluate the book partly with his own sense of what is feasible. Indeed, Dror sometimes acknowledges a casual departure from his own understanding of the empirical literature, and thereby shakes the foundation of his own proposals.

> My findings will be based on a survey of both "literary" and scientific literature and on my own subjective impressions . . . I will regard them as being in the range between "suggestive" and "highly probable" . . . I am not going to keep my factual findings and evaluation formally separate. I will present my findings in a concise, generalized form, without paying what would usually be the necessary amount of attention to exceptions, deviations, and subvariations.

As might be expected from this excerpt, a reader occasionally flails at Dror for making an overly-simple assertion, or reaching a specific recommendation with no basis of analysis.

Dror's analysis suffers from his lack of "the necessary amount of attention to exceptions, deviations, and subvariations." In drawing out a model of muddling through and incrementalism as key features in a policymaking system that he wishes to reform, he does not fully explore the opportunities for innovation within incremental procedures. A system that makes changes incrementally might not be stricken with rigor mortis. Just within the recent history of the United States, there have been dramatic changes in public policy toward minority groups, capital punishment, health insurance, and the use of federal resources to support educational programs in both religious and secular schools. While the spending of state and local governments may change according to the routines of incremental budgeting, the "incremental" growth has been continuous and substantial. Between 1963 and 1967, the combined spending of state and local governments (per capita) increased by 33 percent. Dror himself acknowledges that policy situations may lend themselves to strategies of minimal risk or innovation; and if the former should lead to incremental change. Thus, Dror overdraws the conservatism of incrementalism, and then concedes his reform will have room for incremental decision-making. A reader is left with questions that require more specificity than Dror provides. *What are the worst squeak points of incrementalism? What are their implications for the nature of policy? What conditions require the use of incremental or "optimal" policymaking?* These questions require an exhaustive concern with "exceptions, deviations, and subvariations," and not a disregard for details.

The collection edited by Austin Ranney does not lend itself to the thematic analysis applied to Dror's *Public Policy-making Reexamined.* Its original essays treat various aspects of the policy process, but do not reflect a continuing line of reasoning. Partly for this reason, it complements Dror's book. While Dror offers a comprehensive (and somewhat oversimplified) outline of policymaking, Ranney's collection offers many limited essays that reveal the rich variety of questions, theories, data, research techniques and findings in the policy field.

As its title suggests, the collection is meant to identify the contribution of political scientists (qua scientists) to the *understanding* of public policy, and to its *formulation, implementation* and *evaluation.* Its twelve essays suggest the range of talents that political scientists can bring to these tasks: as developers of theoretical frameworks that help identify crucial lines of influence among the features of the policy process; as describers of governmental structures and political behaviors that are likely to affect those who make policy, and inhibit certain kinds of policy proposals; as assessors of specific policies, to determine which interests they benefit, and whether they accomplish the goals which they claim; and as evaluators of reforms proposed for the policymaking process, to identify those features that are likely to arouse antagonism from policymakers., and those features that are likely to have consequences unforeseen by the reformers.

Aaron Wildavsky looks at several policymaking techniques that have been devised, primarily by economists: systems analysis, program budgeting, cost-benefit analysis, and planning-programming-budgeting. He makes some of the arguments that have been identified as "that political scientist's" rebuke of reformers who disregard central features of the political system. He writes that goals are evolved as the products of interactions among participants, and may be submerged within agreements about specific policies. To upset the customary ways of making decisions about goals and policies would threaten important—if informal—mechanisms. Policymakers must protect their reputations and their access to other officials with whom they share governmental authority, and refrain from offending citizens in ways that might provoke civic discord and undermine the legitimacy of the political system. Although the economists' concern for efficiency in providing services, and their weighing of tangible benefits and costs offer information of great value to the policy-maker, their usefulness seems bounded by the "political" considerations that policymakers use to protect themselves from one another.

Ralph Huitt adds more to our understanding of constraints on policymaking in his discussion of "political feasibility." Huitt sees policymakers' use of economic rationality limited by the complexity of their goals and by the decentralized nature of the political system. The simple decision rules associated with planning-programming-budgeting have had relative success in the Defense Department because the goals of that organization are comparatively clear and non-controversial (deterrence of war, defense of the country, and victory in war). Policy planners in the military may compare alternative policies for their relative costs and benefits, while officials in other units are reluctant to announce the probable long-range accomplishments of their programs in order to avoid conflicts among policymakers who can support specific activities. The decentralized nature of the political system requires policymakers in all units to be sensitive to the demands and constraints imposed on them by others. Huitt has both academic and policymaking experience, and judges that one's definition of political feasibility is an art. "It is a seat-of-the-pants judgment, based on the experience of the person making it." The "cost" questions that Huitt's artist asks himself are: "Will it 'go' on the Hill?" "Will the public buy it?" "Does it have political 'sex appeal?'" Perhaps Huitt is too close to the experience of policymaking to risk generalization. Yet he outlines some of the parameters that bind the policy making artist, and he may contribute to someone else's definition of empirical generalizations.

James W. Davis and Kenneth M. Dolbeare assess the policies of the U.S. Selective Service System by the standards of its official goals, and recommend substitutes for present policy. On the basis of data collected by the Selective Service System, the Defense Department and their own survey of draft boards in Wisconsin, Davis and Dolbeare conclude that the System's goals of "equity" and "efficiency" are not realized by existing (i.e., pre-1967) procedures. The goal of equity fails on account of the high incidence of low-income and black inductees; and the goal of efficiency fails because there are no systematic efforts to define the civilian manpower needs of the country, or meet these needs through the criteria that local boards use to grant deferments. The authors ask if they, *as professional political scientists*, can recommend one policy-alternative over another? They argue that policy-making involves a balance between *assumptions accepted, conditions perceived, goals established, value priorities asserted, means available,* and *effects and by-products considered acceptable.* Further, they claim that scientific research in three of these elements (defining relevant conditions, means available, and effects and by-products produced), will support recommendations. The "fudge factor" in their argument is the notion of scientific analysis that "supports" policy recommendations. They do not claim that the skills of political scientists lead unerringly to one policy-recommendation instead of others. They only *reject* some policies by showing their *inconsistency* with current conditions, means available, or likely effects and by-products. They are less successful in producing unchallengeable recommendations.

In separate papers, Lewis A. Froman, Jr. and Robert H. Salisbury suggest that public policy be used as an independent variable to probe other features of the political system. They depart from the more-typical view of policy: as a dependent variable to be explained by reference to other political, social or economic phenomena. Froman evaluates several conceptions of policy for their potential utility as independent variables, and Salisbury offers some hypotheses about four "types" of policy: distributive, re-distributive, regulatory, and self-regulatory. Their principal argument is important: different types of policy are likely to stimulate different kinds of interactions among other features of politics. Although both papers are useful preliminary exercises for research, their theoretical categories are fraught with some of the problems that Froman offers in his own evaluative check-list: mutual exclusivity; validity; reliability; and ease of measurement.

These two books reveal some of the breadth obtainable from a concern with "public policy." Like "decision-making," "group conflict," "political system," and "role," it is a focus that lends itself to many analytical purposes. Even more than these, "policy" offers a link between the work of academic political scientists and the "practitioners" who must formulate and assess substantive policies. Some of what we design for the purpose of understanding the policymaking process may be useful to those who toil as policymakers. Dror, in a section "On Improving Public Policymaking," and several essays of the Ranney collection discuss the formal linkages between academic policy analysis and policy-making. Like other efforts of this kind, however, their recommendations are less than satisfactory. The roles of the academic and the practitioner are basically different. While one strives for more complete (*i.e.*, general) understanding, the other wants specific prescriptions for discrete problems. Yet the policy-oriented political scientist is joined to the policymaker by common concerns. The analytical techniques, and some findings of political scientists may aid the specific concerns of some policymakers. Perhaps the only general recommendation we can offer to the policymaker is that he obtain sophisticated training in policy-oriented political science, and ask for some of the always-elusive time in order to consider his lessons as he evaluates existing policy and formulates new proposals.

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It can hardly be doubted that political science (abetted in some cases by other social sciences) is rapidly becoming enamored of the study of policy. The advertisements in any recent issue of this *Review* bear testimony to this. Just glancing at the stack of books that I have accumulated within the last few months I come across such titles (all published in 1968) as *Politics and Policy, The Study of Policy Formation, The Policy Process in American Agriculture, Science Policy and the University, The Policy-Making Process, City Politics and Public Policy,* and *Public Opinion and Public Policy*. Naturally, the quality of work on policy varies greatly. The perspectives and interests of any two social scientists with an avowed policy orientation may be radically different. Fuzzy concepts, irrelevant data, insufficient data, and detailed treatments of boring questions abound. But so do stimulating and fruitful analyses. It seems clear that the rediscovery that politics is, after all, principally about outputs, outcomes, authoritative allocation of values—in short, policy—has produced exhilaration among some of our colleagues. Exhilaration, of course, does not always produce insight but, to state a proposition: the more the exhilaration the greater the chances of insight.

It is most productive to attack the task of commenting on *Public Policymaking Reexamined* and *Political Science and Public Policy* by placing them in the context of the "lessons" they teach about the fruitful study of policy. These lessons come from both the strengths and weaknesses of the books.

Lesson #1

Since "policy" is not a self-explanatory term it needs some clear conceptual discussion. The scope of "policy studies" also requires considerable attention, because it does not define itself. At minimum, distinctions have to be drawn between the study of policy decisions, policy processes, policy statements, policy inputs, policy outputs, policy outcomes, and perhaps, policy arenas or issue-areas. In addition, some distinction needs to be made between policy description, which involves the chronicling of alternatives; policy prescription, which involves the advocacy of alternatives; policy analysis, which involves advice on the choosing of alternatives; and policy theory, which involves the explanation of why certain alternatives are chosen and others are not.

There are useful conceptual formulations scattered throughout these volumes. Austin Ranney's essay in the volume he edited is the best. In a few pages he clearly details the component parts of a "public policy," and distinguishes between policy content, policy process, and policy outcome. Robert Salisbury's essay in the same volume does a particularly useful job of distinguishing between three positions on the meaning of policy (pp. 152–153).

James Rosenau, again in the Ranney volume, argues that the term "policy" is so vague, or at least has been made so by the meanderings of political scientists, that it is not really useful. At least in the foreign policy area he proposes the use of a different concept—the "undertaking"—in order to counter traditional murkiness. The core of this interesting argument follows (p. 222): "An undertaking is conceived to be a course of action that the duly constituted officials of a national society pursue in order to preserve or alter a situation in the international system in such a way that it is consistent with a goal or goals decided upon by them or their predecessors . . . [U]ndertakings, unlike policies and decisions, encompass goals and their implementation. Their distinctive quality is that they focus on what government does, not on how it decides to do it or on what it commits itself to do."

In order to explore all of the important connections between policy and society the scope of political science analysis focusing on public policy has to include inputs, outputs, outcomes, and arenas or issue-areas as well as statements, decisions, and processes. The last three categories are much narrower and more restricted than the first four. By focusing exclusively on statements, decisions, and processes their impact is never known. This is akin to knowing all about the workings of an internal combustion engine without being aware that it can be used to drive an automobile or that an automobile if properly powered is more likely to bring greater pleasure and safety than one that is either overpowered or underpowered.

The Dror book is essentially an elaborate investigation of process alone. His conceptual apparatus is generally clear, but it is not very useful in understanding anything about policy. As the title of his book makes clear, Dror is interested in "policymaking." His definition of "policy" is extremely limited and limiting: "public policy, in most cases, is primarily directed at government organs, and only intermediately or secondarily at other actors." (p. 15). He divorces the assessment of the "quality" of public policymaking from the "output" of policymaking. What he is concerned with is the process itself and whether, on the basis of a number of specific criteria, it is satisfactory. Output usually cannot be known and so the quality of the process is all that can be judged. This leads him to such conclusions as: "Compared with the past, public policymaking in all modern states is continually improving." (p. 101). The divorce of quality of process from quality of output and outcome leads to distorted results. If the quality of the process in the Pentagon rises, does it make any difference if the inhabitants thereof reach decisions that incinerate all of us? If the Departments of Housing and Urban Development and Health, Education, and Welfare evolve high quality procedures and yet the ghettos continue to disintegrate is this really good policymaking?

Dror properly asserts that "the significant output on which evaluation must focus is . . . its substantive effect on some real social situation." (p. 36). But he quickly concludes that such substantive effect cannot really be evaluated and so he turns his attention to evaluating process patterns, structural elements, inputs, and limited aspects of outputs—"nominal output" (that is, decisions as stated by the decision-makers), feasibility, and probable real output (a guess about what might happen).

Dror's efforts are useful is reminding us that the "process box" is still important in the study of policy. Their utility is highly limited, however, because he refuses to move outside the process box in any significant way.

Vernon Van Dyke, in his well argued essay in the Ranney book, summarizes an attractive line of argument about the scope of "policy studies":

> I have no criticism of the stress on process or of the accepted limits within which process is studied. The question is whether political scientists should not take a broader view of their tasks where policies are concerned—and I mean policies designed to have effects outside the governmental system itself as opposed to policies related to the governmental process. I believe that they should; not that every political scientist should accept a policy orientation for himself, but that the proportion of those who do should increase and that everyone should regard a policy orientation as legitimate and proper.
>
> The basis for the view is the proposition that our concern should be the promotion of human welfare. . . .
>
> Our concern should also be with the development of general knowledge, with theory, with science, but this proposition should not supersede the earlier one. It states an instrumental value, not the goal value. (pp. 36–37).

Lesson #2

Despite my approving quotation of Van Dyke, I think that in general it is not productive to worry endlessly over the "proper" role of the political scientist in relation to policy. These volumes are filled with numerous, and varying, self-conscious statements about the details of the political scientist's commitment to policy studies. Surely, broad statements, such as the one just quoted from Van Dyke, are useful. Hopefully, all political scientists could agree to the stipulation that ignorance of policy issues is no longer necessary (as it once was widely, although not universally, assumed to be) in order to maintain "scientific" purity. Indeed, I hope that the converse would now be acceptable to most political scientists: ignorance of policy issues is likely to impede scientific progress in the discipline. The essay by Lucian Pye in the Ranney book argues both propositions convincingly.

But beyond these general kinds of statements, detailed agonizing leads to more confusion than clarification. Lincoln Bloomfield's attempt (in the Ranney book) to dichotomize the world of scholarship and the world of policy serves as an example. At this stage in the development of the discipline I think it is more useful to judge a series of individual relationships between scholarship and policy than to detail a set of rigid boundaries beyond which the political scientist may not stray. Salisbury's call for "critical pluralism" (p. 156) at this stage in the development of policy studies is persuasive to me.

Lesson #3

In some work, policy should be treated as an independent variable; in other work, the customary treatment of policy as a dependent variable may make more sense. Three essays in the Ranney volume (those by Salisbury, Rosenau, and Lewis Froman) argue for the utility of treating policy as an independent variable. Salisbury, for example, builds an extension of an earlier scheme proposed by Theodore Lowi for categorizing policies and predicting structural and even environmental variables by the initial act of categorization. Froman discusses a number of alternative schemes with his customary brevity and clarity. Rosenau stresses the utility of this approach in the foreign policy arena.

Another essay in the Ranney volume, by James Davis and Kenneth Dolbeare, does more than theorize about the utility of viewing policy as an independent variable; it actually reports some empirical work on draft policy in which the payoff can be seen. The authors explore the consequences of present policy and the likely consequences of alternatives. This is analytically sound and also allows them to make recommendations on how best to reach certain explicit and implicit values at which the present system presumably aims but cannot achieve.

Lesson #4

There is a particular necessity for the development and use of a "scientific consciousness" in studying policy. This includes, crucially, a belief that knowledge is cumulative. The phrase in quotation marks comes from the Rosenau essay, as does the explanation of its meaning: "Stated most succinctly, a scientific consciousness involves an automatic tendency to ask, 'Of what larger pattern is this behavior an instance?'" (p. 204). It involves the framing of questions in the form of hypotheses and a conscious use of different kinds of variables, the arrangement of which can be altered for purposes of both generating and answering interesting questions. Rosenau says that with only a few exceptions all of the literature on foreign policy lacks this consciousness.

Ideally, the scientific consciousness will appear full grown in work that considers the broad sweep of policy. But, in most instances, it is likely to emerge in bits and pieces. Rosenau complains of the highly limited utility of case studies in the foreign policy area and concludes that virtually none of them have been written by authors with a scientific consciousness. But perhaps there is hope even for the case study.

Lesson #5

Description and prescription are both legitimate enterprises in the study of policy. The prescription can be of specific values or purely instrumental, in which case any values will do. There are dangers in the prescriptive endeavor but there is also much to be gained.

Dror illustrates the dangers. He limits his models to the "instrumentally normative." "They do not state what the substantive values of a system should be, but instead show methods for increasing net output, whatever the values prescribing that output may be." He says that net real output cannot really be measured or known very often and, therefore, he is likely to have considerable trouble knowing if his normative suggestions really work. Thus he seems to be prescribing for government policy makers and is likely to be content if his suggestions are adopted and result in more activity that can be judged by his "secondary criteria" mentioned before, but almost never by his "primary criterion" of net output. He prescribes to attain "quality," and he says "quality is analytically and conceptually the same as the idea of net output" (p. 33). But "net output" can almost never be used in evaluating the policy process. In short, 1) quality must be prescribed, 2) quality equals net output, 3) net output (quality) can almost never be evaluated. He has no way to evaluate the results of his prescriptions. This undoubtedly gives him free rein in prescribing!

Within this unique framework Dror makes some prescriptive statements that are interesting: for example, "One very interesting feature of an optimal policymaking structure is that it should be rather redundant: the contributions to the various phases should duplicate and overlap each other." (p. 211). It is too bad that his own logic prevents a testing of the value of such a prescription. Many of Dror's recommendations lack freshness or interest, however. For example, he tells us that "High-quality manpower should be drawn into the public service." (p. 253) and "Optimal public policymaking requires senior civil servants who have a great deal of knowledge and skills needed for policymaking." (p. 255).

The Davis and Dolbeare essay best illustrates the benefits of prescription. Their careful discussion of the conditions under which prescription should be offered deserves careful attention. For example, they specify three ways in which a social scientist might choose among policy alternatives: "First, he might frankly declare what values he considers appropriate, and seek to defend their propriety in some way. . . . Second, he might assume various possible values alternatively, in effect leaving the final choice to others. . . . Third, he might so assiduously develop data and refine interpretations of causes and effects in the areas of his peculiar strength (conditions, means, by-products) that the range of value choices would be drastically narrowed and so sharply focused that recommendation would involve a minimum of value preference." (pp. 115–116). They take the third option themselves in prescribing in the military manpower field.

The whole policy area is only now starting to be mapped out by political scientists. It seems to me that we have here a unique opportunity to demonstrate our belief that knowledge really is cumulative. I hope that the development of policy studies does not repeat the intellectual history of some other portions of the discipline, in which every new author starts out with his own theory, many elements of which cannot be tested by his own empirical work and will probably never be tested by the empirical work of anyone else either. Thus, I hope that what is valuable in these two books will not be read, reviewed, and forgotten but will instead appear as integral parts of future work.

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Political Order in Changing Societies. BY SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. Pp. 448. $12.50.)

In this new, and provocative set of essays, Mr. Huntington focuses attention on the phenomenon of political stability and on the factors that shape a stable political condition. He suggests that the degree of political order is regulated in large part by the relationship between the rate of institutional and organizational formation within the political system and the rate of social mobilization. He writes: "Just as economic development depends, in some measure, on the relation between investment and consumption, political order depends in part on the relation between the development of political institutions and the mobilization of new social forces into politics." (p. vii) It is this framework of analysis that serves to tie together the seven long essays making up this book.

Mr. Huntington's central thesis is, of course, well known to all who are acquainted with the literature of political development. In essence it argues that development and the resultant political order are obtained when institutional and organizational growth are *compatible* with the rate of social mobilization, the generation of new "social forces" and the resultant political participation. When the rate of social mobilization greatly surpasses the rate of institutional formation for a substantial period of time, the political system will not be able to cope with demands made upon it and "political decay" will set in. It is undesirable, therefore, that the rate of social mobilization exceed the rate of institutional formation, but on the other hand, it is equally important that it not lag far behind, for if it does modernization may well slow down and stop.

This framework is then used in Huntington's well known comparison of American and Western European political development. The author notes that compared to patterns in the political history of Western Europe, in the United States national political institutions were weaker and political participation grew larger, earlier. As a consequence, Huntington concludes that the United States has been less politically developed throughout its growth than the Western European countries have been at corresponding points. Our political system, Mr. Huntington suggests, has strong elements of a Tudor polity, brought here by Englishmen at the very time when their compatriots back home were getting ready to abandon that system.

In the rest of the volume Mr. Huntington is preoccupied mainly with two sets of problems. One set deals with situations where social mobilization overruns the institutional framework and the other set deals with situations where the institutional framework provides a high degree of resistance of the process of mobilization and the expansion of political participation. The first set of problems is treated in two essays: 1) An essay on revolution "the extreme case of the explosion of political participation," and 2) an essay examining the behavior of political systems operating with weak political institutions and organizations. In the latter, new groups mobilized by socio-economic change, struggle in the political arena, totally untamed by organizational and institutional constraints.

Two other chapters examine the difficulties in making a strong institutional framework give way to the new social forces created by social and economic modernization. The author explains in most interesting fashion the vicious cycle faced by absolute monarchs in traditional polities where the weak modernization that takes place has been paralleled by a concentration of political power in the hands of the monarchy, but where that very concentration makes it difficult for modernization to continue. This fascinating problem of the political "take off" has been the subject of a good deal of attention by other scholars concerned with political development and their findings also support Mr. Huntington's observations. The other piece deals with the problem of reformers maneuvering between strong existing institutional resistance to any change and the demand for change by the new social forces.

This book concludes with a chapter dealing with political parties. The author argues that parties are the key political institutions in political development for it is they that primarily carry out the function of mobilization and organization and keep each one at the proper developmental distance from the other. It is this triple function that, for Huntington, embodies the very essence of political development.

The reader will find in this volume many new insights, hypotheses and typologies. The best in this volume are chapters 1 and 3 where Mr. Huntington develops the theoretical framework for the study of development and order and explores the difficulties in getting to self sustaining political growth in traditional polities.

As with any other major volume, one can find a number of petty annoyances and some more serious complaints. The chapters are too long. (The first is an exhausting 92 pages). There is no bibliography. Some readers will be disappointed by the fact that Mr. Huntington telegraphed his punch by publishing three of the seven chapters long before his book appeared. (One of the three, "Political Order and Political Decay," now has been substantially changed with new ideas and new data.) The author has not included a treatment of bureaucracy as a major institution of modernization and this is to be regretted, for such a treatment would have complemented the treatment of the political party. For if parties mobilize and organize men, bureaucracies mobilize and organize non human resources as well. While mobilization affected by parties is massive and undifferentiated, bureaucracies mobilize selectively and rationally. The different functions suggest why before social mobilization begins in earnest it is bureaucracies that are preeminent, while it is parties that become central during modernization and why with modernity bureaucracies return to the center of the stage managing both human and non human resources.

I should conclude with brief comments on the concepts of political development and political decay that Mr. Huntington has advanced in his previous work and in this book. In general I suggest that the theoretical model of political development advanced by Mr. Huntington is most useful in those cases where social mobilization is massive and non selective and the demand for participation is intense. It is much less useful when social mobilization has barely begun, or has not begun at all, for it seems absurd to talk of backward countries as developed because nothing is stirring and the political system is not under pressure it cannot handle. For these and for many other classes of cases, different conceptions of development seem to be needed.

My comment on the concept of political decay is necessarily equally brief. The crumbling of political institutions under pressure of new groups seeking to storm a political system is more than likely to create disorder. But disorder —even of the kind erosive of existing political institutions—may not always be an indicator of decay. The destruction of a political system gives a greater choice in the development of new institutions, and if these institutions are in fact developed it is questionable whether one ought to describe what has happened as decay. In other words whether "decay" takes place rests in part on whether the beginnings of new institutions can be identified. One suspects that the concept of "decay," at least in a small part, is a function of time.

One must certainly acknowledge Mr. Huntington's contribution. His concepts of political development represented—I think there is general agreement on this—a step forward on previous attempts to define the phenomena of modernization. And his concept of political decay at the least began to close a gap in the literature on development. Both concepts have been widely used. This pioneering volume, examining as it does the relation between development and stability, is an interesting and exciting addition to the literature. The interesting framework, the current urgency of the problem of order in countries at all levels of modernity, the fundamental nature of phenomena examined as well as the forthright argument, ought to attract to this new volume the thoughtful attention of political scientists and of that much larger audience concerned with the creation of political environments responsive to massively and rapidly changing needs.

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The Impact of Negro Voting: The Role of the Vote in the Quest for Equality. BY WILLIAM R. KEECH. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968. Pp. 113. $3.95.)

Americans tend to have an almost religious faith in the efficacy of voting. From colonial demands for "no taxation without representation" to the Progressive stress on direct democracy, the ballot has been seen as the basic means for the removal of social ills. Today, as black Americans demand fulfillment of the promise of equality, voting is again emphasized. As President Johnson asserted in signing the 1965 Voting Rights Act, "the vote is the most powerful instrument ever devised by man for breaking down injustice and destroying the terrible walls that imprison men because they are different from other men."

William Keech, of the University of North Carolina, is skeptical of these unquestioned assertions. In this literate and carefully constructed study, he analyzes the real impact of the black vote in two communities, Durham, North Carolina and Tuskeegee, Alabama. Negroes began to register and vote in Durham in sizable numbers more than thiry years ago, and now constitute at least a fourth of the city electorate. Growth in the Negro electorate of Tuskegee began later, about the end of the second world war, but eventually led to a black majority on the voting rolls. In both communities, therefore, we can see the impact of a large body of voters and make temporal comparisons. Moreover, in both communities unusually favorable conditions existed for the exercise of political influence. The Negro population was relatively well-educated, potential leaders had independent economic bases, and efficient political organizations were able to deliver a solid black vote. Durham and Tuskeegee thus provide crucial tests of the impact of a large black electorate under relatively auspicious circumstances.

Keech uses longitudinal comparisons, simple quantitative data, and detailed examination of policy outputs to answer the questions, "What impact does voting have on Negro social and economic status? What concrete advantages result? Does the vote have an influence over the distribution of advantages that is separate from the influence of those social, economic and political factors that are associated with Negroes getting the vote in the first place?" No formal causal modeling is attempted, since there are only two cases at hand.

Following Matthews and Prothro, Keech sees considerable limits on the efficacy of the vote. He concludes, "The vote is a far more potent instrument for achieving legal justice than social justice. The gains I have found to be most susceptible to Negro voting have consistently been those which most clearly involved fair and just administration of existing laws. Social justice, however, demands more than this. It often demands changes in existing law. . . . If social justice demands the eradication of the effects of past discrimination, the vote is even less useful." (p. 106–7).

The specific findings show great variability in the effect of the vote. In Tuskeegee, little change in the status of blacks occurred even when they constituted 35–45% of the electorate. Only after the Supreme Court invalidated an outrageous gerrymander and Negroes became a voting majority were public policies affected. The effect then was considerable and dramatic, but the vote failed to protect the interests of a large and oppressed minority. As Keech wryly concludes, "Saying that votes bring fair treatment of Negroes in Tuskeegee is different only in degree from saying votes bring fair treatment of Jews in Tel Aviv." (p. 94). In Durham, changes attributable to the ballot do occur, but other improvements in the position of blacks are attributed to non-electoral methods, such as litigation, street demonstrations, sit-ins, boycotts, and federal intervention.

The black vote is found important in these instances: the election of city officials, the passage or defeat of local bond issues, cessation of police brutality, equal treatment in the courts, school construction, provision of public services such as fire protection, recreation and urban renewal, and appointments to public offices. (In Tuskeegee, these influences are found only after Negroes became a voting majority.) Electoral power is found to be of little or uncertain importance in code enforcement, street paving, garbage collection, welfare payments, unemployment compensation, compensatory policies to remove the effects of past discrimination and, most vitally, integration of schools and public facilities. In the integration of public accommodations, the vote is found important in the later period in Tuskeegee, but of secondary importance in Durham.

In reacting to democratic myths of the omnipotence of the vote, Keech may have overstated his case. In doubtful instances, his tendency is to minimize the effect of voting power. The ballot has not brought full equality to America, but the gains secured in Tuskeegee and Durham, as specified above, are substantively as well as symbolically important. The value of the vote can be best gauged by imagining how few of these gains would have been realized without the ballot. Only through the democratic force of numbers could blacks balance the advantages secured to whites by economic and social power. While full equality has not been achieved, the incremental changes attributable to voting have been in that direction.

Seeking to show the power of the vote in these particular circumstances, moreover, is an unusual severe test. The governmental authority of municipalities is severely limited, and cannot be affected in many cases by any voting group, white or black. Concentrating on the local level also slights the effect of the vote on the national government. Thus, federal intervention may have been crucial in securing nondiscrimination in public accommodations, but surely one reason for this intervention was the pressure of integrationist votes directed through the national civil rights movement. Furthermore, there are unusual limits to the power of black votes represented by their visibility, the intensity of white resistance, and the historical depth of the American racial problem. Keech does acknowledge these points briefly, but he does not fully qualify his generalizations of the importance of the vote accordingly.

We must also recognize that the value of the vote is partially intangible, and cannot be completely found by assessment of specific policy outputs. Thus, methods such as street demonstrations gain potency partially because they are supported by potential electoral power. Another value of the vote is negative—it provides a means of defense and protection for groups. While it may not secure direct benefits, it can lead elites to refrain from imposing disadvantages. Acting under a rule of anticipated reactions, officials may regulate their own conduct even without specific demands by the enfranchised.

Keech's work remains a well-designed study, in which theory and data usefully interact. It provides a solid model for the teaching of social science method, and yields important empirical conclusions. In our present period of ideological research, it is a fine example of compassionate but objective scholarship.

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Gulliver's Troubles, Or the Setting of American Foreign Policy. By Stanley Hoffmann. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968. Pp. 556. $11.95.)

In this large and ambitious book, Hoffmann attempts the conceptual integration of the external and internal restraints that impinge on American foreign policy. The study is concerned with American national purposes and with establishing "what the United States can or cannot do, given the kind of nation it is, in the kind of world we have. Purposes that go against the grain of a nation's deepest beliefs or habits, or against the grain of the world in which it is trying to fulfill such purposes, are not sound. Power at a nation's disposal ought to be used in full awareness of the external conditions that define which uses are productive and which are not, as well as of the domestic predispositions and institutions that channel national energies in certain directions or inhibit the country from applying them in other ways" (p. xiii).

In the first part of the book, Hoffmann examines the "grain of the world:" the contemporary international system is characterized by revolutionary dynamism, qualified or muted bipolarity, heterogeneous membership, and ideological clashes—making for an overall milieu which "is likely to be immoderate in ends and means" (p. 19). Hoffmann distinguishes between three related levels of the system, each of which exhibits different structural attributes. Most fundamentally, the system is bipolar in terms of the nuclear destruction the superpowers can unleash, but the very restraints imposed by the nuclear stalemate have given the nation-state a new lease on life and have allowed, on a second systemic level, the emergence of political polycentrism. Polycentrism, in turn, has encouraged the trend toward nuclear proliferation which lends a multipolar attribute to the third systemic level.

The peculiar national disabilities that make it so difficult for the United States to operate effectively in this system are treated in Parts II and III, which examine American national style and American institutions. The complexities that result from the intricate interdependence of the three layers of the contemporary international system would tax the skill, patience, and imagination of any nation. They are especially challenging to the United States because of a debilitating set of attitudes which stem from the American national style (a function of America's past and principles) and American governmental institutions. The major institutional problem is the dispersal of power among, as well as within, the elements of the governmental structure and bureaucracy. Deficiencies of foreign policy style are reflected in legalism, reliance on formulas, short-range planning, an engineering type of pragmatism, excessive optimism, a black-and-white image of the world, the conflict between quietism and activism and between the instinct of violence and the drive for harmony, and many other afflictions.

Bleak as this picture may be, we need not despair. American disabilities have worked well in the past—"the American style was admirably suited to the late 1940s and early 1950s" (p. 212)—and can be made to work again in the future. What kind of future international milieu to expect, and what role the United States should properly play in it, are the subject matter of Part IV, the concluding section of the book. Essentially, Hoffmann calls for a more modest American involvement in Europe ("a certain withdrawal") which would allow the emergence of a "European Europe," integrated along confederal lines and protected by a Franco-British nuclear umbrella under American and Soviet guarantee. The program is very similar to the Gaullist blueprint for Europe, purged of its most blatant nationalistic overtones. Aside from furthering the establishment of a harmonious Europe, a curtailment of the American role in Europe would have the additional advantage of freeing American resources for more urgent containment projects, such as the restraint of China. (Hoffmann believes, for example, that the primary question facing NATO today is "whether its members can agree on a policy in the 'new' area of potential hot war, i.e., with China" (p. 461)). Hoffmann is critical of the over-reliance on military instruments of containment, but considers it "essential that the United States continue to resist the challenges of its enemies whenever they try to reap gains by using or threatening to use force across national borders; otherwise, revolutionary ideologies will have little incentive to become at least externally moderate" (p. 360). Hoffmann does not say how (or why) the ingrained deficiencies of American statecraft would qualify the United States for this global task.

There are many interesting and provocative insights in this book, and Hoffmann generally succeeds in portraying the complex interrelationships of world politics, especially in his fine discussion of the contemporary system in Chapter II. Yet the reader is left with a profound feeling of dissatisfaction and exasperation. Hoffmann tells us that his "own interests go in the direction of theory (in the rather loose and modest sense of a network of questions about the principal features of international relations, a systematic effort to understand its determinants and logic) rather than in the direction of policy," and that "one should not expect an apple tree to produce cherries—one should judge it by the quality of its apples" (p. xix). But aside from sketching systemic relationships on three levels Hoffmann provides little theory, even in a loose and modest sense, and instead we get a long discourse about the direction in which American policy should proceed. Hoffmann introduces only two major theoretical concepts—the distinction between moderate and revolutionary international systems and that between "possession" and "milieu" goals—and neither contributes substantially to the subsequent policy discussion. When it comes to a "systematic understanding of determinants" of the international system, which presumably requires a comprehensive discussion of basic factors, Hoffmann tells us with disarming modesty that although he is "interested in economic affairs" he is "quite incapable of making any worthwhile contribution in that domain—hence my decision to leave it out altogether" (p. xix). Hoffmann has a similar aversion to strategic-military matters, which receive only scant attention. This aversion is apparently based on Hoffmann's strong objections to "foreign-policy planning which suffers from that disease—extrapolation from the military or economic areas—[which] leads to overconcentration on discrete sectors or to elaboration of strategic doctrines reflecting a strangely bloodless universe" (p. 320). But the intrinsic importance to the analyst of military and economic matters is in no way diminished by objectionable thought processes they may have inspired. By ignoring specific economic and military-strategic relationships of the international system, it is Hoffmann's analytical universe which becomes "strangely bloodless" and overly cerebral.

One of the major flaws of the book stems from Hoffmann's vacillation over what analytical principles he should bring to bear on the subject matter. One would think that, for purposes of theory as well as practice, the analyst should aim for balanced judgments. Hoffmann, commenting on his criticisms of American foreign policy, makes it plain that this is not his intention: "to borrow a nice metaphor from André Gide, I was concerned with the lion's fleas, not with denying that there is a lion under the fleas" (p. 212). There is nothing wrong, of course, with a critically slanted, imaginative assessment of American foreign policy. But problems develop when an admittedly distorted and highly impressionistic portrayal is subsequently incorporated in an analytical framework whose implicit appeal is to standards of objectivity and plausibility. A portrayal which sees only warts may be appropriate for a critical tract, but it is not very helpful for theorists or policy analysts who presumably strive for a more realistic presentation of features. Hoffmann, who wants to be analyst and theorist as well as critic, does not fully appreciate and guard against the tensions between the intellectual attitudes that these different roles seem to engender. The result is a methodological potpourri. The three large narrative building blocks of the study—the discussion of the international system, of America's stylistic and institutional shortcomings, and of policy proposals—are so dissimilar in methodological assumptions and criteria for evaluation, that they resist conceptual integration and indicate the analyst's loss of control over his material. (This methodological imbalance is underlined by Hoffmann's disconcerting habit of either making the most sweeping assertions, as in his discussion of American national style, or hedging any analytical judgment with the most involuted qualifications, at times to the point of evasiveness.)

This jarring structural defect is the more unfortunate because the book, failing in its task of analytical integration, has not much else to offer. There is little new historical material or historical interpretation, the long list of alleged American disabilities is familiar even to undergraduates from their texts, and the policy proposals are of questionable value and appeal. Especially annoying is the methodological legerdemain with which Hoffmann handles the concept of national style. Understandably, he disavows the notion of national character since it "has turned out to be of dubious validity" (p. 87), and he enumerates the similar objections that can be raised against the notion of national style, even though he proceeds to ignore them. (Here, as in several other instances, Hoffmann seems to believe that merely acknowledging conceptual difficulties will make them go away). Despite his protestations, Hoffmann's analytical method is in no way different from the highly impressionistic, organismic, and reified views of society that are typical of traditional national character studies. Since Hoffmann is primarily concerned with socio-psychological and intellectual shortcomings of American foreign policy, the 300-page discussion of American style and institutions skips along on the surface and never reaches into what Hoffmann calls the "blood and nerves of politics." The result is a strangely ethereal, almost dainty, view of the political process. Offering no linkage between socio-cultural abstractions and foreign-policy-making, Hoffmann seeks to reassure the reader by saying that "when we speak of 'America' in sweeping terms fit to infuriate social psychologists, we shall be using a short cut; we shall be talking about the beliefs, attitudes, and acts of those Americans who are responsible for and concerned with the nation's foreign affairs" (p. 89). But Hoffmann does not analyze decision-makers or opinion-makers in terms of American national shortcomings, and we are left guessing whether Dean Acheson is guilty of excessive optimism, whether Senator Fulbright entertains a black-and-white vision of the world, whether Curtis LeMay holds a utilitarian faith in rationality and harmony, or whether Adlai Stevenson felt a conflict between his instinct for violence and the drive for harmony.

Finally, the book is much too long. It may be that Hoffmann, freed from the discipline imposed by the essay, his usual format of writing, was tempted into a long excursion whose point of destination and avenues of approach were insufficiently charted. Those of us who like his essays will join in wishing him a speedy return home.

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Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Years. BY JAMES L. SUNDQUIST (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1968. Pp. 560. $8.75.)

Speaking of the assassination of John Kennedy and the first three years of the Johnson Administration, James L. Sundquist asks the question: "Is the American system of government so constructed that it must depend upon tragedy and political happenstance to render it capable of responding decisively to the nation's problems?" The originality and care with which Sundquist pursues this problem make his study a significant contribution to the growing literature on policy-making in the United States. Indeed, it is fair to say that his effort to raise and research important policy questions make his book indispensable reading for anyone concerned with American national government.

Politics and Policy is two books in one. Part I of the book consists of case studies of six central domestic policy arenas during the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson years. Separate chapters are devoted to fiscal and structural measures for dealing with the problems of unemployment, poverty, education, civil rights, medicare and the outdoor environment. In Part II the author analyzes the political institutions and processes which explain how these policy innovations originated, got stalled, compromised and, finally, enacted.

The case studies are good narrative accounts of the obstacles facing new federal programs and, like most case studies, their primary value is the exposition of the nuances of the decision-making process in Washington. Sundquist tells the story well, even though the plot is a little worn, and there is a great deal here for the beginning student of government. The chapters on unemployment, poverty and medicare are especially useful in this regard.

What distinguishes this book as an important one for political scientists is the author's attempt to analyze the 1953-1967 period as one in which Democratic activists, largely stymied in Congress, developed policy positions which: (a) differentiated the Democratic party clearly from the Republicans; (b) found wide approval among the general public; (c) received a mandate for enactment in the elections of the 1960's; and (d) were enacted by the majority party under the leadership of Kennedy and Johnson. Addressing himself to the responsible parties debate, the author describes his major thesis: "As it happened, the Democratic party in the 1950's and 1960's did exactly those things the Schattschneider committee said should be done and Herring said could not be expected. It *did* develop a program to which it committed itself—and which it put into effect after winning office." (p. 391)

Sundquist has little difficulty showing that in the 1950's the engine of change for national policy centered in and around Democratic activists on Capitol Hill. Activist Democrats, their interest group allies, the Democratic National Committee and the Democratic Advisory Council formed a policy-oriented subsystem which was at odds with the Eisenhower Administration (as well as, many times, the Democratic leadership of Congress), which did organize policy alternatives, and which did come into its own in the 1960's. Yet the question remains, Was there a direct link between the activity of Democratic party elites, an issue-oriented electorate, and the policy outputs of the mid-1960's?

Relying on public opinion polls and electoral data, Sandquist tries to demonstrate that there was. Concurring with Key's argument in *The Responsible Electorate* that, among those voters who switch parties from election to election, policy attitudes count, he "attempts to go a step further to determine *which policy or program issues are most influential and to assign relative weights to them.*" (p. 435, italics added.) This is a tall order, and he is only partially successful in completing it. But even partial success on a venture this bold is worth careful consideration.

To show that the issues he examines in Part I made a difference in the electoral process, Sundquist devised an "index of relative pulling power" based upon party switchers in congressional elections. For example, among those who voted for Eisenhower in 1952 but wanted the Democrats to win their states's congressional seats in 1954, there were more defectors among those who saw unemployment as the most important problem facing the country than among those who stressed other problems. In this example the index shows an advantage to the Democrats (whose position on the issue was more popular) of 1.3 percent. Similar calculations are made for the other issues.

Given the relatively small differences in the percentages used, given the problem of sampling error, and given the recognized difficulty of controlling for the effects of party and SES variables this effort is not likely to go unchallenged by political scientists. The author, who is well aware of the problems but discounts them, indicates as much when he concludes that the 1954 Democratic gain from the unemployment issue "may have been something less than 1.3 percent but it was surely something more than zero." (p. 439.) Still, at the margins of the electorate and among switchers it is probably true that issues do count heavily, and Sandquist has made an interesting attempt to tell us how much.

The author is on firmer ground when he shows that the Democratic activists were far more successful in proposing popular domestic policies than were the Republicans with their anti-spending, anti-inflation appeals. Regardless of the mandate content of any particular election, Democratic activists led by Kennedy were committed to certain kinds of action in the early 1960's and they could point to broad public support for their objectives. Congress, of course, was a stumbling block, but Sundquist correctly notes that a great deal of legislation was either passed or about to pass before the 89th Congress completed the job. What is truly remarkable is not that 295 Democrats in the 89th Congress passed a lot of bills but that so much was passed in 1963-1964. The 88th and 89th congresses together marked the end of one period in domestic policy-making, and the author's account of this is the best one to date.

Throughout this book Sundquist draws heavily on his experience as an activist staff man on Capitol Hill and in the executive branch. He offers new insights into the policy-making process in Congress and the executive, he has a perceptive discussion of the "dual legislative process" which occurs first in the executive and then in Congress, and he avoids the trap of exaggerating the static or deadlocked features of the national policy-making process. Indeed, if anything he is more sanguine about change than most students of national politics.

Politics and Policy is much more than the armchair reflections of a former activist. It is an attempt to describe, analyze and evaluate the national policy-making process, including parties and the electorate. Except for an occasional tendency to accept the rationalizations of activist politicians at face value (e.g. Adlai Stevenson's claim that policy alternatives can only be made clear in Congress between presidential elections, p. 406), the author's analysis is firmly grounded on empirical data. Students of public policy may fault his stress on policy initiation and process to the neglect of assessing the impact of those policies on the intended beneficiaries, but for an over-view of the process few books can compare with this one.

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The United Nations Force in Cyprus. By JAMES A. STEGENGA. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 1968. Pp. 227. $6.25.)

Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government. By STANLEY KYRIAKIDES. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968. Pp. 212. $6.50.)

Between 1954–58, the United Nations was unable to adopt any resolution dealing with the substance of the Cyprus question. Then, in 1964, the UN Security Council suddenly became involved in Cyprus by recommending the dispatch to the island of a peace-keeping force on a voluntary basis for the organization's members. The two books reviewed deal, respectively, with the stimulus for this Security Council action and the organization's response to the stimulus. Both are based on the assumption that past conflicts between Greeks and Turks, not past instances of their peaceful cohabitation—for instance during the Balkan wars and World War I—render well-nigh impossible any future cooperation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the island. Thus, implicitly or explicitly, they are pessimistic about the prospects of conciliation and a future settlement, incidentally bolstering the Turkish and British viewpoint on the Cyprus problem.

To start from the UN's positive response to the Cyprus question rather than from the stimulus of the Cyprus crisis of 1963. Mr. Stegenga's monograph, as Inis Claude observes in his foreword to it, is "as timely as a piece of research as one could wish," and a "first-rate case study." After a cursory introductory chapter about the background of the Cyprus question. Mr. Stegenga, by a careful perusal of primary published sources and judicious use of secondary materials analyses within the international context the establishment of UNFICYP, the third peace-keeping force the United Nations ever set up, as well as this force's operation. In his assessment of this peace-keeping force, he is careful to state that his appraisal is necessarily tentative, since the Cyprus question is still in flux. After speculating about possible alternatives to this action and asserting that this UN peace-keeping experiment should alert the world's statesmen "to this novel technique of abusing the world body" (with President Makarios being regarded as guilty of this alleged abuse) he tries to assess this force in terms of operational efficiency and of effectiveness. In terms of efficiency, he rates UNFICYP as excellent, but in terms of effectiveness, his verdict is judiciously mixed, yet leaning to the favorable. On the one hand, he holds that this force contributed to bringing about a truce; to reducing killing and violence; to restoring law and order, and a large measure of normal economic and social conditions throughout most of the island; and to relieving the British forces on the island which were ostensibly seeking to perform a peace-keeping function. Together with the United States pressure on Turkey, this force also helped avert a grave threat to Mediterranean and international peace.

On the other hand, Mr. Stegenga points out that UNFICYP is merely a holding operation, not an instrument for bringing about a settlement—with this latter function to be performed by mediator provided for in the relevant Security Council resolution which set up UNFICYP. By its very existence, this peace-keeping force is thus vulnerable to the charge that it may well be inhibiting a settlement "by helping to protect and consolidate an abnormal *status quo* and by reducing the sense of urgency on both sides." (p. 186).

Speculating in conclusion on the likely character of possible future UN peace-keeping forces, he believes that such forces "will be more similar to UNFICYP than to UNEF. . . ." For in a world in which internally significant outbreaks of violence will continue, the future peace-keeping forces are more likely to be law-and-order forces rather that border-patrol or barrier forces, such as UNEF.

An inexplicable omission from this otherwise excellent study is the lack of any analysis of the important status of forces agreement between the United Nations and the Republic of Cyprus, the host state, thanks to which this UN presence on the island became possible. And a tendency already alluded to—to blame President Makarios for the constitutional crisis that led to the international Cyprus crisis of 1963—mars, in this reviewer's opinion, this otherwise objective study, which maintains that the Cyprus Constitution of 1960 was quite unwieldy. Neither Mr. Stegenga nor Mr. Kyriakides for that matter, refers to the fact that, before President Markarios publicitly presented in 1963 his thirteen points for a revision of the Cyprus Constitution, he consulted the British High Commissioner in Nicosia, the late Sir Arthur Clark, whose attitude encouraged the President publicly to put forward these points, triggering an almost instant Turkish government negative response, even before Turkish Cypriot leaders had registered their own views on these proposals. Perfidious Albion, said some. Others perceived in this inconsistency, a conflict of views between the Colonial and the Foreign Office. Finally, a reading of the speeches in general debate of the Greek representatives to the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth General Assemblies would have revealed that the Greek party to the dispute, in contrast to the Turkish party, already since 1956 had shown a special interest in the establishment of UN peace-keeping forces in general, having in mind contingencies of Turkish coercive action over Cyprus that would threaten international peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Mr. Kyriakides' book, sub-titled "Constitutionalism and Crisis Government," deals first, in its first two chapters with the historical back-group of the Cyprus question. The monograph's core—Chapters, 3, 4, and 5—seeks to describe the major features of the Cyprus Constitution of 1960, its areas of built-in tension, and the crisis in Constitution and government of

1963—a crisis which has become almost a norm by this time, Chapter 6—entitled "Cyprus Dilemma"—deals with the involvement of Greece, Turkey, and Britain in the Cyprus question. And "What Prospects for Cyprus" constitutes the book's concluding chapter.

In spite of this admirable outline, and the relatively superior treatment of the core topic, Mr. Kyriakides' monograph will hardly live up to the statement contained in its foreword that it will remain "the best documented analysis for many years to come" of the Cyprus Constitutional question,—unless, of course, no other study on this topic will ever be published. Its bibliography of primary and secondary sources is indeed extensive, not selective, as is Mr. Stegenga's. It is however far from complete. For instance, it altogether omits three Greek Government *White Books* (issued in 1956 and 1958) which have an important bearing on the background of the Cyrpus Constitution, aside from being quite revelatory of the question's international political development. Oddly enough, too, this extensive bibliography omits the relevant Cyprus proceedings of the eleventh and twelfth General Assemblies, where the Cyprus question was exhaustively considered. A cursory perusal of these materials would have revealed that the very condition of a Cyprus Constitution—the establishment of Cyprus as an independent state—originated in the Kashmir-fevered mind of India's Krishna Menon at the ninth General Assembly in 1954.

But bibliographical gaps aside, Mr. Kyriakides' book has several other shortcomings of commission or omission. For instance, in his introductory chapter, ignoring the millet system of the Ottoman government, he ascribes the elevation of the Church by the "Porte" to the maladministration of the local pashas (p. 5). And, disregarding the analogies of *enosis* in the Ionian Islands and in Crete, he suggests that the demand of the Cyprus Church for *enosis* was "a systematic attempt to prevent the development of a distinct Cypriot personality." (p. 9) Other shortcomings were due to his regarding newspapers as primary sources. (p. viii).

In his core chapter on the Cyprus Constitution, Mr. Kyriakides fails to discuss the Joint Constitutional Commisson set up under the London Agreement of February 19, 1959. This Commission worked for almost a year in preparing the text of the Constitution of 1960, incorporating in it the provisions of the Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus agreed upon between Greece and Turkey at Zurich on February 11, 1959. Had he done so on the basis of available published materials, he would have shown how the tension that led to the Constitution's breakdown was quite evident already at its drafting stage.

Perhaps the most distinctive feature of Mr. Kyriakides' book is the public opinion survey he conducted in 1965 in Cyprus. This survey, conducted only among Greek Cypriots, revealed, first, that the majority of the respondents blamed the Zurich agreement and NATO as the main cause of the Cyprus crisis; second, that a plurality of the respondents considered independence as the most realistic solution to the Cyprus crisis; and, third, that a majority of the respondents considered *enosis* with Greece as the ideal solution. The apparent discrepancy between the second and third finding reveals that self-determination as another option under the category of "realistic" solutions, was regarded by the respondents as a means toward an end—*enosis*. It testifies to the influence of the Greek Cypriot leadership's Greek Cypriot public opinion. For since 1954, this leadership had dropped the slogan of *enosis* in favor of the slogan of "self-determination," which, unlike *enosis*, is embodied in the UN Charter (Article I, paragraph 2), thanks to the Soviet Delegation's efforts at the San Francisco Conference.

Mr. Kyriakides' other hypothesis-finding that both Greek and Turkish Cypriots had hardened their positions, would suggest that the two ethnic groups on the island were unable to understand each other better than they could understand, respectively, Greeks and Turks, i.e. that a common Cypriot consciousness, regardless of ethnic origin, religion, language, was not evident when this survey was made. Whether such a national Cypriot consciousness will ever develop, no one can tell. In the past, states have set up buffer states on territories in dispute, as did, for instance, Argentina and Brazil, with regard to Banda Oriental, now Uruguay. That Greece originally favored the whole island's annexation because of the desire for *enosis* of the majority of the island's inhabitants at a certain point in their history; that Turkey, too, (both authors forget this), originally wanted to annex the whole of Cyprus on the basis of a historical title or on grounds of geopolitics and strategic security, may be the best omen for the Republic's continued independence, in spite of George Ball's dictum to the effect that Cyprus was a piece of real estate with a great past and no future. From such continued independence and all the vested interests independence creates, a national Cypriot consciousness could eventually develop transforming the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus into Cypriots.

Hunter College **STEPHEN XYDIS**

The Spirit of Chinese Politics—A Psychocultural Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development. By Lucian W. Pye. (Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1968, Pp. 255. $8.95.)

This is the most controversial book on China published in 1968. The author is a distinguished American political scientist whose work has been in the forefront of methodological innovation. The book therefore demands attention if not agreement.

Lucian Pye's previous publications have focused upon the problems of political culture, often emphasizing Southeast Asia. He now addresses himself to contemporary China in an "essay about the unique national and personality traits that have inspired and shaped Chinese political culture from the time of the Manchu's to the present rule of Mao Tse-tung." (pp. vii) His task "is to describe the constellation of sentiment and attitudes that we feel must have existed for the Chinese political system to have developed as it has." (pp. viii) "The central theme of this essay became the authority crisis in modernization and the problem of psychic aggression for a people whose traditional culture was uniquely designed to repress all manifestations of that basic human drive." (pp. xviii) To accomplish this task, Pye has chosen to write an essay, leaving the problem of data to others.

In brief the argument is as follows. China, spared the identity crisis of transitional systems, instead has faced the necessity for new forms of authority which will permit the Chinese to reassert their historical self-confidence and also provide the basis for a reorientation of the society. In Pye's view the traditional Chinese state was self-contained, with a high stress on hierarchy, and ideology, and the sovereign importance of self-cultivation. Once this system breaks down, the problem of controlling aggression complicates the process of establishing new forms of authority. The first five chapters of the book are a broad analysis of this argument in Chinese historical experience. When the Chinese persisted in a political style, after the reality had changed, they released a flood of emotion that is described as the discovery of "hate."

The argument than shifts to the psychological roots of the authority crisis. In Chapters Six and Seven, Pye confronts the Chinese family, its socialization pattern and particularly its authority images. This requires a consideration of feelings toward authority and an exploration of their origins and functions in the Chinese personality. Pye's analysis derives the Chinese authority feelings from an essential emphasis on filial piety, an absolute denial of the legitimacy of all forms of aggression, and the vision of a rigidly defined order of role relationships. These characteristics are then inculcated through family socialization that invokes shame as the mechanism.

From this historical and psychological analysis come the difficulties of will power, action, and organizational behavior which impedes development. Pye's illustration is a case study of the communes (which is easily the most interesting part of the book). The book concludes with an overall summary of China's problems of the future based upon the book's appraisal.

The reader may have reservations about this book from three different viewpoints. First of all, there is the problem of "national character" studies. In describing the modal value for a society it is not possible to ignore the distribution of the characteristic in the society. Professor Pye has not set about such a study here. But in other attempts to examine the distribution problem the results have undercut the usefulness of the concept. Given the problems of operationalizing such a theory, in the Chinese case this may well prove to be a major stumbling block. In addition, as Pye notes in Chapter Six, there is a constant shift between adult action and family setting. The problem, of course, is to establish the ties between adult performance and the child rearing patterns of the family. Results in such large studies as Torney and Hess *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children* (pp. 217–220) caution against overestimating the role of the family in transmitting such attitudes. Kent Geiger in his study of *The Soviet Family* makes a similar judgment. Though these are not studies of Chinese society, their direction is clear. Consequently while Professor Pye suggests an alternative vocabulary and an interesting perspective on adult behavior as contrasted with the terms of the organizational theorist or the rational choices of the economists, it is not clear that the individually oriented theories are meaningful when applied to a societal pattern.

A second level of analysis centers upon goals. The positive argument for modernization and development is inherent in Pye's work. It is not necessary for him to deal with all the definitional problems of the terms, but to judge the Chinese in terms of a "modern open society" (pp. 45) or to describe the Chinese Nationalist and Chinese Communist leadership as "half educated rulers and strong armed bullies" (pp. 39) is rhetorical and certainly not helpful to the appraisal. Furthermore, it might have been useful to discuss Chinese achievement in terms of stated Maoist goals rather than so heavily in terms of Western political science.

The third level that must be of concern is the view of China which seems to emerge. Here the stylistic language handicaps analysis of an argument and forces the reader to demur. This is of particular importance since much of the case rests upon the special nature of the Chinese in contrast to other transitional systems. Two examples will indicate the problem. On page 30

> "Nowhere in Chinese politics do we have a frank acceptance of the fact that men may be crass and self-centered and that it is only prudent in designing public institutions to insist upon checks and balances and to provide objective rather than subjective restraints on the use of power."

In fact the Chinese bureaucracy was filled with such procedures as the law of avoidance in the civil service and the retirement provisions for mourning. Offical Chinese credo did indeed stress the belief in natural goodness, but there were a variety of provisions to protect the system.

Another example from contemporary China occurs on pp. 118.

> They (referring to the Communists) have needed leaders who can speak the language of revolution and who in their own lives are capable of carrying the spirit of revolution against parental authority to the point of direct confrontation. It is significant that a disproportionate number of the top leaders of Communist China had violent and even traumatic confrontations with their fathers.

The book then discusses Mao, Chu Teh and P'eng Te-huai. The reader must feel compelled to ask, "disproportionate compared to what,?" and how do we know or can we know that the confrontations were traumatic given the state of biographical art on China.

Pye's analysis depends upon the acceptance of his view of China. If one is compelled to deny or modify those views, what remains may be innovative ideas about psychological constraints in politics, perhaps the necessity to re-think or define assumptions, but not an explanation of Chinese politics.

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Spending in the American States. By Ira Sharkansky. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1967. 170.)

One of the most fruitful bodies of empirical research in contemporary American political analysis has been the comparative analysis of policy outputs in the American states. From the standpoint of the systematic study of politics this research is noteworthy not only because of its substantive findings but also because it represents a pattern of systematic cummulative development not often found in political analysis.

Employing a comparative approach, a rough systems conceptualization, the statistical manipulation of readily quantifiable data, and focusing on public policies as outputs of state political systems, this body of research has investigated the relative impact of a variety of factors in determining what states do. One issoe that has assumed central focus in this research is the relative influence of political factors versus non-political environmental conditions in determining state activities. The early studies tended to conclude that economic and environmental factors were more influencial as independent variables than any of a wide variety of political factors. Some research, including the book under review here, suggest that broad generalization needs important qualifications.

Spending in the American States can be evaluated best in the context of this research. Ira Sharkansky has been one of the most prolific and creative contributors to comparative state analysis. The central question posed is, "Why do some of the American state governments spend more money than others?" Like most of the work in this field Sharkansky employs a correlational analysis of a number of political factors, environmental conditions, and state programs and expenditures to investigate this question. Measures of per capita state spending and changes in per capita spending over time are the major dependent variables used. The influence of the past, the impact of political and socio-economic characteristics, international affairs and the national economy, and regional affiliation of the states are successively analyzed in terms of how they affect state spending. State expenditures are then related to state services.

One of the major findings is that previous state spending is the most powerful independent variable related to per capita state spending. The amount of money a state spends per capita, relative to other states, at one point in time is very highly correlated with the relative amount of money it spent previously. These relationships remain strong even over a sixty-three year period. Sharkansky relates this finding to notions drawn from studies of financial decision-making and budgetary processes, that current budgets tend to be formulated around a base of the budget of the immediately preceding period.

Following the pattern of earlier studies, Sharkansky relates per capita state spending to a variety of political and non-political factors. Most of the political variables are found to be of little importance. Unlike earlier studies, however, he finds that social-economic variables are not very highly associated with his measure of per capita spending. He explains this difference from other studies by his use of a measure based solely on money spent by the states. Measures used by others have tended to include both state and local expenditures. Poorer, less densely populated, and less industrialized states tend to rely more on state (rather than local) spending than do the wealthier, more heavily populated, and industrialized state. Thus, the wealthier state governments are not necessarily the highest per capita spenders. Previous spending, the state percentage of state-local expenditures, and local government expenditures are found to be the variables with the strongest independent relationships with the level of state spending.

The most intriguing findings are those relating state and local government spending to state services. Contrary to expectations, Sharkansky finds no consistent pattern of high per capita spenders having the most extensive public services. States that spent the most per capita do not necessarily pay the highest welfare benefits, have the most state parks, or the highest teacher-pupil ratio. Relationships here appear to be rather complex, and the author only scrapes the surface in explaining what his data suggest.

This book offers new and important insights into the correlates of state spending. Conceptually, methodologically, and substantively it adds to the body of comparative state analysis. Some of the findings are important—even though often puzzling and nonconclusive. Both those who have kept up with this line of research and those who are new to it can benefit from reading this book. There are new and challenging formulations and findings for the former, and enough review of earlier work and good discussion of the conceptualization of issues and statistical techniques for the latter.

The major shortcomings of this book—one that is common to much of the comparative state analysis—lie in the quality of explanation developed. The author sometimes seems to be really stretching to come up with plausible explanations for some of the findings. This reader finds some of the explanations offered less than convincing, and sometimes misleading.

For example, when confronted with the finding that expenditures for public welfare and education are less strongly associated with socioeconomic measures than are other areas of spending, the author suggests that the lack of relationship in welfare spending may result from state ideological phenomena which very independently from economic, political, and governmental characteristics. This, obviously, does not explain very much. It seems to me that the cause of this non-relationship is the formulas for federal participation in the major state welfare programs. As I interpret the data used, the federal portion of welfare monies is included in the measure of state payments and expenditures. By and large federal participation in these programs is set up so that those states which give the smallest amounts of money to the largest number of people receive the highest share of what they spend from the federal government. States can rank high in the indices used by Sharkansky either by giving large sums of their own monies in large per recipient payments or by giving small payments to large numbers of people, maximizing the amount of money given out while keeping state contributions low. Thus, high ranking states in expenditures per capita include a combination of poorer states like New Mexico, Louisiana, and Arkansas for whom 65 to 74 percent of money spent for the welfare programs comes from the federal government, and wealthy states like California, Massachusetts, and New York which receive from one third to one half of the money they give out in welfare programs from Washington. Most likely it is this factor that accounts for the low statistical relationships mentioned above. When only state contributions are included the relationships are much closer to the expected ones, with wealthier states tending to spend more per capita.

Patterns of federal participation may also help account for some of the other relationships found. This may be one factor helping to account for the generally weak association found between spending and the quality of services provided by the states.

This book takes us some important steps further toward understanding the factors that influence state policy outputs. It also suggests how complex the analysis and explanations are. Despite the fine contributions of this work, however, this reader is struck by how far we still have to go in developing good explanatory theories of why states do the things they do. It is helpful to know that states which spent large sums of money last year spent large sums of money the year before and ten years ago, and that high spending states tend to be more centralized in the operation of governmental services; but it is still far from a satisfactory answer to the question of why some states spend more than others.

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Korea: The Politics of the Vortex. By Gregory Henderson. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. Pp. 479. $11.95.)

In this provocative and seminal book, a seasoned observer of the Korean scene boldly sets forth his interpretation of Korean society and politics since the fourteenth century. At the same time, the author presents his "theory of the vortex" arguing, in essence, the disadvantages of hyper-integration. It is a penetrating and stimulating book that deserves a wide audience.

The theme of the book, "the politics of the vortex," is deceptively simple. Korea, being such a homogeneous and well-integrated society both in terms of ethnic make-up and culture, failed to develop any meaningful middle groups either in terms of vested interests, religious separations, basic policy differences or ideological divisions. Individuals are totally atomized as a result and the highly centralized state "the eye of the storm") became a "great vortex summoning men rapidly into it." "The atomized mass streaming toward power" is the essence of Henderson's theory. The ethnic and cultural homogeneity along with centralization are blamed for Korea's lack of liberal and innovational spirit, quarrelsome factionalism, and underdevelopment. With this theme, the author examines the traditional society, Korean politics between 1860 and the present, political culture, and the varieties of ways (political parties, communism, and the military) through which cohesion is sought.

I could not help admiring the author for his breadth of learning and his thoroughness in utilizing the existing body of knowledge about Korea. Although the author relied mostly on materials published in English, he has consulted a fair number of publications in both Japanese and Korean. In addition, he had added materials gathered from his first-hand observations during this stay of more than seven years in Korea as a U.S. Foreign Service Officer. While the author maintains uniformly high quality throughout the book, I found his expositions of "colonial totalitarianism (Ch. 4), the period of American military occupation (Ch. 5. "The Gates of Chaos"), and the military (Ch. 12) particularly illuminating.

Henderson's theory of the vortex, however, raises some important questions that need to be answered. Most scholars of Korea would agree that the vortex of the kind described by Henderson did indeed exist among the ruling class (but not the masses) of Korea, and the forces responsible for it still persist. But was it because the masses have been atomized, as Henderson asserts? Have the masses in Korea in fact been atomized? Would decentralization and the development of "meaningful middle groups" cure most of the ills of Korea?

Since Henderson's theory of the vortex is an adaptation of Kornhauser's theory of mass society (William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society,* 1959), we may approach these questions by exploring the question of whether such Confucian societies as Korea and China indeed fit into the model of mass society. (Henderson argues that China and Russia also fall in the category of mass society. p. 333)

Although Henderson chose to stress one aspect of Kornhauser's theory, i.e. the absence of the structure of intermediate groups between the family and the nation, Kornhauser gave considerable weight to the "psychological properties of mass society," i.e. *self-estrangement of the individual* who fails to receive support for a sense of his own worth because of lack of opportunity for participation in society. (Kornhauser, p. 108). Kornhauser argues further that "in pluralist society [where intermediary groups do exist] there are alternative loyalties (sanctuaries) which do not place the nonconformist outside the social pale" (p. 110). What this means is that intermediary groups were but one of the means to placate the sense of self-estrangement among the members of the society. The question to be raised here is whether the structure of intermediary groups is the only means of preventing alienation.

My answer to this question would be negative. While the individually oriented Western societies required intermediary groups to provide a sense of participation, Confucianism created a "subject culture" with detailed hierarchical norms which did not encourage the aspiration for participation among the masses. As long as the rulers enjoyed "the mandate of Heaven," the masses did not feel estranged, and they were not readily attracted to mass movements. No doubt a great number of the ruling *yangban* class felt frustrated because of their inability to obtain government appointments, but very few from this class demonstrated the nonconformist behavior of the estranged.

I would argue, therefore, that Korea and China do not fit into the mold of mass society, and, under diffused culture, the masses were not self-estranged or atomized. In other words, the masses cannot be atomized in a well-integrated society. The situation after the turn of the century when disintegrative forces were injected into Korea is, of course, another matter. The causes for the vortex must be sought in factors other than hyper-integration.

Henderson was close to negating his thesis when he discussed the preponderance of anomic violence between 1945 and 1948 under American occupation. Anomic violence, it should be noted, is a characteristic feature of mass societies.

> The rise of anomic violence was the inevitable result . . . of the rushed urbanization, industrialization, and mobilization of 1937-1945, plus the economic collapse, population dislocations, and lack of leadership during the first year of Liberation. (p. 147).

In explaining why the Koreans were swept into the vortex of politics, Henderson rules out external influence and economic factors as secondary and rather unimportant. ("... external factors are for Korea and her internal courses of secondary importance." p. 7) But, can we not say that the extreme degree of centralization and factional struggles among the elites came about because there was a dearth of "political goods" caused in part by a series of foreign invasions? Future research in economic history may reveal the close connections between economic conditions and political behavior. Although Korea was under complete foreign control only rarely in its history, the effect of these occupations may have been larger than Henderson's assessment, particularly in the shaping of the social and political environment.

Thus I find the "theory of the vortex" rather unsettling. I also believe that the stress on the theory occasionally marred his otherwise superb analysis of Korean politics. However, one need not accept the theory of the vortex to learn from the book and enjoy it. It will be a long time before any work of such scope and magnitude will replace it.

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BOOK NOTES

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

Politics and Experience: Essays Presented to Professor Michael Oakeshott On the Occasion of His Retirement. EDITED BY PRESTON KING AND B. C. PAREKH. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968. Pp. 424. $11.50.)

Reviewing collections of essays in brief compass is always a difficult matter, particularly when the purpose of the collection is not primarily the exfoliation of a theme or topic but the honoring of a man of many interests and influences. Such is the case with this Michael Oakeshott *Festschrift,* containing as it does thirteen essays ranging from philosopher William Dray's exposition of Professor Oakeshott's philosophy of history to Dorothea Krook's contemplation of the *kibbutzim.*

If there is a common theme it is the consideration of politics in four dimensions, of politics in time, inspired by Oakeshott's life-long interest in human experience, tradition, and politics. Books of this sort are vaulable if readers find particular essays valuable. I found all of the essays interesting, but like, I suspect, a good many other Americans I found Sheldon Wolin's "Paradigms and political theories" most valuable.

Wolin takes as his point of departure the now well-known thesis of historian of science Thomas S. Kuhn in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.* While Kuhn's book has been widely discussed by political scientists, most notably in two recent APSA presidential addresses, what has not yet been understood is that the real relevance of Kuhn's book to political science is not so much what Kuhn says about the developmental patterns of various natural sciences, but the example of Kuhn's own style of analysis. Science, considered not as a slogan or a policy or a set of abstractions, but as a phenomenon in the real world is a human institution. In this sense—and Kuhn himself clearly understands this perfectly well—science compares to community and scientific activity to politics. Thus, the way a historian-philosopher of science examines the development of his kind of human institution can be instructive for political scientists in examining their kind. Professor Wolin here opens the door to this angle of understanding.

Wolin invites us to consider the great political theorists on the model of Kuhn's practitioners of "extraordinary" science—the creators of scientific paradigms—and the statesmen, jurists, lesser theorists, and citizens who follow the master's guidance as comparable to Kuhn's picture of the scientific community, the members of which practice "normal" science. Now it is of course quite possible to be picky about this imaginative analogy, but Wolin and Kuhn are surely as capable as you can I of listing the differences between political institutions and activities and scientific institutions and activities. Let us, however, resist the temptation to show off how much we already know, and try to learn something new instead.

What is crucial about Kuhn's analysis is that he (along with such other contemporary philosopher-historians of science as Stephen Toulmin and the late Norwood Russell Hanson) sees science as a living, human activity and not as a doctrine. Understood as a feature of cultural evolution science is not *a* method to be put on or taken off like a costume, (or like the wearing of a particular hat, to invoke a more widely used image) but an activity of mankind developing in time. Wolin in effect says, "Yes, science is a human activity in time and so is politics; and what is more, both can be understood as paradigm inspired."

"My proposal," says Wolin, "is that we conceive of political society itself as a paradigm of an operative kind. From this viewpoint society would be envisaged as a coherent whole in the sense of its customary political practices, institutions, laws, structure of authority and citizenship, and operative beliefs being organised and interrelated." (p. 149) In a passage that should make a good deal of sense to students of political development Wolin suggests that, "In the natural course of its history a society undergoes changes which impose strains upon the existing paradigm. A society may find the paradigm being challenged directly, or it may experience difficulty in coping with the results of change. New social classes may have emerged; new economic relationships may have developed; or new racial or religious patterns may have appeared. In much the same way that a scientific community will seek to adjust its paradigm to account for 'novelty,' a political society will seek to adapt its system to the new developments brought by change." (p. 149)

What from this angle of analysis we are being invited to do is not to look around in the political science or social science literature to find a paradigm (considering therefore structural-functional analysis, systems theory, etc. as rival candidates), but to consider Kuhn's own analysis as a paradigm (or better perhaps the application of a paradigm) not for politics itself but for political science. Kuhn is not much interested in promulgating universal laws of "scientific behavior" in the style of the more conventional philosophers of science. On the contrary he like Toulmin and Hanson repeatedly denies the relevance of rigid "single use" conceptions of science. Kuhn's analysis unlike so much of behavioral science takes its lights not from Newtonian physics and its descendents but from evolutionary, developmental biology.

Wolin's essay pushes us toward the fundamental question: should we try to understand political activity and scientific activity on the model of universal law physics or should we see men as products of evolution developing through their unique cultural capacity the changing adaptive devices called politics and science? It is a question, I think, that Professor Oakeshott would approve of, and, I suspect, there is no more fundamental question for political science. The other essays raise related questions albeit from quite different perspectives. It is quite likely that you will find something of value.—Thomas L. Thorson, *University of Toronto.*

Power and Discontent. By William A. Gamson. (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1956, Pp. 208.)

In introducing his book, Gamson describes his effort as "a discursive essay, with fluid boundaries, on a subject of endless complexity." (p. VII). Judged within such a context, it is a stimulating piece of work.

The presentation grew out of the author's study of community conflict. Originally, it was to serve as a theoretical introduction to an empirical analysis since published.

Two conflicting "perspectives" on power and conflict, influence and social control, are explored. Both orientations are elaborated and an attempt is made to unite them.

The influence perspective focuses on partisans in conflict attempting to realize a proportionate share of social rewards. Gamson argues that the writers who employ this perspective—the Laswellions of *Who Gets What? When? How?* elite theorists, the competitive power school of political party analysts, Marxians, and class conflict theorists more generally—share basic assumptions, related enough to justify considering them as a group. These mutual concerns are the focus on actors, not systems; the attention given to the scope and strategy of conflict, rather than its regulation; and the potentially advantageous use of discontent (perceived as an opportunity for change as against a threat to social order). The extent to which these assumptions, in actuality, are fundamental to each of the schools of thought contained within the category needs elaboration. Also helpful, but less essential, would have been the permutations that occur in each school, assuming that there are basically identifiable and consistent subsidiary assumptions for each.

The social control orientation emphasizes conflict resolution and regulation in contrast to power accumulation. The focus is on systemic questions, and indeed this is one of its distinguishing features. Such problems assume importance as the achievement of collective goods, the integration of the system so as to achieve conflict management, and the characterization of discontent as an element of instability within the governing framework. Unifying concerns among those who employ this approach include the focus on the system or its agents, rather than actors within it; the attention devoted to the regulation of conflict, rather than its strategy or tactics; and the construction of discontent as a problem in system management, rather than one of competitive attempts to direct influence. Parsons, Easton, and Smelser are employed to illustrate these contentions.

The integration of these points of view would appear to be a monumental job, one demanding a clear assertion of underlying assumptions, a development of the theoretical priorities of the proponents of the subcategorizations, and a clear definition of terms. Such a complete synthesis awaits to be done. Gamson concentrates primarily on a clarification of terminology and in stipulating the relationship between and overlap among concepts relevant to both orientations. In the process the author treats such questions as the links between authorities and partisans, the relevance of a sense of trust for political stability and group competitiveness, influence and its use, social control and the channeling of discontent, predictability and resource mobilization in influence attempts, and the implications of the ideas expressed for social change.

Gamson measures the effect of influence as the difference in probabilities between two estimates, the first being the outcome with no partisan pressure considered and the second being the addition of group action to the equation. If the exertion of influence stiffens opposition, leading to a less desirable outcome than would have been expected without partisan interference, then "negative" pressure has been exercised. Resources to be employed in the transaction process are bargaining elements controlled by the influencer and capable of being brought to bear on authorities. The cost of resources employed in such a manner refers to those committed in the bargaining process.

The book explores the various possibilities such assumptions can lead to in analyses, adding confounding variables such as the constraints and inducements that can be employed and the possibility of persuading authorities without introducing new factors into the situation.

The study emphasizes the arena of conflict more than the content of the issues contested. This focus appears particularly suggestive for indicating the parometers of theoretical efforts along these lines while avoiding the complications surrounding arguments of influence attribution and the resolution of single or sets of issues supported in varying degrees by influentials. The scope of influence relates to the areas in which resources can be applied.

Influence and other aspects of questions relating to bring pressure on decision-makers are conceptually clearer and the ideas better elaborated than those dealing with the problems relevant to authorities. While the latter are treated, the consistent emphasis is on the control aspects and binding decision-making as it relates to conflict management. One part of the presentation that would appear particularly rewarding, the prediction of influence attempts and their probable success, while imaginative, is rudimentary in development. If this approach could be clarified and its empirical referants better stipulated, the conceptual precision of the schema would be advanced and empirical testing would be possible, major steps toward a truly integrative theory.

The author's principal enthusiasm is for questions relating to the use of influence. His development of ideas contributing to this orientation is provocative. The treatment of concepts relevant to authoritative decision-making is narrower in focus and more conventional. Over-all, the book represents a rewarding exploratory attempt of synthesizing two conflicting approaches to the study of social concerns. This is not the final statement on the subject, and it does not pretend to be.—WILLIAM J. CROTTY, *Northwestern University*.

Simulation in the Study of Politics ED. BY WILLIAM D. COPLIN. (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1968. Pp. 365. $10.95.)

At worst, this edited volume might be regarded as a non-book drawn from a conference that was a non-event organized to promote a non-method, which deserves a one word non-review: "nonsense." Such a reaction would give an indication of the scholarly isolation of simulation researchers and the prevasive view of simulation as a methodological fad, or even as a pseudo-scientific fraud. But it would unfairly snuff out a useful attempt to generate a more constructive critical dialogue. The original conference was conceived as a means for discussing and evaluating some of the current work on simulation models of social processes. A common focus was set which asked the contributors to describe the assumptions underlying the simulated environments within which human or computerized decision-makers operate. An organizational structure was devised with five substantive panels, each with a non-simulator discussant, plus a graduate student panel on developing simulations and a demonstration-run of Coplin's own World Politics Simulation, with a dual culmination of an overview by Harold Guetzkow, as grand discussant, of the five areas, but also extending on into other areas of political science, and of a discussion of the "policy" potential of this work in government. The purpose was to break down the barriers between substantive areas and between simulators and non-simulators. The formal organizational dialectic of conferences usually vanishes in the haze of the cocktail lounge, whose informal dialectic goes unrecorded, leaving only the papers and formal comments, to be revised at leisure and eventually published, as in the present case. A non-event produces a non-book, to apply Hennessey's Rule, "with no structure, no development, no general argument, and no discernible substantive editing."

Coplin's short introduction and summary do not suffice as the analytical overview which is necessary to break down the substantive barriers, nor is there much exertion of editorial influence within substantive sections. Still, the stimulation of a generally good collection of papers, even if it is a non-book, serves a useful purpose. Even those whose eyes glaze at the sight of mathematical symbols and behavioral jargon should be able to get through most of the papers and any of the comments without discomfort or frustration. And while there is some substantive imbalance, most of the papers have a wide empirical focus and general theoretical relevance.

As for the case made for simulation research, this varies by area. In the first and longest section of the book, the two substantive papers discuss the Northwestern Inter-Nation Simulation (INS) and TEMPER, unquestionably the most influential simulations developed in international relations. Hayward Alker dutifully goes through the INS model in detail, although he admits that this is probably redundant. As it happens, a shorter rendition is also given by Harold Guetzkow, in an abridged and slightly updated earlier paper substituted for his conference comments as grand discussant. Alker concludes with a brief sketch of a possible underlying theory, and a final paragraph on possible empirical verification methods (whose bibliographical footnote is, alas, missing). While this is not up to Alker's usual standard, it is not the piano player that needs shooting, but the piano—the INS. Walter Clemens has much the same problem in his propositional analysis and critique of TEMPER, that "white elephant" of computer simulation developed for the Defense Department. As Kenneth Waltz points out in his comment, neither the simulation programs nor the "theories" they represent are really theories at all, and the simulations are "very expensive crystal balls," and just as sterile from an analytical standpoint.

Going further, Clemens questions the empirical validity of the assumptions listed in TEMPER's non-theory. TEMPER is locked into a "cold war" structure, making it even more of a curio. Morten Gorden, who helped develop TEMPER in, as he puts it, his "rash youth," candidly admits in his rejoinder to Clemens that "just as generals prepare to fight the last war, simulators may model the last reality." But was the contemporary diplo-military wisdom upon which the INS and TEMPER were based *ever* empirically valid? While Clemens disposes of TEMPER, empirical validation is only briefly referred to by Alker and Guetzkow; but one of the studies mentioned, Richard Chadwirk's effectively demolishes both the claims for formal theoretical coherence and for empirical adequacy of INS "theory." The absence of a fuller treatment of this existing validation work detracts seriously from the value of this section of the book, and does little to allay the suspicions of non-simulators about the scientific legitimacy of simulation research in this area.

Happily, most of the remaining papers are superb. In the section on urban affairs, John Crecine's paper on municipal budgeting is a major methodological and substantive milestone, and the short comment by Ira Sharkansky is intelligent. The best paper for the general reader is Paul Ray and Richard Duke's discussion of gaming simulation, drawn from experience with their METRO simulation, a miniaturized world of a middle-sized metropolitan area. Ray and Duke make the point that partially computerized gaming simulations are not makeshift way-stations to completely computerized elegance, but complex experimental tools for the investigation of decision-making behavior. Gaming and computer simulation form complementary components of an integrated and comprehensive research approach, by which a more systematic theoretical and empirical attack can be made on large, complex realities. These two papers on urban affairs, and the excellent review by Howard Rosenthal of simulation in elite mass electoral research (unfortunately, conference comments by Philip Converse were not included in the book), and the report by Rufus Browning (a pose-conference addition) on his partially data-based computer simulation of political recruitment provide the real value of the book. Not only are the papers informative from a methodological point of view, but their substantive content deserves a wider attention among political scientists than has been the case up to now. Two of the student papers are included, one based on the Michigan election studies, by Coombs *fils*, Fried, and Rabinowitz, suggesting a modular approach to election simulation; and the other, by Ronald Brunner, discussing a phased branching design as a possible general framework for the simulation of political development. Finally, there is an interesting discussion by Charles Moore of the heuristic programming approach developed in the Carnegie Tech management science tradition of decision-making analysis, which, if not really simulation, does attempt to state empirically valid decision routines (HP's). In their comment, Meyer Zald and Rolf Schliewen query whether this rather "mentalistic" emphasis on verbalized decision routines does not ignore latent constraints, and also confine itself to routinized decision-making, thus missing the more important organizational phenomena, and perhaps even imposing decisional phasing upon behavior through the way in which a decision is defined.

While I believe that non-simulators will learn something from this set of essays, I wonder if the simulators will. Computers are not magic theory machines which immaculately conceive Truth. Waltz ought not to be ignored, because he is not initiated into the mysteries, especially since these usually conceal a big speculative "fudge factor," as Ray and Duke point out. They also emphasize that the "man-machine interface" is the creative nexus of the simulation approach to the study of decision-making, and not just an unsatisfactory makeshift. In this regard, there is a naive belief that loading a gaming simulation down with rich detail makes it more "realistic." Even when this detail does not introduce the biases of some brand of conventional wisdom, it gets in the way of meaningful comparison of experimental results. Despite Harold Guetzkow's strictures to the contrary, gaming simulation is an *experimental* method. When there is no decent fieldwork source of empirical data, as is usually the case in micropolitics, complex experimentation utilizing simulated environments will necessarily have to provide the incubation phase of behavioral political science—CHARLES A. POWELL, *University of Southern California.*

Islamic Surveys: Islamic Political Thought. BY W. MONTGOMERY WATT. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969. Pp. 186. $4.75.)

Without much doubt, it can be stated that Islam is rapidly becoming a doctrine of world wide significance. The increasing interest in Islamic studies is both academic and political. Islam is the youngest of the great world religions originating in Arabia and founded by the prophet Muhammad with many features common to Judaism and Christianity. It is also a political force shaping the destinies of many millions in the Middle East and elsewhere who adhere to the Muslim way of life.

The author of this book is highly qualified to write on Islamic thought. Mr. Watt is a Professor of Arabic at Edinbrugh University, the editor of the series *Islamic Surveys,* and the author of two additional works in the series. His profound knowledge of the Arabic language and his familiarity with the Muslim world contribute to the crispness and clarity of his writing in this area.

The reader of *Islamic Political Thought* should note on the inside title page the subtitle *The Basic Concepts.* This is essential in order to appreciate why this broad topic is exposed in relatively few pages (129 pages of text). This reviewer gathered two fundamental impressions. First, it is a difficult book for a political scientist to review as it is essentially a collection of basic historical facts. Second, for someone already familiar with Islam, what Mr. Watt has to say is elementary. Perhaps this is the reason for the subtitle. For the reader not familiar with Islam, *Islamic Politic Thought* will serve as an excellent starting point.

The exposition of the basic concepts of Islamic political thought rest on the fundamental premise, which is the theme of the work, that in Islam religion and politics are inseperable. Consequently, the political events of the past, primarily during the life time of Muhammad and the early Caliphs (*Kulafa' al-rashidun*) constitute the roots of Islamic political conceptions since "the concepts implicit in men's practice are more important than the writings of political theorists." (p. x) The eleven chapters of the book adhere faithfully to this premise.

In describing the evolution of Islamic political practice, the author is meticulous about giving his English reader precise definitions of basic concepts and Arabic words. He is cautious in defining these terms within the cultural setting of the period. The early Islamic state in its political concepts was to a large extent based on the nature of the tribal pre-Islâmic society and primarily on such concepts as the *umma* or the community, and *jihad* or 'holy war'. The early Islamic community "was essentially a federation of tribes," and the *jihad* was the extension of raid or razzia which was an important feature of the life of the nomads in the Arabian desert. (pp. 14–5) The raid in the Islamic state was based on a Quranic verse 5.35/9, "O believers, fear God . . . and strive in His way." The common interpretation of *jihad* is that it offered the non-Muslim the choice between Islam and the sword. It is important to note that this choice applied only to pagans, but not to Jews and Christians as they were part of the 'protected minority'—*ahl al-kitab*—(people of the Book), or people with a monotheistic religion.

Under Muhammad, the Islamic state retained its pre-Islamic structure. Mr. Watt points out that "Apart from being the Messanger of God, Muhammad was not superior to other clan chiefs." (p. 21) His relatively weak position began to change partly because of his victorious military expeditions (the battle of Badr in 624), and because after he went to Medina in 622 the religious and the political were increasingly combined as revealed by the political relevance of his preaching. The point is that the Islamic religion simply added another dimension to the solidarity of the pre-Islamic community.

Mr. Watt devotes most of the pages of his book to the early caliphate and the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties. He does this for Islamic political theory first centered around the caliphate, its purposes and dimensions as argued by the jurists and on the political events that led to the creation of the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties. In this discussion of the first four successors of Muhammad, the author notes that these rightly guided caliphs (*Kulafa' al-rashidun*) are held in special standing by Sunnite Muslims. The author reiterates his theme that "It is hardly an exaggeration to say that Muslims normally express political theory in the form of history." (pp. 36-7) The important historical incident that gave rise to the Shi'ite sect and to much Islamic political theory was Mu'awiya's refusal to acknowledge Ali, the last of the *rashidun* as caliph. Such an acknowledgement was essential since the practice until that point had been the choice of a caliph by acclamation (*baya*) of the believers. This position taken by Mu'awiya, the governor of Syria, led to bloodshed between the supporters of the two men and their differences was finally subjected to an arbitration.

Mr. Watt does not go into any details concerning this very important event perhaps because a universally acceptable account of it is non-existent among Muslims. He merely concludes the historical fact that the arbitration was favorable to Mu'awiya who, after the death of Ali, inaugurated the Umayyad dynasty and with it the arguments regarding its legitimacy. The author goes on then to consider the nature of the Muslim community under the Umayyad dynasty and the Abbasid dynasty that followed. He centers his exposition on the organization of these dynasties including the expanded position of the ruler, the military, judicial, administrative and religious; on the expanded notion of the community that included non-Arab Muslims and particularly the influence of the Persians and Turks under the Abbasids; and the numerous political ideas developed by the various Shi'ite sects notably their concept of the *imam* (caliph) who must be a decendant of Ali. Mr. Watt excludes from his exposition any meaningful discussion of the ideas of Muslim philosophers such as al-Farabi on the grounds that "they did not appreciably affect the main stream of Islamic political activity." (p. 81) But in the last few pages of the book Mr. Watt, in an attempt to show how Islam adapts to the contemporary world, argues that adaptive changes have been affected by the ideas of philosophers such as al-Farabi and Avicenna and such theologians as al-Ashari. (p. 127) He also excludes from his discussion such recent reforms as Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida. Instead, Islamic *Political Thought* seems to be centered around the notion of the *umma* or community of all Muslims and what makes for its solidarity, that is, political events; and on the *Sharia* (The Divine Law) and Tradition as being the model of Islamic social and political life, that is, the political ideas. In smort the book is concerned with historical events and those political ideas that have been operative in the historical process.

The attentive reader will note that Mr. Watt is an extremely clear writer. He scratches below the surface primarily in his discussion of the Shi'ite ideas. The book is free from any typographical and transliteration errors. Although *Islamic Political Thought* is an elementary book on the subject, it is nevertheless a valuable contribution to the English literature on Islam.—SAMI G. HAJJAR, *University of Wyoming.*

General and Social Systems. BY F. KENNETH BERRIEN. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1968. Pp. 231. $9.00.)

Man's inhumanity to man is perhaps exceeded only by his inability to understand himself and others. Berrien's book aims at providing a tool for dealing with this inability by applying general systems theory (GST) to "self" and to groups. Although his major audience is intended to be "those psychologists concerned primarily with group phenomena" (p. vi), he attempts to construct a theory which "is a sumarized abstracttion of phenomena running the gamut from cosmology and molecular physics to some references to international conflict'" (p. 188). Surely, the political scientist can fit himself somewhere in this endeavor! The important questions are: Where and Why?

I invite only *some* of my colleagues to fit themselves into the first major part of the book (Chapters II-V), in which Berrien deals with the major concepts of GST as he delineates definitions, assumptions, and propositions for use in the theoretical framework. These colleagues are those who are not familiar with GST and its intellectual foundations. For them, the introductory chapters provide an accurate, readable, and comprehensive treatment of the major concepts of GST and a thorough bibliographic picture of its high priests, most of whom are dutifully cited throughout the body of the text; indeed, the attached bibliography is itself worth the price of the book for the uninitiated.

For the political scientist who has gone through the literature of GST, these chapters can be passed over. They contain nothing "new," "fresh," and "original" as the publishers and Kenneth Boulding would have us believe. For example, Berrien's central concept—"primitive randomness evolves into organized complexity"—was articulated decades ago by Teilhard de Chardin; in the latter's *Phenomenon of Man* a theory of complexification was developed in which orderliness and complexity evolve from randomness. Teilhard analyzed this process in the universe from the point of view of the "within and the without" of things —a point of view not entirely dissimilar to Berrien's discussion of the growth of systems as equivalent to "the expansion of a system in size in which all parts are functionally articulated" (p. 75). In addition, we need not read Berrien's discussion of the probabilistic conditions of systems (pp. 48–50; 201–202) to realize that the universe is neither determinate nor mechanistic. The statistical physicists Gibbs and Bolzmann discovered decades ago the probabilistic nature of the universe and developed the concept of entropy as a framework for its measurement. Norbert Wiener's *Cybernetics* ante-dates Berrien's work by two decades and contains a discussion of feedback, storage, and memory, as does Ross Ashby's *Introduction to Cybernetics*. Moreover, Ashby's *Design for a Brain* contains a discussion of stability and adaptation that is not only much earlier but also much better than Berrien's. Finally, von Bertalanffy's *General System Theory* said—again decades ago—much of what Berrien covers.

It is in Chapters VI-IX—the chapters dealing with the application of GST to social phenomena —that the value of the book and Berrien's genius lie. I invite *all* of my colleagues to fit themselves into the book here. I offer this invitation for two major reasons. First, Berrien's analysis of social phenomena is a good example of theory construction. His incorporation of definitions and assumptions into relational propositions which generate expectations with empirical relevance for a number of research areas in political science is significant: his discussion of norms and roles in Chapter VI has important implications for small-group behavior and for coalitions; his discussion of the all-important GNS/FA ratio in Chapter VII and of the concepts of growth and adaptation in Chapter VII and VIII have great relevance to organization theory and political development; and his discussion of conflict in Chapter IX permits reasoning about domestic and international violence. These sections are suggestive of a variety of relationships which can be formulated easily into warrantable generalizations for research.

The second major value of the book to political scientists lies in Berrien's recognition of *choice* as a probabilistic factor in social systems (p. 93). It seems to me that this recognition has an important implication for political science. Political scientists are accustomed to dealing with the concept of system in one of two distinct ways. The first way is for analysis; that is, one can look at *any* set of phenomena systemically by dividing those phenomena into two categories: variables (the constituent elements of the "system") and parameters (those elements that are "outside" the system and form its boundary). Hence there are analytical systems. Second, there are natural systems, such as molecular and biological systems, where relationships are concretized and provide a basis for reasoning by analogy about social systems.

But it seems that the probabilistic element of human choice gives rise to a third kind of system —artifactual systems, i.e., systems which are products of human choice. Thus artifactual systems are set up *to be* systems, and the interesting theoretical question here is: How do individuals cope with systems which they themselves create? A political system is an artifactual system aimed at facilitating the exercise of human choice. *The Federalist Papers* articulate the logic of one particular kind of artifactual system.

The recognition of artifactual systems bears two important consequences for research in political science, and Berrien helps us to understand them. The first is a shift in research focus, which I shall call constitutional decision making. Berrien discusses deoxyribose nucleic acides (DNA's) as determinants of system form. Could it be, as Berrien seems to indicate, that constitutional decision making functions as the societal counterpart of the DNA template (p. 134)? If so, then can we assume that the structural forms and growth of any artifactual system will necessarily be conditioned by its basic constitutional framework? This is an interesting implication in that studies focusing on political development dismiss constitutional decision making as irrelevant in the dynamics of structure-function in developing societies. The second is a shift in research strategy. Artifactual systems are subject to frequent step-level functions and to changes in parameter values. Conventional research designs usually are cross-sectional, largely as a result of the "correlation game" played by so many political scientists. This "game" can not take account of dynamic relationships over time. Hence Berrien advocates the adoption of longitudinal research designs which can assess variable relationships over time and sees two promising theoretical developments along this line (pp. 157–161): game models and computer simulation. Both developments are examples of what I have called artifactual systems; both permit of continuous instead of periodic, cross-sectional measurements; and both allow for the studying of "real" groups over time.

These are the major reasons why my colleagues should read this book. Each of them may find a deficiency in it, to be sure; for reasoning at high levels of abstraction may involve the thinker in the fallacies of reification and analogous extrapolation. But Berrien treads cautiously and is aware of the epistemological problems raised by GST. For this reason, he only asks of his readers to judge, not whether his theoretical structure is true or false, but whether it will be more or less useful to them in their reasoned inquiry about complicated human relationships. In my judgment, it is an extremely useful tool for the political scientist bent on developing a theoretical competence in his field.—JOSEPH D. OLANDER, *University of Miami.*

Rousseau's Social Contract: An Interpretative Essay. BY LESTER G. CROCKER. (Cleveland: The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1968. Pp. 198. $6.95.)

Professor Crocker combines an impressive familiarity with Rousseau's writings and a polyglot awareness of the secondary literature with psychological criticism and notions of political philosophy to arrive at a novel interpretation of Rousseau as an "authoritarian personality" who anticipates "human engineering" and the "science of behavior." Unfortunately, none of these factors help him to present a convincing explanation of the *Social Contract.* Moreover, the numerous references to secondary studies break the unity of his thought and prevent ready comprehension.

The first chapter explains the historical and psychological setting of the *Social Contract.* Thus, the early works are said to portray Rousseau's first thoughts about man and society; these ideas are developed more fully in the middle period and applied to actual states in the later works. Crocker believes that Rousseau sought a special means of controlling men in all of his writings and finally endorsed authoritarian controls in the practical works. Rousseau's identification of a combat between reason and nature, man's need for a political leader, and the principle that the people are not to be trusted by statesmen is a result of psychological inadequacies according to Crocker: thus, feelings of inferiority prompted his prophetic tone, a deep-seated longing for order compelled him to construct a rigid value system, and the desire that men be independent is evidence of emotional instability.

Crocker is critical of the institutions set forth in the *Social-Contract* and the theories behind those institutions. That Rousseau's State is as self-denying as Sparta is a consequence of the social pact. The community's authority is paramount, and the alienation of liberty is complete because the illiberal conditions of the General Will swallow up individual freedom. Far from preserving man in the independence he enjoyed before society, the total civic participation demanded by popular sovereignty places total control over him. Finally, the passages on the legislator and civil religion convince Crocker that Rousseau sought to establish domination by an elite and to introduce thought control.

Although aware that Rousseau is not responsible for misinterpretations of his thought, Crocker nonetheless considers it worthwhile to identify its "implications and potentialities" by bracing its influences (where the thoughts "have taken root") and to deepen and strengthen his own conclusion by studying analogues ("to what the ideas may conceivably lead"). Rousseau's influence is thus traced to the aristocratic reactionaries, as well as to the radical extremists, of the French Revolution and to precursors of Marxism, as well as of Nazism. Crocker then seeks facile analogues in *Brave New World, 1984,* and *Walden II*—concluding that *all* of these parallel Rousseau's ideas by inventing new possibilities for exerting power over men and reflecting the attitudes of the "totalitarian mind."

Four characteristics of totalitarian democracy—charismatic guide or leader, ideal of community, goal of unanimity, techniques to mobilize and control popular opinion—found in Rousseau's social thought by Crocker persuade him it represents a classic example of such a regime. Moreover, Rousseau's personality is a classic example of the totalitarian mind because: his need for reassurance led him to retreat from reality and to insist on dogmatic certainty; he longed for lost innocence; he was an outsider in his society; and he had a psychological fixation on illusion and deception. Rousseau's political scheme is all the more repungnant to Crocker because it is apparently without limits: he does not count on laws to govern men—he wants to reshape them. Finally, the society of the *Social Contract* destroys the antithesis between liberty and authority by abolishing liberty.

The many problems in Crocker's interpretation prevent its acceptance. For instance, he identifies difficulties in Rousseau's goals without considering that Rousseau also recognized them; concern with Rousseau's possible psychological troubles replaces the investigation of serious philosophical issues (pp. 13–14, 28–29). Rousseau's ideas are often dismissed because they conflict with contemporary opinions; the premises of contemporary opinion apparently need not be investigated (pp. 34–35). To explore the meaning of one book, the *Social Contract,* Crocker treats all writings of Rousseau as equally valid; this method allows him to use letters and first drafts, not to mention works with entirely different purposes, in order to affirm his own questionable interpretation.

There are some errors of scholarship in the book. Despite a plethora of footnotes, Crocker often fails to reference citations from Rousseau or secondary authors (pp. 46–47, 50, 57, 62–63, note 51, note 53, and p. 92). Translations are sometimes inaccurate and complete clauses are often omitted (pp. 69, 70, 73, 74, 85, and 97). At other times, Rousseau is quoted out of context to defend Crocker's own interpretation (pp. 70-71, note 110, pp. 87, 88, 95–96, 176, and 178). Three misprints occur in references to the *Social Contract:* p. 75, references should be to II, 7 and II, 12, paragraph 5; p. 176, reference should be to III, 15.

In sum, the advantages obtained from Crocker's familiarity with all of Rousseau's work and with his life, as well as from Crocker's ability to indicate the pitfalls into which other Rousseau scholars have fallen, do not compensate for the errors of interpretation resulting from his questionable psychological and unexamined political notions. Before the erudition of Professor Crocker can benefit students of Rousseau, a careful study of the *Social Contract*—a study explaining its purpose, its parts, and how they fit together—needs to be made. Then we will be able to judge what light the first draft, subsequent letters to close friends, and passages from other writings shed on the message of the *Social Contract*.—CHARLES E. BUTTERWORTH, *Federal City College.*

Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization. BY DAVID E. APTER. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968. Pp. 380. $7.95; paper $4.95.)

During the past decade David Apter has been one of the major figures in the field of comparative politics and his insights into the study of modernization have influenced not only a whole generation of graduate students, but his peers as well. His early articles calling for the development of unambiguous concepts and empirical theory have been reprinted in a number of collections, as have some of his studies of bureaucracy and traditionalism in Ghana and Uganda. In 1965, Apter brought together much of his prior research in *The Politics of Modernization.* Because of the availability of Professor Apter's earlier work, it is very difficult to see the value of reprinting his articles once again in *Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization;* although the collection does enable one to follow the intellectual development of Apter himself.

Two of the major topics discussed concern 1) the relative capabilities of different types of political systems to achieve modernization and 2) a general approach to the study of politics. In attempting to provide an answer to the question of the capability of various types of political systems to achieve modernization, Apter argues that "the modernization process creates such problems of coordination and control that 'democratic' political systems, in the usual sense of that term, are not very relevant." (p. 329) What is required is high control system with a political religion (ideology) that provides for some popular support.

"Modernization" for Apter represents the ability of a social system to innovate constantly without falling apart, including the innovation of beliefs about change and of social structures, and requires a "social framework that can provide the skills and knowledge necessary for living in a technologically advanced world." (p. 197). However, the entire modernization process implies the introduction of roles that originate in industrial society into a non-industrialized one (p. 302). Since the latter is incapable of satisfying the expectations of the occupants of the modernized roles, control problems arise that require restrictive and authoritarian solutions.

In his discussions of the problems of modernization, Apter introduces and refines his categorization of political systems according to two basic variables; authority and norms or values. Authority patterns can be hierarchial—i.e. authoritarian—or pyramidal—i.e. representative, while value systems are consummatory/sacred or instrumental. The four combinations of authority patterns and norms result in four basic types of political systems: 1) mobilization, 2) theocratic, 3) bureaucratic, and 4) reconciliation. In the short run, he argues, authoritarian systems are more effective in achieving modernization, but by their very nature they lead to losses of information about the rise of values opposed to those of the elite and to the increasing political significance of claims for interest representation—i.e. they increase the likelihood of revolution.

In the only selection written specifically for this volume, Apter attempts to develop "A Paradigm for Political Analysis." He hopes that by focusing on the problem of choice political scientists will be able to reintegrate their discipline. Laudable as his purposes may be, it is very unlikely that Apter's proposal to treat choice as a problem of authority in its normative, structural and behavioral dimensions will ever achieve its purpose. First of all, like much of the author's work, many of the ideas in the essay are neither clearly expressed nor fully developed. For example, what exactly does he mean when he says: "We need to establish boundaries for [political science] around authority and to treat choice as a program of authority in its *normative,* or moral dimension (embodying both its wider objects and obligations), its structural dimension (involving the patterns of social relationship and organization which, analytically defined, contain social life), and its *behavioral* dimension (including the selection between alternatives presented by the other two)." (p. 363). In spite of the lack of clarity of Apter's paradigm, it is evident that he is pointing to a significant—perhaps the most significant—problem in political science; namely, the increasing divergence between normative political theory and empirical studies of political behavior.

Toward the beginning of this review the question of the value of reprinting Apter's articles was posed, since so many of them are available elsewhere. Actually the volume represents much more than a catalogue of the intellectual development of Apter; in some respects it represents the development of studies of modernization over the past decade—from the rather optimistic views concerning the applicability of democratic institutions in developing areas and the hope that a study of developmental politics, unencumbered by preconceptions based on American and European examples, would enable us to understand better the "fundamentals" of politics to a much more sober realization that "the political aspects of development are far more complex than they appeared to observers a decade or so ago." (p. 331).

In these articles Apter deals with a number of significant problems of political analysis—such as the role of ideas in politics, the diversity of the modernization process, the need to "retraditionalize" political systems, especially the necessity of adapting them to traditional values. However, many of these topics are merely referred to and Apter's insights into such phenomena as the development of a middle class are not fully developed.

As do most collections of articles, this volume suffers from constant repetition. For example, Apter's methodological framework is presented, with minor variations, in most of the articles. Editing of the original articles to reduce this repetition would have improved the readability of the book; however, this would probably have resulted in a new edition of *The Politics of Modernization.*—Roger E. Kanet, *The University of Kansas.*

From Pluralism to Collectivism: The Development of Harold Laski's Political Thought. By Bernard Zylstra. (Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum & Co., 1968, Pp. 236. Hfl. 25, 90.)

One welcomes today an intellectual portrait of Harold Laski (1893–1950). His shifting perspective and the intensity of his internal debates are now reflected in the ferment of an entire discipline. As Zylstra shows, the early Laski argued against the myth of the sovereign state, advancing instead a radical pluralist conception in which the state is just one among many associations serving human needs and competing for citizen loyalty. He later reinstated the government as the single most important agency for promoting and protecting interests common to the entire society, viewing it now as an arena where multiple groups advance claims and, ideally, as an umpire with the ability to balance competing claims according to the dictates of distributive justice and public interest. Finally, after the Depression and the rise of Hitler, Laski adopted an increasingly Marxist interpretation of arrangements in Britain and the United States, calling for massive social change through militant political pressure.

Why the progressive radialization? From Zylstra's exposition we catch a glimpse of Laski's own explanation. Equality of opportunity for the development of personality consistently remained the fundamental, if vaguely defined, social criterion for Laski. His early formulation of the pluralist *ideal* afforded opportunity for individual development within voluntary associations while providing limits to arbitrary state action. But, shortly, Laski began to face "hard facts." Political pluralism operated *in practice* within the confines of an increasingly centralized corporate economy; even a socialist party in office "cannot help but be aware of the fairly narrow limits within which it may successfully maneuver, and the danger to which it is exposed if it embarks upon measures which disturb the 'confidence' of men of property" (Laski, 1947). Pluralism remained Laski's ideal, but until the economic preconditions for pluralism were established the existing political balance would consistently work to the disadvantage of broad segments of society. Only militant pressure from below could redress the existing imbalance; only the government, responsive to these pressures, could institute the needed legal changes. The government's role relative to all other associations must expand appreciably to reduce economic inequality, and thus existing pluralist practice must (temporarily?) suffer while its proper preconditions are established.

"When Zylstra, though, seeks to explain Laski's radicalization, he traces the source to Laski's "apostate" secularism, especially to his ideal of social equality. Equality, Zylstra argues with some cogency, must have "qualifying reservations" if it is to be a viable political norm. There must also be some external authority to limit the role of the state if we are to avoid, as he thinks Laski does not, unintentional avowal of a totalitarian idelogy. Only one authentic basis is available: "No political ideal—whether that be equality, freedom, or the public good—can be a safe guide in the direction of the affairs of state unless it is subjected to the inner structural principle of the body politic, founded on the divine order of creation. Without this norm political reflection and action tend to fall into absolutization of either the individual or the community." This central postulate is asserted with vigor but defended with diffidence.

Zylstra's book moves on two levels. On the first we find a useful exposition of Laski's intellectual development and an insightful, but often overstated, critique of Laski's egalitarianism. On the second, we are told that Laski's "failure" exemplifies fundamental deficiencies in the entire secular tradition. Ignoring consideration of the social and economic conditions of pluralist politics (a central concern of Laski's), Zylstra concludes that pluralism must succumb to "autarkic" individualism or oppressive collectivism unless the "cosmonmic" perspective is employed to "delimit" thought and practice. The latter argument, in my view, is hardly persuasive. Even if it were socially feasible to retinstate the "cosmonomic" view, its adoption would alter the style and unexamined bias of contemporary debates more than it would advance their rationality.—WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, *University of Massachusetts, Amherst.*

The Political Sciences: the General Principles of Selection in Social Science and History. BY HUGH STRETTON. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969. Pp. 434. £ 2-15-0.)

This is a "study of just what valuations do and how they do it" in the social sciences. By "valuations" the author means not only good-bad valuations, but also (and indeed more so) important-unimportant, significant-insignificant, relevant-irrelevant valuations. Hence his subtitle; for he is concerned with the selection of a subject for investigation because it is judged to be important, of a piece of evidence because it is deemed to be relevant, of an objection to an explanation because it is judged to be significant.

These are his terms of reference. Within them, what is his thesis? He contends that the field of value has no limits, or, to put it in another way, that it is not possible to be value-free, in history or the social sciences or anywhere else. Therefore, to opt for "a value-free social science" is not to opt out of all values; it is to opt for a particular set of values. Moreover, Stretton asserts, the set of values chosen is bad in two distinct ways: it is bad technically, in that it has a built-in bias toward certain kinds of explanation, irrespective of their appropriateness to the subject, and blinds the investigator to other kinds of explanation by training him to ignore them; and it is bad morally, for the values that are inculcated are bad values. The second (and less important) of these objections has two parts: an objection that

> "to teach students that their morals are extra-curricular is to deny those morals the very service which education and research should give them,"

and that, since values are inescapable,

> "moral awareness had better be built into the process of research itself; which need be no more obscurantist than laboratory rules about safety or painless vivisection";

and an objection (likely to be quoted by hostile reviewers as a sample of Stretton's offensiveness) that the absence of such built-in moral awareness produces "professionally irresponsible skill for sale to the highest bidders." The second of these objections is less well argued than the first, and, while it could be detached without affecting any other part of his argument, its inclusion may reduce Stretton's chances of a hearing for his more central points. Even the first objection, though argued much more persuasively, is a detachable digression in what is essentially a book about the *technical* effects of value on *selection* in the social sciences. It is important to note, though, that Stretton rejects *Verstehen* arguments, not only of Croce and Collingwood, but even of Berlin and Winch, that all genuine study of society is understanding and valuing and nothing else.

For such an uncompromising book, it is remarkably free from straw men. Stretton asserts, for instance, that "strict behaviorism has few champions left." None the less,

> "social scientists keep trying to exclude (values) by increasingly curious principles of selection,"

for

> "a rule that for every effect, causes should be chosen for proximity, weight, and certain knowability . . . is always stupid."

Because

> "moral abstinence, besides being a moral act like any other, often does serious *technical* damage to explanations by excluding many of their technically important parts,"

and has been linked, he says, with

> "a revival, with new terminology, of some very old explanatory systems, especially single-factor systems."

No improvement is possible, if Stretton is right, through increasing professionalism, for the academic social scientist enjoys no great advantages, and suffers some serious handicaps, by comparison with more committed persuaders, who are

> "prepared to stake more . . . on the truth and sufficiency of (their) knowledge. Its truth and sufficiency, moreover, may be tested by judges more severe than the publishers, prescribers and promoters within the pure scientist's profession."

And we are offered the paradoxical corollaries that persuaders like Lenin and Hobson, though not so good (as social scientists) as men like Langer and Viner, are a necessary precondition for their existence as social scientists; that a combination of the care of the social scientist with the passion of the persuader could produce something which would be both better propaganda and better social science; and that the uncommitted director of an uncommitted social science foundation would economise his resources by employing committed, not uncommitted researchers.

In place of "irrational imitations of the forms of physical science," Stretton offers two models for imitation, one more familiar than the other: economics, and law. Economics, "the best social science,"

> "has prospered as it forsook generality, deduction from simple psychological axioms, symmetrically unified theory, and the search for sufficient explanation, for more practical attention to the facts of life and more specialization of diverse models and theories to the diverse particulars of relations in life."

And law is "a neglected good example to other disciplines," in that the lawyer, for all his solid achievement in abstraction, generalization, and even prediction, is commendably flexible, and knows when to stop abstracting and generalizing and simplifying, and when

> "to complicate his laws; to abstract them less and limit them more precisely; to classify more detail in finer categories instead of dismissing more detail from fewer principles."

The thesis of any such book as this can be readily abstracted—if the author has explained himself clearly—and briefly stated. The book's usefulness, however, depends on how fully and well the argument supports these contentions. Stretton wryly refers his readers to the *Massachusetts Review,* (Autumn 1961),

> "where the footnote-checker will be rewarded by much of the argument of this present book in seven pages."

But he does his book less than justice, for the *argument* is precisely what we cannot get in seven pages. That is why, particularly on a subject like this, a long book is likely to be better than a short book, and a book by a single author (if he has the necessary range to write it) better than a collection of essays by several hands; and it is the reason why this book is likely to be a useful one, and why Part 3 is such an important part of it. For it is particularly in Part 3 that Stretton undertakes the kind of detailed and extended examination of individual books, without which it would be very difficult for him to explain precisely how he intended his general points to be applied. And if these books, "too complicated for summary and too good to deserve it, . . . would be a good reading list for a first course in social theory," then the same books, together with Stretton's critique of them, would be no bad basis for a graduate seminar in the social sciences or in any one of them. For it is a stimulating book, not in the vulgar sense in which that phrase is applied to abusive books likely to provoke counter-abuse, but in the sense of examining important questions fully enough to provoke still fuller examination of them.

This is not to deny the book's faults. It is not established, and it is not necessary to Stretton's argument to suggest, that particular economic explanations are chosen (always?) by economists to give support to a chosen economic "therapy," though it may often happen thus. Even if—and particularly if—it were always so, we would still want to know how economists come to fall in love with their chosen "therapy." Again, it is not necessary to his argument, and it is a misleading way of describing More's use of *Utopia,* to say that it was "desired however impractically," and "imagined *because* (my emphasis) desired." But above all, it is not necessary for his argument for him to throw down so many gauntlets. He need not begin his book by comparing "scientism" with "a cargo cult in Melanesia, invoking magical plenty whenever conventional production is scantiest," or end it with complaints that "scientistic" social scientists use their position to exclude from the profession all but the like-minded. Even where he is funny (as where he rephrases an excerpt in language more to his liking, and adds the note: *tr. H Stretton*), he may be needlessly imperiling the hearing of arguments that he considers most important to be heard.—E. D. WATT, *London School of Economics.*

Sarvodaya: A Political and Economic Study. BY ADI H. DOCTOR. (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., 1968. Pp. 229. $6.25.)

"Sarvodaya," a Sanskrit word literally meaning "the rise of all," was given currency by Gandhi during India's independence movement. He used it to designate his political and economic thinking and techniques. Later his disciple, Vinoba Bhave, adopted the term to refer to the Bhoodan and Gramdan movements.

Sarvodaya is hardly a logically consistent philosophy of political and economic life. Much of it was improvised by Gandhi to meet the challenge of changing circumstances. Adi Doctor, who teaches at Marathwada University in India and who wrote this work for his doctorate in 1964, must be given credit for making an admirable effort to lend coherence to what was not only unorganized but quite obviously unorganizable. Gandhi maintained that "he was less concerned with being consistent with what he had previously said, but more concerned with being consistent with truth as he saw it from time to time" (p. 153). Whether one is pursuaded or irritated by the rationality or irrationality of Dotor's subject, one cannot deny that he has presented in this slim volume an able and faithful interpretation of all that goes under the banner of *Sarvodaya.* Perhaps he has succeeded so well that he has given the appearance of order to contemplative chaos.

Doctor begins by giving us a description of Gandhi's vision of an ideal society, the Ramrajya. Here the author is on somewhat surer footing because we know Gandhi's premises and their logical extentions. But when Doctor returns to the real world and begins to deal with the specifics of achieving that ideal society, he loses his grip. By now, the reader knows only too well what objects Gandhi's ideal society should not have. What he does not grasp with any degree of clarity is how the absence of these objects can be brought about or lived with.

Briefly then, at the political level, *Sarvodaya* views governments as engines of violence. Violence must cease in Ramrajya. But who, one might ask, will make decisions in the absence of governments and how. Presumably in Ramrajya there will be no conflicts because each will have according to his need. Decisions will be based on unanimity should conflicts persist, and those making the decisions will be elected by the unanimity of all participating. Should anyone resist a unanimous decision, others will *Satyagrah* to bring about "voluntary" compliance by the resisting party.

At the economic level *Sarvodaya* perceives machines as instruments of indiscriminate exploitation of men and material. But, it may be said, even Gandhi used and advocated the use of the spinning wheel. Ah, *Sarvodaya* is "not opposed to all machines" (p. 80) as long as the benefits of machines "accrue evenly to all" (p. 79). How will that be, one might ask, given human nature? *Sarvodaya* proposes that nurture will take care of human nature. Educate men to minimize their needs because we live in a world of scarcity. Resources are more likely to be in equilibrium with needs if needs are minimal. There will be no residual frustration if these minimum needs are met. In the absence of frustration and no more needs to fulfill, people will share their excess possessions or hold them in trust for others and thus live in harmony with each other rather than in a state of perpetual competition and conflict.

Bhoodan movement, dedicated to the proposition that "Sab bhoomi Gopal ki" (all land belongs to Lord Gopal) and therefore to all men who are God's children, sought to bring about a redistribution of India's agricultural land. Those in possession of more land than they themselves could till gifted it to Vinoba Bhave, the leader of Bhoodan, who in turn distributed it among the landless. But the case studies cited by Doctor point out that a substantial portion of the gifted land either remained idle under its new owners or reverted back to its original owners. Among the probable causes, Doctor mentions no disposition for agriculture among the many who received the land—they rather remain landless laborers—and the lack of capital goods with which to cultivate. And as Doctor puts it, "The typical Indian village of today, is more often than not, torn asunder by factionalism and governed by narrow considerations of caste" (p. 163).

Is the *Sarvodaya* view of political and economic life then totally invalid for today's India? Perhaps not. Rationalization of poverty has always fascinated the poor for they must live with their poverty. It may be many generations before India even approximates the material prosperity of the Western world. For these generations in waiting, *Sarvodaya* has a message, marvelously stated in the Bhagvadgita,

> Advesta sarvbhutanam maitrah karun ev ch Nirmano nirhankarh samdukhsukh chami
>
> (12th chapter, 13th sloka)
>
> He who seeks Nirvana has no enemies for he is a friend to all beings; nor does he desire, for, to him, pain and pleasure are the same.

BHAGWATI P. K. PODDAR,
Youngstown State University

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Frontiers of Judicial Research. By JOEL B. GROSSMAN AND JOSEPH TANENHAUS, editors. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1969. Pp. 492. $14.95.)

The twelve research papers which make up this book were presented at a conference held at the University of Iowa in October, 1967, supported by a fund honoring Benjamin F. Shambaugh, a past President of the American Political Science Association. What the organizers of the conference did, in effect, was to bring together a group of interesting, productive scholars and give them the opportunity of setting forth in tentative fashion their current research interests. It is of course not to be expected that each of these projects constitutes a "research frontier" in any meaningful sense. Several of the papers are truly innovative in theoretical or methodological terms. Several constitute progress reports on major ongoing projects, while others describe completed research. The comments which follow are necessarily highly selective. This is an important collection, and those concerned with judicial behavior will certainly wish to consult it directly.

Three of the papers will be of special interest to methodologists. Grunbaum presents a model of Supreme Court decision-making based on simulation techniques. The model is intended to incorporate both attitudinal and *stare decisis* considerations, and employs a combination of independent and conditional probabilities.

Schubert's study of the Australian High Court introduces smallest space analysis—"a new multidimensional scaling approach which is particularly appropriate to the investigation of matrices of agreement scores that reflect weaker than interval measurement." Smallest space analysis allows Schubert to investigate asymmetrical matrices, he compares matrices based on both opinion and voting data. His comparison of voting agreement in split decisions and opinion agreement in unanimous decisions led to the conclusion that the same two attitudinal scales are components of both voting and opinion behavior. It should be noted that Schubert deals only with patterns of opinion *agreement,* and that other aspects of judicial opinions may manifest different political behavior.

Ulmer employs the discriminant function to explain Justice Frankfurter's civil liberties decisions. He treats cases as complex stimuli which flash different signs to different people. To avoid the claim that the signs with which judicial votes are correlated are subjective responses by the Justices, Ulmer derives them exclusively from lower court records and the briefs. On the basis of six extra-legal signs so derived, he was able to explain Frankfurter's votes in 83.8% of the civil liberties cases of 1959–1960.

In recent years it has become increasingly fashionable to study non-American judicial systems. Four of the papers in this volume are so directed: Schubert's work in Australia, Danelski's study of the Japanese Supreme Court, Kommers' paper on the West German Federal Constitutional Court, and Morrison's study of the Swiss Federal Court. The thrust of contemporary scholarship in the field of comparative politics is obviously non-institutional, and it will be interesting to see whether truly comparative cross-national studies can be developed by scholars who are oriented towards specific institutions. For example, Morrison demonstrates that the Federal Court is not a significant factor in the Swiss political process. This would appear to be the end of comparative *judicial* analysis. But his finding suggests a host of questions to the student of comparative politics, more broadly defined.

Danelski and Kommers report that one factor inhibiting the development of a strong judicial role in Japan and Germany, despite Constitutional provisions creating judicial review, is the widespread realization that the courts are in face political bodies. It is interesting to ask whether a judiciary can develop sufficient legitimacy to permit it to play an active part in politics in an age of legal realism. Perhaps popular belief in "legal magic" is a necessary pre-condition of effective judicial review.

The impact of legal realism on American state judges is discussed by Vines in the one truly comparative analysis in the book. His study of judicial role perception—based on interviews with 26 of the 28 justices of the supreme courts of Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania—takes the theoretical orientation of Wahlke's *Legislative System*. Vines demonstrates that more than half of the justices define their roles in terms of "law-interpreter" rather than "law maker" and that they minimize their policy making function. While there are considerable differences in the role perceptions of judges in different states, these differences do not seem to be related to the method of judicial selection, political party affiliation, or the ideological content of the judges' opinions and voting patterns.

Vines' research opens a wide range of questions. What are the sources of differing judicial role perceptions? Do judges differ from other political elites in this regard? Does the general public—as measured in Murphy and Tanenhaus' groundbreaking study, parts of which are reported in this volume—perceive the role of the judiciary in different terms than do the judges? What effect does this have on the Supreme Court's ability to manage the judicial bureaucracy?

Dolbeare convincingly demonstrates the necessity of directing systematic attention to the actual impact of judicial decisions on public policy, and he has begun to lay the groundwork for such a study. Of particular interest are his comparisons of state and federal courts in terms of the "output-impact focus." State and federal courts are used by litigants with different policy orientations; their impact on public policy differs in important respects; and federal courts are less fully integrated into the urban policy process than are state courts. Dolbeare may have overstated the case for a "bottom-up" view of the judicial system by emphasizing the small number of cases in which trial courts are reversed. Reversal by the Courts of Appeals in 9% of the cases considered may have been enough to keep the district judges "honest." We will need direct evidence from the trial judges before we can generalize about their awareness of hierarchical pressures.

One paper in the collection is seriously flawed. To test the hypothesis that experience with a court influences attitudes towards the judiciary, Jacob administered questionnaires to persons who had undergone bankruptcy or garnishment proceedings, and to a randomly selected control group. When comparing their responses, he treats *minute* differentials—differences as small as six tenths of one percentage point—as meaningful. Having explicitly rejected tests of statistical significance, Jacob makes no attempt to explain how he knows that differentials which appear trivial to the naked eye are of any interest. Contrary to his assertion, his data suggest that attitudinal differences between the debtors and the control group are related to differences in education, income and occupation.

Even more unfortunately, one of his basic conclusions is contradicted by his data. Jacob asserts that "those with experience in the courts felt less efficacious toward them than those without such experience." But data he presents in separate tables demonstrate that this is a half-truth. Those whose courtroom experience was in a garnishment proceeding do have lower scores on the judicial efficacy scale than does the control group. But in five out of eight categories, those whose courtroom experience was in bankruptcy proceedings score higher on the judicial efficacy scale than the control group, holding education, income and occupation constant. Thus Jacob's data support an alternative hypothesis: a "successful" (i.e.: bankruptcy) experience with a court increases one's feeling of efficacy toward it.

Finally, without detracting from the value of the Shambaugh Conference, one may question the utility of a volume such as this one as a mode of communication among scholars. The price of the book is such that only libraries and reviewers will own it. Research papers of this length could have been published as journal articles. Perhaps the latter course of action would have better served the scholarly community.—EDWARD N. BEISER, *Brown University.*

Organizing Men and Power: Patterns of Behavior and Line-Staff Models. By ROBERT T. GOLEMBIEWSKI. (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1967. Pp. 277. $6.00, $3.50 paper.)

Robert Golembiewski's unusually prolific efforts in contributing to the literature of administration have continued to a point where a pattern is clearly discernible. Both the approach and objective of his work have remained rather consistent —he is derivative and synthetic in approach and his objective is to revise the practice of administration. His recent work on the problem of organizing the staff function in management bears the cut of this stamp in bold relief.

The theme of the book is straight forward—it is an argument for a "new concept" for the staff function—and it is organized generally to a format often employed by Golembiewski—critique of the concepts of the traditional theory (both conceptually and in terms of the contemporary realities of organization life), explication of the alternative concept, evidence on the effects (advantages) that accrue from its application in practice, and the place of the concept in "modern organization theory." The concept for staff role in the "traditional theory" Golembiewski self-descriptively dubs the NII (Neutral and Inferior Instrument) model and it is seen as increasingly unworkable as the pace and scope of change, size, and technological level characteristic of organizations increase. In addition, authority relations—and authority is of course *the* problem of the staff-line relationship—are changing in modern organizations, in the direction of being "less direct, arbitrary, and authoritarian. A number of (to use one of the author's terms) "minianalyses" covering specific aspects of organization and the management process are offered to make the argument in more detail—sources of line-staff tension in everyday operations and the tendency of the NII model to cause vertical fragmentation of activities which increasingly require horizontal integration with the growing interdependence of specialized parts in common flows of work.

With the defects of the NII model effectively demonstrated, Golembiewski then brings his alternative on stage: the "Colleague Concept." This concept is shaped to the objective of moving "away from unnecessary stress and repression, and this by maximizing the chances of horizontal integration." The structure which it implies emphasizes coequal cooperation of line and staff units through a "colleague group" and "unit team" structure. While the book notes that this concept is only an approximation, specific guidelines are offered for implementing the alternative approach as well as an extensive argument for its efficacy in reducing tensions and in yielding other beneficial side-effects. The analysis concludes with a description of how the "Colleague Concept" fits the new research on organizations—that it is consistent with the now famous "Theory Y" of management, fosters creativity, eases work stress, facilitates use of computers, and increases integration.

As was noted, this book is very much within the "Golembiewski genre," but it nonetheless diverges from this pattern in two important aspects. One of these is the emphasis on power in organizations—an emphasis which the author asserts was neglected in the traditional theory but is the "warp and woof of this analysis." This "emphasis" amounts to the assumption (made by our founding fathers in drafting the Constitution, see notes) that men are intrinsically both good and evil and possess an insatiable desire for power. The task for organization theory—specifically in designing line-staff relations—is to take these forces as given and make them work *for* instead of against organization purposes. By assuming this emphasis as a starting place, Golembiewski appears to move away (and thereby detracts) from a most important theme that formed a significant part of his contribution in *Men, Management, and Morality.* In that book (and even implicitly in the argument he makes here) the position is taken that the "nature" of men and hence the quality of their lives can to a significant extent be set by the structure of human organizations. This posture supports the normatively uplifting and positive view that people and life can be bettered and that men can perform a positive role in the improvement. And it further highlights the importance and relevance of the study of organizations in an organizational society. The tie-in Golembiewski makes to the founding fathers marks the nature and weakness of his basic assumption in supporting his analysis. It could be argued that it is the ethically ambivalent and somewhat pejorative view of the nature of man reflected in our constitution which has in part resulted in the social and political crisis we are currently facing in the United States. The model of interpersonal relationships implied by the Colleague Concept assumes more of people than the "power orientation" allows. Indeed, it seems clear that if people are the way the "power orientation" view defines them, the colleague structure urged by Golembiewski would operate in a fashion characterized by growing power imbalance or instability, and oftentimes friction and stalemate.

Another difference of this book with much of the author's earlier work is a deficiency of creative synthesis. One of the strengths of his past work has been the ability to go beyond simple use of a wide range of existing research into both novel arguments and imaginative synthesis of fresh insights, conclusions, and implications. This book offers little of this rewarding stuff, save for brief notes such as those on the relation of staff-line structures to use of computers and to potential for creativity.

In fact, the College Concept is so close to the prescriptions clearly implied by the organization research existing when this book was written that it evokes somewhat the feeling, to use the style of its author, that a "house has been burned to roast the pig." This impression is reinforced by the informal, embellished, "bomb-the-point-home" style used to carry the argument—which seems to be an attempt to speak in ever so convincing terms to the practicing manager.

Because the content and tone of the argument tend so much in this direction, in turn, one finds as he nears the end of the book that two very large, old, and nagging questions have again surfaced in the midst of a treatise on administration. One of these questions concerns the serious and persistent gap between the "theory" (or study) of administration and its practice, and the other the proper definition of the relationship between the study of administration and political science—with its corollary concerning the practice of administration and the real world of politics.

Why is the theory-practice gap so persistent? We have known what Golembiewski told us in this book, at least by a general pattern of research findings, for a good while. The "traditional theory" has been whacked at from every corner of the field and long since put down and out in "modern organization theory." Why was a book written in 1967 which not only details an alternative approach to a significant management problem but in addition goes on to labor the underlying theoretical argument—and why does the reader feel, albeit somewhat uncomfortably, that the author needs to do thus? The answer, of course, is that our common experience tells us that the world is still being run in accord with the traditional theory. Golembiewski's strategy in confronting this problem is to reinterpret, reword, and sell the knowledge developed in the academic enterprise in the marketplace of management. At some point we must begin at least to wonder whether the basic problem of communicating to the world outside resides in the institutions and professional contexts within which this knowledge is developed—and that the only effective coping strategy is one which addresses the problem at this level.

The other question (administration, study and practice, and political science and politics) is posed in two ways. One is incidental to this book—the fact that the examples drawn and the data employed fall almost exclusively in the area of industrial manufacturing concerns—but the other is general. Given the fact that a central aspect of modern society is large scale, widespread organization, with deep consequences for our political system that are being noted by, among others, an increasing number of commentators on the pluralist technique, it could be asserted that a major mandate to those who are writing the contemporary administration literature is to tie their studies into this broader, immediate, and extremely important area of concern. This was accomplished in *Men, Management, and Morality* effortlessly and as a by-product. As Golembiewski shows, the staff junction problem is a major source of organizational ineffectiveness. Therefore in spite of the fact that his analysis is technical, relevance to the broader question of political viability is inherrent in it and should have been drawn. For this reason one would hope that in the future this author would move toward the direction of his earlier work, where relevance to political science and politics was clearer.—ORION WHITE, JR., *The University of Texas at Austin.*

Judicial Power and Reconstruction Politics. BY STANLEY I. KUTLER. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968. Pp. 178. $5.95.)

To many casual and not-so-casual students of the American Political System, the Civil War and Reconstruction era finds the Supreme Court where Professor Kutler expected to find it when he began this study, at "the nadir of judicial power and influence.". This volume of essays should mark the end of such an ill-conceived notion.

Professor Kutler securely identifies the judiciary as a participant in those extraordinary political times and much more of a citadel to be captured by the Republican Party, than an institution to be either ignored or destroyed. Professor Kutler lays bare the often delicate interplay of Court and Congress which provides us with a rare laboratory in which to examine the role and "toughness" of the Court under stress during a period when politics was inflamed and polarized.

Kutler further demonstrates how Congress inexorably increased the reach of the Federal Judiciary in our system through attempts to expand Federal protection in the face of state hostility to Congressional policy. While the base of power thus grew, the Supreme Court was busy at the apex giving substance to judicial review as ten Acts of Congress fell in eight years where only two had fallen in the previous sixty-one years. Some of the more valuable portions of the book expand on this theme in some of its less obvious, but more profound, implications.

In sum, this period was marked by the growth of judicial power rather than by judicial abdication. True, this was achieved in the face of *Dred Scott* and during adverse times. But Kutler demonstrates that the political conditions of the war and reconstruction created many of the circumstances leading to this growth of judicial power. As importantly, the author makes clear that to prosper in such soil, the Court's roots must have already grown deeply and well.

Even though all these good things and more abound, an uncertain sort of tentativeness lingers about the book. A major problem may well be that Kutler casts the work as if he were refuting a well-developed, systematic interpretation of the Court's role during the period. Actually, no *interpretation* of the Court's role in these years has ever been developed. The author thus assigns himself to attack random opinions and formless misconceptions without supplying an adequate form of his won. A certain vagueness results from this concern with destroying that which isn't there. Ink could probably have been better spilled by constructing an interpretation while whacking away at the misconceptions. It seems that several unfortunate streamlets flow from this spring.

First, the more specific themes in the book appear haphazardly. The author apparently committed himself too completely to refuting this instance or (as is more often the case) casting doubt on that one, to bring the strands of the work safely through the book. For example, after seeming to dispose (incorrectly, I think) of the notion that the Court was constitutionally opposed to even some Reconstruction legislation and that Radical Republicans need not have been concerned about the Court, the author tells us suddenly in the concluding chapter that "the practical limits of judicial power and an emotionally charged, polarized political situation inhibited the justices regarding the Reconstruction legislation. . . ." (p. 164)

Secondly, the refutations come too easily at times and some seem grounded in shifting standards. For example, the standard used to debunk the so-called danger to the Court from Congress seems so high that one wonders at times whether the author would consider the Court in danger anywhere short of its actual destruction. Further over, however, we learn that the stripping of the Court's jurisdiction to hear the McCardle case was a serious slap at the Court. The whole, in short, suffers from the format's dictation of the way the parts will be handled, and detracts from the consistent development of the really important themes.

I must note that the author seems to be considerably more in debt to Harold Hollingworth's dissertation (*The Confirmation of Judicial Review under Taney and Chase*) than is acknowledged. Professor Hollingsworth develops the theme of judicial activism during this period, and merits some generous acknowledgment from Kutler.

Finally, the reviewer is dogged by the nagging thought that this book may be a bit premature. Evidential points which are available in materials the author researched do not appear at important junctures, and some problems in analysis seem unnatural from the pen of one so skillful. Had the author devoted more than the "few years" he mentions in the introduction of work in a field new to him, certainly we would have a richer product. But one should no doubt rejoice more and complain less. For, not only is the product rich and important as it stands, but no student of our political process can again ignore the Reconstruction Court.—DAVID F. HUGHES, *Centre College of Kentucky.*

A Decent Home. The Report of the President's Committee on Urban Housing. (Washington: U.S.G.P.O., 1968. Pp. 252.)

The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 established a goal of 26 million dwellings, included six million subsidized units for low and middle-income families, to be built or rehabilitated in the next decade.

President Johnson's Committee on Urban Housing issued its report, *A Decent Home,* in December of 1968. The Committee was charged, in standard Johnson rhetoric, "to find the way to harness the productive power of America—which has proved it can master space and create unmatched abundance in the market place—to the most pressing unfilled need of our society." It will come as no surprise to anyone that the Committee failed to discover THE WAY. What the Committee did do, to its unfading credit, however, was to produce one of the most useful, readable and thorough analyses of the inputs of the American housing system to appear in recent times.

Following the format of many such studies, *A Decent Home* opens with a concise committee summary containing findings and program recommendations. The latter range from the suggestion that "all Federally subsidized and Federally insured or guaranteed housing, except public housing, should be financed by bonds insured and guaranteed by the U.S. Government," to the slightly time-worn but worthy advice to channel more Federal funds into research and development activities. The committee report is followed by a series of staff reports which are, not unexpectedly, the treasure troves of the piece.

The staff studies cover many, though by no means all, of the housing system's variables. Absent, for instance, is any discussion of the role of architects or for that matter any reference to the galling problems of housing design. And having once more quoted the goal of the National Housing Act of 1949, "A decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family," the staff chose to ignore the problems of environment altogether while it concentrated upon the problems which stood in the way of constructing the house itself. As a consequence, one finds a very worthwhile paper on housing finance and an excellent overview of the housing industry, but nothing, for example, on neighborhood planning.

In the Housing Industry section, one is treated to a well controlled study of private and public sector overlap. The housing process is divided into four phases—preparation, production, distribution, service, and the participants and sources of rules are charted for each phase, e.g., title company, sub-contractor, broker, insurance company; real estate law, union rule, recording regulation, housing code. All of these elements are not accorded adequate coverage. The productive aspects alone are given a full treatment.

If one trusts to the conventional wisdom that the building industry has not changed in character since the time of Prince Hal, or that union members in the construction trades are America's most overpaid and underworked drones, he is due for some well researched counter-evidence. The home building business is, in the words of one staff study, "fiercely competitive," and it has introduced incrementally a series of technical innovations, both factory and *in situ,* which have substantially altered the methods of home erection. Indeed, it is the housing consumer who is conservative, for he insists that new materials be used in such a way that they resemble old. Thus aluminum siding must be shaped to give the appearance of wood, and new types of interior wall materials must mimic the qualities of plaster.

This is not to say that greater efficiencies cannot be introduced so that the nation has a better chance of attaining its ten-year goal in housing, but the studies reflect a doubt that significant additional economies can be achieved by factory assembly, one of the more common suggestions currently received. Further efforts in that direction will, it is feared, pile up costs of handling, warehousing and transportation. Rather, the report stresses fuller employment of the presently underutilized labor supply, in particular by adapting more of the available techniques of winter building. Such changes require alterations in union work rules and local ordinances as well as industrial decisions.

More than any other single individual, HUD Secretary George Romney will be held responsible by those who keep such accounts for the Nation's success or failure in meeting the housing target. If Secretary Romney's good fairy were to grant him wishes three, one doubts, on the basis of the material in *A Decent Home,* that he could utilize such an ethereal grant-in-aid with any greater success than the last known character so confronted. The choices would be agonizing.

On the other hand, a careful reading of the Report should leave him clearer-headed about his options. He would be less likely to throw away his first wish on improved labor productivity in home-building which the Report thought to be almost as good over the years as general industrial productivity. He might wish for more and cheaper land in metropolitan areas. (In 1950, average site cost for a new FHA-insured one-family house was twelve per cent of the total house price. By 1967, the average site value had climbed to 20 per cent of the net cost of the house.)

If this reviewer could whisper in his ear, he would say, "Mr. Secretary, sir, whatever else you do, ask that good fairy to incline the heart and mind of Richard M. Nixon to avoid those monetary and fiscal policies which in the past have so severely restricted the flow of available funds into the housing market."—Paul A. Pfretzschner, *Lafayette College.*

Problems in Public Expenditure Analysis. Edited by Samuel B. Chase, Jr. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1968. Pp. 269. $6.75.)

The five papers and ten commentaries presented in this volume, along with the editor's introductory chapter, constitute the latest of the books published under sponsorship of the special Brookings program entitled Studies of Government Finance. The papers provided the background for the second Brookings conference on government expenditures. Like its sister volume *Measuring Benefits of Government Investments,* which resulted from the first conference, the focus is on the application of welfare economics to federal government expenditure policy— or, more specifically, the measurement of the benefits and costs of governmental activities. Unlike its sister volume, this book is largely concerned with certain of the problems of benefit and cost measurement that cut across a number of program areas. Although the issues are mostly technical in nature, the book is not designed solely for the specialist but, instead, is aimed at the wider audience of those who have an interest in improving governmental expenditure policies.

The first essay is by Roland N. McKean and is concerned with the use of prices, both when markets do and do not exist, as inputs into cost-benefit analyses. McKean lays particular stress upon his view that choices of governmental expenditures are "group" choices, which means that there is no ultimate test of preferredness or any ultimately correct social welfare function. According to this view, the analysis of public expenditures should be conducted in a manner which is similar to consumers' research in that alternatives and their implications should be pointed out, but this analysis does not point to a "proper" decision since different tastes mean that the various implications will be evaluated differently. McKean goes on to point out that even if one accepts efficiency or Pareto optimality as a goal, there are problems associated with the use of prices which are inherent to cost-benefit analysis. There is no need to summarize the argument here but one should point out that McKean is more pessimistic than either of his discussants, Allen U. Kneese and Julius Margolis, who point to some of the successes of systematic analysis and instances where "artificial" measurement techniques have been devised which can serve as substitutes for the non-existent prices.

McKean's essay is useful and informative in the sense that it points up difficulties inherent in any cost-benefit analysis. On the other hand, inherent difficulties need be no cause for despair. McKean summarizes his attitude by invoking an answer Maurice Chevalier is said to have given when asked how he felt about growing older: "Well, there are lots of things wrong with it, but it's not so bad when you consider the alternative."

The second essay is James R. Nelson's useful discussion of the value of travel time. Historically, the savings of travel time has been considered one of the most important benefits of improved transportation and there have been numerous studies which place monetary values upon the saving of time. Nelson reviews much of this literature and points out the tremendous variation in the values which have been assigned to an hour saved. The most interesting part of Nelson's essay consists of a critique of the methodology by which time has been valued. He argues that the problem is far more complex than has commonly been realized, and he rejects the use of the wage rate as the sole criterion. He documents his case by citing and interpreting some very interesting evidence concerning air travel into and out of New York. In commenting upon Nelson's paper, Steiner develops an important if illustrative model which demonstrates why the search for a single value of time is a quest in vain. Neither Nelson nor his discussants, however, are able to provide a convincing argument which demonstrates what the appropriate methodology should be.

The third essay, by T. C. Schelling, is concerned with the problem of evaluating programs which reduce the risk of death. Schelling argues that the worth of human life is not at issue, but that we should be concerned with the probability of death. Hence, his argument centers upon the issue of determining a method of placing a value upon reductions in this probability. While the discussion is interesting and lively, Schelling does little more than point out the associated difficulties. His discussants, Martin Bailey and Gary Fromm, do not appear to agree with Schelling's definition of the problem nor with his approach to it.

The fourth essay, by Burton A. Weisbrod, discusses the possibility of introducing a consideration of income redistribution into cost-benefit analyses. Weisbrod correctly points out that at present the great majority of the cost-benefit studies ignore the issue of redistribution. Two suggestions are made. First, he suggests that cost-benefit analysts adopt the practice of systematically tabulating the (net?) benefits according to the recipients' age, income, region, and color. Weisbrod recognizes, but does not emphasize, difficulties associated with this proposal. Despite the difficulties, it probably has substantial merit. Second, Weisbrod follows a revealed preference approach for the development of a method of inferring the implicit weights assigned by congressional decision-makers to specified groups when certain projects are adopted. Having proposed the method, he then goes on to apply it for the case of four water resource projects. It should be pointed out that both of his discussants, Robert H. Haveman and Ruth P. Mack, raise certain objections to the procedure. However, neither was intrigued, as was this reviewer, with the fact that the estimated implicit weights in the example for whites with incomes less than $3,000 per annum and non-whites with incomes greater than that amount were negative! One can speculate on the meaning of this result.

The final essay, by James T. Bonnen, fundamentally differs from the others in the volume in that it is concerned with a specific program rather than a general problem of cost-benefit analysis. Bonnen analyzes the distribution of gross (certainly not net) benefits which result from the program of cotton price supports. He is careful to explain the outlines of the working of the program. His methodology for estimating gross benefits appears to be straight-forward, although the details of his calculations are not shown or explained. Bonnen is concerned solely with the distribution of gross benefits and does not consider the allocational aspect of the price support program since it clearly would fail any cost-benefit test. The calculations reveal, the arguments of those who support the program notwithstanding, that the gross benefits are not evenly distributed. "In general about 50 percent of the benefits of the cotton price support program go to the top 10 percent of the larger cotton farmers in each region . . ." William M. Capron, while discussing Bonnen's paper, observes that the estimated distribution of benefits has "little relation" to the rationale by which Congress has been persuaded to appropriate the necessary funds but no one dwells on the implications of the point.

One cannot conclude that this book has been successful in developing generally acceptable solutions for many of the unsettled issues of cost-benefit analysis. Such was probably not the intent anyway. However, it is a useful book and it will probably find its way onto the reading lists of those who teach cost-benefit analysis, and it should be read by all those who are concerned with the analysis of public expenditures.—OTTO A. DAVIS, *Carnegie-Mellon University.*

Modernizing American Government: the demands of social change. EDITED BY MURRAY S. STEDMAN JR. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968. Pp. 182. $4.95.)

Scholars and politicians would both agree that if our ancestors were to suddenly come forth from their graves today, one of the few things they would recognize about modern life would be the structure of governments. In this compact, easily readable collection of essays, Professor Stedman and other contributors describe how our political institutions have coped with new problems and social changes confronting American society in the post World War II era.

The essays are empirical and operational in their outlook, rather than theoretical, as each writer notes proposed reforms for transforming our governmental institutions and assesses the prospects for achieving meaningful changes in the future to meet the demands of social change. As a supplemental text for American government courses, undergraduates will find this short volume ideal for determining whether our governmental structures are meeting the pressing demands of the twentieth century. A selected bibliography, organized around the basic political institutions discussed by the writers, would have been a welcome addition to the book in encouraging further study.

Professor Stedman sets the stage in his introduction by highlighting the impact of future developments on our society. The conflict and tension that exist between political institutions and the forces of change are carefully noted. Each contributor to the volume evaluates the prospects for modernization for the different governmental institutions using Stedman's definition of political modernization as "the process by which the power—allocating institutions of society improve their ability to meet the new demands resulting from social change." (p. 7)

Professor Koenig's essay on "The Presidency" shows how the office of chief executive has been very adaptive to change since the end of World War II. Proposals for reform in the areas of presidential elections, campaign financing, and powers of the President are ticked off in rapid fashion. The call for greater presidential power over personnel, planning, and administrative direction of the executive branch is sounded, but the obstacles to achieving these reforms might have been more thoroughly discussed and evaluated.

The essay on "The Congress" by Professor Derge notes the difficulties the national legislature has in competing with the Presidency in the sphere of foreign relations, and presents some significant proposals for strengthening Congress's informational handling capacity. Derge is quick to recognize that many recommendations in the internal reform of the legislative branch require psychological changes in the climate of Congress which are not politically feasible today. In a day when many individuals feel alienated from the political system, Derge might have discussed proposals for embudsmen, consumer protection legislation, and bills for reducing poverty which indicate that steps are necessary to close the "communication gap" between the citizen and his elected representatives in Washington.

Professor Magrath's essay, "The Supreme Court and A National Constitution," succinctly describes how the Court has conferred supreme economic and social welfare policy-making on Congress and the Presidency, while concentrating its attention on preserving individual liberties and rights, and upholding majority rule in legislative apportionment cases.

"Administration: The National Security Agencies" by Professor Thumm is a concise, well organized essay which describes the various agencies and committees used by Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson to provide coordination, planning, and systems analysis among all governmental organizations involved in foreign policy-making. The description of the failures of the State Department in making long-range plans is particularly illuminating.

Stedman sees in his discussion of "Political Parties" the need to centralize decision-making power if the national presidential parties are to be modernized. Characteristics of both a personalized presidential party and an institutional presidential party are briefly noted, but some comment on third party developments would have strengthened his essay.

Professors Gilbert and Smith in "The Modernization of American Federalism" highlight some of the critical problems, such as socioeconomic disparities and wide variations among states as to fiscal capacity, which concern state governments today. The authors discern six significant trends of federalism since the days of the depression and show in the case of public health how private federalism has evolved in the United States.

In his essay on "Local and State Government" Professor McKee relates why political institutions at the state level have been successful in withstanding changes and shows how the theory of nonpartisanship advocated by the National Municipal League is incompatible with the popular conception of American federalism. The writer illuminates the problem of judicial reform resulting from the lack of well-understood procedures for relating the judicial function to the political process.

In a short summary, Stedman sees the prospects for modernization of political institutions encouraging with the continual expansion of urbanization and industrialization of Americal life. This succinct volume provides constructive suggestions for the restructuring of American governmental institutions that will enable national, state, and local governments in the future to meet the needs of our people.—J. David Palmer, *Georgia State College.*

An Introduction to the Legal System. By Jay A. Sigler. (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1968. Pp. 248. $5.50.)

This endeavor cannot shake free from the paradox which attended its birth. It is a book which proceeds from an empirical frame of reference, yet its basic premise—that jurisprudence is fading as an intellectual activity, being replaced by an analysis of the legal system—is nowhere established in the text by measurable evidence. The superstructure which Sigler felt it necessary to erect as skeleton for his presentation, a systems analysis approach, contributes little to the reader's perception of the actual role of law in society.

The author attempted a marriage of law, political science, and sociology using a cybernetic analogy. His vocabulary of "input," "output," "feedback," "information," and "homeostasis" was an effort to provide a common terminology for legal scholars from different diciplines. If successful this heuristic device (Sigler acknowledges that it is a way of ordering experiences, not a final version of legal reality) could be generative of fresh insights or suggestive of future research. Unfortunately, it seems an unnecessary distraction from the value of this book. (At one point there is even an apparent confusion between what is an input and what is a feedback.) What Sigler has given us is really a study of the functioning of the legal process in the peaceful settlement of disputes. It is also a report of research findings, "consolidating gains already attained, while suggesting future tasks." The systems framework is a device for orienting the reader in the stream of legal phenomena; it is less successful as a source of testable propositions. Sigler is most interesting when not preoccupied with verbiage. The work gets stronger as it proceeds.

One of the studies cited, which is worthy of more than a footnote's attention, is that of Phillip Ennis on crime and punishment as seen by the victims. Only 50 of the 2077 "crimes" alleged to have been committed resulted in conviction and only eighteen per cent of the victims questioned said they were satisfied with the outcome.

The highpoint of the book comes with Sigler's insightful examination of the behavior of the Supreme Court. He explores the Court's strengths and weaknesses—where it can advance and when it must retreat. (The author makes the assertion that the power of Congress to expel its members, or to otherwise discipline them, will not be interfered with by the Court. One wonders whether this precedent will be followed in the Adam Clayton Powell suit.) There is a comparison made of the way the Court has treated different minorities (Negroes, unrepresented voters, accused person, Communists); their interests are sometimes sacrificed by the Court to protect itself from its critics' wrath. Sigler has a provocative discussion of the emergence of a new right to privacy with especial reference to the *Griswold versus Connecticut* case.

One of the strengths of this portion of the book is Sigler's discussion of compliance studies (examinations of the follow-through to Supreme Court decisions). Yet even in this section, there are several annoying errors as in his discussion on page 217 of a study of the consequences of Supreme Court reversal of cases and remanding them to state courts for retrial. Oliver Wendell Holmes is misquoted on the Supreme Court's role as umpire of the federal system. It was Brandeis, not Frankfurter, who wrote the oft-cited Ashwander rules.

Though the book is entitled *An Introduction To The Legal System,* the author's choice of material is almost exclusively American. At a time when a comparative focus is becoming common, Sigler's perspective is too limited for his intentions. The writer must have been aware of deficiencies in his work. His "Afterward" is in part a justification for his approach. It is also a misplaced survey of philosophies of law and an annotated bibliography. His vocabulary is particularly unfortunate at this point. Most political scientists' contributions to the field are labeled as "traditional" or "conventional" scholarship. Only the behavioral approach escapes the stigma.—MARTIN GRUBERG, *Wisconsin State University at Oshkosh.*

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Political Power in the Soviet Union: A Study of Decision-Making in Stalingrad. BY PHILIP D. STEWART. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1968. Pp. 227. $3.95, paper.)

Obscured by secrecy and propaganda Soviet politics has been considered one of the mysteries of the modern world, and too often the Western view of Russia has depended on the cult of Kremlinology, i.e. divining the inner workings of the system from the entrails of the vast Soviet propaganda machine. It is through such painstaking works as this study by Philip D. Stewart of Ohio State University that hard data are being assembled to fill in and correct the impressions of Kremlinologists. Carefully reviewing *Stalingradskaia Pravda,* the organ of the party in the Stalingrad blast, for the years 1954–1962 and the official history of the Stalingrad party organization Professor Stewart has documented the changing pattern of political influence in one oblast in the center of the Soviet Union. He has also related the developments in this one oblast to the overall workings of the party as reported in the general party literature. Although it would be difficult to prove this a representative oblast, it is a major producer in both agriculture and industry, and there is no reason to believe its general pattern of operation is not typical of a large number of oblasts or regions in the U.S.S.R.

The compilation and analysis of the local material on the Stalingrad Oblast party organization is careful, well-organized and lucid. Given the paucity of the data (party activities are never considered part of the public domain in the Soviet Union) Professor Stewart has used his material to the maximum to give a very revealing picture of oblast politics, although on occasion he bores the reader by unnecessarily going into the small details of individual issues having an obscure relationship to his thesis. It is in drawing conclusions and hypotheses from the local material to help explain overall Soviet politics that the author seems not to have made the best use of his material.

One of the strangest of all Khrushchev's reforms was his decision to defy all tradition and bifurcate the party in 1962, into an agricultural and an industrial sector. The present Soviet leaders have dismissed this reform as an irrational act of a leader who had lost touch with reality. Western analysts are likely to treat it in the same vein or suggest it was to prevent agricultural interests from being lost as the party assumed more direct control over industry. The evidence in this volume, however, suggests a very different and almost the opposite explanation.

Professor Stewart asserts from his reading of the general party literature that although "prior to the industrial reorganization the competence of the obkom bureau to deal with problems of industry was limited to questions of secondary importance, then after 1957, the obkom acquired the dominant position in industrial decision-making in the oblast." (p. 119) From this general conclusion he deduced that "from the very start [1957] the bureau of the Stalingrad obkom assumed the dominant position vis a vis the Sovnarkhoz [the newly created decentralized organ for the control and operation of industry]." (p. 113) But the hard data which the author has assembled seems to belie this conclusion. In fact, the oblast party leaders were unable or unwilling to assume the kind of close direction over industry being decreed from Moscow.

For example, the author reports that after 1957, on the one hand, only a few party officials (not including the oblast's first secretary) and some relatively unimportant government administrators took part in the discussions on industrial questions before the meetings of the oblast party committee. On the other hand, the leading party cadres took part in discussing agricultural issues. (pp. 72, 82) Secondly, "the competence of the obkom bureau over the appointment and removal of industrial cadres is much less inclusive than its authority over agricultural personnel." (p. 123) It took two years, for example, for the city party organization to remove an industrial manager "over the protests" of the sovernakoz vice-chairmen and then only on appeal to the obkom bureau. Third, none of the obkom secretaries were formal members of the ruling body of the sovnarkhoz which controlled industry, although they may have participated in its meetings. Fourth, the evidence on the type of education and experience of party cadres makes it doubtful they have had the technical competence and prestige to supervise industry. Although many of the oblast secretaries began their careers as engineers or foremen in factories, they shifted over to professional party work well before the age of forty. (p. 153) The same is true of other party cadres such as the heads of party departments which oversee the economy. To "the extent that Stalingrad is a typical case, then, it is rare that persons who have gained their experience outside the party apparat are appointed to head an obkom otdel." (p. 191) Furthermore, most of the higher education of party cadres has been completed in higher party schools where the major emphasis has been and continues to be political work. (p. 186)

Thus the evidence indicates that the party at least in the Stalingrad oblast avoided and/or were unable to take the responsibility for directing industry as decreed by the 1957 reform and that the industrial leaders of the new sovnarkhozes seem to have resisted such interference. If this were typical of other oblasts, this may have been the reason Khrushchev bifurcated the party, in order to place responsibility for industry directly and unambiguously on one group of the party at the local levels. Of course, with only this one case, such an explanation for splitting the party is only a hypothesis, but even this single case seems to show the rigidity which has developed over the years in the Soviet bureaucracy capable of defying decrees and reorganizations.

Although others may draw different conclusions from the materials, it is, nevertheless, the hard data which Professor Stewart has so prodigiously and carefully analyzed which makes it possible to hypothesize beyond mere speculation on some of the puzzling aspects of Soviet society.—David T. Cattell, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

Rebels and Whips: Dissension, Discipline and Cohesion in British Political Parties since 1945. By Robert J. Jackson. (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1968. Pp. 346. $10.00.)

Most students of the House of Commons seem to have accepted the decline and fall of the 'independent' MP and the diminishing freedom of action accorded to independently-minded members of the two major parties as inevitable, given the growth of the mass party. The rigidity of party relations and the apparent permanence of party cohesion is accepted and applauded. Yet there has been little real empirical work seeking to ascertain the nature of this cohesion within the Labour and Conservative parties, and what preserves and maintains such cohesion.

It is the prime merit of Professor Jackson's book that he amply confirms that the nature of party cohesion is exceedingly complex, that it varies between the parties and is affected by a myriad of factors which include time, the size of the party majority or the length of time it has been in or out of power, individual and group attitudes towards party policies, and the nature of constituency influences on individual MPs. Jackson seeks to explain 'the dynamic relationships between dissension, discipline and cohesion by a detailed examination of the attitudes, beliefs and political behaviour of MPs during the years 1945 to 1964 (p. xi). Much of the study is devoted to a detailed and slightly repetitive analysis of party rebellions in this period, demonstrating that cohesion was often less (and rebellion greater) than is often believed, and that punitive action against rebellious backbenchers has been infrequent and of limited effect.

The study is, however, not merely concerned with rebellion. Jackson, in a fascinating analysis of leader-follower relations, shows that the Conservative party leadership relies more heavily on offering positive inducements to loyalty rather than imposing punishments, indirectly indicating certain basic cultural differences between the Labour and Conservative parties. The Conservatives seem more likely to use patronage as a sop, more likely to reward party loyalty, and prefer to leave or persuade members to resign rather than withdrawing the whip or expelling individuals from the party. Party loyalty is maintained through cultural rather than legal norms, as befits a party of tendencies rather than factions. The more diverse and factionalised nature of the Labour party has made it necessary to seek to maintain discipline, especially on non-sponsored members when the party is in office, though Jackson indicates that the PLP Standing Orders and disciplinary procedures are often as much an embarrassment as an advantage to party leaders. The fact that the Labour party began at the constituency level and developed into a parliamentary party, while the Conservative party began in Parliament and developed its mass party organisation from this, is reflected in the evidence that most Labour MPs that rebel have the support of their constituencies whereas constituency organisations in the Conservative party tend to be more loyal to the party leadership than to their individual member, especially when the party is in office.

Jackson's empirical work is careful and concise, and there is a minimum of factual error, but the concluding chapter is disappointing. He is content to demonstrate that rebellions and discipline are 'but part of the flow of information' (p. 309) in the process of adjusting party policies and is unwilling to discuss the implications revealed by his study. It indicates, for example, that party discipline is as much self-imposed by MPs as imposed by party leaders, notably because of the mutual desire to maintain party unity while allowing for party change. A useful, though ignored, contrast to this is the spectacle of the Liberal Parliamentary party which, while acting as a cohesive group, has no formal party procedures to help enforce such cohesion and their party whip has no disciplinary role.

The adversary nature of Parliamentary activity, plus the cautiousness and ambition of many MPs to stay in Parliament and become Cabinet or Shadow Cabinet members, means that few MPs feel able to afford the luxury of continued dissent, and those who do often avoid isolated action. So, elaborate games of bluff and counter-bluff can mark the nature of the relationship between the whips and the party backbenchers, the nature of this depending upon whether the party is in or out of office. MPs revolt, but rarely to the point, or at a time, where they damage seriously the image of party unity, while party leaders threaten discipline but are reluctant to impose it even in the face of pressure from party loyalists.

Jackson's study indicates that as rebellions are often over policies, and excepting the Labour party in 1951–55 and 1959–61, both parties experienced more rebellions when in office than in opposition, most Labour backbench revolts being over foreign affairs and defense and the majority of Conservative rebellions over domestic policies. He amply confirms that major British parties are cohesive not merely because of the political culture, the structure of the political system and the growth of centralised mass parties, but also because of the need for an adequate adjustment or accommodation process within the parties to allow for policy changes without destroying party unity. This process is accepted by MPs as well as party leaders, though it can be subject to severe strains, especially when the morale of the governing party is low and there is backbench dissent over policies.

It is unfortunate that a fear of criticism for a lack of political science perspective or the 'feel' of British politics should have inhibited Jackson from fully exploiting the potential of his extensive interviews and thorough analysis and at least developing a few hypotheses about the internal nature of the Conservative and Labour parties and the implications for political recruitment in general and leadership recruitment in particular. The study is, however, of great value in defining the real ground on which questions of party cohesion and discipline might be considered, and includes an extensive bibliography. The period of Labour government since 1964 has provided a series of intra-party revolts and disciplinary dilemmas which confirm the complexity and intricacies of this important aspect of party activity.—JOHN D. LEES, *University of Keele, England.*

Patterns of Conflict in Colombia. BY JAMES L. PAYNE. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. Pp. 358. $10.00.)

Considering the improving but generally parochial and unsystematic writing in the field of Latin American politics, Payne's analysis of political conflict in Colombia is a most welcome addition to the literature. It is cast systematically within a theoretical framework, prodigiously researched, comparative not only in terms of the Colombian data but cross-national as well, and skillfully utilizes historical materials to test hypotheses. While extremely provocative, the study is frustrating, nonetheless, because of both theoretical and methodological shortcomings.

In studying the turbulent, strife-ridden politics of Colombia, the author starts from the assumption that we may have assumed wrongly that Latin American *políticos* seek ideas or program rewards. Instead, he suggests they are motivated principally by a drive for status, defined as the prestige participants seek from holding public office, and not by the making or execution of policy. Using the motivational variables of status and program, the author formulates what he calls an incentive theory of politics. Conceptualizing status and program incentives as polar opposites on a continuum, along with the strength of the incentive, a model is presented that permits the comparison of political systems according to the motivational orientations of political leaders. Colombia is characterized by a strong status incentive, Antioquia—a Colombian department—by a weaker status incentive, and the United States by a moderately weak program incentive. To test the theory, a series of thirty-four hypotheses are formulated about incentives in the Colombian political system (Part I), structures in the political environment—the military, political parties, and political competition (Part II), and the consequences of high status motivation of leaders for political parties, Congress and the Executive (Part III). The data employed for testing the hypotheses consist of structured interviews with top-level politicians (130), extended interviews (about 50), extensive historical materials, and aggregate census data. Field research for the study was executed between February and September, 1965.

The basic hypothesis of the study, upon which its validity rests, is that "Status will be an increasingly strong incentive for leadership participation as (1) status-consciousness is higher in the society, (2) the status value of higher political offices is greater, and (3) recruitment to these offices is more open." (p. 28) The first and second conditions appear applicable to Colombia, although no convincing empirical data are offered, but difficulties arise in connection with the openness of political recruitment. Payne maintains that the third condition applies, noting that Colombia is *not* characterized by particularly low social mobility, which is a highly debatable point, as is his assertion that it is unprofitable and misleading to speak of social classes in Colombia, because there appears to be no felt sentiment of class-consciousness. (p. 45) To show the openness of political recruitment, the author discusses low status backgrounds of prominent politicians, which I consider exceptional cases, the ambiguous results of a 1936 occupational census of political leaders, and the findings of his survey. The postulated high incidence of social mobility among upper-level politicians is an unwarranted conclusion because social mobility is measured in terms of occupational status. Assuming that a respondent is an ambassador and his father a journalist (+9 status unit change), it does not follow that the hypothetical ambassador displays high social mobility. How open is political recruitment if the father were an aristocratic *hacendado?*

After arguing that upper-level politicians are motivated primarily by a drive for status and active followers by the search for government employment, Payne turns to some critical structural features of the system. Chapters six and seven focus upon the relation between the military, elections, and political parties in Colombia, Ecuador, and Perú. To simplify the argument, military *coups* stem from civil opposition to the president, with the degree of civilian support for the president—conceptualized as the extent of party identification in the society—representing the key intervening variable. In those political systems where party identification is high, as in Colombia, military intervention is less likely than in countries with low party identification, such as Ecuador and Perú. In chapter eight, the author explains the intense political conflict of Colombia in terms of a series of political factors, which he labels a defensive feud—"a struggle between two groups in which each side recognizes the existence of a mutually acceptable solution less costly than fighting, but that solution cannot be reached." (p. 161) Such a situation prevailed in Colombia before the *Frente Nacional* as a result of strong incentives for political participation, the presence of two political parties, high party identification, decentralized parties, partisan communication channels, and a military not inclined to intervene, Payne praises the alterations instituted under the Frente Nacional for stemming political violence and predicts a "genuine crisis" when the Frente expires in 1974.

Within an environment marked by high status incentive, relatively open political recruitment, and high party identification, the author analyzes the behavior of political groups in the last section of the book. Colombian parties exhibit the following behavioral patterns: keen competition for office, high factionalism, allocation of leadership positions on the basis of electoral strength, cohesive factions on the national level except in elections, and conflict centering around the distribution of political offices, not ideological differences. Turning to the Colombian Congress, turnover is high and legislative behavior is characterized by high absenteeism, low committee workloads, disruptive, conflict-provoking patterns of behavior, and popular-demagogic orientation toward policy. Presidential behavior is marked by impartiality in distributing political offices to factions supporting the government, procrastination in decision-making until the factions can be appeased, avoidance of dramatic commitments to particular policies, and sensitivity to popular demands. While capturing the style of former President Valencia, none of these patterns appears relevant in explaining the behavior of Carlos Lleras Restrepo.

Several conclusions presented in this book are difficult to accept, not only because of dubious methodological procedures but also because of what I consider inadequacies of incentive theory. The use of incentives as independent variables in predicting political behavior is hazardous and begs the question as to why those incentives prevail. Any study that purports to explain questions raised by the author without considering key structural variables of the system, such as the distribution and exercise of political power, the degree and type of economic development, and the extent of foreign economic and political influence, lends itself to faulty interpretations. To demonstrate the point, Payne compares Colombian congressmen, whose principal motivation is status, with United States legislators, whose major incentive is program, and finds that their behavior differs immensely, concluding that incentives represent the crucial explanatory variable. But without placing the Colombian Congress within the context of political decision-making, assuming that the institutional context in Colombia is the same as in the United States, more satisfactory explanations may be overlooked. Structural features of the Colombian political system such as the predominance of the executive in decision-making and the generally subservient role of Congress are not seriously considered. The author attempts to substantiate his interpretation of congressional behavior by predicting, and finding, a lower rate of legislative turn-over in the deviant department of Antioquia, but my calculations suggest that this conclusion is erroneous for the Senate and the difference is minimal for the House.

While present-day predilections of political science thrust interview materials to the foreground, this study would have been strengthened had the upper-level survey been omitted, for shaky, even misleading, conclusions are derived from the data. To say, for example, that no ideological differences separate Colombian party leaders or that no reactionaries are to be found in the Congress on the basis of six poorly constructed questionnaire items is not very conclusive evidence. Even taking into account the above criticisms, along with scattered factual errors, this book warrants careful study.—Gary Hoskin, *State University of New York at Buffalo.*

The Hero and the Crowd in a Colonial Polity. By A. W. Singham. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. Pp. 389. $10.00.)

Claiming that "a sufficient body of knowledge has accumulated in some areas to begin to enable at least some tentative generalizations on the nature of political systems in the Third World" (p. 19), A. W. Singham, senior lecturer in government at the University of the West Indies has embarked upon a comprehensive and extremely well-developed study of the British possession of Grenada, a small Windward Island. From a detailed analysis of the political system of this colony from 1951 to 1962, the time intended to be that island's terminal period as a colony, Mr. Singham has guardedly but seemingly accurately extracted principles which may be applied in some instances to British Caribbean possessions, in others to all British colonies, and in still others, to the colonial system in general.

A number of interesting basic conclusions are drawn by Mr. Singham. Leaders of the emerging nations are "socialized" during the colonial period, and as a result, are "often incapable of making the necessary adjustments to achieve the difficult task of decolonization" (pp. 9–10). They remain unaware of the deep economic, social, and even personality changes which must be undergone, and "the difficulties and pain involved in genuine decolonization usually lead the colonial politician to an attitude of 'it's my turn now'" (p. 10).

Despite claims to the contrary, the authoritarian attitude of the colonial government is shared by the land's emerging native political leaders. They endeavor "to impose change from the top rather than through a process of genuine political socialization" (p. 10). These "elite" members of society become trapped between the traditional society and the colonial leadership and seek identification with the latter. Since they cannot determine whether they have been accepted by the rulers, and lacking the opportunity to be innovative, they often return to the traditional culture of the area once independence has been achieved.

Since Mr. Singham ably demonstrates that no traditional culture exists in the West Indies, he notes that these societies "still face the difficult task of creating a value system that will free them from the stigma of inferiority and will release the creative energies of their people" (p. 11). His study examines the difficulties created by this task, "particularly the role of the colonial political system and its effects on the leaders socialized in this tradition" (p. 12).

Political systems in a colony approaching independence are inevitably unstable, and "a crisis such as that experienced by Grenada is not an isolated phenomenon" (p. vii). Competition for legitimacy among, as Max Weber termed them, the traditional charismatic, and legal domination systems of authority, leads to unsolvable "contradictions." This study considers the relationships between these systems "particularly . . . between the charismatic and legal authority systems in Grenada" (p. 319).

Tremendous rivalry exists between the legal authority or governor who represents the imperial power and the charismatic or native leader who, rising from the masses, seeks the legitimacy claimed by the governor. Complications arise when the charismatic leader is also opposed by the bureaucracy since he poses a threat to the security which they have gained through their position as elites or mid-elites in society.

In the West Indies this picture is further complicated by the existence of intricate constitutional provisions, establishing among other institutions, complex ministerial systems which, instead of unifying the area as was hoped, actually "only further divided the islands and hampered cooperation" (p. 13). These systems place the native leader in a position of direct competition with the governor since the legislature becomes elective, suffrage is often universally granted, and the charismatic leader, or hero, invariably is chosen prime minister.

Through the manipulation of crisis situations, the hero maintains his power, for "the essential link between the hero and the crowd is the former's ability to mesmerize crowds and canalize their emotions for short periods of time" (p. 192). Thus, as politics "routinize" the hero loses power and it is to his advantage to maintain a limited crisis atmosphere.

Having considered these and similar concepts, Mr. Singham proceeds to skillfully dissect the political life of Grenada, a few highlights of which follow. In his examination of the insular economy he notes that it is agricultural with little industrial potential. Nevertheless, he indicates mixed feelings toward tourism. The economy is dependent and the island has been under the grant-in-aid system. A point worthy of note is that many farmers are agro-proletarians, who work for wages and also own small plots. As wage laborers they are more susceptible to labor organization and this makes their political organization easier for the hero.

The author also considers the social structure, attempting to "isolate the critical economic, social, and psychological variables that affect the political culture of a colonial society . . ." (p. 98). An examination of the constitutional order follows. Mr. Singham discusses changes which have occurred since the days of settlement, through the Old Representative System and its collapse, and finally through the establishment of the Crown Colony.

In his survey of recent constitutional and legal developments, the author emphasizes those points which led to conflict between the hero and governor (later the administrator). The 1959 constitution is examined in detail "since it created many of the preconditions for the breakdown of constitutional government in 1962" (p. 144).

The rise of the hero, Eric Matthew Gairy, is closely analyzed. Gairy emerged from the crowd due to the grant of universal suffrage and the crisis situation of 1951. However, subsequent to gaining leadership he "began to make quite reckless demands and to act as though he was above the law" (p. 172). He made little effort to organize urban workers and relied mainly on his personal appeal. This failure to develop an effective political organization greatly hurt his cause.

In 1957 Mr. Gairy was disenfranchized "and until 1961 remained outside the formal corridors of government power" (p. 177). When his franchise was restored he was proclaimed Chief Minister which placed him in direct confrontation with the administrator, James Monteith Lloyd.

Gairy's conflict with Lloyd, the bureaucracy, and the opposition is subsequently brilliantly considered. Charges filed by a Commission of Enquiry led to the suspension of the Gairy government by Mr. Lloyd in June, 1962. In the following election Gairy was defeated.

In this extremely fascinating study, Mr. Singham completely justifies his opening contentions. His study is logical, impartial, complete, and extremely well-documented. Particularly pleasing was the methodology employed which included in addition to extensive documentation, travel to the island, wide-spread interviewing, and the use of participant-observers.

Mr. Singham's repeated references to other studies undertaken in this and related fields and his at times lengthy comments as to their value and shortcomings is of immense value. Other notable features include excellent statistical charts, a section devoted to a description of the methodology employed, appendices containing questionnaires utilized, a bibliography, and a comprehensive index.

This book must be considered an outstanding contribution to the field and deserves attentive study by all students of Caribbean and colonial affairs.—Frank Paul Le Veness, *St. John's University, New York.*

Political Communication: The Public Language of Political Elites in India and the United States. By Satish K. Arora and Harold D. Lasswell. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969. Pp. 312. $6.95.)

If one looks occasionally (say, twice a month) at the front-page stories that have appeared over several years in the New York *Times* and the *Times of India,* paying particular attention to the quoted or paraphrased statements of political leaders, what can he learn about the articulate generalizations that characterize the American and Indian polities? The answer, according to the rather informal presentation of content-analytic findings by Arora and Lasswell, is apparently "Quite a bit." By culling and arranging quotations, and also interpolating fairly sizeable amounts of commentary, the authors have been able to construct interesting analyses of the inner and outer political arenas of the two countries.

More than two-thirds of the book is devoted to this sort of allusive recounting. (In addition, there is an introductory chapter that places the study within the Lasswellian framework of seven decision phases, eight value demands, and so on; a concluding chapter that refers to tabular arrays and discusses trends and possible developments; and two appendices, one statistical and the other methodological. I will focus on this appended material below.) One sees how the Indian and American elites each thematically view their own country, and then how they grapple with the various challenges furnished by the international environment.

Except for an occasional glance at the Indian situation in the American chapters, the portrayals of the two nations do not interpenetrate, nor are they formally parallel in detail. Not only are there only six chapters on India to eight on the United States, but their scopes, singly and together, often differ markedly. In a way such presentational divergence simply mirrors the substantive differences in the two countries' experience. They had Goa and we had (Joe) McCarthy, and not the other way around. But to say this is also to say that in general the book is no more truly comparative than most descriptions of two or more national systems.

The data base extends from January 1, 1950 to June 15, 1958. All front-page stories on the first and fifteenth of the month fall into the information sample analyzed. According to the authors, "The procedure was to note all national speakers (Indians in India, Americans in the United States and to use quoted statements or paraphrases). . . . Each sentence quoted (or paraphrased) is classified according to 'who' said it and 'what' was said" (p. 287). The basic unit, then, would appear to be individual sentences within the front-page communications (speeches, announcements, reports, etc.) of political leaders. I say "appear" because the methodological appendix is so terse and devoid of coding examples that the actual procedures remain uncertain. To illustrate, over the eight-and-a-half years some 408 front pages (17×2×12) would have required examining. The sample of statements, however, totals only 2863—1446 from India, 1417 from the United States—or about seven for each entire front page. My initial impression, underscored by a subsequent perusal of a few issues of the New York *Times,* is that seven is rather low, particularly since "The 'front page' means the stories that appeared on page 1 *plus* the continuation of the stories inside the issue" (italics in original).

Apparently, quite a few remarks have been deliberately left unrecorded. One can perhaps guess correctly about some of the criteria for omission. For example, speakers who were not *prima facie* political were probably ignored. This would mean dropping statements not only by socialites and ballplayers, but also by most businessmen. Of the 143 Americans whose remarks are coded, only four (Bernard Baruch, John D. Biggers, G. G. Gurley, and John A. Stephens) are from business. Stephens is not directly quoted in the text, and Baruch is scarcely typical of the calling. Biggers, though, did advocate high tariffs, while it was Gurley, "president of an oil company, who wrote to Senator William Fulbright: 'We know there is some crackpot fronting for the Jews and we think it is you'" (p. 78). It is difficult to accept these few citations as adequately signifying the newsworthy political communications of American business.

A second criterion for exclusion would seem to be the speaker's lacking nationwide political scope. That would account for the absence of New York City's mayor—indeed, of the entire city government—and of all state legislators. While a few state governors (Byrnes, Dewey, Faubus, and three others) are included, they clearly have played important national roles. Presumably in India state officials more regularly act at this higher level, since the list of 84 Indian speakers includes three state governors, seven state cabinet officials, and five state legislators. What then are we to do with a reference like this: "Dr. William Jansen, superintendent of the New York schools, for instance, suspended teachers without pay for not answering questions that enquired into their political beliefs" (p. 80)? Perhaps the authors deem this an act of national significance, but it is hard to know for sure.

A third exclusionary possibility is that some convenient statement length other than the (grammatical) sentence is sometimes the unit analyzed. This might especially hold for paragraphs where later sentences substantially repeat earlier ones. Similarly, the rules for accepting an account as paraphrase might be more stringent than one would imagine. It also appears certain—though we are nowhere explicitly told this either—that all quotations attributed to unidentified "spokesmen" or "observers" are systematically eliminated.

Some readers might be disturbed that more than 55 percent of the statements from India derive from just one speaker, Prime Minister Nehru. Such a peaking of concentration in so fragmented a country, however, is almost surely a crucial political fact and not a mere investigative artifact. What disturbs me is that it is so difficult to know just what this study is a study of. Far more detailed appendices are clearly called for, ones perhaps that would exemplify the way in which a couple of front pages were actually coded. And yet, while a complaint of this sort is justified, it seems so strange, given all that the political science profession owes methodologically to the book's second author.—Morris Davis, *University of Illinois.*

Politics and Beef in Argentina: Patterns of Conflict and Change. By Peter H. Smith. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969. Pp. 292. $10.00.)

This volume is one in a series sponsored by the Institute of Latin American Studies of Columbia University; and it is one of a small but significant group of studies by North Americans on Argentine rural matters, treated in the light of their important urban relationships—all of them viewing the development of Argentina as a modernizing process.

Three decades ago the first such study appeared —Simon G. Hanson's *Argentine Meat and the British Market: Chapters in the History of the Argentine Meat Industry* (1938)—, which carried the story of the livestock and meat packing industries through the post-World War I depression period.

Two decades ago Carl C. Taylor's *Rural Life In Argentina* (1948) appeared, the standard treatise on the subject.

Most recently, James R. Scobie's two works have thrown much light on this area. His general history, *Argentina: A City and A Nation* (1964), is especially strong in analyzing the rural economy and society, without neglecting the city.

His *Revolution on the Pampas: A Social History of Argentine Wheat, 1860–1910* (1964) ably depicts the unbalanced growth of "urban sophistication" and "rural primitivism"—of a polity too long neglecting human and natural resources under the rule of a cattle-baron elite.

In Smith's book, the Introduction sets the stage with distinctions about Argentine political, economic, and social power; and seeks to locate the origins and development of group conflicts and group behavior.

Chapters 1 and 2 outline the process of modernization, from traditional society through economic liberalism to a lopsided economic modernization and political centralization, with analysis of the participant groups and their particular ideologies of "antiimperialism."

The subsequent chapters consider the political and other responses of these groups to successive economic changes, with emphasis on behavior in the emergence and resolution of conflicts.

Smith's work is a treatise on economic history, but it is much more than that. As an analysis of the country's leading economic enterprise, it is also a case study in national development, in which the economic and the political are profoundly interrelated.

If we view the subject from the standpoint of the distribution of power, we can distinguish certain broad stages in its development. While its roots were established in the last third of the nineteenth century, we can view the first third of the twentieth century as the era dominated economically, socially, and politically by a rural-based, stock-raising oligarchy. Economic power largely coincided with political power, with superiority in the first leading to superiority in the second. The stockmen were divided into the stock breeders and the fatteners, with a shifting relative influence (economic and political) between the two. In close relationship to the two were the packing house-shipper firms, whose influence was largely economic.

During a second stage of development (the 1930's), the distribution of power shifts within the rural upper class between breeders and fatteners; but the class as a whole retained its overwhelming influence, with any serious challenge from workers and consumers still well in the future. During this and the preceding period tactical shifts included showy debates, congressional investigations, press campaigns, and moves toward government regulation of the packinghouse firms.

During the third phase, after 1944, the rural-based monopoly of power was replaced by the Peronist rule, which exalted the position of the masses and deflated the role of the stockmen.

Smith's analysis shows a long process of transition from a traditional to a 'populist' (Peronist) society, in which the urban middle classes long identified their aspirations and interests with those of the ruling groups. During this time socio-economic modernization outran political modernization until, under Perón, "the lower-class groups were able to offset economic weakness with political strength."

Of considerable interest is the author's analysis of Argentina's vigorous economic nationalism (anti-imperialism). The earlier (or 'traditional') anti-imperialism rejected the validity of modernization on the ground that it meant adopting alien, materialistic values (see Rodó's *Ariel*). The country "needed to recover the spiritual purity of its rural past," as symbolized by the *gaucho*, etc. Thus, an anti-economic doctrine gave support to a 'traditional' economy, and an ideological rift was revealed in the upper class, with some adopting a liberal belief in progress.

More recently, a 'modern' form of nationalism became dominant. It condemned foreign 'imperialism,' and endorsed material progress through national economic self-sufficiency (protected native industries, etc.).

This able study is well organized and well written and includes a good index and a good bibliography. The author has made effective use of Argentinian and foreign documentary and other sources.—WILLIAM P. TUCKER, *Texas Technological College.*

Korea: Democracy on Trial. BY JOHN KIE-CHIANG OH. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968. Pp. 241. $7.95.)

In this book Professor Oh has presented the most thorough recent political analysis relative to the politics of democracy in South Korea. His central theme is that for the past two decades South Korea has been experimenting with a Western-type democracy but its prospect is still uncertain.

According to the author, the failure to realize the substance of democracy in Korea is due to the fact that the Korean polity neither possesses the political culture nor the ecological basis to make a Western-type democracy successful there (p. 191). Moreover, ignoring the country's political realities, the early political leaders—particularly Dr. Syngman Rhee and his close associates—were not only determined to create a democratic political system, but consistently maintained the myth of Korea becoming a "democratic state" (pp. 191–94). The United States, too, since 1945 has encouraged the democratization of South Korea, while the Soviet Union has established a Communist North Korea. Consequently, Professor Oh states that the original constitution imposed upon South Korea the "legal-institutional superstructure . . . which . . . appeared democratic and modern," but it could not function well because it was in conflict with the traditional political culture that ". . . had been long accustomed to debilitating authoritarian rule" (p. 191).

Unfortunately, the author does not explain fully the essence of the Korean political tradition or culture; as a result, the reader is left unclear as to how such tradition has prevented the successful implementation of a "democratic" constitution. The present reviewer also feels that Professor Oh does not consider systematically the relationship between successful nation-building (or democracy) and the conditions and/or circumstances which must be reckoned with in nation-building (or democracy). It may well be that such a treatise is beyond the scope of the book, since the author has taken a deductive approach in dealing with the recent Korean political events.

In essence, the problem of "democracy" in Korea is two-fold. First, the Korean people—more particularly the leading politicians—have never arrived at a consensus about the basic structure and purposes of their political system. They had to build an entirely new polity out of both the Japanese colonization and the American military occupation, plus internal subversion and external Communist aggression. Altogether the country went through five major constitutional revisions within a period of fourteen years. During the First Republic the original cabinet form of government established in 1948 was changed to a presidential system in 1952, which came to an abrupt end in 1960 as a consequence of the Student Uprising. During the Second Republic, the governmental system returned to a cabinet form, but the Chang regime which headed it lasted less than nine months. The military regime which overthrew the Second Republic then restored once again a presidential system in 1962 and thus set the stage for the Third Republic coming into being the following year.

Second, the Korean people—particularly among the power holders—have not shown their determination to maintain and nourish the governmental system once it was established. Dr. Rhee first established this "undesirable" precedent. For example, he changed the constitution in 1952 to assume the total control of the Republic (with a presidential system) and then in 1954, among other things, to make himself a president for life (pp. 40–50). When the Rhee regime was overthrown by the students, the first thing the opposition did was to rewrite the constitution and to establish a cabinet system. The military once again rewrote the constitution in order to reestablish a presidential system. Thus far, President Park's "administrative democracy" has performed reasonably well to meet the developmental tasks of the country; but there is no assurance that the present regime will not temper with the constitution. In fact, in early 1969 some members of General Park's Democratic Republican Party openly talked about the necessity of amending the constitution to permit the General to run for a third four-year term in 1971. Here President Park can make a great contribution to the country's political stability, if he should allow for a peaceful transition of authority by dissuading his supporters from changing the constitution.

One major contribution Professor Oh makes in this book is that he has demonstrated with empirical data on Korean politics that there is a great deal of difference between the writing of a constitution and constitutionalism. In Korea the formal constitutional document became subject to major revisions whenever there was a change of regime. While the power holders paid lip service to the "sacred" constitution, at best it was a temporary document and the regime in power felt free to change it for the regime's own purposes. The country must yet develop constitutionalism—the permanent rules which not only impose limitations on public decision-making but also establish the procedures for exercising the political power granted to the government. Yet such constitutionalism cannot be developed in a political vacuum. The Korean experiences demonstrate the futility of adopting the best features of other constitutions to a strange environment. No constitution can function effectively if it does not reflect the political tradition or forces of that political community.

The author has considerable insights into the workings of Korean politics. The book is well researched and documented with English, Japanese and Korean sources. It makes a worthwhile contribution to the field of comparative politics.—JOHN C. H. OH, *Wisconsin State University, Whitewater.*

Towards the Integration of Indian States, 1919–1947. BY URMILA PHADNIS. (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1968. Pp. 297. $6.50.)

Mrs. Phadnis has written a useful historical background to the integration of the princely states into the Indian Union. The work is essentially a history of relations between the states and the Government of India during the crucial period between the Montagu-Chelmsform reforms of 1919 and the termination of British rule in 1947.

The work can be divided into two broad sections—both chronologically and substantively. The first part (pp. 1–97) deals with the expansion of British control over the quasi-autonomous states through a liberal definition of the concept of paramountcy and with the concommitant attempts of the princes to preserve as much independence as possible. The imperial authority sought to keep "paramountcy" vaguely and broadly defined while the rulers of the states wanted a clearer and narrower definition.

The period between 1919 and 1935 was characterized by greater institutionalized interaction among the princes through the Chamber of Princes, but this did not result in significantly greater leverage *vis a vis* the paramount power. By the end of this period, the princes were confronted with the problems posed by constitutional and political developments in British India as well as the growth of political consciousness in their own territories.

The second part of the book deals with the princes reaction to policies and events after the passage of the Government of India Act of 1935. The reaction of the princes to the idea of federation was unrealistic and ambivalent. Before passage of the 1935 Act the princes wanted only the weakest sort of federation, presumably because of their desire to preserve their autonomy *vis a vis* the Centre and to isolate their populations from British Indian nationalist politics. After the reforms were instituted, the states prevented the establishment of a federal center. They did, however, accept the goal of federation and the fact that they could not remain aloof from constitutional developments in British India.

The centripetal effects of India's role in World War II brought the states even closer to British India. This was particularly true of the smaller states, which lost much of their distinctness through cooperative schemes and attachment to larger political entities. After the War, it became clear that much closer integration with British India would be necessary. Although some princes tried to preserve their internal autocracy and a few even sought independent status, the prospect of the British withdrawal underscored the princes' dependence on the paramount power. Given their reluctance to cooperate with the nationalist forces in British India after 1935 and their failure to undertake social and political reforms, it is remarkable that the princes fared so well after 1947.

Although the author's treatment is chronological and not thematic, several broad themes emerge in each chapter. One is the artificial character of the states and the fiction of their internal autonomy in relation to the imperial power. The second is that despite the repeated attempts of various princes to preserve or enhance their quasi-independent status, they recognized the strength of the forces of centralization and integration. Thirdly, the princes were deeply divided among themselves and thus unable to present a united front in the face of the manifold threats to their existence. There were divisions between the larger states and those of middle rank as well as divisions within categories. This was best indicated by their different approaches to administrative and political reform and to the basic issues of federation and integration.

The chief shortcomings of this work are that the author relies far too heavily on a historical narrative of formal relations and on documentary evidence (records of conferences, petitions, etc.). Although Mrs. Phadnis assembled an impressive array of documentary evidence, she neglected the informal and possibly more significant aspects of the relations between the states and British India. The author also has not given adequate attention to the internal politics of the states and to the "popular movements" in some areas. Except for references to Congress resolutions and speeches by few nationalist leaders, the author ignores the general question of nationalist attitudes. These shortcomings make it less valuable as a true background to the integration of the states.

After reading Mrs. Phadnis' work, one is still very puzzled regarding just how the states were brought into the Indian republic and stripped of their autonomy so easily. One gets the impression of sharp changes in policies and attitudes with little explanation of how the shifts occurred. In general the quality of the work suffers from the lack of an explicit conceptualization or central theme.

Despite these criticisms Mrs. Phadnis has provided a very useful reference work in a much neglected area of Indian political development.—HAMPTON T. DAVEY, *University of Missouri—St. Louis.*

Yugoslavia: The New Class in Crisis. BY NENAD D. POPOVIC. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968. Pp. 240. $7.00.)

This analysis by Popovic of the "new class" phenomenon in Yugoslav society elicits an understandably mixed response from the reader. The book, on the one hand, is filled with specific and rather useful insights about Yugoslav politics based upon the experience of a once highly-placed diplomat now taking refuge in the West; whereas, on the other hand, it represents a subdued and yet angry polemic that at times mis-states recent Yugoslav developments with arguments couched in the acceptable phrases of contemporary elite theory. Perhaps the single most annoying feature of Popovic's analysis is precisely this attempt to give his polemical treatment of Yugoslav politics an undeserved legitimacy by the usage of social science terminology. From a social scientist's perspective this effort represents an unfortunate abuse of what has become a productive and widely-accepted theory of political elites.

For all intents and purposes the book is divided into three easily recognizable parts: the first four chapters develop the theme of the "new class" as the revitalized form that privileged, dictatorial rule has been taking in Yugoslavia; the next two chapters deal with foreign policy and administrative structure and, it might be noted, are rather awkwardly placed in the middle of the book; and, the last four chapters focus upon developing "economic nationalism" in Yugoslavia, the nature of the new economic reforms, and the implication of these reforms for current Yugoslav politics. This last set of chapters seem the most pertinent and respectable of the lot and in fact provide some useful insights and intricate analyses of recent internal political haggling and controversies that stem from the new Yugoslav reforms. The single overriding theme that Popovic tries to develop is that the Yugoslav reforms over the years, the presumed liberalization of the country, the trends toward internal relaxation, etc. simply represent the range of subtle instruments the "new class" has employed to consolidate its elite position of power and privilege. A secondary, less explicit but no less relevant, theme stresses the fact that the Communist party in Yugoslavia has been losing ground over the years to "new class" elements, a development which the author for some mysterious, but perhaps humanly understandable, reason quite clearly and sorely laments.

There are also a number of specific points that require somewhat more extensive and more focused comment. At the very outset of the volume Popovic writes about the "many-cornered civil struggle between Communists and Nationalists, as well as among the embittered Yugoslav nationalities," that took place in Yugoslavia (p. 1). The author, however, does not explain that the struggle involved the two distinct resistance forces of Tito's partisans with a broadly Yugoslav appeal and Mihailoviches Cetniks with a narrower Serbian base, which it seems would be a far more accurate way of describing the distinction that Popovic arbitrarily characterizes as "Communists" and "Nationalists." In short, Popovic apparently tries to exploit the lack of detailed knowledge by the Western public regarding World War II Yugoslav resistance forces by characterizing the one group as "Communists" (and, hence, conspiratorial, illegitimate, and perhaps "evil") and the other as "Nationalists" (and, hence, "Yugoslav," legitimate, and official). It would also seem appropriate to emphasize that Popovic knew full well that such an interpretation (given the terminology that he chose to use) would in fact be forthcoming from the public at large in this country. As a second point, Popovic repeatedly claims that the "new class deprived the Party of its main hold on power, leaving it, weakened and helpless, at the mercy of the ruling stratum" (p. 77). Here we have the expression of what re-occurs several times as the Popovic melancholy lament in relation to the collapse of Communist party strength in Yugoslavia. He does not, however, bother to tell us exactly why it is less desirable for the "new class" element to dominate Yugoslav politics than it was (or is?) for more conventional Communist party forces. Indeed, it is not at all clear why we should not applaud any such development as a result of the expected more materially (and, hence, less ideologically) based motivational structure that the "new class" phenomenon in fact implies. As a third point, Popovic forcefully argues that those Yugoslav innnovations that cluster under the decentralization motif are merely instrumentalities (i.e., they reflect no generic value or sincerity of intent by involved reformers) for the further consolidation of growing "new class" power. Accordingly, the wide range of Yugoslav innovations—that is, self-management (p. 116), rotation of public offices (p. 123), the new 1963 constitution with its multi-chamber parliament (p. 126), the fact that the political role of chairman of the people's committee has been favored over the Party secretariat (p. 130), and the recent thrust toward and debate over internal democratization of the Party (p. 133)—all of these become suspect by Popovic as transparent devices that the "new class" has designed merely to perpetuate its authority at the expense of the wider Yugoslav populace. At this juncture, quite understandably, a credibility gap begins to develop as regards the substantive commentary and indeed the very intent of the author, since it seems quite unlikely that any elite (Communist or otherwise) could act so brilliantly and be as thorough in their manipulation of institutional innovation as Popovic suggests that the Yugoslavs have been. The credibility gap widens into an unbridgeable abyss when the author makes his final major point as regards the manipulative control capability of the "new class" element. In this regard, Popovic argues that the "new class" has indeed been strategically clever (although, surely, morally perverse) in permitting the various nationality or ethnic groups in Yugoslavia to assume their share of the burden in top Yugoslav leadership circles (p. 195). In short, he seems to lament the fact that various ethnic groups in the country are able to enjoy a proportionate power-role in the "new class" structure of Yugoslav society, a fact which he seems to feel unhappily serves to undermine the more traditional lines of ethnic identification as a basis of political power. From another perspective, it can of course be argued that such a balance among nationalities in fact represents an eminently wise (and, indeed, unavoidable) strategy given the internal complexity of the Yugoslav environment. In short, all of the factors that Popovic views as opportunistic devices for the consolidation of "new class" control and exploitation might also be interpreted simply as wise strategies of elite maintenance, in addition to being genuinely positive benefits which serve to make the internal setting of Yugoslavia more acceptable and more palpable to its general populace.

Despite the instructive asides and the many insights of this once practicing Yugoslav diplomat, his clear sense of disenchantment and his own involvement preclude the objective treatment of his chosen subject that certainly would have been welcomed. Although vividly reflective of the apparent personal animostity that Popovic as a once highly-placed Yugoslav official has, in addition to those specialized and intimate perspectives that go along with this, the book does in fact possess value and should be recommended to the reader if for no reason other than this highly personalized aspect. However, despite the use that Popovic makes of a terminological lexicon that has currency in the social sciences, the book can be justified neither as a respectable bit of social science analysis nor as a balanced and objective piece of contemporary political history. The virtues that the book in fact possesses must be limited very largely to the highly personalized reminiscenses of a once well-regarded Yugoslav official and diplomat. In general, as might be expected, the author was far too much caught up, personally as well as politically, in most of the events that he attempts to describe to allow for the value of his effort to extend beyond this very limited scope.—M. George Zaninovich, *University of Oregon.*

Party Rivalry and Political Change in Taishō Japan. By Peter Duus. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. Pp. 317. $6.95.)

The Harvard University Press' East Asian Series seems to be well on the way toward a comprehensive, if piecemeal, history of prewar Japan, to which this volume by Peter Duus is a praiseworthy addition. Earlier works in the series have focused upon the establishment of the Meiji Constitution, the career of Hara Kei, and Japanese foreign affairs after World War I; Mr. Duus has devoted his attention to the development of the Japanese party system during the years 1900–1927 and has rendered it lucidly, readably, and interestingly.

Considering the general focus of this *Review*, one should note what Mr. Duus' book is *not:* it is not social science. There is no theoretical focus or concern, and the occasional references made to the social sciences are often needless (p. 17) or meretricious (pp. 238–39). The failure to take account of any of the work of LaPalombara and Weiner, Dahl, Zolberg, or Scalapino, *inter al.*, is most noticeable.

But, then, the book does not purport to be social science; it is history, and enjoyable history. It is well written and it illuminates a period of Japanese history heretofore woefully neglected. The author designates a few important themes and follows them chronologically (with both description and explanation) to a point at which conclusion is logically permissable, whereupon he offers some reflective comments which sum up the previous discussion and provide those familiar with subsequent Japanese history or with developmental politics in general with considerable food for thought. There are typological lapses—the apparent omission of "not" at one point (p. 161, ln. 11) reverses the meaning of a sentence; the rendering of "objection" as "objective" (p. 205, ln. 8) is also misleading—but they do not detract from the substance of the book.

Mr. Duus' three major themes are: (a) what was the process through which the political parties achieved control of the cabinet; (b) why did this process eventuate in a two-party system rather than some other; and (c) once in power, what use did the parties make or not make of this power?

The primary characteristic of the quest for cabinet control is, in Mr. Duus' view, accommodation to the preexisting structure of the Japanese political system: manipulation of and compromise with the various elements in a polity where power was widely diffused. Rather than attempt to reform the structure, the parties were content to play the established game until the *genro,* the Elder Statesmen who constituted the only integrating factor at the apex of the system, died off, thus removing the only group so prestigious as to be able to appoint non-party premiers acceptable to the party politicians who dominated the parliament.

The evolution of the two-party system in Taisho Japan is explained primarily in terms of Japanese political homogeneity and the parties' single-minded pursuit of power. Socioeconomically, both political leaders and the bulk of the electorate were internally quite homogeneous; there was, moreover, general consensus regarding overarching political orientations and national goals (compare this with the newer states of Africa and Asia). With a paucity of acute social cleavages and issue conflicts, political alignments tended to form as vehicles for the attainment of parliamentary majorities. The appearance of such a majority almost invariably prompted attempts to unify the opposition; that the opposition did not simply join the majority group is explained by the presence of a plurality of power-seeking faction leaders, the "outs" whom never relinquished their ambitions, and the "ins" whom never felt compelled to attract (with promised payoffs, no doubt) support beyond a simple parliamentary majority.

In power, the parties continued for the most part to play the game: compromise with the Privy Council, the House of Peers, the bureaucracy, and the military; and tactical, not principled, formation of coalitions and manipulation of issues. In attaining power the Taisho parties lost the reforming spirit which had characterized their predecessors; by the time they achieved cabinet control they had become simply one—and, institutionally, the least legitimate one—of a number of competing power centers. Reform appeared undesirable to some leaders and hopeless to others; except for the brief attempts of Premier Kato, little effort was directed toward solution of the new economic and social problems which faced Japan, as an industrial state, after World War I.

The aspect of party power most significant for the future fortunes of the party system (here Mr. Duus intriguingly implies but justifiably terminates his analysis) was its non-use, either as an instrument for the reform of the system or in response to the challenges posed by a rapidly growing politically conscious sector of the populace largely barred from effective political participation. Consequently, the parties created neither institutional defenses for their position, nor an independent source of legitimacy, nor a public which, perceiving the parties as credible vehicles for reform, was committed to political parties in principle. The price of tactical effectiveness, as Mr. Duus notes, was strategic vulnerability; when rightist elements turned against the parties in the 1930's there were few defenses, institutional or ideological, upon which they could fall back.—JAMES W. WHITE, *Stanford University*.

Social Change in Soviet Russia. By ALEX INKELES. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. Pp. 475. $12.50.)

Social Change in Soviet Russia by Alex Inkeles is a collection of essays written over two decades in time. The author has arranged them under several classifications, each section being introduced by a brief essay of recent origin. Professor Inkeles occasionally updates passages in some of the essays through the addition of footnotes or new paragraphs.

The only significant fault with this collection of generally superb empirical and analytical essays is in the misleading expectation created by the title, the preface, and the first chapters. The reader expects a more coherent and up-to-date examination of social change in Soviet Russia. Indeed, Inkeles raises some tantalizing questions that the reader eagerly anticipates finding sound and recent expositions on. Unhappily there are often only dated commentaries or only scant attention is given.

Inkeles identifies three main elements that are analytically distinguished and that constitute the basic process of social change in Soviet society. These are (1) ideology, especially the conceptual apparatus and the goals of the elite, (2) the social structure that was inherited by the revolutionary regime in 1917, and (3) new institutional forms and social forces set in motion by the leadership of the revolution. The interaction of these elements, Inkeles holds, has shaped the present structure of Soviet society. The author gives scant treatment to the element of ideology, especially to consideration of developments in Soviet Russia since 1953. In fact, it is the light treatment of the post-Stalin period that disappointed this reviewer most seriously.

Despite the foregoing expression of disappointment, the reader gives his warm approval to the groups of essays found in the book. In their original form they were and will undoubtedly remain major contributions to the study of the Soviet social system and especially to the examination of change wrought by the Soviet regime. The problem lies in the failure of the essays to be the natural companions of each other that the author presumes. "The Totalitarian Mystique" is especially out of place in a work dealing with change.

As when some of the essays were first published, a legitimate question can be raised concerning the possible bias of a sample of refugees from the Soviet Union. And, as then, the solution to this question can only be fully resolved with a similar study of resident Soviet citizens. Of course, such an undertaking has continued to be impossible. Otherwise, the research of the author is solidly empirical and where there are questions about the accuracy of a source, Inkeles is quick to inform the reader of his awareness of this question. As studies in the difficult task of conducting empirical investigations where the system is not often open to such investigations, Inkeles' works are models for all students of authoritarian regimes in general as well as of the Soviet system in particular.

To recognize the author as only an investigator of facts, however, would be to perpetrate a most serious error. The finding of facts is always just the beginning, for Inkeles. He is an analytical scholar of the first order and his powers of interpretation are recorded here through papers spanning twenty years in time. What is particularly impressive is his ability to change his interpretation as he finds additional evidence that counteracts previous observations and interpretations. And even more impressive than this is the accuracy and viability of many insights expounded in the late 1940's and early 1950's.

After re-reading the essay on the mystique of totalitarianism, the reviewer dipped his pen in ink to attack the author's adherence to a model that he deems to be inappropriate for most of the post-Stalin period. The succeeding essays dealt with other subjects, so the reviewer's initial reaction appeared to be justified. Then, in the last section, Inkeles returned to the subject of totalitarianism and concluded that it is no longer applicable as a model of the Soviet system because it is insensitive to the sources of social support for the regime, it fails to consider the experimental aspect of the regime and its programs, and it was historically limited in scope. Therein are the danger of selling Professor Inkeles short, and also of reviewing a book composed of such diverse essays written over an extended period of time.—MICHAEL P. GEHLEN, *Purdue University.*

The Political Transformation of Tanganyika, 1920–1967. BY HUGH W. STEPHENS. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. Pp. 225. $12.50.)

To its British administrators, Tanganyika was always the backwater of East Africa, lacking the throbbing excitement or economic potential of Kenya, Uganda, and Zanzibar. Impoverished and sparsely inhabited, Tanganyika lagged behind her neighbors in the apparent pace of political change —at least until 1954, when the founding of TANU (Tanganyika Africa National Union) seemed to catch the colonial regime unaware. Only seven years were necessary to develop a high degree of politicization and to lead Tanganyika to independence.

The Political Transformation of Tanganyika 1920–1967 is not a constitutional history, nor is it an analysis of the organization and growth of TANU—though the impact of British rule and the spread of political awareness play key parts in the story. Rather than tread these worn paths again, Stephens strikes into territory few analysts of African politics have explored: The use of aggregate data for inferring patterns of political change.

Publications on African politics have usually neglected quantitative indicators, or have relegated statistical information to the realm of interesting but unimportant sidelights. The relative absence arose for an obvious reason: the data taken for granted in longer established states do not exist in most of tropical Africa. In undertaking to present a model for political change through the use of quantitative data, Stephens set himself an extraordinary task. The relative absence of appropriate data forced him considerably to modify the indicators of social mobilization suggested by Karl Deutsch in this Review in September, 1961. Stephens draws upon eleven processes of change: population growth, exposure to modernity (visits to out-patient clinics), literacy, mass media audience, modern political participation and political assimilation (both measured by TANU membership), linguistic assimilation, cultural assimilation (adoption of Christianity or Islam), a shift into the money economy, urbanization, and changes in the gross domestic income.

There are minor problems with the measures employed. For example, the mass media audience is expressed as a percentage of the population 15 years of age or older, which "represents 40% of the population"; however, the shift into the money economy is based upon the percentage of males fifteen years of age or older, which "is assumed to represent 25% of the total population." Surely approximate male-female parity exists in Tanganyika after 15 years of age. Modern political participation and political assimilation are both based upon TANU membership, a criterion that, as the author recognizes, cannot be projected prior to 1954 and which does not differentiate between nominal supporters, adherents, and party militants.

Stephens does not fulfill the hope expressed on page 117, where he defined the "main concern" of the study as "the effectiveness of the government in the post-colonial era." Only one of the six chapters—20 of the 125 pages of text—is devoted to events after 1961. In this all-too-short chapter, Stephens focuses upon the political repercussions of social mobilization, notably increased pressures for an expanded scope of government activity and increased political participation. This chapter lacks the detailed richness found in Henry Bienen's admirable study, *Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development.*

Particularly since 1964, Tanganyikan leaders have attempted to expand the government's economic, social and political controls, even while its effectiveness declined in certain respects. As the government becomes more involved with overall regulation policy, it risks, as Stephens points out, becoming the focus for popular grievances and aspirations. The necessary shift into the money economy can be accelerated only through revitalizing agriculture, while diminishing the prospects for widespread discontent that could lead to upheaval.

The major aspect lacking from *The Political Transformation of Tanganyika,* as in all too many of the recent spate of pessimistic books dealing with sub-Saharan Africa, is a clear indication of the factors that enter into the capability of a particular political system. What are the capacities of a political system such as Tanganyika's? It is easy to write of civil service inefficiency and corruption, of declining foreign assistance and the failures of domestic development schemes, or of the political decay exemplified by mutinies and coups d'etat. Given the pace of social mobilization, is the collapse of the Tanganyikan government only a matter of time? Can the trends initiated during the colonial period lead to sophisticated efforts at social prediction? What are the political costs and benefits of altering domestic investment priorities among education, health services, agriculture, industry, communications development, or other necessities for the developing state? Surely measuring social mobilization should be complemented by quantifying the "outputs" of government policy.—CLAUDE E. WELCH, JR., *SUNY at Buffalo.*

The Soviet System and Modern Society. BY GEORGE FISCHER. (New York: Atherton Press, 1968. Pp. 199. $7.95.)

Seldom has a book in this field appeared at a more opportune time carrying such an interesting title. The study of politics and society in the socialist countries is emerging from a period of flux during which unsupported speculation has been increasingly replaced by hard data and theoretically more sophisticated work. This book, written on such a timely and important topic, has been awaited with enthusiasm and anticipation. Rarely, however, has a book so failed to live up to expectations or, indeed, even to speak clearly to what apparently are the author's own theoretical contentions. The reader is promised a treatment of questions regarding Soviet Party leaders' willingness to meet the wants of the people, the changing nature of skills required to guide the advancing Russian economy, and the broader question of how well a "monist" model of control can fit a modern society. The evidence and discussion deal mainly with determining whether there is increasing emphasis on politicians in "top" positions in the Soviet Union possessing both economic and political skills and training.

The data upon which the study and accompanying inferences about the future organization of Soviet society are based consists of a "saturation" sample of official Soviet biographical material on six types of officials designated as "top" executives. Quite understandably this includes Secretaries of the Central Committee, the heads of major national departments, and First Secretaries of the party organizations in fourteen of the fifteen republics of the USSR. These officials compose twenty percent of the sample. Another fifteen percent is made up of Second Secretaries of republics and First Secretaries of party organizations in republic capitols. It is considerably less understandable why the remaining two-thirds of the sample is composed of First Secretaries of province level organizations if political power if the main criterion for inclusion in this sample of emerging top leadership. There are many national level officials not included in the sample that possess a great deal more power than the heads of many of the more obscure provincial party organizations. Granted, there are difficulties in data collection, but the indiscriminate use of all available data poses special problems in this case since the author often points to rather small percentage shifts in the composition of the entire sample as evidence of long-range trends in leadership change in top posts in the Soviet Union.

Using judgements of career patterns as a basis for making distinctions, the sample is divided into four types of executives. The "dual executives" compose sixteen percent of the sample and are characterized by career patterns showing a great deal of technical as well as party work in the economy before receiving a high level post. "Technicians" make up one-third of the sample and have career patterns showing extensive technical work in the economy, but no party work before attaining high office. "Hybrid executives" have technical training but little work in the economy before moving to the top. Nearly half the sample falls into the fourth category, "officials" having limited technical training or experience in the economy before their rise to power.

Using a basic collection of seven variables gleaned from Russian biographical sources in combination with the four created categories of officials, the author generates an amazing number of percentage tables. By the time the possible combinations have been exhausted, sixty tables have found their way into the one-hundred-fifty pages of text. Not surprisingly, many of the tables have little value for the reader and some reveal such small percentage differences that they could have easily been eliminated. The evidence indicates that increasing numbers of occupants of top posts have both economic and political skills. The author presents little additional information about what this means in behavioral or attitudinal terms. Is an "official" really that different from someone falling in the "hybrid executive" category to make these distinctions theoretically worthwhile?

At no place in the book is the reader introduced to the human beings that are being studied. The "dual executive" remains a mysterious, shadowy abstraction, reduced to a set of attributes on paper which don't really tell the reader anything about these individuals as people or decision-makers. One is told that twenty-four percent of newcomers to top positions qualified as dual executives in 1962 while only thirteen percent of the newcomers were dual executives in 1958. The meaning of the small differences reflected in these types of statistics is questionable as is the use of this material in building theory in this area, especially given the subjective coding system that assigned officials to one of the four categories in the first place.

Even if it is conceded that the material presented supports the argument that there is a long-term trend toward dual executives in the Soviet system, this does not necessarily speak to the author's contention that the monist model of organization can fit the socialist society of the future. In all advanced societies, monist as well as pluralist, political leaders must increasingly obtain technical skills and experience if they are to govern these complex societies effectively. This development takes place quite separately from a movement toward or away from a pluralistic representation of group interests, however, as the skills possessed by political leaders have no necessary relationship to the organization of the system within which they function.

Credit should be given to the author for generating an interesting body of data on a very timely topic. It is unfortunate that he chose to communicate his results in boook form rather than in an article or two that would have undoubtedly been extremely well received. The narrow data base, the difficulty of interpreting the countless tables, and the many unsupported attempts at theoretical generalizations limit the value of the study in book form. It is, however, an interesting treatment of an important body of data that will be of some significance until someone treats this subject in much greater detail.—DENNIS C. PIRAGES, *University of Connecticut.*

Fifty Years of Communism in Russia. ED. BY MILFORD M. DRACHKOVITCH. (University Park: Pennsylvania Press, 1968. Pp. 316. $7.50.)

Aspects of Modern Communism. ED. BY RICHARD F. STARR. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1968. Pp. 416 $7.95.)

The papers edited by Professor Drachkovitch are from a 1967 conference sponsored by the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Bolshevik coup. The contributors view various aspects of Soviet life over the perspective of the last fifty years. The papers edited by Professor Staar are from a closed conference on communist-ruled states held in 1968 under the auspices of Emory University. The book includes an introductory chapter by Jerzy Hauptmann; three papers on the Soviet Union; three on Eastern Europe, which is treated as a single unit; three on Communist China; and single papers on the Mongolian People's Republic, North Korea, North Viet Nam and Cuba. Each of these papers is followed by the remarks of a discussant.

The Drachkovitch book is a collection of interpretive essays. The official theme of the conference at which they were delivered was "Fifty Years of Communism in Russia." However, the conference organizers, we are told, decided to focus on a particular sub-theme: namely, the relationship between the original promise or message of the revolution and the performance of the Soviet regime over the last five decades. Drachkovitch notes:

> In their respective fields, the essays in this volume analyze why and how these initial promises were not and could not have been kept. (p. 4)

Drachkovitch argues that this is a legitimate analytical approach. Perhaps it is, but it is also one that introduces a certain bias by emphasizing a particular kind of failure.

Happily, most of the contributors overcome the problem posed by the conference's sub-theme and produce fair balance sheets of significant Soviet successes and failures. The result is a series of fine papers. Among the best of these are Leonard Schapiro's paper on the Soviet polity; John N. Hazard's on Soviet law; Raymond Garthoff's on the Soviet military; Max Hayward's on Soviet literature; and Ivo J. Lederer's on Soviet foreign policy.

Nevertheless, the conference's sub-theme sometimes produces results that jar the reader. In his conclusion to his very good paper on Soviet foreign policy, Lederer inserts a paragraph in which he notes that the Bolsheviks have not been able to fulfill their revolutionary pledge to abolish diplomacy and inter-state relations. He then promptly and wisely drops this matter and proceeds to a discussion of more important failures *and* successes. On the other hand, I suspect that the sub-theme caused G. Warren Nutter little discomfort. Those familiar with his work will not be surprised to learn that he has no apparent difficulty in writing twenty four provocative pages on the Soviet economy without expressing one positive observation about it. The focus of the conference also may have prompted Bertram Wolfe to conclude his essay on Marxism and the revolution with a reassertion of his thesis, now nearly ten years old, that the Soviet regime is one of permanent illegitimacy. This thesis rests, as it always has, on the verbal trick of equating legitimacy with representative government.

Readers will find much with which to agree and disagree in this collection of interpretive essays. All the papers are worth reading, and many are exceptional. After having read the book, I had only two regrets. The first was the focus of the conference. The second was that "technical difficulties" prevented the inclusion of any of the conference's critical discussion of the papers.

The Staar book is not nearly as successful a book as Drachkovitch's. Like many collections of papers, it has no focus. Papers on different countries, even when they share a common general topic such as politics or economics, do not discuss comparable subject matter. A reader looking for a contribution to the comparative study of communist systems will find this book disappointing.

The papers themselves are uneven in quality. A few are analytical and provocative, and some of these are followed by equally provocative critiques. One such example is the exchange between W. W. Kulski and Yaroslav Bilinsky on the nature of post-Stalin political developments, although some may regard Bilinsky's remarks as having a Cold War flavor. Richard L. Walker contributes a searching discussion of the problem of maintaining revolutionary elan in Communist China. If they are read together, the paper by Desmond P. Wilson, Jr. and the critique by Henry

H. Keith provide a good summary of Cuban-Soviet relations.

Most of the papers, however, contain little analysis. Some, including a paper by Hermann Gross on East European economic integration and a paper by Chu-yuan Cheng on the Chinese economy, are valuable as good summaries of useful data. Others, such as Staar's own paper on East European polycentrism and Dae-Sook Suh's paper on the emergence of North Korea's political elite, are merely descriptive. William B. Ballis, according to Edward D. Sokol, is guilty of factual errors and omissions in his paper, which is a rather uninteresting historical and institutional description of the Mongolian People's Republic.

Furthermore, not even all of the interpretive efforts succeed. James McConnell displays considerable creativity in his efforts to relate changes in Soviet military strategy to changes in ideology. He also provides, unwittingly, proof of the danger of using ideology as an explanatory variable in studying Soviet policy making. As Kenneth R. Whiting points out in his critique, many of the changes in strategy that McConnell links to shifts in ideology can be explained better by political and economic factors.

Finally, there is the introductory chapter by Hauptmann. Throughout most of the chapter he does a good job of extracting common themes and problems from the conference papers. Unfortunately, in the last part of the chapter, he attempts to construct a typology of communist ruled states based on the "concepts" of "goal rationality" and "sophistication." The typology's inherent problems are clearly revealed by the Kulski-Bilinsky dispute, which immediately follows this chapter, which occurred apparently before its writing, and which revolves around the question of whether the Soviet political leadership has become significantly more rational and more sophisticated since Stalin's death.

Informed readers will find most of the essays in the Drachkovitch book worth reading. Students of communist systems will find some of the papers in the Starr collection rewarding. Nevertheless, I wish that the better papers in the Staar book had been published individually as journal articles, and the others reworked and further developed for later publication. Taken as a whole as they now stand, they do not make a very satisfactory book even with the inclusion of the discussion, some of which is very good.—JAMES H. OLIVER, *University of Maryland.*

The Electoral System of Finland. BY KLAUS TÖRNUDD. (London: Hugh Evelyn, 1968. Pp. 181. 42 shillings.)

The Revolution of 1905 did not produce lasting institutional reforms in Russia. In the Grand Duchy of the Russian Emperor, however, Finnish participation in that revolution produced a system of representation which remains in effect, and which Törnudd correctly argues is likely to exist as long as there is an independent Finnish political system. In *that* revolutionary period, Finns took advantage of the weakness of the Emperor to create a profoundly equalitarian institutional basis for Finnish politics, just as they later, in 1917, took advantage of the absence of the Emperor to implement first parliamentary government and then national independence. Before the Revolution of 1905, the Finnish Four Estates (nobility, clergy, burghers, and farmers) were still essentially feudal in nature. The Finnish reform of 1906 at one sweep took Finnish politics into its present modern era, for it created a unicameral Parliament elected by universal suffrage on the basis of proportional representation. With the enormous expansion of the electorate that this reform involved, Finnish parties had to expand both their ideological perspectives and their organizational structures to appeal successfully to the new voters. The reform of 1906 thus created the modern party system of Finland as well as the modern electoral system.

Törnudd describes the creation and the operation of the new system of representation in competent manner. He presents a vast amount of material, much of it in statistical form, which should be used by every political scientist interested in the relationship between electoral systems and party systems. Douglas Rae's *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws,* for instance, would have benefited substantially from drawing upon Törnudd's data. Törnudd's tone is clinical, and he is moderate in his judgments and fair in his wording. There is none of the passion here that is found in most of the writings on electoral systems, whether of the one extreme of Hermens or the other extreme of Lakeman. Indeed, one of the major weaknesses of Törnudd's book is that, for the most part, he does not use the Finnish evidence he has so carefully compiled to argue against the extremists of one or another school. This reviewer, perhaps unjustly, suspected that this reluctance flowed from a lack of familiarity with many of the "classic" writings on electoral systems.

This book is not comparative enough. There is too much on Finland in it, including all kinds of parliamentary history of dubious relevance to the topic at hand, and too little political science. In many places in the book, for instance, the material virtually cries out for a comparison with the hypotheses of Maurice Duverger, but there is only one passing reference to Duverger's work, and none to *Political Parties.* Duverger's analyses of party strength, party schisms, and the "basic elements" of party structure would all have helped Törnudd avoid some analytical confusions. Also badly needed are explicit detailed comparisons with French and German electoral systems—and not Weimar alone. The Finnish situation between the electoral reform and the achievement of parliamentary government a decade later, for instance, was similar to the Imperial German situation in which universal male suffrage existed long before parliamentary government. The act of governing was separate from the act of representation, with very important consequences for party development, not least being the disenchantment of significant portions of the working class with representative institutions.

There are some other weaknesses in Törnudd's book. The author's English is often rather awkward, and occasionally misleading. The index is unreliable. Finnish political scientists these days are not famous for their command of Finnish history, and Törnudd is no exception. Sometimes he is a little indolent, as when he simply reports that information on the number of cells in the Finnish Communist Party is unobtainable. Sometimes he jumps to unwarranted conclusions, as when he argues: "When a party puts up the same candidate simultaneously in several constituencies, this can obviously be taken as a sign of central intervention in the nomination." As Törnudd concedes, research into the nominating process is notably lacking in Finland, in spite of the abundance of voting behavior studies. It might just as well be the case in such multiple nominations that constituency party leaders want one or more prominent national party leaders as candidates in their constituencies, especially since such national party leaders might later feel a sense of special obligation to "their" constituency. Provincialism, in the most literal sense, is not unknown in Finnish politics, and Finnish multi-member constituencies have essentially the same geographical boundaries as the Finnish provinces.

Törnudd's title is misleading. He does not treat all the aspects of the Finnish electoral system, and it is here that his most important omission of Finnish material occurs. He discusses only parliamentary elections. Local governmental elections have had considerable impact on the development of the Finnish party system. Doubtless more important, however, is the omission of presidential elections. Finland does have parliamentary government, but it also has a very powerful President of the Republic. The Constitution of 1919 gives the latter very great power, and with one exception (Relander) every Finnish President has made full —sometimes overfull—use of his constitutional prerogatives. Finnish presidential elections do count, and any study of the political importance of the way votes are counted in Finland is deficient if it ignores them. In many important ways, party development has been influenced by the nature of the presidential election, just as parties have influenced the nature of the presidential election. The party configuration in presidential elections is not always, and perhaps not even often, the same as the party configuration in parliamentary elections. It might even be argued that Finland has a different party system for presidential elections than for parliamentary elections. This matter, which would be of considerable interest for students of American parties, Törnudd does not even mention. Since there are some solid studies—in Finnish—of Finnish presidential elections, and the official Finnish presidential election statistics are full of valuable data, this omission is all the more surprising. A second edition, perhaps — MARVIN RINTALA, *Boston College.*

The Nazis in the Balkans. A Case Study of Totalitarian Politics. BY DIETRICH ORLOW. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968. Pp. 235. $7.50.)

The inadequate utilization of social science concepts and methods in the study of dictatorships has resulted in a conspicuous lack of integrative empirical theories about contemporary autocratic politics. This is particularly true of the literature on National Socialism which has been basically ideographic in method, historical and ideological in orientation and broadly factual in content. Personality and policy questions and concern with the dramatic and extraordinary aspects of the regime have long dominated Nazi studies, leaving the everyday functioning of the system largely in the realms of myth and speculation. We know little about the political process in the Third Reich: at this stage it would be difficult to provide informed answers to the crucial question: "How did the Nazi system work?"

There is, however, an increasingly noticeable concern about the political process among students of National Socialism. Recent studies have begun to supplant the grand generalizations about the nature of politics under the Nazis. Painstaking empirical investigations of the more mundane aspects of the regime have started to convey a more realistic picture of the political process. Professor Orlow's study of an obscure organization in Nazi Germany is illustrative of this new orientation.

The study of the SOEG (Southeastern Europe Society) successfully demonstrates that the monolithic facade of totalitarian rule concealed a multiplicity of goals, bureaucratic chaos, over-lapping empires, fief-warfare as well as personal feuds and rivalries. The SOEG, which was founded to achieve coordination and control of German policies in Southeastern Europe, was a total failure. The large number of competing agencies with conflicting goals and ambitious leaders, the absence of clear lines of authority and the lack of institutional hierarchy made the imposition of a consistent and rational policy in that area impossible. The personal nature of power relationships frustrated the institutional delimitation of authority and resulted in continuous power struggles and bureaucratic warfare. The only fixed point, the only common reference was Hitler who remained above the conflicts as the supreme and ultimate arbiter for whose favors all parties vied.

The study is a well-documented historical account of the establishment, growth and ultimate demise of a minor organization in the Third Reich. In analyzing the tactics and maneuverings of Nazi leaders, the conflicts of issues and of personalities, the study illustrates the confused maze of institutional and personal relationships that determined the nature of decision-making in the regime. However, the book suffers from two major shortcomings: as a historical account it may be criticised for its inadequate historical framework, while as a case study of totalitarian politics it lacks sufficient conceptualization.

After following the author's detailed analysis of the issues and personalities connected with the operation of the SOEG, the reader is left with less than a meaningful perspective of Nazi activities in Southeastern Europe between 1940 and 1945 (since the SOEG was concerned with all the countries in the area south of Poland, "Southeastern Europe" is a more accurate term than "the Balkans"). Granting the lack of consistent policies and frequent shifts of emphasis due as much to the rapidly changing military situation as to internal power relationships, there were still some constant themes (such as policies toward the Volksdeutsche, economic organization and trade) that could have been handled in broader and bolder strokes. In addition, a historical perspective of German designs in Southeastern Europe would have lent the study a much needed framework within which Nazi policies and SOEG plans could have been better evaluated and understood.

The lack of adequate conceptualization deprives the author of the opportunity to make a much needed theoretical contribution to the study of totalitarianism in general and Nazism in particular. In the absence of any analysis of the concept of totalitarianism, it remains unclear why and in what respects the SOEG experience would demonstrate "totalitarian politics." The failure to utilize empirical data for the construction of hypotheses necessarily limits the study to description. The author fails to suggest relationships among the several characteristics of Nazi politics which makes his account interesting, but not explanatory of the system as a whole. What is one to make, for instance, of his statement concerning the incompatibility of Nazi ideology with economic and political realities? Such a statement lacks extrinsic meaning and fails to have explanatory value unless its relationship with other system attributes is made explicit by menas of hypotheses. Does an inoperative ideology tend to enhance conflict between "bureaucrats" and party men? Does it contribute to the multiplicity of goals and bitter rivalries? Does it tend to prevent institutionalization and stabilization of relationships thereby fostering confusion and insecurity which leaves the dictator the only fixed point in the system? His observation that a number of "systems" existed simultaneously in the Third Reich is similarly intriguing but non-explanatory in the absence of theory. Does this suggest the existence of a series of concentric circles of personal influence which frustrates the establishment of bureaucratic hierarchy? Could it explain the importance of *Rückendeckung* or personal backing without which no lower level official could hope to succeed in the Hitler regime? What is the theoretical significance of the fact that the SOEG was established as a private organization to coordinate public policies? These and many other questions are suggested by the author's account, but unhappily, it is left to the reader and to future scholars to extract theory from the data.

In sum, the study illustrates the limits of empirical investigations in the absence of theory which could order, connect and explain observed system characteristics. A description of the parts cannot explain the workings of the whole. Personal rivalries, bureaucratic chaos, empire building and the overwhelming authority of the dictator do not add up to a functioning, interdependent system, nor can they explain the political process without the help of intervening concepts and theories. Professor Orlow has written a thorough empirical study of the SOEG and succeeded in identifying a number of important characteristics of Nazi politics. To what extent he as a historian should be criticised for the lack of conceptualization and theory building depends on one's conception of history as a discipline.—JOSEPH NYOMARKAY, *University of Southern California.*

Reform und Aussenpolitik: Die Aussenpolitik der SPD Berlin-Bonn. BY ABRAHAM ASHKENASI. (Köln und Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1968. Pp. 220. 25.00 DM)

The SPD in the Bonn Republic: A Socialist Party Modernizes. BY HAROLD KENT SCHELLENGER, JR. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968. Pp. 247. 31.85 Guilders.)

There is probably no other European political party that has been the subject of more scholarly study than the German Social Democrats. The party's fascinating history, the ideological orientation of most academics, and the SPD's own excellent archives have combined to make it an attractive topic for historians, sociologists, and political scientists. The two additions to the literature on the SPD under review are both concerned with the party's post-war modernization. The work by Schellenger focuses primarily upon the party's domestic policies and general ideological transformation. Ashkenasi's book is more concerned with the SPD's foreign policy and particularly with the differing foreign policy programs developed by the governing SPD in Berlin, led in the post-war period by Ernst Reuter and later Willy Brandt, and the Social Democrats in West Germany, who were in opposition throughout the period examined in the book.

Schellenger attempts to test Michels' dictum that "power is always conservative" with reference to the SPD's post-war leadership. If power breeds conservatism, how can the organization ever innovate as the SPD apparently did? His argument is that Michels' thesis does not preclude adaptation and innovation if the party's elites perceive that reform is necessary in order to save the organization from decline and eventual disintegration. The SPD's elites perceived that as a result of the changing "political, social, and economic environment" in post-war Germany and Europe, reform was needed if the party was to remain a political force. Schellenger thus claims to have extended Michels' thesis with the findings of the "modern political sociologists," who demonstrated (apparently to both Schellenger and the SPD leadership) that the old programs and style were irrelevant.

This explanation for the SPD's self-modernization is hardly new and, as a conceptual framework, extremely thin. Indeed after a brief theoretical introduction, Schellenger makes no further mention of his working hypotheses until the last few pages of the conclusion in which he makes the above-mentioned modification of Michels.

The bulk of the book is actually a traditional, straight-forward description of the SPD from 1945–1961. After a brief sketch of the history of German socialism, Schellenger devotes three chapters to the SPD's programmatic development, which culminated in the adoption of the Bad Godesberg *Programm* in 1959. Schellenger gives us an account of the policy debates held at every national *Parteitag* from 1946 to 1960. As part of this analysis and in an attempt to determine the ideological orientation of the various *Bezirk* organizations, he analyzed policy resolutions submitted to the SPD's national conferences from 1950–1960. But he makes no systematic presentation of his findings. Perhaps the earlier work of Richard Rose on English party activists, which also used constituency resolutions to the national conferences of the Conservative and Labour parties for data on the ideology of party activists, would have been helpful here.

Schellenger then describes the influence of the Berlin SPD on the national organization and the gradual influx of "new-types" of leaders into the SPD's national organization. These three chapters on the party's leadership are the best in the book. Schellenger gives us a lively account of the conflicts within the Berlin organization between the Old Guard led by Franz Neumann and the modernizers led by Reuter and Brandt. He correctly points out that the intra-party squabbles were not only over party policy, but also included strong personality differences and conflicts over the party's style and image. He then examines the West German organization and describes the growing influence and rise to national prominence of other reformers in the various *Länder*. He sees this process of modernization culminating in the new "package" of personalities and policies the SPD presented to the electorate in the 1961 election.

His concluding chapter discusses other European Socialist parties and their strategic and tactical adaptations to the challenge presented by the "end of ideology". Schellenger relies here almost exclusively on the earler writings of Lipset and uncritically accepts the "end of ideology" argument.

Ashkenasi's main focus is on the conflict over foreign policy programs that took place within the Berlin SPD and the national organization from 1946–1961. He attempts to demonstrate that the governmental responsibility held by the Berlin organization made it more amenable to the pro-Western foreign policies of the Adenauer coalitions than to the policies of the Schumacher-led national SPD. He argues that the Berlin SPD, by virtue of its position as a governing party, had by the early 1950's made the transformation into a modern catch-all party several years before the national organization realized that the Schumacher strategy would doom the SPD to permanent minority status.

This is a difficult thesis to systematically examine. If governing alone induces a more moderate, pragmatic approach among Socialist parties, as Ashkenasi contends, how can one explain the fact that the Hessian organization of the SPD, which has consistently been the most "leftist" of all *Bezirk* organizations, is also a SPD stronghold? Clearly other factors such as the personalities of different leaders, and regional variations in the social structure of the party's membership are also involved.

Ashkenasi's sole concentration on disputes over foreign policy is also quite artificial. As he must admit at various points throughout the book, it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate foreign from domestic policies when examining intra-party conflicts. He mentions only as an afterthought that perhaps disagreements over policy were sometimes artificial and actually cloaked what were mainly clashes of personalities. With the same data one could also easily argue that policy was largely secondary to personality and power considerations.

Ashkenasi's study then is also poorly conceptualized. The material he gathered could have been effectively used to analyze such problems as the relevance of foreign policy as an issue area in Germany or the domestic sources of the SPD's foreign policy. Depth interviews with the major participants still living, would also have perhaps enabled him to ascertain whether foreign policy was actually an independent factor in the intra-party conflicts. Although both authors conducted interviews with party officials, they give no systematic presentation of their findings. The interviews were apparently of the "background" variety.

It is especially regrettable that neither author examined the social bases of SPD support during its modernization period. No attempt was made to link policy and leadership changes with electoral outcomes. The data for such a venture is available. Since 1953 the SPD has periodically commissioned extensive studies of the German electorate. Even an examination of the past research reports of organizations such as the *Institut für angewandte Sozialwissenschaft* in Bad Godesberg, which does most of the SPD's polling work, might have produced information on the effects of policy and leadership changes upon the electorate. The utility of such surveys for secondary analysis needs investigation by students of comparative political sociology.

In summary, Schellenger's study essentially supplements Douglas Chalmers' earlier work on the post-war SPD. His detailed accounts of various party conferences and the personalities of SPD leaders will be useful additions to the English language literature on post-war German politics. Ashkenasi's study will be helpful as a convenient reference for those interested in the details of disputes within the SPD over foreign policy. But as contributions to the systematic comparative study of political parties, both works are less than satisfactory.—DAVID P. CONRADT, *University of Florida.*

Students and Politics in Developing Nations. EDITED BY DONALD K. EMMERSON. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968, Pp. 444, $9.50.)

Students in the developing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America constitute a dynamic and highly influential action group. Large-scale student protests have been instrumental in toppling such authoritarian regimes as Jiménez in Venezuela, Rhee in South Korea, Diem in South Vietnam and Sukarno in Indonesia. In recent years student strikes, protests and boycotts have indeed become one of the most active forces in promoting political and social change in developing nations.

Who are these student activists? What biographic variables influence their behavior? What are the motivating forces behind student political movements? How does the university and its milieu affect student activism? What are the relationships between student politics and social change, as well as the interactions between student politics and national politics? Donald K. Emmerson and fourteen contributing authors explore these questions in the context of the developing nations of Africa (Algeria, David B. Ottaway; The Congo, Jean-Claude Willame; Ghana, David J. Finlay, Roberta E. Koplin, and Charles A. Ballard, Jr.; South Africa, Martin Legassick and John Shingler), Asia (China, Bruce D. Larkin; Indonesia, Harsha W. Bachtiar; South Vietnam, David Marr;), and Latin America (Brazil, Robert O. Mayhr; Chile, Myron Glazer; Cuba, Jaime Suchlicke: Venezuela, William L. Hamilton.)

In his concluding chapter, which is an analysis of the findings of the above authors, Emmerson indicated that student activists in the developing nations are most likely to be made. They most often live away from their families and are usually less religiously oriented than their parents. He finds that both parental status and income are unreliable indicators of student behavior and political attitudes. The university radical who adopts a given political position simply because it is contrary to his father's beliefs is indeed the exception. Moreover, the principal factors that appear to contribute most to student radicalism in developing areas are the sudden release from family constraints, the disorienting effects of an urban environment, and the increased opportunity for interaction among peers.

The university mileau also contributes to the politicization of the student. In the developing nation, the university is most often located in a large city, usually the capital. By providing easy access to political information, large national audiences utilizing an extensive communications network, proximity to both government and opposition forces, and often extensive areas of poverty —the large city tends to facilitate the work of the student activist.

The quality of the university system is a crucial variable. According to Emmerson, where faculty is part-time and underpaid, where lectures are given to large anonymous crowds, "where 'education' means passing examinations and 'learning' means cramming for them, where the student is unsupervised, unstimulated, and finally unrewarded"—under these conditions student unrest is almost inevitable. However, when barriers to university entrance are raised, when curriculum as well as occupational incentives become more professionalized, when effective communication lines are established between faculty and student, when the quality of the faculty and university life is upgraded, student activism is likely to decline.

Most of the contributing authors find that protests follow a general pattern. These protests may extend over a few days or several years, but the pattern seems to be standard: an initial, perhaps almost insignificant incident, followed by initial protest, "repressive" counteraction, massive protest, attempts to organize for sustained activity, further demonstrations revolving around a larger set of issues, increased partisanship and factionalism, lower enthusiasm, isolation and eventual decline.

Student politics obviously differ from "adult politics." Emmerson infers that the main difference lies in the fact that the former are more often the art of the impossible and that student activists do not understand the rules of the adult political game. Yet is it that they do not understand these rules or that they do not *want* to understand them? Students emphasize style over program, committment over compromise. This fact, Emmerson points out, is both their weakness and their strength. Perhaps unconsciously, they endeavor to find and to take advantage of every available opportunity to trigger larger political and social forces into action. "But whatever success in opposing the injustice and oppression they so keenly feel," says Emmerson. "(they) can at least serve to break the silence, to indicate fresh directions for the polity. That, in itself is no mean achievement."

In constructing this book, Emmerson has selected a small but representative assortment of developing nations. However, even Emmerson admits that the chapter on South Africa—though this is not a criticism of the chapter itself—appears anomolous to the book as a whole; surely the nation that pioneered the first successful human heart transplant seems a bit out of place among an array of developing African, Asian and Latin American nations. Each contribution is well-written, readable and internally consistent. Though Emmerson makes no mention of a common conceptual framework for the structuring of each chapter, his book, unlike many other symposia, seems to possess such an attribute.

The task of the political scientist in this budding and explosive field, now referred to as *students and politics,* is to search for the overall causes of student discontent and activism. Emmerson et al. have begun the slow, arduous process of mapping the roots, causes and trends in student political activism. They have begun to analyse and manipulate the available data, and in doing so have indicated many inconsistencies and information gaps. The book is a beginning, a pioneering effort in the study of student activity and politics in developing nations. As such, it provides a penetrating insight into some of the forces that encompass and bewilder our turbulent age.—HARLAN J. STRAUSS, *University of Oregon.*

Paul Miliukov Political Memoirs, 1905–1917. EDITED BY ARTHUR MENDEL, (Ann Arbor, the University of Michigan Press, 1967. Pp. 508. $9.75.)

Rationalism and Nationalism in Russian Nineteenth-Century Political Thought. BY LEONARD SCHAPIRO. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. Pp. 169. $5.00.)

The Making of a Workers' Resolution, Russian Social Democracy, 1891–1903. BY ALLAN K. WILDMAN. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967, Pp. 271, $7.95.)

The Crisis of Russian Populism. BY RICHARD WORTMAN. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1967, Pp. 211. $7.50.)

The varied reactions of Russian intellectuals to the plight and prospects of their country in the nineteenth century seem never to lose their interest, or so it would appear from the regular appearance of new books dealing with this important theme. The significance of the issues, even for our own time, and the vigor and originality of many of the writers, explain the continued interest. The radicals remain the favored subject, through, as Leonard Schapiro notes, it is impossible to justify this either in terms of the quality or originality of their ideas. Indeed if one were to use the chatchword of the contemporary left—"relevance"—as his measure, the radicals would lose hands down.

The Schapiro essays on *Rationalism and Nationalism in Russian Nineteenth-Century Thought* were lectures delivered at Yale University in the autumn of 1965. The conceptual notion which Schapiro used to divide Russian political thinkers is stated in the title: the rationalists, who emphasized the possibility of fully rational political decisions, and the uniformity, or universality, of the political development of nations; and the nationalists, who stressed the uniqueness and the continuity of the traditions and institutions which form the political mentality of a people. These contrasting attitudes are illustrated in the opening chapter by the familiar examples of Speransky and Karamzin, as well as some of their less well-known contemporaries. The dominant theme of Russian nineteenth century thought is presented as a dynamic and creative tension between these two traditions, and the most appealing intellectual figures are the moderates of either camp who blended elements of both traditions: rationalists with some sense of history, particularly the historical development of key Russian political institutions; or nationalists whose respect and concern for national political and social institutions were informed by a sense of the ideas and institutions which offered reform notions adaptable to Russia. Hence the tribute to Pushkin, whose "mature political thought, so far as it can be discerned, seems to be that rare synthesis of both liberalism and conservatism and of both rationalism and nationalism." Similar considerations lead Schapiro to give Granovsky and Chicherin more favorable comment than Herzen, and to see creative and highly original thought in the writings of the latter-day Slavophile and Zemstvist, Dmitri Shipov.

Schapiro finds a left and right wing in both the nationalist and rationalist camps. But whatever the degree of radicalism, structurally the ideas of the groups in each camp betray a common lineage. Thus the Socialist Revolutionaires traced their descent to the Slavophiles and to Karamzin rather than to the traditions which inspired the Social Democrats. Within this interpretive structure Lenin was not a rationalist and a "European," in the pattern of Struve or Plekhanov, but a nationalist. Lenin followed the populist lead in rejecting a long-term, progressive role for capitalism in Russia—"Capitalism was something that was already there, in the village as well as in the town, and something already to be destroyed." The ideas of a one-stage revolution and of a uniquely Russian path of development are evidence that he belonged in the nationalist revolutionary tradition, the tradition of Paul Pestel and Peter Tkachev. Comparing him with the latter, Schapiro notes:

> . . . the real parallel between Lenin and Tkachev lies in their nationalism—the sense that each had of the realities of the Russian scene which had to be taken into account before there could be any hope of a successful revolution. Most important perhaps is the conviction the two men shared that the overriding reality in Russia was the autocracy; that the autocratic machine had to be captured and used; and that this could only be effected by a disciplined minority, and not by the mass.

The right wing of the nationalist current of political thought was represented by Lenin's contemporary Shipov, whose thought, according to Schapiro. "represented at the time one of the most enlightened attempts to reconcile autocracy and reform, of the kind which had repeatedly failed in the course of the nineteenth century."

Thus, as Schapiro sees it, all political argument in nineteenth century Russia was, in the end, about the same subject—the autocracy. For this was the only institution of significance until the *zemstva* took feeble root. Among the revolutionaries the effort was either to overthrow it, and to build anew, as with the populists, or to capture it and use it in the interests of another class, as Pestel, Tkachev, and Lenin wished to do. Shipov sought to broaden the foundations of government by means of the *zemstva,* while the liberals attempted to build a whole new set of public institutions capped by an elective parliament. The events of 1917 marked the failure of the liberals to make their parliament an effective organ of government and brought the Bolsheviks to power. But history played a trick on the Bolsheviks, for with the institution of autocracy they inherited also the main problem of their predecessors: "how to run a country effectively with the sole aid of an outmoded autocratic system, and at the same time aspire to modernization."

Richard Wortman writes about the main radical expression of Schapiro's category of "nationalist" political thought, populism. For him the chief deficiency of the available literature on the populist movement is that it does "not consider the problem of the basic nature of the populist ethos. We have learned much about the events, organizations, and participants of the movement, but little about the populists themselves." He then proceeds to provide a good deal of interesting detail about the personal and psychological experience of a number of populists—most notably, Aleksandr Engel'gardt, Nikolai Zlatovratskii, and Gleb Uspenskii. The essays on these three colorful figures are extraordinarily well-written and informative. Wortman is right in his insistence that one needs a sensitive perception of the personal and intellectual pilgrimage of individual populists—needs to observe Engel'gardt attempting to form intelligentsia agricultural communes, to sense in the words and experiences of Uspenskii the real meaning of intelligentsia insolation from "the people," and to savor the deep disillusionment of Zlatovratskii in his later years—to understand the human meaning of populism. Yet he has not neglected the task of systematic analysis of populist ideas, and the later portions of the book perform this function admirably. These cover the history of the populist movement through the 1800s when in the aftermath of the destruction of populism as an organized movement, an effort was made to revive populist doctrine. Wortman writes with particular perception of the appearance of Marxism in Russia, and of the rather confused and confusing eclecticism with which populist intellectuals sought to incorporate elements of Marxism in their own thought.

If there is any major criticism which one might direct at this fine book, it is that while its author is thoroughly sympathetic to the individual populists, he is generally somewhat biased against populism as a political doctrine. He writes of populist doctrine at the end of the 70's that it "dissolved into a mist of exalted concepts whose meaning was difficult for them to perceive." Or later, writing of the 80's, he speaks of a doctrine that had "turned into a body of sacresanct principles meant to comfort rather than to arouse." The general impression conveyed is that most populist doctrines consisted of "exalted concepts" or "illusions." The positive elements of populist-thought —its perception of the unique elements of Russian reality, and its persistent and increasingly productive study of the chief ingredient of that reality, the peasantry, deserves more favorable attention.

The period of the history of Russian Social Democracy which Professor Wildman treats (1891–1903) has been given a good deal of attention by many authors. He justifies his monograph as one "which concentrates on the substructures of the movement, one that defines the participating social groups, their attitudes and motivations, their interaction and mutual responses, and the resultant inner tensions and conflicts." What this means in application is a history of the Social Democratic movement during these fateful thirteen years which centers on the theme of the relations of intellectuals and workers. Much attention is given to the organization of Marxist "circles" in the 1890's, to the reactions of the workers to this activity, to early efforts at training of workers, strike activity, etc. He finds the efforts of the SDs to organize the workers extremely effective, and challenges the interpretations of Pipes and Keep which "have tended to ignore or depreciate this development and treat the workers' movement and Social Democracy as two entirely unrelated phenomena." Wildman finds the SDs increasingly effective in their efforts to bring the workers into the movement during the 1890's, as evident, for example, in growing skill in the composition of literature for distribution among workers.

But at the very moment when the Marxist intellectuals were most successful in stimulating and organizing the workers, the inner logic of the movement itself was leading to a fateful separation of the two groups. Wildman dwells at length on the division of function between the workers and the intelligentsia in the SD movement. As organizations grew in size, the typical "center" came to be dominated by intellectuals, and the strain between the intellectuals of the center and the workers in the lower echelons of the organization increased. The climax of this process was the 1903 Brussells-London Congress. The triumph of "Iskraism" at that congress was the triumph of "the close fraternity of those revolutionary intellectuals who were fanatically convinced of their historical mission in the forthcoming decisive stage of the revolutionary movement." The tragedy of the congress was that it ignored and repudiated the extraordinary achievements of earlier SD intellectuals, and of vigorous and highly motivated workers in the SD movement, to build a strong working class basis for the movement:

> . . . it [the intelligentsia leadership of the SD movement] had lost the ties that had once firmly bound it to the working class . . . A certain amount of sensitivity and tact could undoubtedly have done much to ease the breach; but this would have required yet another reorientation in the psychology of Russia's wandering fraternity of social renegades. This was not to come until after the upheaval of 1905, and then only in the Menshevik camp.

For the period which he treats, therefore, Wildman stresses the similarities, rather than the dissimilarities, between future Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. For him the crucial question is the viewpoint of the intellectual leadership of the SDs toward its worker following, and by this measure the two were indistinguishable from one another, or indeed from the populists, with whom they shared a "primary commitment . . . to the mystique of revolution itself, to the vision of a faultless society purged of the anomalies of the existing order . . . ." Thus the implications of this commitment become, in the last analysis, more significant than the specific differences of political program upon which Schapiro's groupings are constructed.

The political memoirs of Paul Miliukov are surely one of the most important, as well as one of the most interesting, documents of Russian political history of the twentieth century. Professor Mendel is to be congratulated for his choice of this translation project, though not for the care with which it was executed. There are a number of obvious translation errors which should have been caught in the editing.

It was Miliukov's destiny to play a key role at two decisive turning points—the transition from the autocracy to the constitutional monarchy, in 1905–6, and the transition from the constitutional monarchy to the republic, in 1917. The book makes very useful reading in company with all the others, but perhaps especially the Schapiro volume. Miliukov would be classified as a political rationalist in Schapiro's categories, and he has often been criticized for an excessively rationalist approach to politics which his critics describe as making him too uncompromising in dealing with the tsarist government after the 1905 Revolution, or with the circumstances of 1917. Miliukov's defense of his actions on both occasions makes convincing reading. He argues that his political following would have collapsed had he cooperated with the government on Witte's terms, and repudiates Maklakov's charges that he was chiefly responsible for the failure of the crucial First Duma. On the other hand, he admits, with characteristic candor, that he underestimated the division of opinion in high governmental circles and acknowledges that retrospectively he would "ascribe a greater significance to the efforts of those who wanted to preserve the Duma than I thought at the time . . ."

As a political rationalist, Miliukov had worked for many years to establish and strengthen parliamentary institutions in Russia. Schapiro portrays this enterprise as essentially futile:

> When the time of decision came, in 1917, the Duma proved powerless as an organ of government; and the liberals proved powerless to assert either its legitimacy or its effectiveness. In the end, therefore, the one viable and real institution—the autocracy—won the day, even though it won under entirely new management.

Looking at this quotation in the context of Miliukov's memoirs exposes certain weaknesses. The adjectives "viable" and "real" fit awkwardly; the collapse of the autocracy hardly seems an argument for its viability, and why it was more real (whatever that means) than a younger political organ which had been functioning quite vigorously for several years is certainly unclear. Surely the point is that the autocracy collapsed and that the liberals, and later the socialists, attempted to create an executive organ to replace it. That they failed in this enterprise appears, in Miliukov's memoirs, to be quite easily explainable in terms of the extraordinary circumstances of the time, a frightful paucity of effective political leaders, and a vigorous element of utopian revolutionaries whose political fanaticism was as important as the shortsightedness of the tsar in weakening the parliamentary system at its birth, and who, at least in the case of the Bolsheviks, were actively hostile to parliamentary government both in 1905 and in 1917.

Perhaps the chief difficulty with Professor Schapiro's conception is that it portrays autocracy as an institution with a life of its own. This writer, at least, interprets these events not as the persistence of the old autocracy, which in any event had ceased to be an autocracy with the introduction of the new constitution in 1905–6, but with the creation of a new Bolshevik-inspired autocracy which was built upon the wreckage of former institutions by Lenin's plan and had as little similarity to the governmental structure of Russia in 1914 as the governmental structure of Nazi Germany bore to that of the German Empire of the same year.—HERBERT J. ELLISON, *University of Washington.*

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

The UN Secretary-General and the Maintenance of Peace. BY LEON GORDENKER. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Pp. 380. $8.50.)

Trygve Lie, while musing on the nature of the office to which he had just been appointed in 1946, concluded that the Secretary-General of the United Nations was to be more General than Secretary; but where, he wondered, were his divisions? In large measure the history of the office from 1946 to the present may be viewed as a series of attempts to answer that challenge—attempts marked with varying degrees of success. Each of the three incumbents has sought both to legitimize the role of the Secretary-General as a participant in United Nations policy-making and execution and to expand the range of activities considered appropriate for his concern.

Leon Gordenker's work on the subject, after examining the historical background of the office, does an admirable job of surveying the developments in the United Nations relevant to each of these two themes. In doing so he has filled a large gap in the literature on the United Nations, for not since Stephen Schwebel's book on the same subject, published in 1952, has there been a major study devoted to this all important office. The work is well researched, smoothly written and characterized by thoughtful, measured judgments. As the title indicates, however, the book is confined to a discussion of those aspects of the Secretary-General's activity relating to the maintenance of peace (and within this category primary emphasis is placed on the four instances of United Nations forces deployment: Suez, the Congo, West Irian and Cyprus). The author specifically excludes consideration of the Secretary-General's activities in the economic and social realms.

Another omission, implicit but no less important, is Gordenker's incomplete treatment of those issues involving the use of force in which United Nations activity was minimal and ineffective. For example, much is made of the innovative brilliance of Dag Hammarskjold in elaborating UNTF at the time of the Suez Crisis of 1956. Yet there is no attempt to explore very thoroughly his relative inaction with respect to the Hungarian revolution which was occurring simultaneously. The author accepts the standard version that there was little or nothing that either the Secretary-General specifically or the United Nations generally could do, given the willingness of the Soviet Union to use its own troops in Hungary. Perhaps; but it remains true that during some portions of the period Nov. 1–4, 1956, when Nagy was in control of the government, that the borders of Hungary were open and that a United Nations presence might have been provided in that unhappy land. The point is not that Hammarskjold or the Security Council missed a great opportunity; the point is rather that Gordenker doesn't explore why Hammarskjold displayed an almost polar difference in his willingness to act as between Suez and Hungary. The answer may well be the obvious; that the Secretary-General was reluctant to get involved in a Soviet Union–United States dispute. If so, this says a good deal about the kinds of issues on which the Secretary-General can make capital; and it says something about Dag Hammarskjold as the servant of his office rather than of peace.

This point illustrates my only important reservation to the study: it is covered with a patina of "the official history." While Professor Gordenker is far too sophisticated ever to write as a member of the "gee whiz" school of analysis which characterizes all too much of United Nations Association studies, it is clear that his heart lies with all three Secretaries-General, most especially Dag Hammarskjold. However judiciously stated, a central theme of the book is that whenever Secretary-General activity is expanded the world is better for it. There is nothing wrong with believing this; but the reader should be made aware that he is reading a work with normative overtones—description all right, but description with a purpose: a defense of the office, of its incumbents, and of its expansion. In sum, Professor Gordenker—as the author of this study—could just as well be a member of the Secretariat as a Princeton professor.

In somewhat the same vein, it is difficult to disagree with any of Professor Gordenker's judgments, because he is a past master of the "on the one hand this . . . on the other hand that" school of analysis. If at one point he seems to be saying the Secretary-General has no political base, at another he analyzes his changing constituencies. If personality differences affect the Secretary-General's ability to act effectively, Hammarskjold as well as Lie became the object of Soviet wrath—and, it can be argued, was saved from a similar fate only by his untimely death. These kinds of judgments can certainly be viewed as reasonable; they also leave the reader puzzled as to just what the author thinks are the most important considerations in analysing the office.

Despite these reservations, the work is critically important for any student of the United Nations. If implicit exhortation seems sometimes to smother cold analysis, this is perhaps as much the fault of the traditional way of looking at international organization as it is any particular biases of the author.—JAMES N. MURRAY, *University of Iowa.*

Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules. BY J. W. BURTON. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968. Pp. 251. $7.00.)

The general systems theory and its derivatives have already left a lasting mark on the study of politics. They have given us a new set of terms. We owe them a new taxonomy. New hypotheses have been generated by the general systems theory. It has extended the number of verifiable propositions about political behavior.

J. W. Burton's *Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules* is one of the latest, most complete, and most imaginative attempts by a distinguished scholar to apply the general systems theory to the study of international relations. Burton's study is an offspring of the research program of the Centre for the Analysis of Conflict at University College in London. In many ways it appears to be a theoretical companion volume to a promised empirical study of a conflict done at the Centre, and it is a great pity that the two cannot be reviewed together. Burton's new hypotheses and propositions would then, perhaps, stand up more convincingly to some elements of the traditional theories which he refutes. Even without this opportunity one has to admit that the success of Burton's effort on the frontier of systems analysis is remarkable. It would be a disservice, however, not to raise critical questions about many a proposition that he has made.

The introductory part of Burton's study presents an excellent discussion of the general systems theory. It echoes, of course, the work of systems theorists in many fields but the summary is presented here with great simplicity and elegance. The structure of Burton's own theory of international relations resembles a triangle. At the top angle rests his central proposition derived from the general systems theory: the conduct of states is preconditioned by the need of states either to adjust to changes in their environment or to alter the environment. For Burton the ideal type of world society would be "one which is fully permissive of change and never requires adjustment by a State or its systems other than that which is slow-moving and continuous" (p. 36). At one base angle of the triangle lies the concept of legitimacy in the behavior of states. It tries to account for the difference between reciprocal and co-ordinated behavior, which is systemic and functional, and power behavior, which is non-systemic and hence dysfunctional. The second base angle of Burton's structure is occupied by his theory of decision-making. Burton's new realism concentrates on those decisions that are within the capability of states. The ties among the three angles of this triangle are defined by the inner logic of Burton's theory. The needs of states can be satisfied only by legitimized behavior; decision-making "bridges the gap between legitimacy in the sense of representing the values and interests of the State, and legitimacy in the sense of acting in accordance with agreements and demands made on the State"

(p. 57); mistakes in the decision-making process, of whatever origin, lead to dysfunctional results.

What troubles me in this construct is Burton's refusal to conceive explicitly of states as systems of action. He claims with Charles McClelland that they are "better regarded as the resultant of the interacting behavior of systems," but if they have a role in world society—and Burton admits that it may be a role independent of the systems of which they consist—are they not systems, too? This is an issue which is important not only from the theoretical point of view. Burton has taken this stand obviously consciously, as the predictive and especially the prescriptive parts of his study demonstrate. But he is typically cautious and circumspect. On pp. 28–29 he would say: "States as entities do have their unique properties and needs. . . . Furthermore, one of the roles of authorities is to ensure that the State responds as a whole to environmental circumstances: responses to threats and to war are obvious examples of total response, and all systems and parts of systems are mobilized accordingly."

This is clearly the way systems behave. But this is not the way Burton wants states to behave. It is certainly theoretically productive to abandon the concept of homogeneous state behavior. Burton's accusation of the traditional approaches that they did not recognize this problem is patently unjustified. He opens himself, however, to a charge of having oversimplified the heterogeneity of role, function, and performance of individual states in the international system. Instead of analytical categories of distinction he uses those of a historical and geopolitical nature and loses his defenses against an undue intrusion of subjectivism.

When Burton deals with the practice of international relations his tendency is to exaggerate the influence that social theory has on social action. If one chooses, however, to emphasize the self-fulfilling-prophecy effect, one cannot leave out that of suicidal prediction: social theories can and do work both ways. To blame "conventional wisdom" for the failures of international practice and not to give it credit for some of the success is to present only half of the picture. And to promise that the general systems theory may emancipate diplomacy from the shackles of "conventional wisdom" and transform it from an art into a science has any meaning only if one accepts, first, Burton's argument that, inspite of what he said about conflict in Ch. 5, "reperceptions of intentions and attitudes, and the revelation of choices (i.e., conflict resolution) is possible by accurate communication, but not by bargaining and the usual processes of diplomacy" and, secondly, that while "apparent differences of interests between States present problems to be solved," "diplomacy is primarily an instrument of contest, not of problem-solving" (p. 204). But to accept those two premises would amount to seconding Burton's ultimate removal of politics from the relations among nations.

Yet, it would be unfair to end on this note. Burton's critique of past theories is radical because he is building a new paradigm. If he shifts ground, it is because the new ground is still uncertain. If he is circumspect, it is because he is pioneering. *Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules* may make a few questionable claims but it is by far richer in stimulating hypotheses and propositions.—Mojmir Povolny, *Lawrence University.*

Disarmament and Soviet Policy: 1964–1968. By Thomas B. Larson. (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1969. Pp. 280. $6.95.)

This book is intended as a sequel to a study of Soviet attitudes towards arms control and disarmament in the Khrushchev era. (Alexander Dallin, *et al., The Soviet Union and Disarmament*) Its goal is to consider ". . . the changing character of decision making and of decision makers in the post-Khrushchev USSR, and examine trends in ideology, foreign policy, economic development, and military affairs bearing on disarmament prospects." (p. 3)

The book can be divided into two essays approximately equal in length: the first deals with trends in Soviet domestic and foreign policy; the second, with the specifics of Soviet disarmament proposals, and Soviet positions on American and other proposals. Additionally, the book contains an excellent bibliography, a chronology of events pertaining to disarmament negotiations, and an essay by Kenneth Lieberthal on Chinese disarmament policies and their impact upon the USSR.

The author contends that despite a lessening of interest in disarmament and the adoption of a "harder" line on the part of the post-Khrushchev leadership, those in power seemingly have not rejected the assumption that meaningful negotiations are possible with the United States, although they have avoided obvious displays of handholding. On balance his analysis leads him to a pessimistic conclusion as to the possibilities for future agreements.

For those concerned with the nuclear dilemma, this is of great concern since the past record is not a happy one either. Of the agreements signed to date, all have been on peripheral issues. None has affected the capacities of the states in terms of internal deployment, or development of weapons systems. The treaties concerning outer space and Antarctica affect areas of transient human habitation and uncertain military value. The partial test ban treaty and the non-proliferation treaty put no curbs on internal activities. Three of the four treaties prohibit activities which neither power has engaged in regardless of whether or not there was a formal ban in existence. Conventional weapons are covered only in the Antarctic and outer space treaties. In short, none of the agreements has affected the strategic military programs of the two powers. These agreements have been valuable primarily for their psychological value in temporarily reducing tensions; but, on the obverse side, the negotiation of the partial agreements may have also muted enthusiasm for broader understandings.

Larson shows a marked preference for formal rather than informal or tacit agreements. He argues that informal agreements, under the press of changing and uncertain circumstances have an "easy in, easy out" quality that, although not absent from formal commitments, is present to a lesser degree in them. This preference is not without merit. Tacit agreements, being less explicit in terms of prohibitions and goals do tend to be less inhibiting. Statesmen are more constrained by formal agreements since repudiation forces a state to pay a price in terms of its future credibility. Larson does not deny that viable, tacit arrangements are possible, but feels that presently such agreements are precluded because of the extreme asymmetry in forces and objectives of the two powers.

He attacks as myth the assumption prevalent in both official reports and scholarly monographs, that the USSR wishes to freeze the military status quo. In fact, the Soviet Union has shown no interest in accepting a permanent strategic inferiority, even if such a stance seems to offer substantial economic benefits in terms of freeing resources for other more productive projects. As example, even though economic resources have been tight, the collective leadership has initiated several new and expensive military programs such as the ABM deployment. Thus, the hope of equality remains in Soviet thinking about the defense, but by means of technological breakthrough, rather than massive deployment.

In terms of interpretation, the book offers little that is new, comes to no startling conclusions, and has few ideological axes to grind. Where data is thin, unavailable, or ambiguous, Larson seldom fails to point up the deficiency. He tends to emphasize the factors that militate against progress on measures that would restrict the arms race between the two super powers in significant ways, rather than the interests that should be common and compelling reasons for agreement. What emerges is a carefully researched, well-written piece that should prove of interest to the expert as a summary, and to the layman as an introduction to the complexities of arms control and disarmament.—J. LARRY TAULBEE, *Emory University.*

Peace and the Strategy Conflict. BY WILLIAM R. KINTNER. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. 264. $6.95.)

The Weapons Culture. BY RALPH E. LAPP. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1968. Pp. 230. $4.95.)

Anyone interested in a balanced picture of present day conflicting strategies for American national security and their consequences is recommended to read both of these books in tandem. *Peace and the Strategy Conflict* by William R. Kintner is a persuasive example of the anti-communist marginalist school that one has come to expect of studies emerging from the Foreign Policy Research Institute at the University of Pennsylvania. Kintner sees continued peace possible only through the maintenance of not U.S. parity with, but substantial nuclear superiority over, the Soviet Union and China. He is concerned, as was the American Security Council of last year, that present policies are giving up our superiority and thus our security. Believing a meaningful detente with the Soviet Union is something of a snare and a delusion, he refuses to recognize any meaningful degree of polycentrism within the communist bloc in so far as it affects our security. Consequently, he thinks the test-ban treaty of 1963 was a mistake; he questions the non-proliferation treaty recently ratified by the U.S.; and he supports a substantial anti-ballistic missile system. While paying lip service to the concept of arms control, he fears its general acceptance would only lead to "euphoria" on the part of the American public and thus places his faith in continued efforts to increase the margin of nuclear superiority of the United States over the Soviet Union.

Ralph Lapp, addressing himself to many of the same issues in *The Weapons Culture,* takes his position at the opposite end of Robert A. Levine's marginalist spectrum—that of the anti-war middle marginalist. Accepting as he does war and not communism as the greatest danger to American security, it is no surprise that Lapp emerges contradicting Kintner at almost every point. He approves the test-ban treaty; supports non-proliferation efforts; and rejects any anti-ballistic missile defense as provocative, defensively ineffective, and contributory to an expanded arms race rather than increased security. Arms control is necessary and desirable in Lapp's opinion but has not been seriously pursued by either the United States or the Soviet Union. Conversely Kintner believes that such steps as have been taken tend only to weaken the United States. Arms control, a long range goal of Kintner, in his opinion is possible only when the Soviets turn from "institutional fabric military goals and conspirational conflict methods to moderation and respectability." This is not to be expected in the forseeable future.

These two books are excellent examples of how analysis of and recommendations for American national security diverge when written from different value bases even though the same facts are common to both writers.—CLIFFORD KETZEL, *University of Kansas.*

The Arab-Israeli Dilemma. BY FRED J. KHOURI. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968. Pp. 436. $10.00.)

From the first page of the Inroduction to the final page of the conclusions, Professor Khouri makes painfully evident his determination to write a scholarly, comprehensive and dispassionate account of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He relies heavily on UN documents and *The New York Times* dispatches for his documentation. Indeed, there is hardly an unfavorable reference to Israel which is not taken from a UN report or is not prefaced with the phrase "according to *The New York Times.*" Yet, alas, the early reception of this book suggests that the objectivity of an author bearing an Arab name and writing about the Arab-Israeli dispute will have little credibility.

That Professor Khouri's book would be received unfavorably by pro-Israeli reviewers is not surprising. Israeli spokesmen have frequently voiced their belief that UN reporting of the countless clashes of Israel and the Arabs has been unfair and this book is in large part a reflection of those reports. But the favorable reception the book has received in pro-Arab circles is revealing of the state of the Arab-Israeli debate in the United States. There is passion in this book but a passion for a peaceful settlement of the dispute through UN auspices. Those Arab and Israeli leaders who are viewed as intransigent and uncompromising are dealt with harshly. David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Dayan and Golda Meir share villain's honors with "extremist" Syrian and Palestinian leaders and frequently with Nasser. Moshe Sharett and Levi Eshkol are pictured favorably along with King Hossein and King Feisal. In other words, the heros of both Israeli and Arab nationalism are condemned. In viewpoint Professor Khouri is very close to Uri Avneri whose *Israel Without Zionists* must count among the least popular books in the Zionist world. That, in contrast, Khouri should be favorably received by pro-Arab groups and his book placed on their recommended reading lists simply reflects the fact that of the countless books printed on this subject by American authors, only a handful treats the aspirations of the Arab people with any sympathy as does this book.

There is little doubt that the reader searching for bias in this book, as in any other on this subject, will find it. But whatever bias may be found is minor. Professor Khouri strives for and to a remarkable extent achieves balance. This book is in no sense a polemic. Yet it is heavily judgmental. Men and events are weighed against the type of behavior which could have produced a peaceful solution and judged when found wanting. In a different book this judgmental quality could be both interesting and valuable as in Christopher Sykes' *Crossroads to Israel.* Here it is somewhat defeating of the real value of the book: a faithful chronicle of events of the Arab-Israeli conflict especially as concerns the role of the United Nations. At the very least *The Arab Israeli Dilemma* stands as a valuable reference work for the student of the Middle East. But the effort to supplement careful description with analysis is subverted by the tendency to judge.

Given his objectives, Professor Khouri needed to construct a picture of the milieu of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Obvious analytic objectives would be an examination of Arab and Israeli nationalisms, a differentiation of Arab and Israeli mass and elite attitudes, and an exploring of Soviet and American Cold War behavior as it related to the Middle East. There is little point in judging Arab or Israeli elite behavior if the area of freedom of action has not been explored. Professor Khouri deals only obliquely with Arab and Israeli nationalisms. His repeated references to King Hossein as being "moderate" implies an attitudinal continuum, a highly debatable point and one never explored. Arab public attitudes are commonly treated as monoliths with the "anti-Israeli Arab masses" assertion a frequent one. Soviet motivations are asserted, never analytically developed, and the assertions are usually in the unreconstructed Cold War mold? This is particularly unfortunate with regard to the pro-Israeli Soviet period in 1947–1950. The assumption here as elsewhere that this was a sophisticated effort to achieve instability in the Middle East badly needs reexamining.

The tendency to judge is a common one in the literature of this period of Middle East history. In this case it detracts from what is otherwise a careful and comprehensive scholarly work.—
RICHARD W. COTTAM, *University of Pittsburgh.*

Mathematical Models of Arms Control and Disarmament: Applications of Mathematical Structures in Politics. BY THOMAS L. SAATY (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1968. Pp. 190. $11.95)

Thomas Saaty's *Mathematical Models of Arms Control and Disarmament* is a short but highly substantive book which focuses on real world problems relevant to arms control and disarmament from a mathematical perspective. The author aims to show that, contrary to the opinion of many students in political science, arms control and disarmament problems, although highly complex and seemingly insoluble scientifically, are potentially amenable to scientific analysis and ultimate solution through the employment of analytically tractable mathematical models: particularly game and decision models.

To realize his aim the author proceeds in a fashion which is characteristic of operations research. He begins by dimensionalizing arms control problems into three phases: (1) the selection of arms control objectives and their consistency; (2) the adoption of arms control policies and their stability—the most significant topic covered by Saaty; and (3) the choice of effective arms control actions to carry out policies and to fulfill objectives. Correspondingly he orders *Mathematical Models in Arms Control and Disarmament* into four self-contained units, of which the first three are presentations of game and decision theory models for the analysis of the respective three dimensions of arms control. The fourth unit is a current overview of the literature of international conflict and arms control research.

Structurally the individual units are autonomous, each having three components: (1) an operational definition of the particular phase of arms control under consideration which is translatable into a formal mathematical analysis; (2) a review of mathematical techniques relevant to the phase of arms control problems being analyzed; and (3) selected illustrative applications of the models and their derivations to real world cases.

More specifically, Part One is a single chapter unit devoted to the analysis of nations' arms control objectives and the measurement of their consistency. A graph theory model utilizing the "logic relations" technique of Joxe, (1964) which measures the consistency of foreign policy objectives is restated succinctly and clearly by Saaty and applied in an illustrative fashion to test the consistency of the West German foreign policy objective of re-unification.

Part Two is a multi-chapter unit devoted to a quantitative analysis of deterrence, arms control and arms race situations and the measurement of nations' foreign policy stability therein. The first chapter begins with the formulation of a dynamic equilibrium criterion for the measurement of policy stability. Mathematical models for the analysis of policies in deterrence, arms reduction and arms race situations are then proposed by Saaty. For stable deterrence situations Saaty proposes a probabilistic model in which stability or equilibrium is a function of the ratios of probability of gains with war to gains from successful deterrence for two or more competitors. For arms reduction Saaty proposes a graph theoretical model which formalizes the present arms level and the process of reducing arms from this initial level to a new negotiated level. For the analysis of policies in arms races the Richardson model is restated with its elaboration by Caspary to include economic constraints. The chapter is concluded with an illustrative application of Intriligator's dynamic model of a missile war (1967).

The second chapter in Part Two focuses on the means for determining optimum strategies for coordinating policies between two, or more, nations leading from conflict situations to arms control situations. Within this framework Saaty presents one of the more penetrating and extensive reviews of the game theory literature. The review, although comprehensive, suffers from a major structural defect in that the author's attempt to compress and consolidate the game theory literature into a relatively short and coherent restatement implicitly assumes a high level of familiarity with the mathematics of game theory; its comprehension will be difficult for the non-mathematically oriented political science audience. The second chapter of Part Two is concluded by the illustrative application of the meta-game model to the problems of nonproliferation and Vietnam respectively.

The third and final chapter of Part Two focuses on the negotiation process by which agreements on policies are arrived at between two conflicting parties who negotiate rather than resort to war to resolve their conflictual interactions. Saaty represents the process of negotiation as a cooperative game for which a Nash type approach is posited as the means for conflicting powers to avoid threat escalation and consequently to arrive at mutually acceptable agreements.

Two types of incomplete information games (Auman Maschler 1966) are then posited by Saaty as models for the analysis of the negotiation process in which the two or more negotiating parties have incomplete information as in arms control and disarmament situations. The first game type is an infinite stage or recursive zero-sum game in which the opponent is known but the payoff matrix is unknown. The second game type is a one-shot game, which need not be zero-sum, in which the payoff matrix corresponding to each opponent is known but the opponent is unknown.

Part Three, the last of the three substantive units, is a single chapter unit devoted to analysis of the choice of effective actions to carry out arms control policies and objectives. In this regard Saaty operationally defines the criterion for effective arms control actions as the assurance that the provisions of an arms control treaty are being adhered to. He then restates a number of quantitative models that appear to provide this assurance. A Bayesian decision theory model and other game theory models are presented which enable the estimation of the probability of causes of the violation of arms agreement, given apparent effects of the violation. The unit is concluded with a brief comment on the of traditional sampling techniques for ensuring conformity to arms agreements.

Part Four, the least formal in the volume, is also a single unit chapter devoted to an overview of the recent arms control and international conflict literature. The review is sketchy in nature and lacks internal structure. Fortunately, Saaty supplements Part Four with a comprehensive reference list which follows the final unit and which is excellently cross-referenced in the text.

Mathematical Models in Arms Control and Disarmament is an important work because it provides a succinct, substantive and articulate argument for harnessing the power of applied mathematical models—of the non-linear type—for the analysis of complex political problems. In this regard Saaty succeeds in showing that there is a great deal to be learned by political scientists from the application of mathematical game and decision techniques to international conflict situations in both the scientific and policy dimensions. In doing this, however, he does not shirk his responsibility of revealing the present inadequacies of game theory and other abstract mathematical techniques for explaining the ever complex reality of the social science universe. He also indicates those areas in which he thinks there is a need for refinement of mathematical techniques to make them more effective tools for the enhancement of our analytical capabilities.

The Saaty volume, however, suffers from two weaknesses. First, almost all of Saaty's models involve the use of non-linear equations and inequalities. Although such models may provide more realistic descriptors of social and political systems than the more idealized linear models currently in use, the techniques for solution of non-linear equations are extremely complex and are in large measure beyond our present computing machinery capacity.

Second, Saaty presents a fairly large number of mathematical approaches to the study of the various dimensions of conflict. However, he fails to plot out, even if only in a preliminary fashion, the steps by which to begin arranging the techniques in order to enable the formation of a general theory of conflict and correspondingly of integration in the future. It would seem that in this regard, chapter four should have been devoted to pointing the way social scientists should be going in this area rather than a mere impressionistic review of the literature.

On balance, the present reviewer feels that Thomas Saaty's *Mathematical Models for Arms Control and Disarmament* makes a significant contribution in the area of international relations to the fledgling but quickly developing body of mathematical social science literature. It attempts to bridge the gap between political science and applied mathematics in a realistic way and indicates how applied mathematics may be used by social and political scientists as it is used by the engineer today, as an effective analytical tool. Moreover, it paves the way for similar subsequent review studies of applicable mathematical model in other areas of political science.—SAMUEL J. BERNSTEIN, *The University of Rochester.*

Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response. BY ALASTAIR TAYLOR, DAVID COX, AND J. L. GRANATSTEIN. (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968. Pp. 211. $2.75, paper.)

This book by three Canadian scholars examines Canada's commitment to international peacekeeping. In the first of four sections, Alastair Taylor discusses the "international context" of peacekeeping and observes that peacekeeping has been closely tied to colonial-related, predominately intra-state, conflicts. He believes that such conflicts are almost past and that future peacekeepers will be concerned with inter-state convicts among small, relatively unstable, regimes. He speculates that small states in conflict might be reluctant to cooperate with peacekeepers where their own, no longer anti-colonial, interests are involved and, under such circumstances, great powers might find it advantageous to utilize UN Charter peace preserving methods through the Security Council.

Taylor also suggests that protagonists might prefer regional peacekeeping arrangements to a wider international (UN) peaceforce. He fears that regional orientation would do more harm than good, although it cannot be discounted entirely because of previously demonstrated "susceptibilities, prejudices, and preferences." While this is true, there are considerations which extend well beyond susceptibilities. For example, how can small power regional military requirements be reconciled with the international perspective peculiar to UN peacekeeping? Taylor touches on these matters all too briefly. Canada's role in this is not clear either; it may try to mediate regional versus international perspectives, or it may simply be left out if UN peacekeeping gives way to regionally dominated solutions. What Taylor calls a second, post-colonial-related, phase of peacekeeping might really be an end to it altogether if the great powers are willing to assert their collective authority through the Security Council. Given current political and ideological divisions among them, this is not likely. If small power intransigence and regionalism prevail, however, then the prospects for peacekeeping are bleak indeed.

In two following sections, David Cox discusses political and military aspects of Canadian peacekeeping and he reports on discussions held at the Queen's University-CIIA Conference on Peacekeeping held in Ottawa in 1967. In his first article, Cox examines Canada's problems and frustrations in maintaining a credible detachment from US policy while remaining committed to Western interests. Canada has achieved considerable success in this as indicated by its wide acceptance as a peacekeeper. However, peacekeeping creates a dilemna vis a vis NATO and NORAD and a solution was sought in the 1964 White Paper on Defense. In it, Canada's alliance obligations were reaffirmed while greater flexibility and mobility were provided for the armed forces. This should permit an easier response to peacekeeping calls from the UN wihout undermining present alliance commitments.

Cox also points out the importance of US political and financial support for peacekeeping and rightly indicates that peacekeeping is especially valuable for mitigating conflict in the non-Communist world. In fact, after the demise of UNEF, it appears that there are few prospects for peacekeeping in any other context.

The Peacekeeping Conference report yielded several good ideas; an especially interesting one, specifically directed at Canada, was the admonition that Canada looks like a great power to many developing peoples. Canadians were advised to avoid the appearance of "great power chauvinism" in their peacekeeping posture. This idea is probably remote from most Canadian minds.

The last section, by J. L. Granatstein, is an overview of Canadian peacekeeping experience. The reader who is not acquainted with this history will be impressed by the continuity of Canada's commitment since 1946. Covering so much ground in so brief a section leaves the political analysis a bit thin; nevertheless, basic differences in the approaches of the Liberal and Conservative governments are noted. Granatstein observes that public pressure forced Conservative Prime Minister, John Diefenbaker, to send Canadian peacekeepers to the Congo in 1960. While Conservative hesitation was a fact, the effect of public opinion is less well documented. There was relatively little public or Parliamentary debate at the time and if the Liberal opposition placed great pressure on the government, it did so in private. Granatstein also examines Egypt's objection to the use of Canada's British-sounding "Queen's Own" battalion for UNEF duty in 1956. This upset Canadians who had been so active in the formation of UNEF. Granatstein discounts the popular theory that Nasser's offended sensibilities motivated his rejection of Canadian troops; rather, he says that Nasser interpreted Canada's November 1 abstention in the General Assembly (done in light of its peaceforce proposal which followed) as equivocation based upon ties with Egypt's attackers, Britain and France. In essence, Nasser questioned Canada's neutrality and integrity with regard to UNEF. Eventually, he accepted Canadian administrative troops instead of infantry and Canadians convinced themselves that the matter was primarily technical.

Granatstein holds hope for the continuance and usefulness of peacekeeping and discounts recent criticisms of the policy. However limited the prospects, he believes that peacekeeping can calm some troubled waters and implies that in a nuclear world any contribution to calm is better than none at all. Peacekeeping is within the means of Canada to perform well—a similar effort added to US armed might would not be noticed. It is seen as a workable policy for one important smaller power which is trying to alter its external environment in order to create a mode favorable international climate. As such, this process has implications which extend well beyond Canada.—Donald E. Milsten, *University of Maryland, Baltimore County.*

Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension. By J. C. Hurewitz. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. Pp. 550. paper, $3.95.)

Professor Hurewitz' study is "an inquiry into the causes and consequences of military intervention in the postwar politics" of eighteen separate states which constitute the region of the Middle East and North Africa. (The author prefers to denote this entire region as the Middle East.) He views the army's intervention in politics as the function of many interplaying factors such as historical, international and domestic change.

In his introduction the author defines his method of studying the military role. In rejecting the use of a general theory, he argues that the existence of diversified political systems in a wide region like the Middle East can not be easily managed by a universal theory. It is for this reason that the present reviewer doubted, even before reading the book, not the validity of a general theory circumscribing the military role in politics, but whether the study of the military role in eighteen countries, discussed country by country, could be managed effectively in one volume and, needless to say, by one scholar.

The way that Professor Hurewitz discussed the army role in each country produced little of significance for the study of comparative politics. Unfortunately, these chapters were for the most part descriptions of political events in the last two decades. True comparison between countries was relatively lost because the style of discussion varied from one country to another. The author was often found discussing the historical development of a political system with little success in linking such development to the present role of its army. Treatment of other countries such as Iraq and Syria—the only two countries discussed in one chapter—was mainly confined to the discussion of the causes of the political instability of their regimes.

In one of his concluding chapters, Hurewitz argues that there is little relationship between military modernization and social change and, at least in the Middle East, army rulers are not social revolutionaries, (Chapter 23). Support of such a hypotheses cannot be established simply by the comparison of the performance of military regimes vs. civilian regimes. Correlations between the army and modernization can only be established when we view the army as a social institution interrelated with other institutions in the society; this relation did not receive more than "lip service" from the author. Further, too often in our study of change we confuse military leadership and military establishment. Military leaders who control the government must be good conspirators, but are not necessarily the best political leaders that the army can provide. The retardation of modernization under the military regimes in Iraq and Syria is attributed in part to poor quality of leadership rather than to the desire of the military rulers to keep their communal value above the national value—the theme of the author's argument (p. 428). If this is true then why do we see the army's officers often losing their own communal support?

The truth of the matter is that army organization creates cohesion among officers from various communities who work to protect their own organizational interests; but not necessarily completely suppressing their communal values. It is also correct to argue that army officers in order to keep control over governmental structure need the support of different communities, and for this purpose they must enlarge the basis of political recruitment to other groups. If the Syrian and Iraqi regimes are dominated by a certain communal class, this is because the rulers came into a governing situation which was not of their own creation. Once the military regime establishes a strong grip on power it tends to move away from its own narrow constituency. Thus, it is significant to analyze patterns of change in military regimes over a defined period of time. The regimes of the Arif brothers (1964–68) was heavily dominated by Sunni Arabs in the first year, but it gradually incorporated a substantial Shiit element in government positions.

When all this is said, one may infer that rigorous investigation and more socio-economic data are needed to define the military relationship to politics. The "dimension" of the army role is not judged alone by the increasing number of the armed forces or the augmentation in defense appropriations; both of which the author emphasised. Other indices of army organization such as increasing specialization and differentiation of roles and autonomy, because of both their social and political implications, seem to be far from the author's thinking. Role-expansion of the army, however, depends among other things on the development of other institutions such as bureaucracy, party system, and on the degree of institutionalization of other social functions. These interrelated relations were central to Hurewitz' thinking when he wrote his two chapters on the Sudan and Tunisia, but he did not search for them in his studies of other countries. In Tunisia the author did not fail to recognize the role of the Neo-Destour Party in containing the army from encroachment on the civilian government, and in the case of the Sudan, the "high standards of the civilian bureacracy" (p. 163), to which is attributed the avoidance of military radical policies. Unfortunately, the Sudanese bureaucracy's role was not fully explained.

With the exception of these remarks, the author has written a very informative and erudite account of the military politics in the Middle East, which deserves attention from those who have interests in military authoritarianism. The author is to be commended for his search for data and information which this reviewer knows is very difficult to find, on a region which has become addicted to violence.—Abdul H. Raoof, *SUNY at Buffalo.*

Alliances and American Foreign Policy. By Robert E. Osgood. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968. Pp. 171. $6.50.)

With the advent of polycentrism, the traditional subject of alliances is receiving new attention. Catalzying this interest has been the invocation of alliance commitments to justify large scale military operations in Southeast Asia. However, this rationale has been so forcefully challenged by domestic dissenters that the government must reappraise its alliance policies as part of an overall reconsideration of United States foreign policy.

Robert E. Osgood, Director of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research offers his book on alliances (which "originated in a group study conducted by the Center for the United States government") as a clarification of the subject as well as to provide suggestions as to their future role in American foreign policy.

Historically, alliances were the primary instruments by which states adjusted to the fluctuations of balance-of-power politics. In this task, alliances performed four functions: "accretion of external power, internal security, restraint of allies, and international order." Each state would emphasize those functions which were most relevant to its own psychological and military situation. But the priority previously accorded alliances has diminished in the postwar period as other forms of commitments, such as foreign aid, unilateral declarations, and base agreements, have provided greater flexibility in performing these functions.

Osgood explains both the declining importance of alliances and their continued use by developing the concept of preponderance (or empire). He assumes that because of its dominant military power, conjoined with the goal of a stable international order, the United States will continue to intervene abroad but in a manner more circumspect than, for example, in Vietnam. The current functions of several alliances, when viewed in the perspective of preponderance, indicate that American policies differ from region to region depending on the types of conflict prevalent. Thus NATO (and the Warsaw Treaty Organization as well) gives priority to the functions of intra-allied control rather than to deterrence. The latter function is performed by the existing two-state balance of power, leaving the superpowers free to deal with their allies' increasing pressures for independent policies. This situation is described as "political polycentrism within a framework of military duopoly."

In other parts of the world, resistance to communist control still is of primary concern to the United States. But because of the lack of consensus on security interests, the growth of indigenous nationalism and the increasing range of Soviet weaponry, reliance has been placed on commitments more informal and flexible than alliances. The role of alliance organizations has been to provide American access to particular governments and the opportunity to influence them. Osgood concludes that a kind of balance of power has been attained between the United States and the Soviet Union, but that China's unclear intentions may require further extension of American commitments.

A major portion of the book concerns the future of alliances. On the premise that the "changing structure of power and pattern of conflict will have a decisive effect upon the nature and role of alliances in the future." Osgood considers several alternative structures of power. Selecting one, not unlike the current situation, he speculates on the roles which alliances will likely play in American foreign policy. Technological developments (overseas transport capabilities, nuclear proliferation, and antiballistic missiles) are assessed for their impact upon this projected structure.

Three difficulties lessen the value of Osgood's work, all traceable in some degree to the restricted scope of his study. The first is reluctance to question the assumptions upon which America's foreign policy rests. Should the United States press for a stable international order? Need it enter alliances in order to ensure influence over its allies?

A second difficulty relates to the author's style of combining the formalisms of alliances with impressionistic observations of contemporary events. The conclusions drawn from this combination tend to be more platitudinous than, as Osgood calls them, speculative. For example, Osgood reminds us that, "The United States will have to make up for its reduced opportunity for direct leadership by opportunistic maneuvering in an increasingly . . . fluid field of power and interests." (p. 14) And, "The obligations and responsibilities entailed in various commitments may become more limited and flexible." (p. 159) Again, "ABM's seem likely to strain relations between the United States and its allies, but American ABM policy can mitigate the strain." (p. 154)

The third difficulty is common to all who try to generalize from recent events. The book was written before the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, before the bombing of North Vietnam was halted and before Arab-Israeli military activities has resumed. There is little doubt but that these events would require the author to modify several of his evaluations.—Jerome J. Hanus, *The American University.*

Cohesion and Conflict in International Communism By Peter Mayer. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968. Pp. 256. 34.20 guilders.)

In contrast to the Western European alliance system, regarding which a large body of literature exists, the Soviet alliance system has been somewhat neglected in recent years. No doubt this is partly the result of research problems familiar to all observers of communist affairs: the paucity of hard data; the presence of a perplexing ideological factor; the traditional separation of Soviet, East European, and Chinese fields of study. It may also reflect the lingering assumption that the uneven distribution of power in the communist camp makes the term "alliance" a misnomer. There is, of course, a massive inequality of power in the Western alliance also, but there, at least, several member states exercise independent control over their own nuclear weapons, a fact which generates a need for consensus beyond what is evident in the Soviet alliance.

The difficulties of the task invite careful attention to any work which proposes to resolve them. Professor Mayer attempts not only to explain the sources of unity and disunity in relations among communist states, as the title suggests, but sets for himself a number of additional tasks: to relate Marxist-Leninist theory to the problems of intra-bloc relationships; to explain the role of ideology in limiting policy choices available to current Soviet leaders; to clarify some contemporary political concepts, such as "power," and apply them to communist relations; and to examine the problem of creating international decision-making agencies capable of reestablishing unity in the communist world. It is an ambitious task, and one which, in a number of respects, exceeds what has been accomplished in this book.

In his attempt to establish the causes and sources of disunity in the camp, Mayer identifies several related factors. One is an organizational factor, involving basic questions of control both within the CPSU and in the party's relations with other groups. The Bolshevik-Menshevik split in 1903 over the nature of the party provided the setting in which "the various factors which currently defy communist unity attempts first emerged." (127) Mayer argues that the major contemporary obstacle to unity in the camp lies in this organizational principle—that the movement must be monolithic and that the interests of the Soviet Union must be preeminent.

Ideology provides a second cause of disunity, but it is not clear just how important a factor it is. Mayer views communist ideology as inherently disunifying because of the contradictions existing among its basic doctrines, in particular the contradiction between "socialism in one country" and "proletarian internationalism." Yet most of the weight of his explanation falls on a third source of disunity: nationalism. In Eastern and Central Europe, recent years have seen "the abandoning of Marxism-Leninism by the party-states, who substituted policies based on national interest for the previously pertaining internationalism of the communist movement." (144) In the case of Chinese-Soviet relations, the additional factor of culture is involved, but Mayer makes contradictory statements concerning its importance. At one point he states that ". . . the differences between U.S.S.R. and Chinese communism derive largely from the cultural heritages which have helped shape the two nations." (56) Elsewhere he rejects the cultural analysis presented in Klaus Mehnert's *Peking and Moscow* as unacceptable. (108n)

Mayer states his preference for the organizational, or in his terms, "institutional," explanation, yet the analysis provided in the bulk of the book shifts back and forth among the various causes of disunity, generally failing to make a clear case for any one of them. Nor does the mere identification of several causal factors constitute an explanation. We are left then with multiple sources of disunity, and little guidance in weaving them into a convincing, multi-faceted explanation of communist inter-state relations.

The expository sections of the book are heavily documented and contain a great deal of useful information and some perceptive insights into communist bloc affairs. They include also, however, a fair number of intriguing, but unsubstantiated, conclusions about communist relations concerning which one could have wished for a bit more evidence. He states, for example, that Hungary now has "far greater independence" from the USSR than has Poland (179); that "Stalinist oriented foreign policy precepts . . . resulted in a series of unmitigated failures after the communist coup in Czechoslovakia" (226); and that Soviet controls over Eastern Europe were "dismantled" after 1953, while "the Soviet Union retreated step by step to popular indigenous demands for greater political, economic, and cultural autonomy. . . ." (227)

It is disappointing in a book on this subject to find the question of the sources of Soviet power over other communist states treated only in a scattered and indirect way. Since 1956, Mayer argues, Soviet power over the bloc countries has been "political" rather than "military," but these concepts are not clearly defined, and are included in the book almost parenthetically (pp. 124-5) in the midst of a discussion of the Sino-Soviet dispute. In any case the recent Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia has not done much to fortify a purely political explanation of Soviet-Eastern European relations.

The author has succeeded in gathering together, in the text and in countless footnotes, much of the relevant information concerning recent relations within the communist camp. But the task of organizing and evaluating the data and extracting a convincing analysis of these relations remains to be done.—D. RICHARD LITTLE, *Northern Illinois University*.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The sixty-sixth Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 8–12, 1970, at the Biltmore Hotel, Los Angeles, California.

ERRATA

In F. M. Barnard's article on "Culture and Political Development: Herder's Suggestive Insights," published in the issue of June, 1969, line 18, p. 10 should read: "But it is equally fair to presume. . . ."

The bibliographical statement on p. 545 of the June, 1969 issue incorrectly identified the publisher of Charlotte Beradt's *The Third Reich of Dreams* as the University of Chicago Press. The book was published by Quadrangle Books, Inc., of Chicago.

ARTICLES ACCEPTED FOR FUTURE PUBLICATION*

December, 1969

James W. Clarke, Florida State University, "Environment, Process and Policy: A Reconsideration"

Philip E. Converse and Warren E. Miller, University of Michigan, "The 1968 Elections"

Jeff Fishel, American University, "Party, Ideology, and the Congressional Challenger"

John G. Gunnell, State University of New York, Albany, Arthur S. Goldberg, University of Rochester, and A. James Gregor, University of California, Berkeley, Symposium on "Explanation, Deduction, and Social Scientific Inquiry"

Alex Inkeles, Harvard University, "Participant Citizenship in Six Developing Countries"

Edward J. Mitchell, Institute for Advanced Study, "Some Econometrics of the Huk Rebellion"

John E. Mueller, University of Rochester, "Voting on the Propositions: Ballot Patterns and Historical Trends in California"

James C. Scott, University of Wisconsin, "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Social Change"

Michael J. Shapiro, University of California, Berkeley, "Rational Political Man: A Synthesis of Economic and Social-Psychological Perspectives"

W. Phillips Shively, Yale University, "Ecological Inference: The Use of Aggregate Data to Study Individuals"

Sheldon S. Wolin, University of California, Berkeley, "Political Theory as a Vocation"

March, 1970

Joel D. Aberbach and Jack L. Walker, University of Michigan, "The Meanings of Black Power: A Comparison of White and Black Interpretations of a Political Slogan"

Barry Ames, Stanford University, "Bases of Support for Mexico's Dominant Party"

Michael Haas, University of Hawaii, "International Subsystems: Stability and Polarity"

Howard D. Hamilton, Bowling Green State University, "Direct Legislation: Some Implications of Open Housing Referenda"

John E. Mueller, University of Rochester, "Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson"

Paul F. Power, University of Cincinnati, "On the Grounds for Civil Disobedience within American Democratic Thought"

Kenneth Prewitt, University of Chicago, "Political Ambition and Democratic Accountability"

William H. Riker, University of Rochester, "Rational Behavior in Politics"

Patrick Riley, Harvard University, "A Possible Explanation of Rousseau's General Will"

Stanley Rothman, Smith College, "Barrington Moore and the Dialectics of Revolution"

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* Production exigencies may occasionally necessitate publication of articles in issues other than those given in this listing.

Martin Shubik, Yale University, "Voting, or a Price System in a Competitive Market Structure"

Duff Spafford, University of Saskatchewan, "The Electoral System of Canada"

June, 1970

Steven J. Brams and Michael O'Leary, Syracuse University, "A Mathematical Model of Voting Bodies"

Steven R. Brown and John D. Ellithorp, Kent State University, "Emotional Experiences in Political Groups: The Case of the McCarthy Phenomenon"

Walter Dean Burnham and John D. Sprague, Washington University, St. Louis, "Additive and Multiplicative Models of the Voting Universe: The Case of Pennsylvania, 1960–1968"

William R. Caspary, Washington University, St. Louis, "The 'Mood Theory': A Study of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy"

Aage R. Clausen and Richard B. Cheney, University of Wisconsin, "A Comparative Analysis of Senate and House Voting on Economic and Welfare Policy, 1953–1964"

Otto A. Davis, Melvin J. Hinich, and Peter C. Ordeshook, Carnegie-Mellon University, "An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of Policy Formation in a Democratic Society"

Ada W. Finifter, Michigan State University, "Dimensions of Political Alienation"

Bryan R. Fry and Richard Winters, Stanford University, "The Politics of Redistribution"

M. Kent Jennings, University of Michigan, and L. Harmon Zeigler, University of Oregon, "The Salience of American State Politics"

Paul E. Peterson, University of Chicago, "Forms of Representation: Participation of the Poor in the Community Action Program"

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

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

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

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